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ABSTRACT 
This thesis applies the concept of the core executive to answer the general questions 
posed by Rhodes and others about the real nature of the relationship between 
institutions and the internal dynamics of cabinet government, as opposed to 
constitutional theory or conventional wisdom - how does cabinet government actually 
operate? What does it do and, more importantly, how does it do it, particularly in 
Westminster -style political systems? The core executive literature is almost wholly 
European. This study applies the concept of the core executive to an empirical analysis 
of the contemporary Singapore government from 1991 -1998. 
The Singaporean political system is not a typical liberal democracy in the European 
tradition. It is a polity which has evolved a unique character under the long guidance 
of one political party and one premier. Most approaches to policy analysis have been 
developed in the context of pluralist liberal democracies and are inappropriate for a 
study of an illiberal democracy such as Singapore. An approach that will facilitate an 
empirical analysis of both the structure and dynamics of the policy system offers the 
best frame of analysis in this case. 
The core executive approach, provides a framework which facilitates the study of the 
internal structure and dynamics of the system of governance by focusing on who 
controls and runs the system and the strategies they use. This thesis therefore analyses 
the Singaporean system of government using this framework while giving due weight 
to the historical and theoretical contexts. The study is however, essentially realist and 
empirical and attempts to deal with the Singaporean state as we find it, to assess its 
political functionality and its prospects. The study hopefully adds to the limited 
understanding of the inner workings of the Singaporean core executive developed to 
date and will, perhaps, provide additional insights particularly of the nature, internal 
dynamics and operations of contemporary strategies of governance in Singapore. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A MIRACLE OF GOOD GOVERNMENT? 
Singapore is a small nation of almost four million people, which, in the course of 40 
years, has built itself from a third world colony, albeit upon colonial foundations of an 
already successful economy and an efficient administrations, into a wealthy 
independent nation without resort to military or civilian dictatorship, with an 
entrenched, though partial, democracy, a stable society and an economy that has 
averaged annual growth of 8.5 per cent each year since independence. Its per capita 
GNP in 1998 was higher than that of its previous colonial master, it is a net lender to 
the world, it has one of the world's highest levels of foreign reserves,2 and, at the end 
of 1995 was classified by the OECD as having developed sufficiently to be removed 
from its register of developing countries, a decision confirmed by the IMF in 1997.3 It 
has a multicultural society which is well educated, stable, increasingly wealthy, and 
fully employed under the administration of a efficient and highly effective government. 
More than 80 per cent of families own or are buying their homes.4 
Singapore has been classified as one of the four East Asian 'miracle' economies 5 It has 
been hugely successful at wealth creation and wealth distribution, although the equity 
of the latter has in recent years become more questionable. This is one of the most 
dramatic social and economic transitions undertaken in modem times, perhaps only 
surpassed by the transformation in South Korea. This has raised many questions as to 
how this transition was achieved and what processes have underpinned the public 
policy record that, in large part, produced it. 
1 Huff comments that the PAP "...inherited a successful economy and...a stable and efficiently functioning 
administration." See: W. G. Huff, The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and development in the Twentieth 
Century, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 357 -358 
2 In June 1997, Singapore had official foreign reserves of US$81 billion, ranked fifth internationally with 
Hong Kong and greater than the level of US foreign reserves. 
3 "Resisting Promotion ", Newsweek, 6 June 1997. Available at: 
http: / /pathfinder. com /asiaweek/97 /0718 /newsmap /singapor.html 
4 See: The Economist, 13 January 1996, pp. 27 -28. However, David Martin Jones states that "By 1995, 
Singapore had the highest rate of home ownership (91 per cent) in the OECD. ", although Singapore is not an 
OECD member or associate state. See: David Martin Jones, Political Development in Pacific Asia", Cambridge, 
Polity Press, 1997, p. 97 
5 A term used by Jon Woronoff. See: Jon Woronoff, Asia's 'Miracle' Economies, 2nd ed., Armonk (NY), M. E. 
Sharpe, 1992 
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But this is also a nation in which "...we may feel that something is not going well... "6. 
Despite the obvious economic progress of which the Singapore government and its 
people can be proud, some of the strategies adopted to support rapid economic 
development have been criticised as undermining the social and political integrity and 
maturing of the nation, allowing little space for political advances to match the 
economic_ As Raymond Lim, founder of the political discussion group The Roundtable 
has commented: "In Singapore the state is extremely powerful. The Government calls 
the shots here. Civic organisations only test rather than determine the limits of the 
growth of civil society."7 Although since approximately 1991 under the first Goh Chok 
Tong government, some expansion in this space has been allowed, it is not with an 
intention to further democratise,' but as a strategy to contain social discontent arising 
paradoxically from the success of the government's economic policies both from the 
increasingly affluent middle class9 and from its traditional working class supporters 
who are becoming aware of growing income inequalities." Singapore is a "managed" 
society;11 the ruling political party is generally seen as synonymous with the state," 
the government is proud that it is not a liberal democracy, 13 the legitimacy of its 
tenure seems to rest substantially on an economic contract between the government 
and the electorate14 and economic development is the paramount policy area." 
This overwhelming presence of the state is reflected in the nature of state -society 
relations, both economic and social. The Singapore economy is a form of 'state - 
dependent capitalism "6 with the government's participation in the economy 
contributing in 1997 to more than 60 per cent of GDP1-7, belying the findings of some 
6 Tan Beng Seng, An Eye Opener, Singapore, Livelihood Publications, 1992 
7 Zuraidah Ibrahim, "What grows beneath the banyan tress ? ", Straits Times, 2 May 1998, p. 2 
8 Chan Heng Chee, "Singapore: Coping with Vulnerability ", in James W. Morley, (ed.), Driven by Growth: 
Political Change in the Asia -Pacific Region, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1993, pp.219 -4I 
9 Garry Rodan, "The Growth of Singapore's Middle Class and its Political Significance ", in Garry Rodan, (ed.), 
Singapore Changes Guard: Social Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s, Melbourne, Longman 
Cheshire, 1993, pp. 58 -59 
10 Chiew Seen Kong and Ko Yiu Chung, "The Economic Dimension ", in Stella R. Quah et al, Social Class in 
Singapore, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1991, p. 136. See also: Garry Rodan, "Class transformations and 
political tensions in Singapore's development ", in Richard Robinson and David S. G. Goodman, The New Rich 
in Asia: Mobile phones, McDonalds and middle class revolution, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 38 -39 
I 1 Cherian George and Kevin Tan, `Barriers to a web society ", ST Interactive, 17 May 1998, 5 pages, 
http://www.asial.com.sg/straitstimes 
12 Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore, London, 
Routledge, 1995, pp.34 -35 
13 George Yeo, "Young PAP - Recasting the Net ", Petir, May /June 1993, p. 19 
14 Goh Chok Tong in an interview with Raj Vasil in, Raj Vasil, Governing Singapore: Interviews with the new 
leaders, Singapore, Times International Press, 1984, pp. 198 -199 
15 Lee Kuan Yew, "What people want is good government ", in Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez and Sumiko 
Tan, Lee Kuan Yew. The Man and His Ideas Singapore Times Editions, 1998, p. 380 
16 Linda Y. C. Lim, "Singapore's Success: The Myth of the Free Market economy ", Asian Survey, 23, 6, June 
1983, pp. 263 -275, p. 273 
17 Embassy of the United States Singapore, Country Commercial Guide FY1999: Singapore, Singapore, 
Embassy of the United States, July 1998. Available at: 
http://www.state.gov/www/about state/bus iness/com_guides/ 1999 /eastasia/sing99.html 
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that Singapore has the second freest economy in the world.18 In social terms, Singapore 
is a state in which citizenship is defined and statutorally enforced in terms of civic - 
republican codes of individual -state duty and reciprocity19 within a framework that 
uses state power to co -opt cultural, social and economic institutions, movements and 
forces to the purposes of the state20 so that social and political developments are 
severely restricted 21 The penetration of the state into civil society is such that " 
Singapore is unique in East and Southeast Asia in the extent to which its managerial 
state is able effectively to engineer the economic, cultural and political behaviour of its 
society. "22. This has resulted in a state which has been described as "...a curious cross 
between the Leninist cell system and the Confucian Chinese Mandarinate. "23 
However, a description of society-state relations using the concept of hegemony seems 
more satisfactory. Terms such as ideological he gemony24 an hegemonic program25, 
PAP hegemony26, and more specifically, "... a Gramscian ideological hegemony 
imposed by the political leadership over society ... "27 have been used in recent years. 
Singapore is thus a complex polity, characterised by enormous economic and social 
achievements, equally large policy challenges and the hegemonic exercise of state 
power through both centralised and distributed power structures which attempt, 
paradoxically, to simultaneously combine both economic freedom and social and 
political oppression. 
18 James D. Gwartney and Robert A. Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World: 1997 Annual report, Vancouver, 
The Fraser Institute, 1997, p. 3 
19 Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore, London, 
Routledge, 1995, pp244 -250 
20 Garry R04 44 aan, State- society relations and political opposition in Singapore ", in Garry Rodan (ed.), Political 
Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, London, Routledge, 1996, pp.103 -104 
21 These limitations are illustrated in the continuing national debate on artistic freedom and censorship as 
recently detailed in: "Rocky road for S'pore artists in search of more freedom ? ", ST Interactive, 16 May 1998, 4 
pages, http: / /www.asial.com.sg /straitstimes 
22 Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya and David Martin Jones, Toward Illiberal Democracy in 
Pacific Asia, Oxford, St. Martin's Press, 1995, p. vii 
23 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the banyan tree, London, 
Routledge, 1996, p. 50 
24 Chua Beng Huat, "Pragmatism of the Peoples Action Party Government in Singapore: A Critical 
Assessment ", Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 13, I, 1985. In this study, Chua uses the concept of 
hegemony to examine the development of a pragmatic ideology by the PAP oriented almost wholly towards 
economic development. He later abandoned the concept of hegemony and relaced it with a communitarian based 
analysis. See: Chua Beng -Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, London, Routledge, 
1995, p. 14 and p. 44. Chan Heng Chee had earlier described the PAP as an hegemonic party. See: Chan Heng 
Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass -Roots, Singapore, Singapore University 
Press, 1976, p. 218 
25 Christopher Lingle, Singapore's Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions and Political 
Dependency, Barcelona, Edicions Sirocco, 1996, p. 160; 
26 James Gomez, "Proportionalising Political Representation in Singapore: Problems and Prospects ", 
Commentary, 13, 1997, pp. 118 -130, p.128 
27 Choo -oon Khong, "Singapore: Political Legitimacy Through Managing Conformity", in, Muthiah 
Alagappa, ed., Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1995, pp. 108 -135, p. 110 
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Four factors have been consistently identified as crucial to Singapore's achievements: a 
stable, efficient and corruption -free government and legal system; liberal trade and 
investment policies highly integrated with the international trading system; its 
developed human resources; and the effectiveness of the `technocratic elite' in the 
state bureaucracies in developing and managing the policies on which these 
achievements are based. In respect of Singapore the consensus is that government has 
made a difference 28 In a small island nation with only two resources, its geographical 
position and its people, both had to be developed to their greatest capacity. This task 
was not managed by the market or the state alone, but by a complex interaction of 
institutions and personalities with political, social and economic forces, through a 
unique policy system which has developed from the hegemonic political program of the 
ruling People's Action Party (PAP), initially under Lee Kuan Yew and, since late 1990, 
under Prime Minister Goh Chock Tong. 
There is no doubt that, in establishing the foundations for the nation's economic and 
social achievements and in building upon them, the public sector has played a crucial 
central role. The conventional wisdom regarding the foundations of Singapore's 
economic success is succinctly captured by the Head of the Civil Service: 
"Singapore has succeeded because of clean and effective government, free of corruption, 
meritocratic, efficient and responsive, fair and impartial, able to offer Singaporeans 
continuous improvement in their quality of life with economic progress and a safe and secure 
environment. By being nimble and pragmatic, we have been able to spot dangers earlier than 
others and make good use of opportunities that have come our way. These characteristics will 
continue to be important in Singapore life. They form the fundamentals of good governance. "29 
Government and its executive agencies are at the centre of the Singapore story. 
However, as Rhodes contends, there is much that we don't know about how 
government works; too much of the literature is based on assumptions about how 
government should work, is legalistic and distanced from the real dynamics and 
structures of systems of national governance. Is the prime minister really in charge of 
government? Do business interests actually participate in governing the nation? Do 
civil society actors have a genuine role in running the country? Are backbenchers just 
seatwarmers or do they have any authentic power within the system of governance? 
28 See: World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993, p- 180, pp_ 347 -368. In 
their report developed for the World Bank's East Asian Miracle project, Soon and Tan concluded that in 
Singapore's case, the government was "...integral to Singapore's rapid industrialisation." See: T. W. Soon and 
C. S. Tan, Lessons of East Asia: Singapore: Public Policy and Economic Development, Washington, World 
Bank, 1993. An analysis of the role of human capital development in Singapore's development is included in: 
Jong-I1 Kim and Lawrence J. Lau, "The Role of Human Capital in the Economic Growth of the East Asian Newly 
Industrialised Countries ", Asia -Pacific Economic Review. 1, 3, 1995, pp. 3 -22 
29 Lim Siong Guan, "The Public Service ", in, Yeo Lay Hwee, ed., Singapore: The year in review 1995. 
Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies, 1996, pp. 35-48, p. 35 
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The key question that core executive studies addresses is - how does government work 
in the real world ?30 
This thesis is a study of the core executive in the context of the Singaporean hegemonic 
state. In particular, it examines the Singaporean core executive under the Goh Chock 
Tong administrations, 1991 -1998 so as to enhance our understanding of how 
contemporary governance in Singapore has developed since the transition to power 
from Lee Kuan Yew in December 1990; a transition that was supposed to usher in a 
'new' form of governance in Singapore. It does not, however, claim to be an holistic 
study, as the conditions for undertaking this type of research in Singapore are such 
that only certain aspects of the core executive, predominantly institutional structures 
are researchable, particularly by a non -Singaporean. The theoretical framework for the 
thesis is provided by the concept of state hegemony. However, because this concept is 
oriented predominantly to institutional analysis, it is supplemented by a policy 
community/networks approach where possible. The thesis therefore focuses 
predominantly on institutions operating under conditions of hegemony and secondly 
on those aspects of core executive dynamics which are accessible. It uses the Singapore 
case as a means of examining who are the central players in governing this hegemonic 
Westminster state and how they govern. It attempts to answer such questions as: Who 
is at the centre of government and policy making? How do they really govern? What 
are the roles of institutions? What non -institutional actors can be identified? What are 
the distinctive structural characteristics of the Singaporean public sector which 
determine the structure and dynamics of the Singaporean core executive? What is the 
nature of the relationship between the political executive, the bureaucratic elites and 
other elites? Are there any distinctive dynamics which characterise the Singaporean 
core executive? In particular, this thesis asserts that it is essential to examine 
Singapore as a Westminster state and the implications this has for its system of 
governance, an issue which has only been peripherally addressed in the literature. In 
addition to analysing the structure and dynamics of policy making, the thesis, in 
conclusion, also attempts to assess the durability of the current core executive 
arrangements under conditions of hegemony and its prospects for the future. 
The study will add to the already complex picture of the Singaporean public policy 
system developed to date and will, hopefully, provide additional insights particularly 
of the nature, internal dynamics and operations of Singaporean public bureaucracies 
and the functions and roles of the political executive. In particular, it is hoped that this 
study will provide a core executive analysis which will complement those which have 
been done for European nations. 
30 R. A. W. Rhodes, "From prime ministerial power to core executive ", in, R. A. W. Rhodes and Patrick 
Dunleavy, eds., Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive, London, St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. I1 -37 
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THE ANALYTICAL FRAME 
The Singaporean political system is not a typical liberal democracy in the European 
tradition. It is a polity which has evolved a unique character under the long guidance of 
one political party and one premier. Most approaches to policy analysis have been 
developed in the context of pluralist liberal democracies and are inappropriate for a 
study of an illiberal democracy such as Singapore. An approach that will facilitate an 
atheoretical empirical analysis of both the structure and dynamics of the policy system 
offers the best frame of analysis in this case. Of the choices available, one which 
provides a frame that facilitates the study of the internal dynamics of the policy 
system, is required. For this reason, and also because of the basic Westminster nature 
of the Singaporean polity, a core executive analysis will be used so that structural 
components are given due consideration. However, the analytical framework should 
also take account of Singapore's post -colonial status as a relatively new nation and 
state as this has been a major determinant of the evolution of its political system. 
Therefore the historical context of the policy system will be strengthened to take 
account of these influences as well and, where appropriate and possible, comparisons 
will be made with other Asian nations. 
Research Methodology 
This research has been principally undertaken through interviews of senior policy 
makers in the upper echelons of the Singapore Civil Service, statutory boards and 
government linked corporations and, to a lesser degree, in the community, business and 
higher education sectors. This study is the first by a foreign researcher that has been 
permitted by the Singaporean government to include extensive interviews with large 
numbers of members of the elite Administrative Service and senior bureaucrats. Koh's 
excellent survey and sociological analysis provides a valuable complementary study." 
Two rounds of interviews were held with senior public sector executives; the first in 
1995 and the second in 1998. The 1995 interviews were structured and aimed at 
collecting data on the major structural and process characteristics of the policy system. 
A structured approach was thought necessary, as the literature revealed little about 
these matters 32 The interviews conducted in 1998 were semi- structured and again 
involved senior executives in ministries and boards but also included government 
linked corporations and Members of Parliament. Although the latter two groups had 
31 Gillian Koh, "A Sociological Analysis of the Singapore Administrative Elite: The Bureaucracy in an 
Evolving Developmentalist State ", unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Sheffield, 1995 
32 In 1995 Gillian Koh was completing her research which included the investigation of complementary issues, 
but the author was unaware of her research at that time. Koh's dissertation was finalised in late1995. She now 
works in the Institute of Policy Studies. 
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been approached in 1995, they had refused to be involved in the study at that time. 
These interviews examined the dynamics of the policy system in greater detail than the 
1995 interviews and, in particular, attempted to collect data on the dynamics of the 
core executive, particularly the interaction between senior bureaucrats and the political 
executive. Consequently, almost all these interviews were conducted on the basis that 
they not be attributable due to the sensitivity of these topics. 
Note on Research Difficulties 
Conducting empirical research on the Singaporean public sector is not an easy task. 
The problem stems from a desire by Singaporean authorities to keep the policy centre 
secret and, indeed, to keep government in general, as secret as possible. There is a 
particular sensitivity about relationships and dynamics; I was told ad nauseam, in on- 
the- record interviews that in reality, the Singapore political system, public sector 
management and policy dynamics mirrored without blemish, both Westminster 
constitutional legal theory and a linear, non -dynamic, model of policy making. The 
centre of government was as one, separate but complementary roles were dearly 
defined and universally adhered to between bureaucrats and politicians. Policy 
disputation, except for minor personal preferences, never spilt over into major policy 
disagreements, factionalism or schism; the only polity in history to be so blessed. This 
culture of secrecy and exclusion of inquiry is reinforced legally and institutionally. 
There is no Freedom of Information Act; instead there is the Official Secrets Act based 
on the eponymous British act, which is designed to suppress access to or release of 
government information; any government information. 
The scope of this act, and its inhibiting effects on civil servants' disclosure of any 
information, should not be underestimated. In one memorable interview, when faced by 
a complete refusal by one senior official to divulge any information of interest to the 
study, the author, to test the limits of the act, asked whether the official could divulge 
the colour of the toilet paper used by that particular ministry - something which 
countless Singaporeans would have known. The official replied that this was 
impossible as it would infringe the act. When it was pointed out that this information 
could be gained by simply visiting the toilet in one of that ministry's buildings, the 
official replied that while that was so, nonetheless he could not divulge the 
information! While this is an extreme example of the power of the Official Secrets Act 
to suppress information, it is unfortunately also indicative of the wider effects of this 
legislation on the culture of the Singapore Civil Service; the legitimate protection of the 
interests of the state which the act seeks, is often reduced to bureaucratic inanity. 
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There is also no consistency in access by researchers to government information. A few 
examples will illustrate the difficulties. One example in relation to this study is that a 
Singaporean researcher, Gillian Koh, for her doctoral research was able to survey all 
members of the Administrative Service, I was not. While in 1995 I was provided with a 
breakdown of each division of the Singapore Civil Service by race; in 1998 this was 
refused. In 1995, I was provided access to the Civil Service Instruction Manuals; in 
1998 this was refused. No reasons were given; access was denied, presumably because 
the information was secret. Yet access to the same information was provided to 
honours students at the National University of Singapore whose theses are publicly 
available. A more notable example is access to government statistics. While all 
ministries and boards compile copious statistics, these are deemed to be secret. The 
release of any statistics not published by the Department of Statistics requires 
approval by a Permanent Secretary or even a minister. The statistics published by the 
government are those which it is considered essential to make available for market 
consumption and political necessity; no more and no less. 
This inconsistency also applies to access to ministries and boards. While in 1995, I 
was received with unfailing courtesy by all ministries and boards, in 1998, several were 
openly hostile; they would have served their government better by refusing to 
participate in the study. In 1995, the Parliamentary Library was accessible to foreign 
researchers by arrangement; in 1998 no access was allowed. In 1998, access to 
government information on -line was also restricted. For example, in October 1998, I 
applied for accounts with Singapore Telecommunications for a CommerceAsia on -line 
account, to access certain commercial databases which were being marketed by the 
government including the on -line inquiry service of the Registrar of Companies and 
Businesses. The account was never opened and neither SingTel, nor CommerceAsia 
returned my faxes or emails about the matter despite repeated requests. The online 
inquiry staff at the Registrar of Companies and Businesses pursued my application 
request when I continued to inquire as to its fate, but soon they too stopped answering 
my email and could apparently do nothing; somebody had decided I shouldn't have 
access. Similarly, in the same month I applied for an on -line account to use LawNet, 
the on -line legal database which includes legislation, cases and parliamentary records. 
I was refused an account although the regulations allowed a request for a personal 
(non -company) account to be made to the LawNet Management Committee. Despite 
my requests for such a submission to be made, the LawNet contact officer refused to 
answer my emails or, I assume, to forward my request. At approximately this time, the 
main Singapore database on the international legal database, Lexus, was suspended, 
thus stopping any on -line access to Singaporean legal databases except by law 
companies through LawNet. 
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In many of the 1995 interviews, ministries sent minders with the person I had 
requested to interview and in 1998 at least some of my ministry and board interviews, 
and possibly those in some GLCs, were recorded without my being told that this 
would be done.33 These strategies had the desired effect of limiting the responses to 
questions. In one particular case, the person I had asked to interview was so 
intimidated by the minder who accompanied him, that he didn't answer any questions. 
The minder become so infuriated with him, that she began answering the questions and 
so I conducted the interview with her instead. Almost all those interviewed found it 
difficult that I was not an academic, but a fellow civil servant who could draw upon 
his own experience of government in pursuing this research. In 1998, my lack of access 
to certain information and officials threatened the viability of certain aspects of the 
study, so I had to resort to my own networks built up over 20 years and pursue those 
issues in a way that I had not planned or anticipated; particularly those concerned 
with coercive governance strategies. 
The unfortunate conclusion that one must draw is that foreign researchers, at least 
those concerned with public sector management and public policy, are assumed to be 
hostile to Singapore while domestic researchers are generally not; although domestic 
researchers also face considerable difficulties. I was informed by a senior official in the 
Prime Minister's Office, in response to a question about local academics' work that 
domestic political science researchers were "not allowed to know what's going on - 
they know nothing!" This says little that is positive for Singapore and much about the 
public sector culture which is hardly flattering. Despite these difficulties, in general the 
senior executive of the Singapore Civil Service and the other public bureaucracies are a 
very impressive and talented group of people who manage a policy system of 
impressive achievements. In general they have a passion for Singapore and a 
considerable appreciation for both the strengths and weaknesses of what they call "the 
system ". It is somewhat of a mystery why they wish to perpetuate a culture of 
paranoia and dysfunctional secrecy and why they think, in a small society like 
Singapore, those who wish to find out how they work, if determined, cannot do so. If it 
is true that only the paranoid survive, it is equally true that the quality of their survival 
is low, if measured in terms that are more than economic. This is unfortunate, because 
it is largely unnecessary. 
STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The study comprises nine chapters. 
33 I was informed that certain meeting rooms in ministries and boards have hidden audio and video recording 
facilities and that these are used for interviews with outsiders, particularly foreigners. In one case, I interrupted 
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Chapter One provides a theoretical framework for the study and then examines how 
the Singaporean state and political system have historically developed in relation to 
this framework. In particular, it identifies determinants of the PAP's governance 
framework and its general approach to national governance. 
Chapter Two extends the historical analysis to the Singaporean public sector, within 
which the core executive is principally located. This chapter identifies the major 
structural aspects of the public sector. 
Chapter Three presents the concept of the core executive and how it can be applied to 
Singapore. Tt critically examines this concept in the context of the Westminster political 
system on which the Singaporean polity is based, examines the functional aspects of 
the core executive and then analyses the application of the concept to Singapore, 
including a discussion of who might comprise the Singaporean core executive. 
Chapter Four examines the relationship between the core executive, the legislature and 
the political system in terms of both structure and dynamics in order to begin the 
process of mapping out the institutional base of the contemporary Singaporean core 
executive and how it governs the nation. 
Chapter Five examines the relationship of the judiciary to the core executive by 
analysing its relationship with the political executive and other institutions of state. 
Chapter Six examines the dynamics of the relationship between the political executive 
and the public sector executive, how these two groups contribute towards core 
executive membership and operationalise governance strategies. 
Chapter Seven provides an analysis of the leadership of government linked 
corporations (GLCs) and statutory hoards, examines how they might contribute to the 
membership of the core executive and discusses their role in national governance. 
Chapter Eight provides two studies of particular strategies of governance used by the 
contemporary Singaporean core executive; one examining aspects of the consent 
building framework, the other of the coercive framework. 
Chapter Nine presents the conclusions of the study. 
administrative staff setting up the recording procedures in a room I was about to use for an interview. 
1. GOVERNANCE, SINGAPORE AND THE 
HEGEMONIC STATE 
GOVERNANCE IN SINGAPORE: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This study attempts to understand how contemporary Singapore is governed by taking 
a realist, empirical approach to governance. To do this effectively it must take account 
of how the Singaporean state is organised. The major focus of the study is therefore on 
how the system of governance is structured and what its dynamics are; who governs 
and how they govern in Singapore. In practical terms, this is about who makes policy 
and how are those policies made. In addressing these issues, what perspectives on 
systems of governance and policy making provide the most appropriate approach for 
this particular study? This question is addressed in the first section of this chapter, an 
answer provided in the second section and a review of the development of the 
Singaporean state provided in the final section. 
Singapore and the Research Paradigm 
Singapore is a distinctive state and polity. It is a Westminster style post -colonial state 
in Southeast Asia, peopled principally by Chinese and Malays; peoples who have an 
historical tradition of strong monarchical political systems. The Singaporean state has 
been variously described as an 'extremely intrusive' authoritarian state', 'strong and 
paternalistic'2, and a polity in which political discourse has been largely shaped by a 
single man; Lee Kuan Yew.3 The political system has been described as "effectively 
oligarchic, dominated by a technocratic elite who regard political debate as 
"dysfunctional ", an obstacle to the achievement of rational solutions "4, where 
democratic politics is a "political perversion "5 and therefore has a government devoid 
of a 'competent opposition '.6 Instead, it has been claimed that politics has been 
' Cal Clark and K. C. Roy, Comparing Development Patterns in Asia, Boulder, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 
1997, pp. 80 and 83 
2 Cal Clark and K. C. Roy, Comparing Development Patterns in Asia, Boulder, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 
1997, p. 144 
3 James Cotton, "Political Innovation in Singapore: The Presidency, The Leadership and the Party ", in, 
Garry Roden, ed., Singapore Changes Guard, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1994, pp. 3-15, p. 3 
4 Choo-Oon Khong, "Singapore", in, Muthiah Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest 
for Moral Authority, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995, pp. 108 -135, p. 132 
5 T. S. Selvan, Singapore: The Ultimate Island, Melbourne, Freeway Books, 1991, p. 298 
6 Michael Leiffer,'Triumph of the Will ", Far East Economic Review, 15 November 1990, pp. 27 -34, p. 28 
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replaced by economics7, government by administrations and competitive political and 
social discourse by the political dominance of one party and an ideological hegemony 
which suppresses the full development of civil society thus severely limiting the 
development of mediating structures between state and society. 
The resulting political system has escaped a consensual definition; its supporters 
proclaim that it "is not a one party state; it is a parliamentary democracy "9, and that 
the political system is characterised by both "representative and participatory 
democracy ",0, or even, more blatantly echoing the government's own line, that it is a 
'controlled democracy" in which good governance should prevail over democracy and 
human rights and that the system of public administration is essentially the 
government.12 More critical analysts have deemed it to be a "non- liberal 
communitarian democracy "13 or a "restricted Asian democracy "14 while others 
concluded that it is not a democracy but rather an "authoritarian- capitalist regime ".15 
At the extremes it has been termed the rule of a "technocrat emperor "16 which in the 
7 Lee Kuan Yew has stated: "political problems ultimately mean the problem of how we make our living, 
how we can give everyone a fair and equal chance to study and work and have a full life." Lee Kuan Yew, 
The Battle for Merger, Singapore, Ministry of Culture, 1962, p. 83 
8 Chan Heng Chee, "Politics in an administrative state: where has the politics gone ? ", in, Seah Chee Meow, 
Trends in Singapore, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1975, pp. 51 -68 
9 Richard Clutterbuck, Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia 1945 -1983, Singapore, Graham 
Brash, 1984, p. 347. Clutterbuck, a former Major- General in the British army, bases this assessment on the 
most basic level of institutional analysis. His comments on political openness ignores the almost total lack 
of accountability of the GLC sector and reveals a lack of understanding of the true functions of the GRO 
sector. Also, his comments on the secrecy of the ballot in Singapore reveals how little he understands of the 
administrative arrangements for vote processing and his cursory analysis of the legal system (less than one 
page) speaks for itself. These are indications that perhaps his general admiration for the economic and 
social order achievements of the PAP governments has limited his analysis of the political infrastructure. 
See: pp. 337 -353 
10 Jon S. T. Quah and Stella R. Quah, "The Limits of Government Intervention ", in, Kemial Singh Sandhu 
and Paul Wheatley, eds., Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 
1989, pp. 102 -127, p. 123. The claim for participatory democracy by these authors is based on the existence 
of unelected Town Councils. This concept of participatory democracy is impossible to reconcile with others 
as it contains no element of participation; appointment to Town Councils is completely regulated by the 
government except in two constituencies controlled by opposition political parties and, even in these, all 
Town Council members are appointed. The Town Councils have a purely administrative function and do 
not serve to broaden political discourse. 
11 Jon S. T. Quah, "Public Administration in Singapore: Managing Success in a Multi- Racial City State`, in, 
Ahmed Shafiqul Hague, Jermain T. M. Lam and Jane C. Y. Lee, eds., Public Administration in the NICs: 
Challenges and Accomplishments, London, Macmillan, 1996, pp. 59 -89, p. 61. Quah, a professor at the 
National University of Singapore, defines a 'controlled democracy' as "a republic with a parliamentary 
system based on the British Westminster model, but which has been adapted to suit local conditions ". Quah 
defines the "local conditions' as principally fear of communal riots necessitating the government 
"restricting individuals, groups., organisations and the press from sensationalizing and exploiting issues of 
race, language and religion." In line with the PAP's ideology, no critical assessment of this arguments 
offered and no alternatives proposed. This is one example of the PAP ideological hegemony extended to the 
intellectual class. 
12 Linda Low, The Political Economy of a City- State: Government -made Singapore, Singapore, Oxford 
University press, 1998, p. 26 
13 Chua Beng -Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 184. 
Chua comments that "the PAP government in Singapore is still far short of meeting the necessary conditions 
for a communitarian democracy to which it allegedly aspires." p. 201 
14 CIark D. Neher and Ross Marlay, Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: The Winds of Change, 
Boulder, Westview Press, 1995, p. 134 
15 Christopher Lingle, Singapore's Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian values, Free Markets Illusions, and 
Political Dependency, Barcelona, Editions Sirocco, 1996, p. 40 
16 Joseph B. Tamney, The Struggle Over Singapore's Soul: Western Modernization and Asian Culture, Berlin, 
Walter de Gruyter, 1995, p. 81 
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words of a former President of Singapore is acted out in a "loutish political style" '2 
resulting, according to others in a general state of fear in society because of political 
executive terror.18 
In terms of state -society relations, it has been argued that in Singapore civil society has 
been depoliticised19, and that the government refuses to allow the institutions of civil 
society to have a political face, that: 
... it has drawn up the limits of civil society by stating that interest groups are just that - 
groups representing special interests - and that they have to become political parties if they 
wish to extend their beliefs beyond those interests and push for change that affects society as 
a whole?° 
Rather, the PAP has proposed that an alternative to civil society, termed "civic 
society ", a depoliticised civil society which is ideologically aligned to the PAP, as the 
model for Singapore. In acknowledging, in 1995, that the state was all pervasive, 
Brigadier -General George Yeo using the banyan tree as metaphor commented that 
The problem now is that under the banyan tree, very little else can grow. When state 
institutions are too pervasive, civic institutions cannot thrive. Therefore, it is necessary to 
prune the banyan tree so that other plants can grow.21 
However, such new growth has to be 'controlled' growth, acceded to be a largely de- 
politicised citizenry. This was summarised by a Straits Times editorial: 
It is important that emerging civic institutions do not overstep their mandate and adopt a 
politically adversarial role ... Conflict for the sake of civil society will not do ... By contrast, 
a questioning, but understanding, population working together with a responsible Government 
can create the kind of civic culture that will politically complement Singapore's economic 
success. 22 
The de- politicisation thesis has not been accepted by all. Chua, while admitting that 
the government has reduced political debate and activity to a very low level, and even 
"been successful in convincing academics and intellectuals to accept this particular 
conception" comments that this does not mean "the end of ideology nor the end of 
politics. "23 Despite this assertion, in the face of a 'pervasive' state, Chua concludes at 
17 C. V. Devan Nair, "Foreword" in, Francis T. Seow, To Catch a Tartar: A dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's 
Prison, New Haven, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1994, p. roo( 
18 Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, London, Macmillan, 1994, 
pp. 199 -221 
19 Stanley Bedlington, Malaysia and Singapore: The Building of New States, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1978, pp. 241 -243 
20 Straits Times, 30 December 1990, p. 18 
21 The idea of "civic society' was proposed by the PAP's second generation ideologue (the first being S. 
Rajaratnam), Brigadier -General George Yeo. 
22 Straits Times, 25 June 1991, p. 10 
23 Chua Beng Huat, 1995, op. cit., pp. 42-43 
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the end of his study of the possibility of communitarian democracy in Singapore that 
For the individual, being politically oppositional can be a perilous activity, to be taken en 
only after serious consideration of the existential conditions of living in a very small island 
city- state, where the state is pervasive in every sphere of social life. First, one's livelihood 
is directly or indirectly tied to some part of the functions of state agencies. Directly, one may 
be in the employ of either the civil service or one of the many large government- linked 
enterprises. Indirectly, as the private sector economy is highly regulated by licensing and 
other administrative processes, it is believed that one's professional practices may be 
jeopardised by difficulties in running the gauntlet of bureaucratic processes. The tendency is to 
avoid offending the political regime.24 
By 1998, the civil society debate had been rekindled, at the government's initiative, 
seemingly in response to the acceptance by the cabinet that under the increasingly 
complex conditions of modernity that are impacting on Singaporean society and 
economy, the state could no longer adequately rule alone. The banyan tree metaphor 
was replaced by the tembusu tree25 at a national closed -door conference on civil 
society sponsored by the Institute of Policy Studies. Government participants at the 
conference spoke of a new government agenda which "will give more space to civil 
society and encourage Singaporeans to move beyond the achievements of the past" in 
which the government would trust civil society more 26 This message was reinforced, 
again by George Yeo, who stated that civil society and the state had to work together 
in a new era in which 'state -society ties were undergoing a transformation. "27 Stating 
that he refused to use the 'civil society' label, RAdin. Teo Chee Hean later in 1998, 
called for an active citizenry, "which takes an interest in community and national 
issues ... and which possesses the passion and commitment to contribute and 
participate. "28 
Civil society groups were generally sceptical to this effort to re- define state -society 
relations. In reports from the civil society conference carried in the Straits Times, the 
overwhelming reaction was doubt of the government's ability to renegotiate this 
relationship as summarised by Constance Singam's comment that: 
The Singapore experience - the experience of legal sanctions, the erosion of civil space and 
liberties, instills in people an often inexplicable fear and fosters a sense of uncertainty about 
the limits to people's freedom of action 29 
T. Sasitharan at the same conference, concluded that: 
24 Chua Beng Huat, 1995, op. cit., p. 207 
25 The tembusu tree is a deep -rooted tall tree with a small canopy under which other plants can grow. 
26 Statements by Professor Tommy Koh Thong Bee, Ambassador -at- Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See: 
Koh Buck Song, "More space in tembusu tree era ", Straits Times, 8 May 1998, p. 3 
27 Zuraidah Ibrahim, "Civic groups will have bigger role ", Straits Times, 7 May 1998, p. 2 
28 "RAdm. Teo for people sector ", Sunday Times, 21 June 1998, p. 28 
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I fear the reality of the reality beneath the rhetoric of these proceedings is still about the 
Government seeking to retain full and final control 3° 
This was verified by BG. Yeo in his comments on the issue. Yeó s conception was that 
in contemporary Singapore, civil society "operated within the bounds of the state "31 
and was inherently bounded by hegemonic parameters: 
As our common consciousness grows, the bounds of debate will be relaxed but, realistically, we 
will always need an outer perimeter to hold our society together.32 
Such a common consciousness derives from ideological hegemony, not from a 
relationship between state and society which is negotiated and characterised by trust, 
mutuality and respect. The hollowness of the government's claim for the 
transformation of state -society relations in 1998 was confirmed by its failure to amend 
any of the legislative framework for political and social control and its continuation in 
1999, to allow its bureaucrats to control such minor events as a speech at a book 
launch33, a speech of thanks by an opposition member of parliament at an invitation 
only party dinner34 and the dispatch of Internal Security Department operatives to 
openly video and monitor a meeting at the non -party aligned Open Singapore Centre 3s 
If there is politics in Singapore, it is politics of a particularly limited and dangerous 
type. It is, most certainly, not a liberal democratic polity to which almost all our 
contemporary research frames in political science are oriented. Rodan concludes that 
"some very conditional independent political spaces" tenuously exist and that any 
expansion of political activity in recent years has through an "expansion of the state 
itself" through innovations in the co -option of civil society within the state sphere 36 
Hill and Lían in assessing the nature of civil society in Singapore interpret existing 
state -society relations as being evidence of "consensus politics" and argue that within 
the limitations imposed by the state that there "is indeed space in the interstices 
between the 'political', as defined by the state, and the 'legitimate' - albeit 
unobtrusively political - concerns of interest groups which have arisen ... "37 Whether 
one argues for the existence of no politics or an 'unobtrusive' politics, it is obvious that 
the nature of state -society relations in Singapore does not conform to that 
29 Koh Buck Song, "What plants will grow under the tembusu tree ? ", Straits Times, 9 May 1998, p. 14 
30 ibid. 
31 Zuraidah Ibrahim, op. cit., 1998 
32 ibid. 
33 "gagged author issues letter and beats the law ". Available at http://www.singapore- 
window.org/sw99/91106jg.htm 
34 "SPP Annual Dinner 1999 ". Available at: http:// members. tripod .com /politics2l /mainpage.net/ 
39 James Gomez, "Watching the watchers: A counter Surveillance Report". Available at: 
http:www.gn.apc.org /sfd lLink / 20pages /Link / 20Folders /osc/ 140699.htm1 
36 Garry Rodan, "State- society relations and political opposition in Singapore ", in Garry Rodan, ed., 
Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 95 -127, pp. 120 -121 
37 Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore, London, 
Routledge, 1995, p. 241 
16 Ross Worthington 
characteristic of liberal democracies but rather of an "authoritarian polity. "38 
As the nature of state -society relations disclosed above suggests, the contemporary 
Singaporean state is characterised by a hegemonic framework facilitated by what Chua 
terms "an ideology of pragmatism "39, administered by an elite "High technocracy in 
GLCs or civil service "40 bent on maintaining these arrangements. Any meaningful 
analysis of Singapore's system of governance requires that account be taken of this 
hegemonic program and its character understood. 
Hegemony and State -Society Relations 
Gramsci drawing upon Marx, Engels and Lenin saw the state as essentially coercive 
and sought to develop a new revolutionary methodology for replacing it with a 
'regulated society' that would be operationalised by democratic consensus. He 
distinguished between two types of social control; coercion, including control through 
rewards and punishments; and intellectual leadership, including the inculcation of 
moral values which underwrites the development of ideological and systemic consent. 
For Gramsci, the modern capitalist state has the historical potential to achieve an 
advanced form of social control exercised through 'hegemony' which is broadly defined 
as the ideological ascendancy of one class over society. The hegemonic order is the 
interrelated matrix of institutional and social arrangements and beliefs derived from 
the ruling class, preferably the proletariat, supported by coercive powers, the origins of 
which were concealed through a number of strategies, supported by the consent, either 
active or passive, of citizens facilitated by a civil society. For Gramsci, hegemony is the 
organisation of consent. This consent does not arise spontaneously, but is won 
through ideological struggle and material concessions which combine to unite the 
subordinated and the dominating classes as members of the same political community. 
The power through which the dominant class organises consent is both centralised in 
the coercive apparatus of the state and diffused across institutions co -opted into the 
hegemonic program induding the church, the family and schools. Therefore, consent is 
not just organised through state institutions, but also within civil society. 
Hegemony is therefore based on intellectual leadership exercised principally through 
civil society rather than the state. The consent to these arrangements is not necessarily 
exercised through formal consent activities such as voting, but rather through a 
psychological state of acceptance of the social and political order based on an active 
38 Jean- Louise Margolin, "Foreign Models in Singapore's Development and the Idea of a Singaporean 
Model ", in, Garry Rodan, ed., Singapore Changes Guard: Social Political and Economic Directions in the 
1990s, PP. 84-100, p. 96 
39 Chua Beng Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, London, Routledge, 1995. p. 5 
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acceptance of core values and institutions. The advanced capitalist state could achieve 
hegemony by the incorporation of all classes within its own cultural and economic 
ethos, even to the point of the incorporation of trade unions into this order.41 This 
hegemonic project transforms the state, unifying and communalising it, with the state 
acting as 'educator' to achieve these aims, by imposing its own values and beliefs onto 
citizens,42 either through democratic or oligarchic means 43 If oligarchy prevails within 
the hegemonic project and the 'educator' is bourgeois, Gramsci considered this 
detrimental to the interests of the working class. Additionally, the intellectual 
educative functions of the state cannot be treated as a unified force as it too is 
challenged by splits in the hegemonic structure, in this case "between bureaucracy and 
specialists on the one hand and political leaders on the other ... "44 
The hegemonic state can only be achieved by stages, but in its final evolutionary form, 
it becomes so inclusive across class boundaries that coercion becomes obsolete, politics 
is democratised and becomes an aspect of the everyday life of all citizens, civil society 
is highly developed and ideologically aligned with the hegemonic project, the party45 is 
transformed into the state and in the process becomes non -political, dominating 
society through its technical functions of 'propaganda and public order, and moral and 
cultural influence' thus suppressing any pluralist tendency.46 The degree of 
incorporation of civil society by the party and the state determines the degree of 
pluralism within society and indicates the democratic- oligarchic tendency of the state. 
The achievement of hegemony is therefore the 'highest historical development of a 
class' as it provides it with complete control of society, politics and economy 47 
Civil society according to Gramsci is a sphere in modern capitalist societies within 
which classes and class factions engage in political and ideological struggles which 
4o Linda Low, The Political Economy of a City -State: Government-made Singapore, Singapore, Oxford 
University Press, 1998, p.225. GLCs are government linked corporations; i.e. government owned businesses 
and trading enterprises. 
41 Joseph Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought, Oxford, Blackwell, 1980, p. 32 
42 Miller defines hegemony as " A term used by Gramsci and his followers to refer to the non -coercive 
aspects of class rule, i.e. to the ability of a dominant class to use agencies of socialisation to foist its own 
values and beliefs on to the remainder of the population." See: David Miller, ed., The Blackwell 
Encyclopaedia of Political Thought, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991, p. 200 
43 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, Quintan Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith trans., London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 260 
44 Anna Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 277 
45 In Gramsci's conception this is preferably the mass revolutionary party as exemplified in the communist 
parties of the early twentieth century. It may, however, also encompass other parties of the bourgeoisie, but 
this is a less desirable option, although possibly only a stage in the evolution toward a hegemony of the 
proletariat. See: Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. and trans., Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, New York, International Publishers, 1971, pp. 147 -156; pp. 210 -218; pp. 267- 
269 
46 Ann Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics, 2nd ed., Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987, 
pp. 222 -226. For Gramsci's views of the role of the Party see: Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, 
Des and trans., Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, New York, International 
Publishers, 1971, pp. 147 -157 
47 Ann Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics, 2nd ed., Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987, 
p. 116 
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create mass movements and complex organisations.48 This concept differs from 
Hegel's in that he excludes economic organisations and relationships from civil society. 
Gramscí s most significant contributions include his conception of the state as central 
to politics and society, his idea of a Rousseau -like stateless self -governing consensual 
society and his understanding of hegemony; its hidden nature and its production 
through a sophisticated hegemonic program and its perpetuation through the consent 
mechanism of civil society which he saw as potentially being 'the same thing' as the 
state 49 These concepts are useful in an examination of the mechanisms of governance 
in an illiberal democratic state such as Singapore 
When placed in historical perspective, a Gramscian interpretation of the Singaporean 
state is not surprising. If Gramsci had still been with us, he could well have interpreted 
Singapore during the period 1959 -65, as being at the point of a 'crisis of hegemony' in 
the context of the conditions surrounding the struggle between the PAP and it's 
communist- aligned opposition, the Barisan Socialis; " a phase in the class struggle that 
precedes: either the conquest of power on the part of the revolutionary proletariat ... 
or a tremendous reaction on the part of the propertied classes and governing caste. "sa 
The Barisan Socialis were the voice of the proletariat with widespread popular 
support among the Chinese working class and the PAP quickly became the voice of the 
propertied classes and their allies and eventually prevailed. 
In Singapore, hegemonic rule is achieved not through democratisation but through 
oligarchic means. The bureaucratic, political and business elites are integrated thorough 
a bourgeois party which uses meritocratic assessment based on educationa151 and 
other achievements to select the public sector and political leadership. Because of the 
high degree of penetration of the state into the market and society, the party selected 
elite also penetrate these sectors thus perpetuating oligarchic control. The People's 
Action Party (PAP) has not yet achieved such a dominance of civil society that it is 
fully aligned to the hegemonic ideology and program of the party, but it has achieved a 
substantial degree of dominance. As civil society is the site of interest articulation it 
must be assumed that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for it to be fully integrated 
with the hegemonic program. Indeed, de Certeau suggests, correctly in my opinion, that 
48 Anne S. Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics, London, Croom Helm, 1980, p. 200 and pp. 222 -225 
49 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell -Smith, London, 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 160 
50 Gramsci, 1971, op. cit., p. 191 
51 This meritocratic selection process into the party and the administrative elite should be assessed in the 
context of the proven linkage between social class and educational achievement. Meritocratic selection 
based upon achievement in a first university degree and the university of graduation, establishes a basis for 
a self- perpetuating administrative elite which admits members principally from the upper middle and upper 
classes. See: Hilary Metcalf, Class and Higher Education: the participation of young people from lower social 
classes, London, Council for Industry and Higher Education, 1997;Annette Larreau, Home Advantage: 
Social Class and Parental Intervention in Elementary Education, London, Taylor and Francis, 1989. The PAP 
government under Goh Chhok Tong has attempted to overcome this problem of disproportional recruitment 
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this is impossible 52 The oligarchic hegemony that has evolved in Singapore has also 
taken account of the potential for conflict with the working class by designing the 
governance system and its policies so that this class also benefits from the hegemonic 
regime in at least economic terms. Singaporean hegemony is therefore neo- Gramscian as 
it has substantially de -fused the potential for class -based conflict within the political 
system. It has been even more successful in that it also appears to have substantially 
managed the social order so that the possibility of conflict among racial and religious 
minorities is negligible; an issue of state -society relations which transcends Gramsci 
conception of social relations.53 
The exercise of hegemonic power has allowed the PAP to "create the underlying rules 
of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play, and to get other players to 
commit themselves to those rules, because these rules are now part of the self - 
understanding of the players ... "54 This has resulted in a very strong state, a weak civil 
society, and an ideological hegemony that has even been adopted by many opposing 
political parties.55 The party has been transformed into the state and the instruments 
of propaganda and hidden coercion have been developed and implemented for a 
considerable time. Any study of governance in Singapore must take account of this. 
An Analytical Framework: Structure and Dynamics in Context 
The Singaporean political system is obviously not a liberal democracy in contemporary 
terms. It is a polity which has evolved a unique character under the Iong guidance of 
one political party and one premier. Most of the assumptions underlying many current 
approaches to governance are inappropriate for this particular analysis; in particular, 
the liberal pluralist framework is incapable of including the authoritarian mechanisms 
of social, political and economic control and the problematical nature of consent to 
oppression characteristic of Singapore. An approach that will facilitate an empirical 
analysis of both the structure and dynamics within the policy system offers the best 
frame of analysis. In developing an approach which has the greatest explanatory 
from the working dass by providing uniform monetary transfers to all students under the Edusave scheme 
so that they can partially self -fund secondary and post -secondary education. 
52 De Certeau identifies the "murmurings" of everyday life as a source of both hidden, almost unknowable, 
revolt against hegemonic forces, and a mechanism of self -subverting adaptation: "an uncodeable difference 
insinuates itself into the happy relation the system would like to have with the operations it daims to 
administer. Far from being a local, and thus classifiable revolt, it is a common and silent, almost sheeplike 
subversion - our own." See: Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1984, p. 200 
53 John Clammer concludes in his assessment of the PAP's management of racial and religious relations in 
Singaporean society that "The pride of Singapore is not economic growth or public housing, important as 
these achievements are, but it is the stable multi- ethnicity that is the hallmark of society... (that Singapore) 
proves to the world that racialism ... in at least one society, (is) mastered and overcome." See: John 
Clammer, "The Politics of Memory: Rethinking Culture and Identity", Commentary, 14,1997, pp. 40-49, p. 49 
54 Emmanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations ", 
Millennium, 26, 2, 1997, pp. 249 -277, p.261 
55 Garry Rodan, "Elections without representation: The Singapore experience under the PAP ", in R H. 
Taylor, The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Cambridge, 1996, 
pp. 61-89, p. 63 
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power for a particular case, Hogwood and Gunn recommend "... a 'contingency' 
approach (adjust policy- making methods to the circumstances and the issue in 
question). There is no 'one best way' of making decisions... "56 Lindblom warns us not 
to have too great a faith in the scientific analysis of many policy issues; "Most people, 
even poets and ballet dancers, know a great deal about...aspects of policy making."57 
Thomas Dye perhaps provides one of the most realistic assessments: "Most public 
policies are a combination of rational planning, incrementalism, competition, group 
activity, elite preferences, systematic forces, and institutional influences. "58 
Lindblom would have us focus on the participants in the political process, the "... 
ordinary citizens, interest -group leaders, legislators, legislative leaders, party activists, 
party leaders, judges, civil servants, technical experts, and business managers. "59 
Hogwood takes a complementary approach and recommends that we focus on the 
problems of decision makers.60 Rose maintains that we should take an holistic 
approach, examining institutions, social and economic contexts, the bureaucracy, the 
distribution of resources and the mix of policies and programs characteristic of 
western industrialised nations6' Despite his reluctance in defining an analytical 
framework Wildaysky is equally holistic, suggesting that analysis focus on "... 
relationships between people...(the) tension between resources and objectives, planning 
and politics__.What combination of social interaction and intellectual cognition, 
planning and politics, leads us to figure out what we should want to do and how to do 
i.t ? "62 
All of these views of a practical approach to the study of policy systems and 
governance sensitize us to the essential characteristics the policy making process and 
state governance; it is very complex and no one approach to analysis is necessarily 
adequate. Policy making is bounded by political, socio-cultural and economic 
rationality; there is no absolutely objective analytical framework - personal values, 
priorities, emphases and interests determine the nature, focus and therefore outcomes 
of the research; the boundaries of policy making can rarely, if ever, be reached or 
mapped as it is a process the beginnings and ends of which are rarely obvious - even 
the best analyses are partial and, analytical approaches are tools which can be 
usefully employed to examine the nature of particular policy environments and policy 
issues, but they cannot be relied upon, or expected, to fully reflect reality. Research is 
56 op. cit. p. 62 
57 Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy making Process, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1980, pp. 3-4 
58 See: Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1975, p. 
59 Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy- Making Process, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, Prentice -Hall, 1980, p. 3 
60 Hogwood, op. cit., 
61 See; Richard Rose, Understanding Big Government: The Program Approach, London, Sage, 1984. Rose's 
analytical framework is particularly discussed on pp. 7 -12. 
62 Aaron Wildaysky, Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis, New Brunswick (NJ), 
Transaction Publishers, 1987, pp. 17 -18 
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constrained by the possible, by what is actually researchable. A research agenda that 
may be possible in the United States or Japan, may be impossible in Indonesia or 
Singapore, or even dangerous. The prudent empirical researcher must fit his ambitions 
to the restraints of the world as he finds it in the belief that despite these restraints, 
hidden knowledges still exist within the research topic. 
An approach which recognises the complexity of the policy environment and which 
provides a 'best fit' for a particular case is therefore most suitable. For this particular 
study, because the Singaporean political system is hegemonic, an institutional 
approach using the concept of the core executive provides a frame which facilitates the 
study of governance in this polity, although it does not adequately take account of the 
dynamics of the policy system. For this reason the research attempts to include policy 
community perspectives where possible so that the dynamics of the governance system 
can be considered. However, both of these components of the analytical framework 
fail to give consideration to the historical and ideological contexts within which the 
policy system operates, and so the analysis will be strengthened to take account of 
these influences as required, although a detailed analysis of the ideology of the core 
executive in Singapore is beyond the scope of this study.63 
This study will therefore principally use the core executive and to a lesser degree, 
policy community frameworks, to analyse governance in contemporary Singaporean 
while giving due weight to the historical and post -colonial context as appropriate. The 
issue of ideology will not be examined, except peripherally, although its importance is 
acknowledged. In particular, this study will examine the core executive under the Goh 
Chock Tong administrations, 1991 -1998. 
In the next section, the development of the PAP hegemonic state in Singapore is 
analysed. This is followed by an examination in Chapter Two of the major aspects of 
the development of the executive agencies of the PAP hegemonic system, the civil 
service and the broader public sector. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PAP HEGEMONIC SYSTEM IN 
SINGAPORE 
The People's Action Party (PAP) has ruled Singapore for 40 years and in November 
63 Several studies have addressed the issue of the ideology of the PAP. See: Chan Heng Chee and Hans - 
Deiter Evers, "National Identity and Nation Building in Southeast Asia ", in, Chan Heng Chee and Hans - 
Deíter Evers, Studies in ASEAN Sociology Singapore, Chopmen, 1978; John Clammer, Singapore: Ideology 
Society, Culture, Singapore, Chopmen Publishers, 1985; Michael Hill and Lien Kwen Fee, The politics of 
Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore, London, Routledge, 1995; Chua Beng Huat, Communifarian 
Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, London, Routledge, 1995; John Clammer, Values and Development in 
Southeast Asia, Petaling Jaya, Pelanduk Publications, 1996 
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1999 celebrated its 45`h anniversary. It is one of the longest terms of continuous 
governance terms by any political party in any nation this century. To understand 
contemporary governance in Singapore, it is therefore essential to understand the 
historical determinants of the PAP's development and how these have contributed to 
its institutional framework, its political strategies and to the way this has shaped 
state -society relations. In this section, these determinants are identified and discussed 
and the key components of the PAP approach to governance identified. First a general 
background is provided and then the development of the PAP is discussed as 
comprising four phases; self- government, the Malaysia period, the independence 
period and the post -Lee period within which this study is located. Only the essential 
foundations of the contemporary political system are covered in the discussion of the 
first three phases, with most emphasis being on the development of the current 
political system. 
The Colonial Background 
Modem Singapore dates its founding from the establishment of a trading post of the 
British East India Company on the island by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819. In 1824 
Singapore was ceded in perpetuity to the British East India Company and in 1826 was 
combined with Malacca and Penang to form the Straits Settlements. Singapore 
continued under the control of the British East India Company until the transfer of 
control to the Colonial Office in 1867, thus establishing it as a Crown Colony. 
From its inception, colonial Singapore was prosperous and self sustaining, with this 
prosperity almost entirely dependent upon entrepôt trade. During the period to 1942, 
Singapore prospered, although suffering from occasional minor recessions and sharing 
the pain of the major world depressions of the time. Essential to the success of the 
colony was the strategic relationships forged between the colonial administration, the 
private British (and subsequently other Western) trading companies and Asian 
entrepreneurs and traders, particularly the Nanyang Chinese who had moved to 
Singapore, principally from southern China, in large numbers. These relationships of 
mutual interest between the colonial government, the private sector and the ethnic 
elites established a pattern which was to be institutionalised by the colonial 
administration but eventually rejected by the modern governments of Singapore as new 
forms of institutionalisation were established. The 'iron cage' of British civil 
administration was imposed on the colony. Singapore has therefore, always been a 
modern administrative state in the sense that it has had since its founding, a strong, 
authoritarian civil administration. It is very much a child of modernity. 
Singapore was occupied by the Japanese from February 1942 to September 1945. The 
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Japanese administration could not be termed a highlight of public administration in 
Singapore but it did make its contribution by the simple fact that the Japanese 
administration could not run the island by itself. It lacked not only personnel, but 
personnel with any experience of public administration. It required that the local public 
service continue to administer the island under Japanese direction. This led to Iocals 
undertaking many of the tasks previously done by their colonial masters and exercising 
responsibilities which had previously been forbidden to them by the British. This 
developed in local civil servants a degree of independence and a belief in their own 
capabilities, not so evident under colonial rule. It also provided them with several 
years experience in running their own affairs under considerable hardship, an 
experience which proved invaluable in the push for independence after the war. 
Following the re- imposition of colonial administration in 1945 through a temporary 
British Military Administration, the Straits Settlements were dissolved and Singapore 
became a separate Crown Colony in April 1946. 
The defeat of Japan and the return of the British to Singapore did not mean the 
resumption of business as usual. The British found, on their return in 1945, a Singapore 
which was substantially different from that which it had left in 1942. The population 
was still shocked by the brutality of its occupation, but was convinced of its capacity 
to survive and administer itself and was ready for change and greater control of its 
own destiny. 
The push for indigenous control began through the development of political 
organisations. In September 1948 the Singapore Labour Party was founded. A large 
number of political parties were to be subsequently founded over the following years, 
but those of significance were the Singapore Progressive Party, Singapore Labour 
Party, the Workers' Party, the United Peoples' Party 64 the Peoples' Action Party, the 
Barisan Socialis, the Singapore Democratic Party and the Singapore People's Party, as 
these are the only parties to achieve parliamentary representation. All of these parties 
were inter- racial. 
In 1953 the British government appointed George Rendel to inquire into the 
constitutional status of the colony. The Rendel Commission consequentially 
recommended self -government through the establishment of a unicameral parliament of 
thirty-two members, twenty -five of whom were to be elected by universal franchise, 
four were to be nominated by the Governor and three were ex- officio. 
64 The United People's Party was however, essentially a one man, one constituency party and had no broad 
electoral support. It was founded by Ong Eng Guan after his ouster from the PAP . It was the vehicle with which 
he tried to challenge Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP in the early 1960s and to continue his own political career. 
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Under the new constitution the electorate was transformed. For example, women 
comprised approximately 50 per cent of the enrolled voters whereas previously only 
eight per cent of women had been enrolled. However, voting rights were still restricted 
to those with British citizenship, principally those born in Singapore. This still left 
many immigrant residents disenfranchised, particularly among the Chinese65 and led to 
further demands for independence. This led to a second round of constitutional talks 
in March 1957, to which Lee Kuan Yew was a party, resulting in the establishment of 
a State of Singapore governed by a fully elected Legislative Assembly in 1959 under an 
expanded franchise underwritten by Singaporean citizenship rather than British 
citizenship 66 
The PAP Phase 1: Birth Pangs of an Hegemonic Party67 
In May 1959, elections were held under the new constitution resulting in a government 
dominated by the People's Action Party (PAP) which had won forty-three out of the 
fifty -one seats in the new Assembly. Before examining the development of the PAP 
government, it is necessary to briefly take stock of what kind of party the PAP was, 
how it developed and how it managed to resolve a number of difficulties to retain 
office, prosper and implement its unique governance system. 
The circumstances into which the first PAP government was borne would have been an 
enormous challenge to any political party, in any country at any time. The main 
features of these circumstances are set out below. 
A political party less than five years old, founded principally by English educated and 
speaking Chinese, with limited political experience and no experience of the exercise of 
state power, attempts at the end of colonial rule, to appeal to a predominantly 
Chinese dialect speaking electorate. It must also ensure that it appeals to at least a 
significant proportion of the Malay population recently empowered by a sense of 
nationalism and cultural pride by coming end of colonialism. The electorate has little 
65 Lam, Lin Jenny, ed., Voices and Choices The Women's Movement in Singapore, Singapore, Singapore 
Council of Women's Organisations, 1993, p. 116 
66 This agreement also included a compromise on control of internal security through the establishment of an 
Internal Security Council with British, Singaporean and minority Malayan representation; and, retention of 
external security powers by the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom also retained the right to suspend the 
Singapore constitution and re- impose colonial rule, as the ultimate safeguard against a possible communist 
ascendancy These changes were implemented through the passing of the State of Singapore Act in the British 
parliament in August 1958 and the subsequent proclamation of the Singapore Constitution Order in Council by 
the Governor of Singapore in November 1958. 
67 An hegemonic party system is postulated as a more accurate definition of the status of the PAP by Chan Heng 
Chee after the analysis of Giovanni Satori. See: Chan Heng Chee, "Political Parties ", in Jon S. T. Quah, Chan 
Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, eds., Government and Politics of Singapore, (rev. ed.), Singapore, Oxford 
University Press, 1987, pp. 146 -147. Also: Giovanni Satori, Parties and Party Systems, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1976. Although Chan in her own work had previously used the term `dominant 
party system' to describe the position of the PAP in the Singaporean political landscape, she here agrees with 
his definition of the PAP as an hegemonic party. 
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affinity with the British concept of government and no cultural tradition of democracy, 
has no history of political participation except for partial participation in the previous 
ten years. The majority Chinese population are imbued with pride for the recent 
independence their motherland has found under the new communist government of 
Mao Zse Dong68, and want independence for themselves as soon as possible. 
Additionally, the dominant Chinese community is split, in power terms, between the 
minority English educated and the majority Chinese educated. The former have access 
to power, money and prestige through their ability to actively participate in the 
management of government and business most of which is conducted in English. The 
mass of the Chinese educated, without easy access to an economy dominated by the 
English language, harbour a deep resentment of the English educated "running dogs" 
and did not identify with them.69 Also, communism, as the mother of the 'new' China, 
has a broad general appeal to the working class majority of the Chinese population, 
although most of the Chinese business class were politically conservative and 
supporters of the Guomindang rather than the communists. The latter were a small but 
important reservoir of support for the moderate PAP leaders. 
Most of the inexperienced leaders of this new party cannot speak Chinese, so they 
cannot communicate effectively with the masses whose votes and support they need. 
They have little affinity with Chinese culture or with the Islam and traditions of the 
Malay community. They have a poor organisational base; only an affiliation with some 
trade unions and professional bodies although relatively strong contacts with the 
English educated professional class. Unfortunately, they are suspected of being 
extremists by this latter group and have little political support from them. 
To expand their contacts with the mass of Chinese voters the leaders act on several 
fronts; the Chinese leaders begin to learn Chinese dialects and Mandarin, they recruit 
as many Chinese speakers to their ranks as they can and, most importantly, they forge 
an alliance with a pro -communist group with a large mass support base which requires 
a cover to achieve its own political goals - an alliance of convenience with substantial 
inherent conflicts of interests, goals and means. The pro -communist group is aligned to 
an armed faction, is highly disciplined, has a clear political agenda and has substantial 
resources at its disposal through its affiliations with unions, Chinese educational 
institutions and Chinese cultural organisations. 
68 The pride of Singaporean Chinese in the restoration of Chinese sovereignty by the Chinese Communist 
Party after a century of European imperialist dominance and invasion by Japan was incalculable. The 
Communist Party was seen as synonymous with Chinese national and cultural pride. Pang Cheng Lian 
reported: "Any mart in Singapore who wants to carry the Chinese speaking people with him cannot afford 
to be anti- communist. The Chinese are very proud of China." Straits Times, 5 May 1955 cited in Pang 
Cheng Lian, Singapore's People's Action Party Its History, Organisation and I ' dership, Singapore, Oxford 
University Press, 1971, p. 2 
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Not only must the party battle for support against other political parties, manage the 
numerous policy challenges that face every government, particularly in the already 
difficult period of nation building, but it must constantly struggle for its internal 
survival by managing the conflicts inherent in the factionalism which resulted from this 
alliance 70 
In the first years of government, the challenges became even more complex as both 
domestic and external factors threatened the viability of both government and nation. 
Peter Chen summarises the challenges thus: 
Between 1960 and 1980, the Singaporean government had to overcome a daunting series of 
political, social and economic threats to the nation: rising population and unemployment, a 
national housing shortage linked to poor living standards, the internal communist political 
threat with its armed wing in Malaysia and its internal union power promoting labour unrest 
and union confrontation, the Indonesian confrontation, the integration (upon which the PAP's 
initial national development program depended) and subsequent expulsion from Malaysia, 
racial conflict and the closure of British bases!' 
T. S. Selvan catalogues the starting point for the first PAP government: 
When Lee and the PAP carne to power the kitty was empty, worse, they had inherited a $44 
million deficit. Unemployment was a chronic disease with politician -inspired labour strikes 
eating into the body politic. The worse year was 1955, with 275 strikes and Iockouts, the 
highest for a decade. The number of man-days lost in strikes was 152,005 in 1960, 410,889 in 
1961, 165,124 in 1962 and 388,219 in 1963. It was a strike happy trade union movement, and 
naturally investors stayed away from the island. Illiteracy was widespread, the people were 
breeding ton fast. The public health was deteriorating rapidly with tuberculosis...smallpox, 
cholera, diphtheria, dysentery and filth tearing away the nation's heart. The crime rate 
was astronomical, with Chinese secret society members terrorising the country. In short, 
Singapore was adrift; an island betrayed; a fine mess 7Z 
How did the PAP as a party and government cope with these challenges, what lessons 
did it learn and how have these been incorporated into its governing style and 
approach to policy making? 
Survival, Consolidation and Institutionalisation 
The most basic tasks for the PAP moderates to ensure their survival were: 
69 Jackie Sam, The First Twenty Years of the People's Association, Singapore, People's Association, 1980, 
pp. 23-24 
70 Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for Merger, Singapore Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 16 
71 Chen, Peter S. J. "Sociological Studies on Singapore Society ", in Basant K Kapur (Ed.) Singapore Studies: 
Critical Surveys of the Humanities and the Social Sciences, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1986, p. 
33 (Check page number) 
72 T. S. Selvan, Singapore The Ultimate Island (Lee Kuan Yew's Untold Story), Melbourne, Freeway Books, 
1991, pp. 26 -27 
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1. To develop their own strong support base particularly among the Chinese 
population, equal or superior to the pro -communist affiliated organisations in 
attracting mass support; 
2. Gain control over the trade unions, moderate their political activities and establish 
an industrial relations climate conducive to rapid economic development; 
3. Introduce policies and programs which would rapidly address the most pressing 
domestic policy issues - housing, unemployment, industrial development, 
population control and education and to have the electorate give it credit for these; 
4. Develop an electoral platform which would appeal to the majority of the electorate 
by addressing the practical 'bread and butter' political issues as well as presenting 
a strongly anti -colonialist position; and, 
5. Abandon the alliance with the pro -communist faction as soon as feasible so the 
moderate's program could be clearly differentiated from that of the pro- 
communists. 
This program was implemented by the new PAP government and was successfully 
carried out.73 The path to the entrenchment of control by Lee's moderate democratic 
socialist faction within the PAP over the party and its governments was the bedrock 
on which the party developed to take its presence form74 In some ways it is a classic 
political tale of the struggles undertaken in many countries at this time between 
democratic moderates and communists. It is complicated however by an environment 
of post -colonialism, the political volatility of the community, the constant potential for 
inter -racial and inter- religious violence, suspicion of the nature and political intentions 
of the PAP by the major political parties in Malaya and the willingness of the colonial 
power to intervene militarily in the case of what it would define as a communist 
victory; a definition which could have included the moderate wing of the PAP, in 
addition to its pro-communist faction, had the latter won domination of the party. 
Winning Control of the Party and the Government 
The broad pattern of events which led to the victory of the democratic socialist 
(hereafter termed the 'moderates') under Lee Kuan Yew set the pattern for Lee's and 
73 Of course, the struggles which ensued over this program to establish moderate dominance of the PAP and 
to oust the communist affiliated group were complex and full of political drama The detailed analysis of 
this struggle does not form part of this study and would detract from its focus on the major characteristics of 
the policy environment and the general discussion of its origins. There are many detailed works on this 
period and the emergence of the PAP as the dominant party in Singapore. Refer to: Thomas l Bellows, The 
People's Action Party of Singapore: Emergence of a Dominant Party System, Yale University Southeast 
Asian Studies, New Haven, 1970; Chan Heng Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance The PAP at the 
Grassroots, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1976; Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for Merger, Singapore, 
Singapore Government Printing Office, 1961; Our First Ten Years: PAP Tenth Anniversary Souvenir, 
Singapore, PAP Centre Editorial Board, rid.; Pang Cheng Lian, Singapore's People's Action Party Its 
History, Organisation and Leadership, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1971; Shoe Poon Kim, The 
People's Action Party of Singapore 1954 -1970: A Study in Survivalism of a Single Dominant Party, Ph.D. 
thesis, Indiana University, 1971 
74 Thomas Bellows commented that. "From the time it came to office a decade ago, the PAP leadership has 
had two paramount political objectives, the first of which was achieved by the end of 1965: (1) to survive 
and not to be removed from, or maneuvered out of, office by either the British or the Alliance ovemment in 
Kuala Lumpur; (2) to maintain a qualifiedly open and pluralistic political system while making certain that 
the probable winner (between 1961 and 1964) in an open electoral contest - the Communist- supported 
Bansan Socialis - would come off second best." Bellows, op. cit., p. 5 
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the party's attitude to party control, control of the nation and the management of 
relationships with their political opponents thereafter. 
The alliance between the pro -communist faction and the moderates was principally 
forged during the period of extremist political activity by the pro -communists during 
the period 1954 -56. This period was characterised by pro -communist instigated riots 
and disturbances which mobilised large sections of the Chinese community in objection 
to national service, labour and educational issues. These tactics did not work to 
progress the communist political agenda due to the effectiveness of the internal 
security arrangements and the determination of the British to suppress them. The pro- 
communist then changed their tactics and determined to work within the developing 
political system to achieve their ends of establishing a pro -communist state in 
Singapore. The PAP was perceived as the appropriate vehicle for mainstream political 
participation. The pro -communists were thus involved in the PAP from its founding as 
it provided a more moderate cover for their activities. For the moderates it gave them 
access to the mass of the Chinese population and greater access to the trade union 
movement with which they already had some links. An alliance of convenience, it was 
never an easy partnership. 
In the beginning, the PAP party structure was typical of a mass party structure. 
Branches were established throughout the island in each electorate. These elected 
representatives to the annual party conference which elected the Central Executive 
Committee (CEC) which exercised executive power over the party organisation. 
Membership criteria were not restrictive, characteristic of a party wanting to expand 
its membership and power base. In the beginning there was an informal agreement 
between the moderates and the pro -communists that the latter would limit their CEC 
membership to a minority of positions; initially a limit of three seats. However, the 
moderates were unable to enforce this agreement as the pro -communists were well 
organised and were able to effectively take control of most branches. Thus, under a 
constitution in which CEC membership was determined by the degree of branch 
control exercised by any one faction, the moderates, without strong control of the 
branches were at a severe disadvantage. Realising their advantage, the pro -communists 
made two attempts to wrest control of the CEC from the moderates by using the 
annual party conference. 
At the 1956 Third Annual Party Conference, the pro -communists succeeded in 
increasing their CEC membership from three to four. This seems to have been the 
precursor to taking control of the CEC at the Fourth Annual Party Conference in 
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August 1957, which they did, taking six of twelve seats,75 allegedly though 
manipulation of branch representation at the conference.76 However, shortly after this, 
five of the six were detained under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance by 
the Lim Yew Hock government and three were expelled to China. This allowed Lee 
Kuan Yew and the moderates to again control the party. This temporary loss of control 
of the CEC by the moderates galvanised them, on regaining control of the executive in 
October 1957, to change the party management structure so that the power of the 
branches over the election of CEC members would be removed. 
Four categories of members were established: probationary member, ordinary member, 
probationary cadre member and full cadre member. The CEC was to be elected only by 
full cadre members. This change was a key tactic in maintaining control of the CEC 
and of the party in moderate hands. A Board of Selection was also established to 
manage membership promotions between the various rankings and party 
appointments. The board was also controlled by the moderates. This provided 
effective mechanisms for control of the party's central structure, but provided no 
guarantees for control of the branches. This move changed the fundamental nature of 
the PAP. It became in effect a cadre party masquerading as a mass party,77 although I 
contend that under contemporary arrangements, it eventually became a party of the 
executive. It also further alienated the pro -communists from the moderates, although 
the partnership endured out of political necessity. Bellows sums up the nature of the 
party after this restructure thus: 
In terms of actual location of power, the PAP was at best a dichotomous structure, at worst an 
inverted hierarchy. Discipline emanating from the CEC was sporadic and tenuous and very 
much dependent on the threat of actual implementation of security measures by the Labour 
Front Government?' 
Although the new structure assured the moderates control of the party centre, efforts 
were continued to retain the pro -communists in the PAP as they were required to 
ensure mass support for the party through branch and affiliation networks. In this way 
both the moderates and the pro -communists were playing a dangerous game of 
brinkmanship each trying to maintain a position from which they could, at the 
appropriate moment, wrest control of the party from the opposing faction. If the 
communist front organisations (including the PAP pro -communists) and their leaders 
were too obvious or radical, the probability of detention (or expulsion to China for 
many) under the Internal Security Ordinance was high. They were therefore forced to 
75 Bellows (p. 22) and Pang agree on this. 
76 Bellows, op. cit. p. 23; Pang, op. cit. p.7 
77 Chan Heng Chee comments that; "It would only be honest to describe the PAP as a cadre party in a mass 
party guise.' Chan Heng Chee, "Political Parties ", in Jon S. T. Quah et al, Government and Politics of 
Singapore, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 159 
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remain within the fold of the PAP which provided some interim protection until the 
time was right to act more independently. 
This time soon came. Following the election of the first PAP government in May 1959 
under the new constitution providing for full self- government, the strains between the 
moderates and pro -communists began to show. The new constitution was to be 
reviewed by 1964, holding out the promise of full independence shortly thereafter. The 
possibility, for the pro -communists, of forming an independent communist state was 
therefore on the horizon. With the power of the state at their disposal, the moderates 
were anxious to implement their policy agenda. This had never been fully endorsed by 
the pro -communists and, its implementation was to cause considerable friction. Chan 
summarises the sources of this friction: 
After the 1959 elections the pro-communist wing of the party grew increasingly disenchanted 
with Lee and the moderate leadership over a number of issues such as the continued detention 
of certain political detainees, the new amendment to the Citizenship Bill which deprived 
some left wing leaders of their citizenship, the Government's failure to unify the labour 
movement, and the attempts to control the Singapore Trade Union Congress, obvious signs th a t 
Lee and his associates were determined to contain the leftist elements. The pivotal issue 
which eventually precipitated the split was merger with the Federation of Malaya 79 
The merger issue was crucial for the pro -communists as incorporation within the 
Federation, and especially through internal security matters being controlled from 
Kuala Lumpur, would almost certainly constrain their political ambitions and could 
possibly lead to any pro -communist political party being proscribed and its leaders 
detained. If merger could be avoided, the 1964 post -review constitution might still 
provide the mechanism for implementing the communist political agenda. For the pro- 
communists, merger with Malaya had to be defeated in order for their political agenda 
to he achievable. The conflict between the pro -communists and the moderates became 
an open war in mid -1961. 
The split culminated after two by- election losses by the government (one orchestrated 
by the pro -communists while supposedly supporting the moderate PAP candidate) 
and a vote of confidence in the legislative Assembly over the merger issue. The PAP 
pro -communists abstained from the vote of confidence, were subsequently expelled by 
the PAP and shortly after crossed the floor of the Parliament and formed their own 
political party the Barisan Socialis. At the same time, the PAP Lost an estimated 70 
per cent of its members and 35 of its 51 branches to the new party, including branch 
finances 80 It also lost most of the community centre managers from the People's 
78 Bellows, op. cit. p.27 
79 Chan Heng Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance The PAP at the Grassroots, Singapore, 
University of Singapore Press, 1976, pp. 194-195 
80 Pang Cheng Ilan, op. cit. p. 15 
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Association, a government, not party, organisation which it had established in July 
1960 as a means of establishing an alternative community network independent of the 
unions and Chinese cultural associations.81 
Realising that it was in danger of political defeat resulting from the massive support 
provided to the Barisan Socialis from its branch network, union affiliations and strong 
community network, the PAP government responded on several fronts. To appeal to 
the electorate at large, but particularly the working class, it accelerated the 
implementation of State Development Plan projects aimed at developing economic and 
social infrastructure and particularly at increasing housing stock and employment 
opportunities.82 It began to rebuild the party branch network, commenced the 
development of an enhanced community centres network as a base for building 
community support for countering the Barisan Socialis and attacked its opponents 
through tough new legislation to remove their sources of funding and support. 
The moderates tried to rebuild the branches through their own members of parliament, 
but realised that the urgency of the situation required measures that could more 
effectively deliver increased political support. Turning to the most powerful 
mechanism available to them, the civil service, the government decided to use the 
recently established People's Association within the civil service as its prime points of 
community contact and through it enlarged the community centre network throughout 
the island. By September 1963, 103 community centres had been built 83 Staffed and 
paid for by the government, these centres provided the PAP government with a 
network which could rival or even surpass that of the new opposition. The centre staff 
were drawn from PAP cadres and civil servants mainly from the Social Welfare 
Department who had been provided with PAP political training. The role of the 
community centres was: 
... to ensure the survival of a non -communist state by providing the necessary "bridge" between 
government and masses. The hangers, trusses and decks of this bridge would be made up of 
civil servants and party cadres S4 
The community centres had the promise of replacing the secondary affiliation 
mechanisms through which many voters had identified with the PAP - the unions and 
Chinese education and cultural organisations now more clearly associated with the 
Barisan Socialis. Using the community centres and all the other mechanisms available 
81 Lee Kuan Yew, "Nation Building and the People's Association ", in Jackie Sam (ed.),The First Twenty 
Years of the People's Association, Singapore, People's Association, 1980, p.7 
82 See: Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Office, First Development Plan 1961 -1964, Review of 
Progress for the Three Years Ending 31st December 1963, Singapore, Government printer, 1964 
83 Seah Chee Meow, Community Centres in Singapore. Their Political Involvement, Singapore, Singapore 
University Press, 1973, p. 31 
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to government, the PAP government 
...inaugurated a policy of information saturation to educate, convert, give shape to and guide 
public opinion. ....It became an organiser of programs, policies and opinion, focusing and 
sharpening the discontinuities between itself and its opponents in order to distinguish the 
PAP from all varieties of opposition and promote it as the one feasible alternative 85 
This experience of using the bureaucratic mechanisms of state power to provide 
effective and direct political links between the government and the community was an 
enduring lesson for the moderate PAP leaders and one upon which they were to build. 
The associated widespread use of television (each community centre was provided 
with a television set), over which the government had monopoly access, also taught 
them the power of media control. 
In addition to using the bureaucracy, the PAP used that other more powerful 
instrument of government - legislation - to change the rules by which the conflict was 
being fought, so as to advantage itself and disadvantage its opponents. It accelerated 
its control over the trade union movement, a major power base of the Barisan Socialis. 
The Trade Union Act, enacted in May 1960 had led to an open struggle between the 
moderate and pro -communist trade union leaders in the Singapore Trade Union 
Congress (STUC) over control of the unions. The PAP subsequently de- registered the 
pro -communist controlled STUC, after losing the initial struggle, and established the 
National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) as an alternative. The pro -communists then 
established the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU), thus splitting the 
union movement and somewhat weakening the Barisan Socialis grip on it. The PAP 
then used the resources of the state once again, providing funding and seconding civil 
servants to work with the NTUC to further entrench it and to make it a more attractive 
alternative to STUC affiliation. 
The struggle between the two parties continued to centre on the issue of merger with 
Malaysia. The PAP, using the resources of government available to it, staged a very 
astute and highly focussed campaign. It augmented this with skilful political 
maneuvering through its control of Parliament, especially in the drafting of a 
referendum motion to be put before the electorate. 
The referendum provided no option to vote against merger, included two of three 
alternatives which were obviously unpalatable and allowed the government to count 
blank votes as votes in support of the proposal that received the most votes. The 
preferred option was also placed at the top of the choices on the ballot. This was a 
ruthless exercise in political maneuvering which the PAP were to become masters of. It 
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was justified in those terms which many political parties use in the same circumstances 
- it was a matter of survival, in this case survival against a doctrinaire and 
demonstrably powerful communist front organisation capable of extreme violence 
which also had the potential for exacerbating any existing ethnic tensions as the 
opposition movement was almost wholly Chinese 86 This perception that the extreme 
left was becoming a vehicle for Chinese cultural aggression in the island is one of the 
major reasons C. V. Devan Nair, one of its most prominent early Indian leaders 
deserted it for the more moderate faction of Lee Kuan Yew.87 Devan Nair was to 
become a prominent PAP cadre, head of the NTUC, minister and eventually President. 
The government's efforts were also assisted by the ineptness of the Barisan Socialis in 
handling this issue and especially by its inability to provide a convincing alternative to 
the merger proposal. Following an agreement in August 1964 between Lee Kuan Yew 
and Tunku Abdul Rahman on the principles on which a merger would be based, the 
Barisan Socialis had stated in September that while it agreed to the proposed merger, 
it did not agree in total to the principles on which the merger was to be based S8 
This agreement in principle to the merger by the Opposition allowed Lee Kuan Yew to 
develop a strategy by which he could state that merger could be taken for granted; the 
real debate was over how it was to be achieved. This effectively deprived the Barisan 
of any policy options which would clearly differentiate their views from the 
government. This was compounded by the fact that in reality, the Barisan Socialist 
were actually violently opposed to any merger. It also allowed the government to argue 
in parliament that as all parties had agreed to the merger in principle, the referendum 
could be worded so as to provide options on the conditions of merger only. 
Now that its constituency network through the community centres allowed it to be 
clearly differentiated from the Barisan Socialis, the PAP had an avenue for separating 
its pro -active policy on merger from the oppositions confusion over the issue. These 
centres facilitated an island -wide campaign by the Prime Minister which was to 
85 Bellows, op. cit. pp. 46 47 
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substantially enlarge support for the PAP's merger proposal 89 These new links with 
the electorate, provided through use of civil servants and public facilities and 
resources, greatly enlarged the PAP support base and assisted in differentiating in the 
minds of voters the differences between the two camps. Other, more sinister steps 
were also taken to support the merger. The Malayan Prime Minister threatened to close 
the causeway (and by implication cut off the island's water supply) if merger was 
rejected, and a whispering campaign that the government could identify votes, was 
conducted. The referendum, held on 1 September 1962, supported the PAP's position 
with 70.8 per cent of the vote, not counting the blank ballots cast by Barisan Socialis 
supporters 90 
This win greatly boosted the PAP's confidence in its ability to succeed electorally 
against the Barisan Socialis. The government was, however, well aware that the 
referendum results, because of a number of factors peculiar to it, could not necessarily 
be replicated in a general election 91 However, the prospects were looking much better 
for the PAP government. Its performance in implementing its 'bread and butter' 
programs contained in the State Development Plan 1961 -64 - public housing, schools, 
water and power upgradings, the introduction of television, capital works and 
infrastructure - had begun to have a widespread impact. It was obvious to most 
citizens that the PAP government was delivering on its promises. The government's 
'can do' reputation for administrative efficiency was being established and gaining it 
the reciprocal political support it required. 
These victories by the PAP were further augmented when the Internal Security Council, 
comprised wholly of PAP, British and Malayan members, instigated Operation Cold 
Storage on 27 February 1963 which substantially undermined the organisational and 
parliamentary capacity of the Barisan Socialis It essentially removed the capacity of 
the Opposition to be any political threat of significance by imprisoning or deporting 
almost all of its leadership. Two explanations have been given for this action; (1) that 
89 The role of the People's Association and its community centres in supporting the Government's 
referendum option is explained by Jackie Sam: " The People's Association, its staff depleted, was given the 
task of explaining the issues involved. The official campaign lasted only three weeks in August. From 
operation headquarters at Kallang and 20 community centres, the organisation's staff of 100, with 122 
Government officers and 60 volunteers went out every morning in 77 jeeps, station wagons, lorries and 
vans - all equipped with tape recorders and loud -speakers - to explain the Governments viewpoint and the 
mechanics of the referendum. The thrust of this campaign was in the rural areas; in four days these 282 
officers, divided into teams of two to four, held 4,352 street or village meetings." See: Jackie Sam, op. cit. pp. 
60 -61 
90 Bellows, op. cit. p. 49 
91 Bellows, op_ cit. p 50 comments: "The feeling of optimism was, however, restrained by realistic self - 
doubts. Some who had voted for the government alternative on merger had been intimidated, others were 
confused by the constitutional complexities of the issue and the vicissitudinous quality of Barisan 
arguments. The PAP was well aware that it could not hope to win 71 per cent of the popular vote in a not 
too distant Assembly election." The intimidation Bellows speaks of alludes to the allegation that a 
whispering campaign had been undertaken by the PAP warning voters that it could identify those people 
casting blank (i.e. pro -Barisan Socialis) votes. By its very nature such an allegation could never be either 
substantiated or misproven. 
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it was taken as a precautionary measure to stop pro -communists from organising 
violent, possibly armed, opposition to the Malaysian merger, and (2) to arrest and 
detain pro -communists thought to have been involved in or supportive of a communist 
inspired revolt in Brunei.92 Those arrested and detained under this operation included 
the Secretary- General of the opposition party, its Vice -Chairman, the Secretary - 
General of its trade union affiliate, the Singapore Association of Trade Unions, and 
several members of the Barisan Socialis Executive Committee 93 
The next elections were held five days after the official merger with Malaysia, and 
seven months after the decimation of the opposition's leadership by Operation Cold 
Storage, on 21 September 1963. The PAP won 46.9 per cent of the vote but 72.5 per 
cent of the seats in the Legislative Assembly. The Barisan Socialis had polled 32.1 per 
cent, a reasonable result that translated into 13 seats. However, the PAP had won its 
first general election without the support of the pro -communists. Following the 
elections, the federal Malaysian and the Singaporean governments also instigated 
several security operations against the Barisan Socialis and other left-wing 
organisations, arresting and detaining senior members, deregistered their affiliated 
trade unions and community organisations. 
The Barisan Socialis never developed an adequate response to the use by the 
government of its internal security or legislative powers which became a principal 
means of controlling the development and operations of the opposition. Its response 
was doctrinaire; it never publicly changed its long term policy stance by attempting to 
take the middle ground politically, or to develop an approach to contesting national 
politics which could seriously challenge the ingenuity of Lee Kuan Yew and was 
probably incapable of it.94 This allowed the PAP the opportunity to consolidate its 
power and to present itself as the only party capable of government. 
From October 1963, the remaining 8 Barisan Socialis MPs in the Singapore Parliament 
began a boycott of the Parliament, thinldng that they could continue their struggle 
against the PAP from the streets. However, they were to find that without the support 
of unions and community organisations, and in the face of a PAP government intent on 
using all means at its disposal to contain them, this struggle was to translate into 
92 This is the explanation given by Lee Kuan Yew. Lee Kuan Yew, "Nation Building and the People's 
n ' Associatio, m Jackie Sam (ed.),The First Twenty Years of the People's Association, Singapore, People's 
Association, 1980, p. 13. A more comprehensive explanation is provided by Minchin, op. cit. pp. 127 -128 
93 Clan, op. dt. p.196 
94 James Minchin comments that in establishing a new party to fight the PAP, the opposition fomented the 
seeds of its own destruction because of considerable organisational weaknesses, internal ideological 
differences and inexperience in high level politics. It did not have the discipline, capacity. or experience to 
counter the PAP effectively. Minchin believes that a more effective strategy would have been to force 
multiple by-elections or a general election which would have had a considerable chance of destroying the 
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political oblivion. In October 1965, shortly after Singapore separated from Malaysia, 
the remaining Barisan Socialis parliamentarians resigned their seats, leaving the 
political field open to PAP domination. Lee Kuan Yew and his associates could now 
establish the PAP as the natural party of government and commence their path to 
hegemonic control. 
A detailed analysis of the evolution of the PAP govemment after this period is dealt 
with in considerable detail elsewhere.95 However, it is necessary that we examine a 
critical period which helped fashion the PAP as it is today; Singapore's inclusion in the 
Malaysian Federation. Singapore joined the Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 
1963 and left the federation on 9 August 1965. 
The PAP Phase 2: Singapore in Malaysia 1963 -65 
The period of merger with Malaysia was a pivotal experience for the PAP and its 
leaders. While it does not need to be examined in detail for the purposes of this study, 
it is necessary, because of its effects on the PAP's governing style, to understand the 
essentials of merger, the reasons for its failure and its longer term effects in shaping the 
PAP as a hegemonic party. 
The PAP had sought merger with Malaysia for a number of reasons and it was, at that 
time, the cornerstone of their political and economic strategy for the island. Merger 
would provide Singaporean industry with a large domestic market and integrate it into 
the physical infrastructure of the Malayan Peninsula, assuring it of a continual water 
supply and a supplementary electricity supply. Further, it would remove any reason 
for the Malaysian government to develop ports, airports and other infrastructure to 
compete with that already existing in Singapore. 
Prior to merger, and in its early months, the PAP was confident that it could be 
accepted into the Affiance party coalition which controlled the federal Malaysian 
government, and take an active part in government. When it became obvious that the 
Affiance was determined to not allow the PAP a role in federal government, the 
already uneasy climate between the Singaporean leaders and Kuala Lumpur broke into 
open conflict, to the point where Malay leaders were calling for the detention of the 
95 Space limitations require this historical background to be truncated For detailed analyses of the 
development of the PAP and its evolution into an hegemonic party which has dominated Singapore for more 
than 30 years see: Thomas Bellows, The Peoples' Action Parry: The Emergence of a Dominant Party System, 
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970; Chan Heng Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at 
the Grassroots, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1976; Chan Heng Chee, Singapore the Politics of 
Survival, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1971; Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for Merger, Singapore, 
Singapore Government Printing Office, 1961; Pang Cheng Lian, The People's Action Party: Its History, 
Organisation and Leadership, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1971; Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: 
Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore, Times Editions, 1998 
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PAP leaders and the Secretary- General of UMNO was proposing to imprison Lee 
Kuan Yew and rule Singapore directly from Kuala Lumpur.98 For the merger not to 
succeed was initially inconceivable for the PAP leadership, but soon after merger, that 
leadership commenced a strategy, substantially of its own doing when seen in the 
context of the conditions of merger,47 to undo the merger after only two years. 
Despite a number of substantive policy differences, the most important source of 
conflict was the refusal of the Alliance to accept the PAP into its ranks, thus forcing it 
into the opposition and leaving it powerless in federal affairs. This was particularly 
unacceptable to Lee Kuan Yew and some other PAP leaders, although it seems to have 
caused no difficulties for Goh Keng Swee and Toh Chin Chye who were not as married 
to the Malaysian concept as Lee. The possibility of a PAP coalition with other 
opposition parties (known as the Malaysian Solidarity Convention) removing the 
Alliance Party from office was equally unacceptable to the federal government, which 
had the power, by military force if necessary, to ensure that it did not occur. This it 
did through the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman informing Lee Kuan Yew on 1 
August 1965 that Singapore was to be expelled from Malaysia. Lee announced it, 
tearfully, to the nation on 9 August 1965.98 
This was not a legal separation based on a gentlemanly understanding of irreconcilable 
differences. It was a bitter ousting of Singapore by a Malay- dominated federal 
government determined to continue its dominance of the Malaysian Federation and 
equally determined not to provide any possibility for the PAP to challenge it. This was 
reciprocated by a PAP determination not to play second fiddle to a federal 
government to which it was opposed in ideological and power terms. There was no 
continuation of economic policies which could support Singapore's attempts to be the 
industrial centre of the federation. Singapore was not only out, but out with all gates 
barred to its political re- integration in any way. 
While some among the PAP leadership, particularly Toh Chin Chye and Goh Keng 
96 Minchin, op. cit. p. 157. Minchin provides an insightful analysis of the political and personal imbroglio 
that was to result in separation. See Minchin, op. cit. pp. 141 -161 
97 The conditions under which Singapore was included in the federation were such that the Singapore Chinese 
would never have been able to exercise any substantial direct political control over the federation; Singapore's 
role was to be an economic, not a political engine. This is illustrated by the way in which the federal 
constitution made allowance for two types of citizenship within the federation; citizens who were Singapore 
citizens and citizens who were not This reflected the complementary constitutional arrangements that left 
Singapore with almost total control of its domestic affairs. In effect it was politically cordoned off from the 
federation in most matters except representation in the federal legislature and even there its representation was, 
by agreement, proportionally smaller than its entitlement. See: Michael Leiffer, "Singapore in Malaysia: the 
Politics of Federation ", Journal of Southeast Asian History, 6, 2, 1965, pp. 54-70. For a more recent re- 
assessment of the failure of merger from a Singaporean perspective see: Albert Lau, A Moment of Anguish : 
Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1998 
98 Minchin comments that the medication which had been prescribed for Lee at this time gave him severe mood 
swings, often making him uncharacteristically tearful. See: Minchin, op. cit. p. 156 
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Swee, were not particularly worried about separation,99 for Lee and most probably for 
the Chinese majority, it came both as a shock as well as a relief from the incessant 
conflict between the federal and Singapore governments. The Malay community on the 
other hand saw themselves change overnight from being a majority group nationally (if 
not regionally in Singapore), to a minority in another nation. This perception has had a 
significant effect on the attitudes of the Malay community to the PAP government and, 
in turn, on the policies implemented by the PAP in its relationship with that 
community, particularly its attempts at developing a sense of national identity across 
ethnic lines. Singapore was now on its own. 
The PAP Phase 3: Entrenching PAP Control in Independent 
Singapore 
Following its departure from Malaysia in 1965, the PAP government was faced with a 
range of challenges; the Indonesian confrontation disrupted trade with that country, 
the possibility of Indonesian attacks on Singapore itself could not be discounted, 
Malaysia had to be persuaded to remove its troops from Singapore, there was no 
effective national defence force and threats of forced re- integration were being made 
against Singapore by UMNO 'ultras "oo; and the economic policy challenges were so 
great as to almost make these issues of minor concern 101 The government felt 
surrounded by enemies and, within this context, an ideology of survivalism was seized 
upon as a mobilising concept for the economy, society and politics.102 This concept 
arose from a crisis mentality in government, the civil service and the party based on the 
issue of how Singapore was to survive.103 This survivalist approach was subsequently 
reinforced by a government value framework requiring 'pragmatic' decisions, 'discipline 
and sacrifice ,104 and an increased emphasis on the virtues pushed by Lee Kuan Yew; 
'orderliness, cleanliness, discipline, intensity, virility' 1os 
Economic and security policies were made a priority. Singaporean troops were 
repatriated from Brunei, the two battalions of the SAF were supplemented by the 
volunteer People's Defence Force. The Vigilante Corpsto6 and the Special Volunteer 
99 Minchin, op. cit. p. 157 
100 R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Singapore: The Legacy of Lee Kuan Yew, Boulder, Westview Press, 1990, 
p.64 
101 See: John Drysdale, Singapore: Struggle for Success, Singapore, Times Books International, 1984, pp. 
395 -403 
102 Chan Heng Chee, Singapore: The Politics of Survival, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1971 
103 Drysdale, op. cit., p. 404 
104 Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq, The Prophetic and the Political: Selected Speeches and Writings of S. 
Rajarataam, Singapore, Graham Brash, 1987, p. 269 
105 Minchin, op. cit., p. 3 
106 The Vigilante Corps, which still exists as part of the Singapore Police Force (SPF), was established as an 
emergency citizen force to counteract Indonesian attacks on Singapore under the confrontasi policy of Sukarno. 
It is interesting that almost all the people I interviewed for this study, including regular SAF officers, did not 
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Constabulary were established and in March 1967 compulsory military service was 
introduced. Israeli military advisers were contracted to establish a new Singapore 
Armed Forces (SAF) based on a small core of regular forces, a training command and 
compulsory national service and to advise on redevelopment of intelligence and 
internal security mechanisms. The trade unions were brought under even greater 
control, with strikes outlawed, secret ballots introduced, working conditions reduced 
and placed largely in the hands of employers.'07 Albert Winsemius, a Dutch economic 
consultant, was flown in under United Nations auspices to assist further with 
economic planning and a new export oriented economic policy introduced aimed at 
world, not regional markets and dependent upon large foreign investment by 
transnational corporations.t08 A number of economic and trade agreements were 
negotiated with Malaysia and in June 1967 the currencies of the two nations were 
separated, thus normalising relations and substantially reducing tensions. Singapore 
was now, indisputably, mistress of her own destiny. 
In the period after independence the PAP's experience of politics and government over 
the previous 16 years began to coalesce around a number of strategies through which 
the PAP's hegemoníc framework began to consolidate. In the next section, we will 
examine the principal strategies through which the PAP consolidated its control of 
Singapore from 1965 and which became hallmarks of its style of governance. 
Winning Elections and Consolidating Government 
With the Barisan Socialis having departed from the parliament almost completely by 
1965, either voluntarily or under threat of possible arrest, the PAP won all the 
subsequent 11 by- elections in 1966 -67 giving it absolute control of the legislature. The 
last Barisan politician, Chia Thye Poh, was arrested and imprisoned in 1966 under the 
Internal Security Act (ISA) and was not released until 1995. He was under ISA 
restriction orders until November 1998.109 The Barisan subsequently boycotted the 
1968 elections, although Lee warned of an opposition resurgence if the economy turned 
bad or young voters became disenchanted 110 From 1968 to 1980 the PAP won all 
seats in each general election; gaining 84.4% of the votes in 1968, 69% in 1972, 72.4% 
in 1976 and 75.5% in 1980. This record was assisted by the PAP's determination to 
use all means available to undermine the development of an effective opposition. For 
know of the continued existence of this force. It is constituted under the Vigilante Corps Act and is an almost 
wholly volunteer force staff by Police National Servicemen. In 1998, their training has special components, 
different from regular police training, within the Police Training Command. 
107 Rodan, op. nit, 1989, p. 91 -92 
108 Margolin, op. cit., 1989, pp. 147 -148 
109 Chia Thye Poh has the dubious honour of being the world's longest political detainee, having been 
detained from 1963 -1995 without trial or any charges being laid or proven. 
110 Drysdale, op. cit., p. 403 
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example, following the 1972 elections, two opposition candidates were imprisoned; 
Leong Mun Kwai" on charges of inciting assassination and Harbans Singh Sindhu112 
for defamation of Lee Kuan Yew.113 In 1976, the government again took legal action 
against opposition candidates; Shamsuddin Tung Tao Chang, a united Front 
candidate was arrested under the ISA on ethnic disturbance charges and Leong Mun 
Kwai was found guilty of defamation against Lee Kuan Yew. J. B. Jeyaratnam was also 
charged with libel against Lee Kuan Yew.114 An opposition presence arrived only in 
1981 as the result of a by- election when J. B. Jeyaratnam of the Workers Party won the 
seat of Anson. This win was the result of a happy confluence of circumstances for the 
opposition parties. The new PAP political leadership were inexperienced and ran a 
poor campaign, Jeyaratnam was supported by many younger voters and was also able 
to capitalise on a number of unpopular government decisions" which were 
compounded by the PAP government breaking its rule of allowing one year to lapse 
between the introduction of controversial policies and an election, due to pressures to 
introduce the new generation of leaders. This kept recent unpopular policies in the 
minds of the electorate. 
The 1984 general election was held in the aftermath of a rapid re- alignment of the 
party to usher in a new generation of MPs and executive leaders. It saw another seat 
won by an opposition party - the Singapore Democratic Party's (SDP) Chiam See Tong 
- and Anson retained by the Workers Party - and the PAP's vote decline by 12.6% to 
62.9 %, giving the opposition almost 40% of the vote. This led to speculation that this 
was the beginning of the end of PAP dominance."6 A level of voting below 60% begins 
the process of converting votes to seats, so this was approaching a critical level for the 
PAP, as the single member first- past -the -post system is an all -or- nothing voting 
strategy - governments can lose or win on 1% of the vote, unlike preferential voting 
systems. In this election 215,000 new voters participated representing 13% of the 
electorate and bringing a better educated general voter to the polls than in the past. 
From this election onward, young voters would increasingly be involved, a point not 
lost on Lee's determination to develop the next generation of leaders. Following this 
election, Lee questioned whether the voting system should be changed to provide votes 
111 Leong Mun Kwai was a People's Front candidate. 
112 Harhans Singh Sindhu, a lawyer, was a veteran Barisan Socialis member who had broken away in 1975 and 
formed the United People's Front. Tt was supposed to be an amalgamation of several parties, but appears to have 
been based more on personal animosity to other opposition groups than a coherent political grouping_ 
113 Choo, op. cit. p. 52 
114 Choo, op. cit., p. 64 
115 For example; the decision to demolish blocks of flats in the electorate to make way for a Port of Singapore 
Authority (PSA) container terminal; the PAP candidate being a relative of the head of the PSA; delays in housing 
supply; the attack on dialects by the Speak Mandarin campaign. See: Milne and Mauzy, 1990, p.65 -66 
116 Bilveer Singh, Whither PAP's Dominance: An Analysis of Singapore's 1991 General Elections, Petaling 
Jaya, Pelanduk Publications, 1992, p. 15 
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of different value based on age, although the proposal was not pursued.117 Instead, the 
government introduced Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs), ostensibly to 
ensure ethnic minority representation in the legislature, but with the intention of making 
it more difficult for the opposition to win seats. Each GRC was formed by combining 
three single member constituencies into one and fielding a team of three candidates, 
one of whom had to be from a minority race. As part of this strategy, the Anson 
constituency held by the Workers Party was abolished. In the 1988 general election, 
Jeyaratnam was banned from standing because of defamation action taken against him 
by the Prime Minister and the only opposition seat retained was by Chiam See Tong 
for the SDP. 
Goh called elections early, in August 1991. The opposition, on the initiative of Chiam 
See Tong, introduced its 'by- election strategy', guaranteeing that it would not contest 
every seat and so ensure the return of a PAP government, in the hope that it would 
garner greater support in the constituencies it contested. The government again changed 
the electoral boundaries and the nature of the GRCs, shortly prior to the election. 
Fifteen GRCs were created, only 21 single member constituencies retained,118 and 
teams were increased to four candidates, ostensibly to force young voters to change as 
they were "preferring candidates who were best suited to their own needs without 
being sufficiently aware of the need to return a racially balanced party slate.. "119 This 
would seem to be an indictment of the quality of PAP candidates and an indication of 
the lack of support for the government more than a fault with voters. 
The election of four opposition members and a further fall in PAP votes sent shock 
waves through the PAP, even though it represented only 5% of the seats and swings of 
approximately 6% against it in key electorates. Chiam See Tong and Low Thia Khian 
were joined by two additional SDP members; Cheo Chai Chen and Ling How Doong, 
the later defeating the only woman PAP minister, Dr. Seet Ai Mee. This has been the 
highest opposition representation since 1963. It is even more revealing that in four 
other single member seats120 the opposition receive 47% of the votes or above, and in 
the Eunos GRC it received 47.6% of votes, putting it within striking distance of 13 
seats in the legislature; a return to the 1963 balance of power. These numbers were not 
lost on the government which threw additional people and resources into these 
marginal electorates and increased attacks on the opposition. The government 
particularly attempted to portray the opposition as incompetent - its usual strategy - 
117 The Straits Times, 24 December 1984, p. 1 
118 The Report of the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee, 1991, Cmd. 12 of 1991, 8 August 1991 
119 Goh Chok Tong speaking to the second reading of the Parliamentary Elections Bill 1988. See: Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates, 50, 11 January 1988, col. 178 
120 These were in the electorates of Braddell Heights (Sin Kek Tong for the SDP); Bukit Batok (Kwan Yue Keng 
for the SDP; Changi (Tan Bin Seng for the Workers Party); and Nee Soon South (Low Yong Nguan for the SDP). 
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but in pursuing this, was assisted by the opposition itself. In by- elections held in his 
own seat of Marine Parade in December 1992, Goh Chok Tong's team received 72.9 
per cent of the vote in what had been billed a test of his leadership style. This boosted 
Coh's standing in the party and parliament and helped overcome some of the damage 
done from the 1991 general election_121 
During the period 1991 -1997, the SDP split because of policy, strategy and personality 
differences between Chiam See Tong, Chee Soon Juan and Ling How Doong, resulting 
in several court cases and libel suits. Chiam left the SDP and joined the newly 
established Singapore People's Party (SPP)122 and Chee and Ling123 took control of 
the SDP and initiated a policy of greater confrontation with the government 
lJnfortunately, in doing so, the SDP was to find that part -time politicians with little 
administrative support are at a severe disadvantage to a government with the full 
support of the public bureaucracies at its disposal. The SDP attacked the government 
on the issue of increases in the cost of living including the cost of health and hospital 
charges and argued that government health subsidies were very low. Before and during 
a parliamentary select committee inquiry on the issue, the government, which has 
access to many statistics that are not published, demonstrated that the SDP's 
arguments were wrong and the SDP itself made a number of basic arithmetical errors in 
presenting its case.124 The government controlled media made much of Chee's and 
Ling's incompetence in not presenting factually correct arguments and threatened to 
call Chee before the bar of parliament and try him for contempt. Chiam's SPP 
continued with a non -confrontational policy to opposition politics. 
These successes against the opposition were offset by a scandal involving the 
discounted sale of apartments to Lee Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong which were 
heavily defended by Goh and the state controlled media even though the transactions 
were a prima facie breach of the ministerial code of conduct issued under Lee's 
premiership125 and possibly of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The government's 
121 Goh's vote actually dropped from 77.2 % in the 1991 general election to 72.9 % in the by- election. 
However, as this by- election had been fought as a personal battle between Goh, the Singapore Democratic Party 
and the Workers Party, Goh considered it a substantial victory, which it was. The Worker's Party failed to field a 
team as one of the nominees did not register on time. See: The Straits Times, 20 December 1992, p. I 
122 The Singapore People's Party was established by that faction of the SDP which agreed with Chiam's non - 
confrontational approach to opposition politics. 
123 Ling was an MP and so was made Chairman of the party. Chee was appointed Secretary- General. 
124 Asiaweek, 16 August 1996. Available at: h ttp: / /pathfinder.com /asiaweek/96 /0823/ 
newsm ap/singapor.html 
125 The 1979 Code of Conduct for Ministers states in Article 3(vi) "A Minister ought not to enter into 
transactions whereby his private pecuniary interests might, even conceivably, come into conflict with his 
public duty." Further, the final article of the code (Article 5) contains provision for the extension of the code in 
terms of uncodified "rules of prudence" which would appear to forbid the acceptance of gifts such as discounted 
real estate purchases. This article states: "... Ministers should carefully avoid all transactions such as the 
acceptance of gifts of substantial value from members of the public which can give colour or countenance to the 
belief that they are doing anything which. the `rules of obligation" forbid." See: Code of Conduct for Ministers, 
Cmd 2 of 1979, Singapore, Parliament of the Republic of Singapore, 15 January 1979. 
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Iegislation regulating home and public internet access, while allowing free access by 
businesses, was also a negative factor in 1996, particularly with the middle class. 
In the 1997 general elections, the PAP played an even harder form of politics than 
usual, managing thereby to reduce the opposition presence in parliament to two seats; 
Chiam See Tong (SDP) and Low Thia Khiang (WP) retained their seats. J.B. 
Jeyaratnam accepted a Non -Constituency seat, thus increasing the opposition presence 
to three in a legislature of 83 members. The government admitted using blatant pork 
barrel tactics126 by linking HDB upgrading and other expenditure programs to electoral 
support for the government. Constituencies were warned that the HDB upgrading 
programs would not proceed in those electorates that voted against the government 
with the Prime Minister threatening that they would "become slums. "127 In the 
opposition held electorates, this loss of government support was expanded to include 
denying the Pasir Potong constituency a station on the new North-East Mass Rapid 
Transit (MRT) line being constructed.128 This was despite the opposition parties 
agreeing to again use the 'by- election strategy' that had proven so successful in 1991. A 
guarantee of power was not enough for the PAP; its philosophy of total control could 
not accept even a minimal opposition representation. It therefore developed a 'local 
election' strategy to counter the opposition's 'by- election' tactic. 
The 'local election' strategy called for the development of detailed development and 
improvement plans for each GRC and single member constituency.129 At election time, 
these plans, at the heart of which was highly subsidized enhancement of most 
Singaporeans prize possession - the HDB flat - would be provided in great detail to 
the electorate as an inducement to support the government; essentially a simplistic 
pork barreling approach. This strategy worked; the PAP increased its vote from 61% in 
1991 to 65% in 1997, thus reversing the decline that had continued since 1981. It must 
be said, however, that this approach was greatly assisted by a number of other 
factors; the amendments to the GRC boundaries, thus reducing the number of single 
member constituencies and making it more difficult for the opposition to field large 
teams; mistakes by the opposition, the lack of detailed policy programs by opposition 
parties, media speculation about the possibility of the opposition winning the Cheng 
126 Brigadier -General George Yea commented, in reply to an accusation of using pork barrel politics by the 
United States' State Department, `Very strange ... pork barrel politics has a long tradition in America." 
Asiaweek, 10 January 1997. Available at: http: / /www. pathfinder .com /asiaweek/97 /1226 /newsmap/ 
singapor.html 
127 Asiaweek, 10 January 1997. Available at: htt p: / /www.pathfinder.com/asíaweek/97 /1226/ 
newsmap/singapor.html 
128 Personal communication 
with Chiam See Tong. 
129 Derek de Cunha, The Price of Victory: The 1997 Singapore General Election and Beyond, Singapore, 
ISEAS, 1997, p. 2 
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San GRC which led to a feeling that the opposition would win additional seats ;130 and 
intimidatory tactics by the government. 
But did this signal a beginning of greater electoral support for the PAP? The leader of 
the Singapore Democratic Party, Dr. Chee Soon Juan thinks not; the choice for many 
was an economic, not a political choice - they succumbed to electoral bribery.13' Derek 
de Cunha agrees; that the increased support reflected a choice by the electorate to have 
their homes improved at government expense. Rather than gather the country behind it, 
the PAP's tactics may in the long run, turn against it. In particular, the defamation 
actions taken against Tang Liang Hong and J. B. Jeyaratnam, but Tang in particular, 
caused wide- spread concern. This was exacerbated by the apparent vindictiveness of 
also laying charges against Tang's wife for assisting her husband's defence. Tang and 
his wife had to subsequently flee to Australia. These social divisions, particularly the 
discontent of the Chinese- educated, were admitted to by Goh Chock Tong in a post- 
election address, 132 and even justified by Lee Kuan Yew as "a risk we had to take. "133 
To any objective observer, Singaporean or not, there was no threat to the PAP whether 
it lost five seats in Cheng San or 20 seats in a legislature of 83 in which it was 
guaranteed an absolute majority and in which a two- thirds majority is required to 
change the constitution. The risk only exists within an obsession with absolute control 
and an intolerance for even the mildest form of legislative accountability; which 
actually cannot be forced upon the government unless the opposition controls more 
than one -third of the legislature; 24 seats. 
The electoral performance of the PAP from 1959 -1997 is shown in Table 1.2 below. 
TABLE 1.2: The PAP's Electoral Record 1959 -1996 
Year Total 
Seats 
Seats 
Contested 
Seats Won by 
Opposition 
Seats Won by 
PAP 
PAP % of Total 
Votes 
1959 51 51 8 43 53.4 
1963 51 51 14 37 46.6 
1968* 58 7 0 58 84.4 
1972 65 57 0 65 69 
1976 69 53 0 69 72.4 
1980 75 38 0 75 75.5 
1984 79 49 2 77 62.9 
130 Derek de Cunha provides a perceptive analysis of the effect of the media's speculation about the Worker's 
Party winning the Cheng San GRC. He believes that most voters began to believe that the opposition would 
win this GRC and that their representation would automatically increase as this one win would provide five 
seats. This then assuage a general desire to have an opposition voice in parliament, but without having the 
opposition come from `my back yard'. Therefore voters felt free to vote for the PAP in the certainty that the 
opposition would win Cheng San. The statistics partially support this proposition as the PAP vote in Cheng 
San was the lowest among the GRCs at 54.8 %. See: Derek de Cunha, op. cit., pp. 56-57 
131 
"Chee: HK will suffer if it emulates S'pore's system', Straits Times, 21 December 1996, p. 33 
132 "PM Goh: Time to close the cracks after GE ", Straits Times, 6 February 1997, p. 1 
133 Quoted in: "Why PM dramatised Cheng San battle ", Straits Times, 8 January 1997, p. 1 
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1988 81 70 1 80 61.8 
1991 81 40 4 77 61 
1992* 81 4 0 4 72.9 
1997 83 36 2 81 65 
by- election 
Removing Sources of Social Dissatisfaction 
The top -down policy making process of the PAP governments, devoid of community 
consultation and developed within a technocratic rather than a political framework, 
often generated considerable social hostility to the government. hi response, the 
government has found the flexibility to change policy in response to feedback on large 
scale general public dissatisfaction, despite its avowed resistance to 'popular' policies. 
This was the case in liberalising the use of Central Provident Fund (CPF) funds to 
allow people to use these forced savings for purchasing a first property, education 
expenses, purchasing shares in GLCs as they are privatised and for some other limited 
purposes. The government also discontinued the educational and taxation preferences 
provided under the graduate mothers scheme134, moderated the steaming and language 
policies in schools, introduced the Edusave scheme to provide family based education 
funding for all children, provided direct payments to citizens to increase CPF and 
Medisave account balances to partially offset cost increases, enhanced training 
initiatives for workers and the unemployed, extended the housing program to sell small 
HDB flats at highly subsidized prices to low income families to promote home 
ownership,135 expanded the MRT system, funded intra- township light rail systems to 
avoid liberalising its car ownership restrictions, increased subsidies and support for 
the small and medium enterprise business sector, provided tax breaks for small 
business and individuals and expanded the housing upgrading programs for both HDB 
estates and private estates. 
Of all these measures, the direct subsidy of housing upgrading in HDB estates and 
direct payments to citizens have had the greatest impact on maintaining electoral 
support for the PAP. They are, however, very obvious vote purchasing policies. They 
do not indicate an increased respect for the PAP's ideas, approach to governance or 
guarantee a long term mandate. They actually make the economic policy for political 
support trade off between the government and society so obvious as to increase its 
vulnerability, not enhance its strength. 
134 Provided to families in which a graduate woman married a graduate man; a simple eugenics policy aimed at 
producing children of higher intelligence, despite the psychological evidence that there is no basis to such a 
policy. It is simply based on one of Lee Kuan Yew's core personal beliefs, despite the fact that neither of his 
parents were from a higher education background. See: `Breeding the Brightest ", Asiaweek, 2 March 1984, pp. 
23 -26 
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In terms of ethnic relations policies, the PAP government had been aware for many 
years of the general low socio- economic status of the Malay community. In 1981, with 
increasing wealth and a trend in income inequality being perceived, Mendaki, a Malay 
community development organisation was established under government sponsorship 
and the control of Malay PAP MPs. The government made a $10 million donation and 
encouraged GLCs and others to also donate to build an endowment trust, aimed 
principally at providing educational enrichment and support programs for Malay 
students. In 1989 A similar organisation, SINDA,136 was established for the Indian 
community. Despite some concern about its appropriateness, a third organisation of 
this type, the Chinese Development Assistance Council, was established in 1992 to 
assist poor Chinese families with education programs. The organisations are funded by 
"voluntary" deductions from all workers salaries and transferred to the organisation 
of the workers racial group. Although one can choose not to have the small monthly 
deduction made, there appears to be few who do. Support for the Malay community 
was further increased when the government co -opted in 1991 of the Association of 
Muslim Professionals, an independent community organisations originally established 
to compete with MENDAKI in providing education and training support to the Malay 
community, by offering it generous subsidiaries for its activities and accepting 
government direction in the development of its programs.137 
Controlling Social Dissent 
By November 1966 due to the withdrawal of the Barisan Socialic from parliament, the 
PAP was totally in charge of the nation. The government made it known that tight 
social discipline was required for economic survival and that no substantial form of 
dissent would be tolerated. It's jailing of Chia Thye Poh under the ISA, its harsh 
suppression of Barisan street protests in 1967, its domination of the unions and its 
uncompromising stand on most policy issues drove this message home. 
There were few significant acts of resistance to the government between 1967 and the 
1980s, except for the continuation of Jehovah's Witnesses and members of the 
Unification Church, both banned organisations, to proselytize. Members of these 
organisations continued to be prosecuted and jailed by the government138 In 1974, a 
confrontation between the government and the University of Singapore Students Union 
135 This is probably the only housing subsidy actually provided by the government, despite its claim that HDB 
housing is heavily subsidised. 
136 SINDA: Singapore Indian Development Association 
137 Chua Beng Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 196 
138 The Jehovah's Witnesses are proscribed because of their resistance to compulsory military conscription. 
The Unification Church (Moonies) is seen as a dangerous cult which destroys families and teaches obedience to 
its leader over loyalty to nation and family and is banned on those grounds. These arrests still continue; 
between November 1995 and July 1996, more than 60 Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted and most jailed. See: 
"Fighting faith of stoic witnesses to repression ", Sydney Morning Herald, 11 April 1998, p. 6 
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over the treatment of redundant workers and the union's right to challenge government 
policy was resolved by jailing the student leaders led by Tan Wah Piow and changing 
the University of Singapore Act to ensure that student organisations had no political 
role.139 
In May and June 1987, the ISA was used to detain 22 young social activists, many of 
whom were members of Roman Catholic social organisations,140 and charge them with 
being members of a "Marxist conspiracy" affiliated with Tan Wah Piow. Confessions 
were forced from those arrested and were broadcast on national television, However, 
nine of the detainees later refuted them in April 1988 following their release. These 
were then forced to sign statutory declarations re- confirming their original statements 
or face continued detention under the ISA - on which there exists no limit. In 
association with this case, Francis Seow was arrested in May 1988, presumably to 
stop him representing the detainees. Seow, while on release from detention, fled 
Singapore for the United States. This deprived the detainees of their first choice in 
legal representation and removed an opposition member from parliament in one blow. 
This case was also intimately linked with warning religious organisations, specifically 
the Catholic Church, not to transgress on political issues. Subsequently, the 
maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, drafted with the advise of the ISD, was 
enacted. This legislation forbade religious organisations or their officials from being 
involved in political matters. 
Within the legal profession, any tendency to dissent individually or collectively, has 
been minimised by two strategies: (a) the government's economic power through its 
control of a large part of the legal market through government departments, statutory 
boards and GLCs;141 and (b) legislative changes which have removed the right of the 
Law Society to comment on legislation and subsumed its position within the 
profession to the government controlled Academy of Law. 
These restrictions on the Law Society arose from its criticism, under the leadership of 
Francis Seow, of another social control mechanism, changes to the Newspaper and 
Printing Presses Act in May 1986. These legislative amendments were aimed at 
imposing greater government control of the print media. Radio142 and television were a 
government monopoly and so were already under tight control. The government 
139 Tan Wah Piow's version of this confrontation is expounded in: Tan Wah Piow, Frame -Up: A Singapore 
Court on Trial, Oxford, TWP Publishing, 1987. Tan is now a lawyer in London. 
140 The organisations these people were associated with included Young Catholic Workers, the Catholic Centre 
for Foreign Workers, the Catholic Peace and Social Justice Commission and an amateur drama group called 
"Third Stage ". 
141 Beatrice S. Frank et al, The Decline of the Rule of Law in Singapore and Malaysia, New York, The 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1991, pp. 77 -78 
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directly criticised the Law Society, threatened to change its legislation and called Seow 
and other Law Society officers (including Teo Soh Lung, arrested as one of the 'Marxist 
conspirators' above)143 before a Select Committee of parliament and televised the 
proceedings including vehement attacks by Lee Kuan Yew, Prof. S. Jayakumar Wong 
Kan Seng and others on the Law Society officials. A very clear message was sent to 
society about the limits of political activity and debate; that commentary on legislation 
outside a political party environment would not be tolerated as it is the act of "an 
enemy" of the govenunent.144 
Weakening Political Opposition 
The PAP government enjoys a solid record in destroying the personal reputations and 
careers of its opponents, unless those opponents accept the system as it is and 
obviously work within it The international credibility of these attacks is so low that no 
nation to whom a Singaporean opposition politician has fled has agreed to repatriate 
him to Singapore to face outstanding charges, including Malaysia, Australia, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. J. S. Jeyaratnam has been charged 
with fraud, disbarred from practicing as an attorney, found guilty of defamation three 
times (twice with multiple suits), has been bankrupted twice, disbarred from standing 
for parliamentary elections, fined and reprimanded by the Parliamentary Privileges 
Committee on at least two occasions and expelled from the parliament, all on charges 
which seem to have little if any credibility and whose roots are political rather than 
legal. In response to the findings of the Privy Council that exonerated Jeyaratnam of 
charges leading to his disbarrment, the government removed the Privy Council as 
Singapore's final court of appeal. Despite his consistent opposition to the PAP, it is 
true, but unfortunate, to conclude that Jeyaratnam has served the PAP well; his life 
under the PAP is a lesson to all Singaporeans of what outspoken consistent opposition 
to the PAP will bring; professional ruination and poverty. 
Shortly before the 1988 elections, Francis Seow, president of the Law Society and 
candidate for the Workers party who had been attempting to recruit a slate of lawyers 
to run as opposition candidates, was arrested under the ISA. No additional 
candidates from the legal profession stood, but Seow was allowed to contest the 
elections. He was latter arrested, charged with taxation fraud, and subsequently 
sought political asylum in the United States. He has never returned to Singapore. 
142 The exception being the Redifusion service, a cable radio service which provided no programming which 
could be critical of the government. 
143 Both Teo and Tang Fong Har, another attorney active in the social justice activities of the Law Society, 
were later arrested as part of the `Marxist conspiracy' plot. Teo was also a member of the Workers Party, which 
was a further incitement for the government to attack her. 
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As well as direct attacks on the opposition, the government has used the analysis of 
voting patterns and electoral boundary changes to influence the distribution of 
opposition votes in particular constituencies. For example, after an analysis of voting 
patterns in the 1988 election revealed that Malay enclaves in particular housing estates 
may have increased the anti- government vote, the government began a more rigid 
enforcement of its racial composition rules for HDB and Urban Redevelopment 
Authority (URA) housing estates. These stipulate that in any particular apartment 
building or estate that the Chinese proportion of residents cannot exceed 80% or 
Malay 22 %.145 This then slightly redistributed the Malay vote among several 
electorates. This manipulation of electoral boundaries continues to be a key PAP 
governance strategy. In 1997, Tan calculated that on a two party basis, "under the 
GRC scheme, you can secure 75% of all seats in Parliament by winning only 37% of all 
the votes cast ... It is possible to secure 90% of all seats in Parliament through the GRC 
by winning only 45% of the votes. "146 
Co- opting and Controlling the Media 
In its fight for political supremacy, the PAP developed an appreciation of the power of 
the media to influence the population and to mould social and political opinion. The 
state controlled television and radio, but not the print media. Although the PAP had 
acted against the press from 1959,147 it began a concerted attack from May 1971 with 
the detention of the proprietor of the Chinese language Nanyang Siang Pau. A series of 
attacks on the print media culminated in all the Singaporean domestic print media 
being forcibly amalgamated into Singapore Press Holdings which is state controlled 
through the government's ownership of special "management shares ", although normal 
shares are traded on the stock exchange under special government reporting 
regulations. The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act has been successively amended 
since May 1977 to control all print media through censorship and indirect state 
control. 
The foreign print media have often been attacked by the Singaporean government, sued 
and their circulation terminated or restricted for criticising the government. This has 
included the Asian Wall Street Journal, the Far East Economic Review, the International 
144 Giam Chin Toon, President of the Law Society in 1990 stated that the consequences of the society 
commenting on legislation is that the government "would treat us as an enemy and harm us." See: Frank et al., 
op. cit. 1991, p. 82 
145 "Singapore 
", Asia 1990 Yearbook, Hong Kong, Far East Economic Review, p. 214 
146 Kevin Y. L. Tan, "Is Singapore's Electoral System in Need of Reform ? ", Commentary, 14, 1997, pp. 109- 
[ 17, p. 115 
147 After the PAP won office in 1959, Leslie Hoffman, the editor of the Straits Times, fled Singapore for Kuala 
Lumpur fearing arrest because of Lee Kuan Yew's hostility to his editorial policies. See: T. J. S. George, Lee 
Kuan Yew's Singapore, rev. ed., Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 1984, pp.144 -147 
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Herald Tribune, Time, and the Economist.148 The government has also restricted the 
entry of certain journalists to Singapore because of their corporate affiliation, 
particularly Dow Jones affiliates, and amended legislation so that all foreign 
publications with a circulation of at least 300 copies and weekly or more frequent 
publication (i.e. all foreign publications) to apply for an annual licence which is 
granted or revoked at ministerial discretion 149 All these media companies have bowed 
to government pressure in the face of loss of circulation in Singapore. In terms of 
foreign television and news reporting, ordinary citizens are not allowed to purchase or 
install satellite dishes for receiving foreign satellite signals, although business 
applications are allowed. The single domestic cable television service carries foreign 
news, but it is government owned through a consortium of GLCs. There is therefore no 
independent sources of radio, print or television commentary of any type available to 
the ordinary citizen which does not risk the possibility of government censorship, 
except for the internet. Aspects of this governance strategy are examined further in 
Chapter Eight. 
In silencing its critics, since the inauguration of the first Gob Chock Tong government 
the PAP political executive has tried both the carrot and stick approach, perhaps 
indicative of a conflict in temper and style between the new premier and the old who 
remains within the cabinet. Goh Chock Tong's open and consultative style led to what 
was seen in some quarters in 1991 as an opening up of political dialogue; what one 
commentator called a new "speak up" culture: 
Some samples can be given ... of this new "speak up" culture: Russell Heng's commentary that 
the PAP government erred in its charges and arrest of the "Marxist conspirators "; Cherian 
George's criticism of the conscriptive rules and regulations which govern what newspapers 
can write and what they cannot; Hussin Mutalib's criticisms about certain key aspects of the 
PAP school policy and the Bill on "Religious Harmony "; Bilveer Singh's comment that 
Singapore's modernization drive will not work if there is a feudal political system; Vivian 
Balakrishnan s challenge to the government to openly and unobtrusively declare that it does 
not discriminate against the minorities; Chua Beng Huat's suggestion that racial issues could 
have been played up during the Election to prevent the emergence of class antagonism; and 
senior law lecturer Walter Woon's publicly- expressed view that Singapore does not have a 
Constitution given the ease with which changes are made to the Constitution. "15° 
This tolerant style, mild by the standards of liberal democracy, was however, soon 
gone. In a review of the domestic politics in 1994, Cherian George commented: 
"In the discussion of many issues of national interest in the past year and preceding years, I 
detect certain modes of thinking within the Government. .,. it has become virtually 
148 Frank et al., op. cit, p. 103 
149 Frank et al., op. cit., p. 105 -106 
150 Hussin Mutalib, "Domestic Politics ", in, Lee Tsao Yuan, Singapore: The Year in Review 1991, Singapore 
IPS, 1992, pp. 69 -105, p. 73 
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impossible for Singaporeans to contribute to the discussion of issues of public interest without 
their motives being questioned and their ideas labelled and caricatured by those in 
authority. ... if Singaporeans point out areas where more public action can help improve the 
lives of some of their disadvantages countrymen, this will invariably earn long lectures from 
the government about the ills of the Western welfare state. ... Singaporeans wanting to 
expand the space for public discussion are labelled as trying to pressure for American style 
press freedom.... such comments are not only unfounded, but also smack somewhat of paranoid 
delusions. There are positive examples, but these are rare. "tsi 
The government also acts to quieten individual critics. In response to a comment by 
Devan Nair on BBC radio in June 1988, that he and Lee Kuan Yew had consorted with 
American diplomats to a greater degree than had Francis Seow, Lee Kuan Yew sued 
Devan Nair for libel in an attempt to blunt the cotnments.I52 Dr. Chee Soon Juan, a 
NUS academic and member of the SDP, was dismissed from his position at the 
university and subsequently sued by three PAP members (including his immediate 
superior at the university) and had very large damages made against him in 1992 after 
standing against Goh Chock Tong in the 1992 elections. In 1994, Lee Kuan Yew sued 
the International Herald Tribune and instigated action against Christopher Lingle, then 
an NUS academic, for publishing suggestions of a Lee family dynastic succession in 
Singapore.153 Also in 1994, a more significant government attack was made on a critic 
who was not an opposition supporter but a member of the upper -class intelligentsia. In 
reaction to two articles from author Dr. Catherine Lim in the Straits Times, proposing 
that the style of government was still a contest between Lee Kuan Yew's dictatorial 
style and Goh's consultative style, both Goh and Lee severely attacked Lim, a mild 
mannered ex- academic with no interest in politics, and demanded that she enter 
politics if she wished to comment on the government This attack indicated a number 
of things; the government's lack of understanding of those elites outside its co -opted 
circle, its low awareness of the rejection by these elites of the PAP's co -option 
mechanisms and their acceptance that citizens could pass general non -party political 
comments on the government, and the government's continued sensitivity and inability 
to handle criticism in a what in a genuine democracy would be seen as a mature way. 
Strengthening Institutional Controls 
The constitution adopted in 1967 as the institutional framework for an independent 
Singapore has been carefully designed to provide the government with complete control 
of the institutions of the state with no sources of independent review of the executive. 
Various changes have been made to the constitution since 1981 to further strengthen 
the government's institutional controls. In 1981, C. V. Devan Nair was appointed as 
151 Cherian George, "Domestic Politics ", in, Yap Mui Teng, Singapore: The Year in Review 1994, Singapore, 
IPS, 1995, pp. 52 -60, p. 58 
152 Frank et al, op. cit., p. 83 
153 Christopher Lingle, Singapore's Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions and 
Political Dependency, Fairfax (Va.), The Locke Institute,1996 
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the first politician to become president. This was seen as a precedent that could 
prepare the way for Lee Kuan Yew or some other politician to become head of state; a 
change from the appointments previously made which were from non -political 
candidates. This politicisation of the presidency drew it into the sphere of political 
control and closer to the political executive, thus depriving it of any likelihood of being 
a source of alternative power. This process was finalised by the introduction of the 
elected presidency in 1994. 
The government has also taken a number of steps to amend the constitution in other 
ways, to amend legislation, introduce additional legislation and further regulate society 
through delegated legislation so as to minimise political dissent and maximise the 
penalties for it. An analysis of the place of these institutional arrangements with 
respect to the hegemonic program is the focus of Chapter Four. 
Succession Planning and Regime Reproduction 
Underlying these strategies for consolidating control of the nation, the PAP was very 
concerned about its longevity and under the direction of Lee Kuan Yew, took a 
comprehensive approach to planning its leadership and cadre successions as the core 
step in entrenching long term PAP control of Singapore. 
Since the late 1960s, Lee Kuan Yew had began designing a system of succession 
planning to ensure the continuation of the PAP as a party and a government. In 
managing the transition to a younger generation of leaders, Lee was principally 
concerned with regime reproduction. He did not want a new type of politics, but a 
continuation and consolidation of the system he had established. It was therefore 
necessary to ensure that this was understood by the party, the parliament, the civil 
service and society; the process was generational renewal not political renewal except, 
possibly, at the margins_ A difference in the style, but not the substance of governance, 
could be tolerated. Lee's control of the political discourse was not to be terminated 
with his retirement.154 Maintaining control and social discipline during the transition 
period was therefore essential; social and political discipline was not to waver - the 
second generation leadership was to be as tough as the first. This resulting in a number 
of actions being taken to control social dissent, further weaken the opposition and 
ensure that the mechanisms of control over the party, the government, the legislature 
and key institutions were maintained or strengthened. Additionally, the government 
took a number of steps to remove possible sources of social dissatisfaction, among 
Malay and Indian communities in respect of their socio- economic performance, in 
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terms of education and labour policy and access to CPF funds for purposes other than 
retirement benefits and the provision of welfare through enhancements to the HDB 
housing program. In concert with these transitional control measures, many of which 
have been covered earlier in this chapter, Lee Kuan Yew took personal responsibility 
for succession planning and regime reproduction. 
In November 1990, Lee Kuan Yew stepped down as Prime Minister after holding the 
premiership since 1959. The new prime minister, Goh Chock Tong, an economist, had 
been selected and groomed by Lee for the position over a period of 14 years, although 
not necessarily as his first choice of successor.155 The change of premiership was the 
culmination of a process of finding a replacement political executive that had begun in 
1968 and accelerated from just prior to the 1976 general election. Open speculation 
about a generational change was being made by 1973 when Chan Heng Chee 
speculated that the new leadership would include Ong Pang Boon, Jek Yuen Thong, 
Chua Sian Chin and Dr. Lee Chiaw Meng.156 Chan was wrong only in respect of the 
durability of her candidates - none survived to be included in the final handover by 
Lee Kuan Yew. 
Remaking the Party Leadership: Culling the Elite 
The retirement of the first generation post -independence PAP leadership was 
substantially controlled and managed by Lee Kuan Yew. He even forced the pace of 
retirement of Goh Keng Swee (1984)157, Rajaratnam (1985) and Toh Chin Chye (1988) 
his closest political colleagues but, even moreso, he changed the backbench with some 
rapidity, overriding any objections from the party, cadres or MPs themselves, so 
absolute was his personal control of the political centre and so obsessed was he with 
the leadership renewal project. This left, for many years, a residue of passive hostility 
in many party branches to the younger Ieaders and among many cadres and former 
MPs towards Lee.tss 
Lee sought for the next generation of the PAP Leadership, which is synonymous with 
the political executive, young (less than 40 years of age), highly educated leaders with 
proven management skills who would continue the authoritarian political and 
154 James Cotton contends that political discourse in Singapore has always been moulded by Lee Kuan Yew. 
See: James Cotton, "Political Innovation ", Garry Rodan, ed., Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political and 
Economic Directions in the 1990s, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1993, pp. 3 -15, p. 3 
155 Alan Chong, Goh Chock Tong: Singapore's New Premier, Petalíng Jaya, Pelanduk. Publications, 1991, p. 3 
156 Chan Heng Chee, Succession and Generational Change in Singapore, University of Singapore, Department 
of Political Science Occasional Paper No. 3, p. 2 
157 Goh Keng Swee stepped down in 1984 to become a consultant, initially to the Chinese government. At the 
same time two other Old Guard leaders also retired; Howe Yoon Chong and Chua Sian Chin. Chua, then Minister 
for Home Affairs retired from the ministry but remained on the backbench. 
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technocratic administrative systems he had established. Technocrats, not politicians 
were required; politics was under control. Although the main push for a new generation 
of leaders began in the mid 1970s, the renewal process had begun with 18 new MPs in 
1968 159 the replacement of five more in by- elections in 1970 which allowed, among 
others, Hon Sui Sen later Finance Minister, to enter parliament.16o 
in 1972 eleven new members were inducted including Ong Teng Cheong, an architect; 
Dr. Ahmad Mattar, a polytechnic lecturer; Chin Han Tong, a trade unionist; and Dr. 
Tan Eng Lian, Singapore's first Rhodes Scholar and a medical practitioner. Another 11 
new candidates were inducted in the 1976 elections, including Goh Chock Tong 
Managing Director of Neptune Orient Lines,161 Suppiah Dhanabalan Executive Vice 
President of the Development Bank of Singapore,162 and Dr. Ow Chin Hock an 
academic economist. In two 1977 by- elections, Bernard Chen Tien Lap, concurrently 
Deputy Secretary in the PMO163 and MOF164 and Lim Chee Onn, a Harvard educated 
economist, were recruited. Chen was immediately promoted to Minister of State for 
Defence. In February 1979 seven by- elections were held, one because of the death of 
the incumbent and six forced by Lee's renewal program to both recruit new people 
and train the new leaders in electioneering skills. At these polls Dr. Tony Tan Keng 
Yam, Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation,165 and Howe Yoon 
Chong, Head of the Civil Service166 and Teh Chang Wan, Chief Executive of the 
Housing Development Board entered parliament. Howe was immediately made 
Minister for Defence and Teh Minister for National Development. In 1980 two new 
leadership recruits entered the scene; Professor S. Jayakumar from the Law Faculty at 
the National University of Singapore (NUS) and Dr. Yeo Ning Hong, a research 
scientist from the pharmaceutical company, Beechams. In 1984, 26 new PAP 
158 Carolyn Choo, Singapore: The PAP and the Problem of Political Succession, Petaling Jaya, Pelanduk 
Publications, 1985, p. 105 
159 The most eminent among the 1968 intake was Chua Sian Chin, party treasurer 1970 -1984 and a minister, 
He left the cabinet and resigned from the party's CEC in 1984 and remained a backbencher until the 1991 
elections. 
160 Hon was a talented man, former chairman of the Economic Development Board and a star recruit. He 
unfortunately died of a heart attack in October 1983. 
161 Neptune Orient Lines and its associated companies is the government owned shipping company. Goh Chok 
Tong was formerly its Managing Director. 
162 Dhanabalan was an Administrative Service officer and from 1975 also a member of the board of the 
powerful Economic Development Board. He had previously worked in the Ministry of Finance's Economic 
Development Division and the Economic Planning Unit in the Prime Minister's Office before joining the EDB 
as a divisional director in the Projects Division. Prior to that he was assistant to Dr, Goh Keng Swee, the 
Minister for Finance and Deputy Prime Minister. He left the EDB to join the DBS when it was created from the 
EDB in 1968. 
163 Prime Minister's Office 
164 Ministry of Finance 
169 Tan is probably the most intellectually gifted of all the current political leadership, with the possible 
exception of George Yeo, which itself is very talented. He has a first class honours degree in physics from the 
University of Singapore, a masters degree in operations research from MIT and a Ph.D. in applied mathematics 
from the University of Adelaide. He is also from a wealthy family and therefore has a degree of independence that 
his colleagues from more modest backgrounds may lack. 
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candidates, all graduates, entered the elections. Of this new crop, six were identified 
as having the potential to join the new leadership team: Brigadier -General Lee Hsien 
Loong (Lee Kuan Yew's eldest son)167, Dr. Richard Hu Tsu Tau168 Wong Kan Ceng169 
Yeo Cheow Tong170, Mah Bow Tan,171 and Ng Pock Too172. Mah and Ng were 
defeated in this election, but were elected in 1988. 
Lee successively retired Goh Keng Swee, the second most powerful of the first 
generation leaders and Howe Yoong Chong in 1984; Toh Chin Chye and Ong Pang 
Boon from cabinet also in 1984, Rajaratnam, E. (Eddie) W. Barker, Toh and Ong front 
the parliament in 1988.173 C. V. Devan Nair had been retired through the mechanism 
of elevating him to the presidency in 1981 from which he was ignominiously dismissed 
in 1985 through a combination of Lee's ruthlessness, his own weaknesses- and for 
advising the opposition on political tactics to attack Lee.174 Toh and Ong remained in 
166 Howe Yoon Chong, in addition to being Head of the Civil Service, was also chairman of the Development 
Bank of Singapore and Chairman of the Port of Singapore Authority. 
167 Lee Kuan Yew's second son, Brigadier -General (NS) Lee Hsien Yang, is now CEO of Singapore Telecom, the 
nation's largest company and the largest and most profitable of the government linked corporations. There was 
obvious sensitivity to Lee Hsien Loong's entry to political life both because of his father and his being a 
professional soldier, at this time he was a Brigadier -General in the SAF. However, he was not the first officer of 
this rank to be called into public service; although the first to enter politics. In September 1982, Brigadier - 
General Tan Chin Tiong reluctantly accepted a transfer to become Second Permanent Secretary in the Ministry 
of Home Affairs and has continued his career in the civil service where he eventually became Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs from which he retired in 1998. Rajaratnam wrote a lengthy defence of 
having professional soldiers in the party and the parliament and this was reproduced in the Straits Times. Lee 
Hsien Loong was the second professional soldier, but the first of general staff rank, to enter politics in 
Singapore; in 1976 Major Abbas Abu Amin, a career SAF officer of Malay origin, had been elected to 
parliament. It is instructive that in association with the younger Lee's candidature, the PAP at Iast publicly 
revealed its selection methods for candidates in a series in the Straits Times running from 3 June to 1 July 1984. 
168 Hu's selection into the next generation broke the rule on recruitment of young candidates. In 1984, Hu was 
58 years old. His selection was based on perceived talent and stability and has been proven correct. Prior to 
entering the ministry he was Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore and of the Singapore 
Government Investment Corporation and had in these capacities worked closely with both Lee Kuan Yew and 
Goh Keng Swee. 
169 Wong was a former Public Service Commission scholar and an officer in the elite Administrative Service 
within the civil service, which he entered in 1970, eventually rising to Deputy Secretary in the ministry of 
Defence before taking an executive position with Hewlett- Packard in I98I. 
170 Yeo was formerly managing director of engineering firm Le Blond Makíno Asia, but had previously been a 
director in the Economic Development Board for three years. He is a former scholar. 
171 Mah was an officer in the Administrative Service and had been CEO of Singapore Bus Services, deputy 
chairman of the Singapore Monitor newspaper, chairman of NTUC Comfort, the trade unions' taxi and transport 
co-operative, chair of two GLCs and a member of the Vocational and Industrial Training Board and the Singapore 
Polytechnic Council. 
172 Ng Pock Too was an Administrative Service officer who had been a divisional director in the Economic 
Development Board. 
173 Barker retired to become Deputy Chairman of the Singapore Totalisator Board, where Goh Keng Swee was 
chairman, as well as chairman of Sembawang Indonesia Pte. Ltd., a subsidiary company of the large GLC 
Sembawang Holdings, now SembCorp Holdings. Rajaratnam, in poor health, became the Distinguished 
Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. He is now totally retired from public life. 
174 The dismissal of Devan Nair from the presidency was an ugly confrontation between Lee Kuan Yew and his 
former colleague who had run the trade union movement as Secretary- General of the NTUC from 1966 - 1979. 
The facts surrounding the case are shrouded by innuendo, political propaganda and Devan Nair's own 
inconsistency in putting his side of the story. It seems, however, that Devan Nair had been advising Francis 
Seow, former Attorney -General turned Workers Party politician, on political tactics for attacking Lee and the 
PAP and on how Seow could find support from the United States embassy in Singapore. Lee took advantage of 
Devan Nair's alleged alcoholism and indiscretions while on a visit to Sarawak, as grounds for dismissing him as 
president and then muddying his name further through a parliamentary investigation that was serialised in the 
Straits Times. This matter had consequences in the `Hendrickson affair' in 1988 in which United State diplomat 
E. Mason "Hank" Hendrickson was accused of colluding with Seow and interfering in Singapore's internal 
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parliament until 1988 and were both critical of Lee's approach to recruiting the 
successor generation.175 Toh in particular became somewhat of a disenchanted internal 
critic while retaining his seat in the parliament but not in the cabinet. Ong was critical 
while inside the cabinet and the parliament, but the press control in Singapore was 
such that the views of neither got a substantial public airing.176 Both Toh and Ong 
were given an additional impetus to retire by their seats being abolished in preparation 
for the 1988 elections)" 
Of this inner circle, only Goh had any substantial power base; in the Singapore Armed 
Forces (SAF) and the public bureaucracies, where he was widely admired and had a 
large personal following. Toh's power rested in the party and was more easily 
subverted, although he had a substantial following in the branches and among the 
older cadres resulting in residual resentment of the political renewal process lingering 
for some years. Rajaratnam's influence was almost purely personal. There was, 
however, only a minor power struggle over the transition from within the inner group, 
except for Toh's objections to what he saw as Lee's increasing authoritarianism, but 
this was generally tolerated as it did not threaten Lee's transition program and 
actually demonstrated a toleration of alternative views. 
Lee's approach was typically methodical and followed his maxim of 'leave nothing to 
chance'. He had the bureaucracy identify the top 500 people in the nation who met his 
criteria within the 35 -40 year age group and then went searching for those interested or 
able to be persuaded to enter political life.178 Lists were compiled, dossiers developed, 
background checks made by the ISD and government departments until as full a 
picture as possible was developed of possible candidates. By the early 1980s the 
second generation leaders had taken over the selection, with Goh Chock Tong as chair 
of a selection committee in his capacity as First Organising Secretary of the PAP, 
although Lee still had the final control over selection. Yeo and Jayakumar were the 
other members.179 Mattar was chair of a complementary committee, including Sidek 
affairs. Hendrickson was required to leave the country within 48 hours of receiving a government notice that his 
activities were incompatible with his diplomatic status. This issue is discussed further in Chapter Four. 
175 Toh was a founding member and chairman of the PAP. Ong Pang Boon was also an early member. Both were 
ministers from 1959 -1984 and Toh was also at one time vice -chancellor of the University of Singapore. Ong, 
Chinese educated and fluent in dialects, was a key link to the Chinese community for Lee after the split with the 
Barisan Socialis. He was Assistant Secretary- General of the PAP for many years. Toh was for almost his entire 
career one of the five at the centre of the political executive with Lee, Goh Keng Swee, S. Rajaratnam and C. V. 
Devan Nair. 
176 Ong made attacks against Lee in constituency speeches from 1984 -1988 when he retired. See: Selvan, op. 
cit. pp. 183 -184. Toh's most public criticisms, other than in the parliament, were made in Asiaweek in 1984. 
See: "We're all ball -bearings, Quality- Controlled ", Asiaweek. 7 September 1984, pp. 36 -38; `Breeding the 
Brightest ", Asiaweek, 2 March 1984, pp. 23 -26, p. 25 
177 "Singapore prepares for elections ", Far East Economic Review, 4 August 1988, p. 22 
178 Lee actually admitted that 500 possible candidates were screened. See: T. S. Selvan, op. cit., p. 52 
179 Choo, op. cit. p- 90 
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bin Saniff180 and Wan Hussin Zoohri,181 tasked with identifying candidates from the 
Malay community.182 The selection of Indian candidates was the responsibility of the 
main selection committee. During preparations for the 1997 general elections, the 
selection process included the CEC chaired by Goh Chok Tong, a General- Secretary's 
Committee chaired by Goh Chok Tong and on which Lee Kuan Yew, Lee Hsien Loong, 
Tony Tan, Wong Kan Seng and George Yeo served,183 a general selection committee 
chaired by Yeo Ning Hong and comprising four to five ministers, and a series of lunch 
and afternoon tea interview sessions with prospective candidates chaired by ministers 
appointed by Goh Chok Tong.184 In 1996, the Malay candidates selection committee 
was chaired by Abdullah Tarmugi and reportedly included all Malay MPs who split 
the work of initial interviewing of Malay candidates among three groups; public sector, 
including the universities and polytechnics, GROs and Malay community and religious 
organisations.185 It appears that since 1988, the psychological tests which Lee Kuan 
Yew had insisted on under his governments have been dispensed with, although 
medical records are still apparently checked by a party appointed medical pane1.186 
Following the successful completion of the rigorous selection process187 - probably the 
180 Sidek bin Saniff is now Senior Minister of state in the Ministry of the Environment and an MP for Aljunied 
GRC. 
181 Wan Hussin bin Hj Zoohri was a PAP backbencher 
182 Choo, op. cit. p. 91 
183 According to interviews, these were the key people on this committee. Wong Kan Seng was then Second 
Organising Secretary and George Yeo was Chairman, Young PAP. 
184 "4 rounds in selection process ", The Straits Times Weekly Edition, 19 October 1996, p. 14 
185 I sought confirmation of this information from Malay MPs but was not able to do so. 
186 Informants commented that there was considerable resistance by the younger generation to psychological 
testing and some medical professionals who were invited for interviews directly questioned its relevance. 
187 The selection process, which still operates, is quintessentially Singaporean; a mixture of colonial and 
Chinese social habits mixed with technocratic exactitude and caution. It is an eight stage process. Candidates on 
the `large' list are invited to afternoon tea with the selection committee. On being invited candidates who are 
not interested in political participation politely but insistently refuse, or devise a strategy for interview which 
would lead them to being excluded from further consideration. These meetings, held every three weeks on a 
Saturday, went for three hours, usually 5pm -8pm. The first meeting is rather like a medical triage session; the 
candidate is classified into PAP MP material, PAP non -MP material or not suitable for PAP purposes. Choo 
reports that only 45% proceeded to the second stage. At this stage the candidate faces another committee for a 
`dialogue session' on general issues and attitudes. One member from the first meeting with the candidate would 
also attend this second round. At the third stage the successful candidate attends another dialogue session with 
the stage two committee during which discussion would focus more on PAP policies and the candidates attitudes 
and approach to them. At this stage the full background and security check on candidates are available to the 
committee, so one assumes that any perceived difficulties with the candidates background are discussed at this 
stage. Only 21% pass this stage. The fourth stage is the candidates meeting with the First Organising Secretary 
of the PAP - in the 1980s, Goh Chock Tong. The third stage committee will have recommended a particular role 
for the candidate and the chair would have briefed the PM. The candidates future role is therefore discussed, 
whether as a backbencher, junior minister or some other role. If the candidate accepts this offer, and 
considerable pressure is bought to bear so that they do, the fifth stage is an interview with a party committee. In 
the 1980s this was chaired by Lim Kim San, former cabinet minister, now chairman of Singapore Press 
Holdings and the Council of Presidential Advisers. Kim does not perform this function now and it is thought 
that the chair rotates among the political executive. On passing this stage, those selected for ministerial 
appointments and those about whom there are still some doubts, were sent for psychological testing and an 
intensive psychiatric assessment as the sixth stage. This psychological testing is intensive, lasting 1.5 days 
and included tests of intelligence, personality, values and decision making ability. Three intensive interviews 
are also included. This testing program aimed at analysing the same candidate abilities as used in the civil 
service for Administrative Service officers, known by the acronym HAIR: Helicopter view (i.e. see issues in 
broad context), Analytical abilities, Imaginativeness and ability to relate to Reality. The seventh stage is a 
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most thorough in any country - the new PAP candidates had to become involved in 
constituency or 'grassroots' organisations (GROs), as their selection was based on 
technocratic competence, not political skills or knowledge. This was complemented by 
appointment to party committees so that renewal of the management of the party 
organisation would proceed in unison with political leadership renewal. In order to test 
the capabilities of the new leadership in the absence of an opposition that would be 
able to pressure them politically in both the parliament and the constituencies, the first 
generation leadership developed a training regime that would place the second 
generation leaders under enormous working pressure. 
This regime had two components: multiple simultaneous appointments in the ministry, 
the party and GROs for each potential leader and rapid rotation through ministerial 
portfolios to test adaptability and policy making ability and coherence. It has also 
been suggested that a third component - testing in by- elections for the ability to 
communicate and identify with the electorate - formed a part of this process and that 
MPs were retired on purpose to provide by- election opportunities for the new leaders 
to practice electioneering skills.188 The first large scale test of the new generation's 
electioneering skills was the 1984 general elections which they managed, including the 
recruitment of new candidates for one -third of the parliamentary seats.189 This 
practice was maintained until the membership of the second generation leadership 
was decided and the transition of Goh Chock Tong to the premiership was finalised. 
In 1980 Lee announced that his preferred second generation leadership team 
comprised seven people: Goh Chock Tong, Ong Teng Cheong, Dr. Ahmad Mattar, 
Bernard Chen, Lim Chee Onn, S_ Dhanabalan, and Dr. Tony Tan. Lim and Chen were 
subsequently replaced by Dr. Yeo Ning Hong and Professor S. Jayakumar. Many of 
these had a public sector background. Mattar was a polytechnic lecturer, Goh was an 
officer in the Administrative Service, Ong an architect with good links to grassroots 
organisations, Dhanabalan from the Administrative Service (Development Bank of 
Singapore and the Ministry of Finance), Chen and Lim had been from the 
Administrative Service, Jayakumar from NUS and Yeo from Beechams. Below this 
leadership group was a second team comprising Dr. Wong Kwei Cheong, Lee Yock 
meeting with the Prime Minister and other cabinet ministers at which the Prime Minister decides whether he can 
work with the candidate. The final stage is a meeting with the full Central Executive Committee of the PAP, 
which includes all the senior cabinet ministers. Even at this stage the candidate can be rejected and Choo reports 
that this has happened based on "sheer gut feeling ". After entry into politics, the new members chosen for 
ministerial positions then faced a rigorous learning process supervised by the Prime Minister and under the 
mentorship of a senior cabinet minister. Candidates who were not judged successful after two years at this level 
were relegated to backbench positions or left as junior ministers, or even asked to resign. This is probably the 
most exacting process of political selection in the world. See: Carolyn Choo, op. cit. pp. 89 -98 
188 Choo, op. cit. p. 102 
189 This included the recruitment of three women candidates; Dr. Mine Wong, a university lecturer, Madam Yu- 
Foo Yee Simon, a trade union official; and Dr. Dixie Tan a medical practitioner. Tan left parliament at the 1991 
elections; the other two are still MPs. 
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Suan190, Dr. Wan Soon Bee and Dr. Tay Eng Soon. Their backgrounds were a balance 
of public and private sector; Wong from Aiwa Electronics, Lee from the 
Administrative Service (Economic Development Board -EDB), Wan from Olivetti and 
Tay from the Defence Science Organisation (DSO). 
All, however, had not gone smoothly for the transition. While many of the new 
ministers succeeded, some failed the test. Of Chan Heng Cheé s nominated successor 
group, Ong Pang Boon was seen as a direct threat to Lee because of his high level of 
support in both the community and among the Chinese educated, inducting those who 
were PAP cadres191 Ong's wife, Chan Choy Siong, a PAP backbencher was also very 
popular. Both were sent overseas after Ong was deprived of his cabinet position and 
Chan of her seat.192 Of the 1972 intake, Dr. Lee Chiaw Meng, was appointed Minister 
of Education and Minister of Science and Technology in 1976 but fell out of favour in 
1978, was relieved of his cabinet post in early 1979 and subsequently left 
parliament 193 Dr. Tan Eng Liang, Singapore's first Rhodes Scholar,194 was inducted in 
1972, was appointed as Senior Minister of State for National Development in 1975, 
the first Senior Minister of State for Finance in 1978 and was tipped initially as Lee's 
successor. However, he was dismissed from cabinet in 1976 and also left politics. In 
1986, Teh Cheang Wan, then Minister for National Development, committed suicide 
while being investigated for corruption. Dr. Augustine Tan, an economics lecturer at 
NUS, was elected in 1972 and appointed as political secretary to Lee Kuan Yew 
following his election. By the late 1970s he had been relieved of this position and 
moved out of the potential leadership group and left parliament at the 1991 
elections 195 Dr. Ow Chin Hock, also an economist, was recruited in 1976 as a 
potential member of the leadership team but rose no higher than Parliamentary 
Secretary196 in the Ministry of Culture, then the Ministry of Education. He resigned 
from this position in 1981, staying on the backbench where he sits today. A number of 
other academics also didn't make it to the leadership group; Associate Professor Lau 
190 Lee Yock Suan was an Administrative Service officer who was a divisional director in the Economic 
Development Board. 
191 At a meeting of PAP cadres in 1971, Ong had more support than Lee and was an obvious threat. 
192 Ong was the Minister of Education. Toh Chin Chye was tasked with removing these threats to Lee's 
continued premiership. See: T. J. S. George, Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore, rev. ed., Singapore, Eastern 
Universities Press, 1984, pp. 180 -181 
193 Lee had a Ph.D. in engineering and had also been made Vice Chancellor of Nanyang University, the 
Chinese medium university in Singapore later amalgamated with the University of Singapore to produce the 
National University of Singapore (NUS). 
194 Tan received the D.Phil. in chemistry from Oxford University, lectured briefly at the University of 
Singapore and then worked as chief chemist, an executive position, for a multinational corporation in 
Singapore before entering politics. 
195 Tan is now an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Arts and Science at NUS. A practicing Christian, he 
may have had a habit of being too free with the truth, such as his revelation in 1981 that there was no 
government subsidy for HDB flats, contrary to the official government line. See: Straits Times, 15 August, 
1981, p. 5 
196 Parliamentary Secretary is the lowest rank above an ordinary Member of Parliament, not counting the 
position of chairman of a Government Parliamentary Committee which has no constitutional status. 
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Teik Soon197 remained a backbencher; Dr. Wong Kwei Cheong resigned from the 
ministry in 1984, remaining as a backbencher until the 1997 elections at which he 
retired ;198 and Dr. Wan Soon Bee was dropped from the ministry after the 1988 
elections but remains as a backbencher.199 
Some failures were quite spectacular. In 1976, Minister of State Wee Toon Boon was 
imprisoned for corruption. Bernard Chen, although appointed Minister of State for 
Defence on his election in 1977, was eased out of the ministry by 1981.200 Lim Chee 
Onn, appointed Secretary -General of the NTUC and Minister without Portfolio2p1 in 
1979 and vice- chairman of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the PAP in 
1982, was dismissed from all his posts in 1983 by Lee amidst a display of public 
animosity.202 Lim's dismissal could be interpreted as evidence of the power of those 
under a new appointee to undermine a poor performer through direct appeal to Lee 
ICuan Yew or conversely, of Lee being able to generate hostility from within an 
organisation against an appointee whom he no longer finds acceptable. Chua explains 
some of these failures, especially of the brightest and those with academic 
backgrounds, as being based on personality issues, especially an inability for them to 
work with Lee Kuan Yew. By using the case of Tan Eng Liang, Chua argues that these 
dismissals are made to fit into an framework based on the PAP's ideology of 
pragmatism so that those dismissed are classified as either incompetent, impractical or 
as having personality difficulties. In the case of Tan the first two labels are falsifiable 
given his acknowledged academic brilliance and his successful career as a senior 
company executive.20' It is more probable that, in general, the constant personality 
problems suffered by political recruits were those of the prime minister rather than the 
197 Then head of the political science department at NUS. His replacement at NUS was Professor Chan Heng 
Chee who undertook a number of government positions; Ambassador to the United Nations, Director of the 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Director of the Singapore International Foundation, Ambassador to the 
United States. 
198 Wong remains on good terms with the current political executive, being mentioned with sympathy in the 
Prime Ministers National Day speech in August 1998 in respect of the misfortunes which have befallen his 
business interests in Indonesia. He has been a director of several GLCs. 
199 Dr. Wan Soon Bee is now managing Director of a logistics firm, having left academia. 
200 Chen now sits as an ordinary backbencher for the West Coast GRC and is now managing director of the 
GLC, Intraco. It is assumed that, in some way, he did not meet Lee's standards for ministers. 
201 The Secretary- General of the NTUC is traditionally appointed to the cabinet as Minister Without Portfolio, 
the duties of which are to manage the union movement, maintain a general responsibility for all industrial 
relations issues not directly under the Minister for Manpower, as well as oversight the NTUC's business and 
investment activities (including the Singapore Labour Foundation) within the quasi -state sector and their 
interaction with the government linked corporate sector. This in itself is a very demanding position 
202 Lim was publicly disgraced by tee with Lee's letter dismissing him and Lim's response being published in 
the Straits Times. Lim Chee Onn was subsequently appointed as managing director of the Keppel Shipyard and is 
now managing director and deputy chairman of Keppel Land. Both of these companies are GLCs. Selvan is of the 
opinion that the official reasons for his removal - "lack of communication skills" - was a cover for Lim's 
incapacity to handle the pressures of such fast promotions and enormous responsibility combined with a 
tendency for "harebrained schemes and unlimited dreams ". Another version, is that Lim appeared too ambitious 
in developing an NTUC company sector and businesses that would make it too autonomous. See: T. S. Selvan. 
Singapore the Ultimate Island, Melbourne, Freeway Books, 1991, pp. 50 -52 
203 Chua Beng Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore. London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 53- 
54 
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recruits themselves. 
What resulted from this selection process was actually two generations of leaders; a 
largely interim second generation, many of whom have now departed from legislative if 
not public functions, and a third generation who now form the PAP leadership and 
control the party's CEC and the cabinet, although they are usually called the 'second 
generation' leaders or the 'New Guard'. Lim Chee Onn and others could best be termed 
the 'lost generation' of leaders. Following this process, the Singaporean elite was 
littered with the metaphorical corpses of political discards and a heightened degree of 
passive hostility to involvement in government by much of the nation's elite. 
By 1984 the younger generation held 11 of the 12 positions on the PAP's CEC, Lee 
remaining as the Secretary- General. Only three of the Old Guard ministers remained in 
the cabinet; Rajaratnam, Barker and Lee as Prime Minister. After the 1984 elections, 
the cabinet included a younger generation comprised of Goh Chock Tong (First Deputy 
Prime Minister), Ong Teng Cheong (Second Deputy Prime Minister), Suppiah 
Dhanabalan, Tony Tan, Teh Cheang Wan, Ahmad Mattar, Yeo Ning Hong, S. 
Jayakumar, Richard Hu and Lee Yock Suan. Following the next general election in 1988, 
Rajaratnam and Barker had retired and only Lee remained from the Old Guard. 
While remaining as Prime Minister, the day to day management of the government was 
handed over to Goh Chock Tong as First Deputy Prime Minister and the new cabinet 
of 11 which was now comprised of Ong Teng Cheong as Second Deputy Prime 
Minister, Dhanabalan, Tony Tan, Ahmad Mattar, Yeo Ning Hong, Jayakumar, Hu, 
Lee Yock Suan, Wong Kan Seng, Yeo Cheow Tong and Lee Hsien Loong. Following the 
1991 elections, minor changes were made to the cabinet line -up of 16 which now 
included Goh and Lee as Prime Minister and Senior Minister respectively, Ong Teng 
Cheong (Deputy Prime Minister), Lee Hsien Loong (Deputy Prime Minister), 
Dhanabalan, Tony Tan, Mattar, Yeo Ning Hong, Jayakumar, Hu, Lee Yock Suan, Wong 
Kan Seng, Yeo Cheow Tong, George Yong -Boon Yeo, Lee Boon Yang and Mah Bow Tan. 
Supposedly, in response to internal discord within the cabinet, reportedly instigated 
by Lee Hsien Loong, in December 1991 Tony Tan resigned his portfolio to return to 
banking, followed by Dhanabalan 's departure in August 1992, also for the private 
sector. In November 1992, Goh revealed publicly that both Deputy Prime Ministers 
were suffering from cancer and would take leave from their duties for treatment. 
Dhanabalan subsequently returned to the cabinet in December 1992 and Tan in 1996. 
However in the period 1992 -94, the government lost five cabinet ministers and a Senior 
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Minister of State.204 In the face of his son's cancer and possible removal from the 
political system, Lee Kuan Yew transferred the secretary- generalship of the PAP to 
Goh Chok Tong in 1992. The transition from the founding father of the PAP was 
substantially complete, although Lee continued to have considerable personal power 
within the party and government. This new executive has followed Lee's strategy and 
has been planning party and government succession since the 1991 elections, a process 
which now seems to be institutionalised within both the party and the government 205 
as it is the bureaucracy that tracks potential candidates for consideration in this 
process.206 
CONCLUSIONS 
From the above, we can conclude that historically and in contemporary Singapore the 
PAP governments are hegemonic and that the institutional structure of the state is 
central to the system of hegemonic control and the mediation of relations between state 
and society. The strategies of governance we have identified, and the careful 
succession planning undertaken by the party, have consolidated PAP power and 
provided the foundations on which the hegemonic political system has been built. This 
system operates on the following principles: 
1. Integration of the Singapore Civil Service and other public bureaucracies into the 
political program as the executive instruments of both hegemonic control and 
nation building; 
2. The careful design of the constitutional and legal framework of the state so that the 
PAP's control of the institutions of state is absolute and political and policy 
actions have a prima facie legality regardless of the moral, ethical or democratic 
dimensions of these actions; 
3. The direct control of the instruments of state coercion by the political executive 
through bureaucratic and quasi -state structures to maintain the threat of state 
action against opponents; 
4. The development of a repertoire of consent building strategies which operate 
through PAP control of the media and special bureaucratic mechanisms, such as 
the People's Association and the HDB which assist in restructuring and controlling 
social dynamics; 
204 Cherian George, "Domestic Politics ", in Singapore: The Year in Review 1994, Singapore, IPS, 1995, pp. 
52 -60, p. 52 
205 For the view of Lee Hsien 1 
Loong on this strategy see: Nigel Holloway and Lawrence Minard, "Singapore's big chance ", Forbes, 29 
November 1999, pp. 44-46, p. 46. For brief comments from Goh Chok Tong see: "Finally being His Own 
Man: Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia - and himself ", Asiaweek, 25 November 1999. Available at: 
http:cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/interview/goh.cholctong/index.htm 
206 Under Lee Kuan Yew, it was reported that the Ministry of Education tracked the top 500 students in 
the nation and that after their graduation from university, the records for this cohort were transferred to 
the Internal Security Department to continue tracking as their careers advanced, This information was 
shared in summary form with the prime minister's personal office. Under Goh Chok Tong, the cohort is now 
reported to be 2000. The Directorships and Consultancy Appointments Council is also reported to track 
pnvate sector and GLC business executives for appointment to boards and GLCs, with this database being 
maintained by Temasek Management Services. Data from interviews, 1995 and 1998. 
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5. The production of an hegemonic framework, with social, economic and political 
dimensions, so that the PAP's control of the nation is not just retained but is 
reproducible through a number of inter- locking consent building strategies. 
In Singapore, the PAP has moved a considerable way towards establishing a 
hegemonic system that substantially mirrors, and in some ways surpasses, Gramscí s 
model, although it is an oligarchic, not democratic hegemony. Gramsci, of course, was 
not able to develop his intellectual project further, but in terms of what he has 
bequeathed us, the PAP has surpassed his understanding of how hegemony might 
operate. Probably because of its small size and the possibility of substantial social, 
economic and geographical control, the PAP has developed and implemented 
strategies to overcome divisions among the political leadership, intellectuals and the 
bureaucracy. It has done this by incorporating the bureaucratic leadership in a close 
partnership with the political leadership and recruiting politicians from the 
bureaucracy. It has adopted a similar strategy with intellectuals by making them all 
state employees and incorporating them into the bureaucracy. It has subverted 
potential conflict between the working class and the ruling class by ensuring that the 
rewards of economic development are also provided to the working class and that the 
ability of this class to organise through unions and other civil society structures is 
severely compromised by state control of these mechanisms and their co -option into 
the hegemonic program. The PAP also provides a route of transition from the working 
class to the middle class based on meritocratic recruitment to the bureaucracies, GLCs 
and even the political leadership, which provides a seemingly objective and equitable 
class transfer system. These strategies are underwritten by a number of powerful 
coercive and consent building mechanisms. 
The political system is not, however, fully hegemonic and weak pockets of resistance 
remain active in civil society and the political opposition. Although there appears to be 
general agreement on the strength of the PAP's ideological hegemony, the legitimacy of 
the PAP government remains questionable, as its legislative minority is based on a 
gerrymandered electoral system through which in 1997, 35 per cent of citizens voted 
against the party, Majority support in this election was influenced by the PAP's threat 
to reduce government expenditure in electorates that voted against it. Under these 
conditions, it can be concluded that the PAP hegemonic project is still unfinished, 
although its framework is firmly established and the party is unquestionably in control 
of government. 
In the following chapters, this framework will be examined so as to provide an 
understanding of the structure and dynamics of contemporary PAP governance and 
how it acts to design, implement and maintain its political program. 
2. THE PUBLIC SECTOR: DEVELOPMENT, 
STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS 
It is generally agreed that "... one of the key factors contributing to Singapore's 
political stability and economic prosperity is the quality of its public service."' The 
development of public sector bureaucracies that identify with and partner its political 
program has been instrumental in the development and maintenance of PAP control of 
Singapore and form a distinctive group within the Singaporean core executive. This 
chapter examines the development of the public sector in Singapore under the PAP 
governments and especially its relationship with the political executive, in order to 
facilitate an understanding of the contribution the public bureaucracies make to the 
membership of the core executive as well as the structure and dynamics of the 
executive agencies through which the core executive functions. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Following the control of the Straits Settlements passing from the British East India 
Company to the Crown in 1867, a Straits Civil Service was established in Singapore on 
the traditional British colonial pattern. This remained separate from the Federated 
Malay States' Civil Service until 1920, when the FMS Civil Service and the Straits Civil 
Service were combined to form the Malayan Civil Service. This was subsequently 
incorporated into the Colonial Unified Services2 with the elite managerial stream 
incorporated into the Colonial Administrative Service in 1932. This service was racially 
divided and controlled by British colonial administrators; locals were relegated to 
lower positions attracting lower salaries and poorer conditions, although in the 
Federated Malay States after 1924, a small number of positions in the Administrative 
Service were held by aristocratic Malays who were given preferential treatment by the 
British.3 
Few Asians applied for positions in the civil service? The Straits Medical Service was 
'1 Jon S. T. Quah, "Public Administration in Singapore: Managing Success in a Multi- racial City -State ", in Ahmed 
Shafiqul Huque et al, eds., Public Administration in the NICs: Challenges and Accomplishments, New York, St 
Martins Press, 1996, pp. 59 -89, p. 59 
21n 1945, the Colonial Unified Services comprised: the Colonial Agricultural service, Audit Service, Administrative 
Service, Legal service, Chemical Service, Civil Aviation Service, Customs Service, Education Service, Forest 
Service, Geological Survey Service, Medical service, Mines Service, Nursing Service, Police Service, Postal Service, 
Research Service, Survey Service and Veterinary Service. See: Yeo Kim Wah, Political Development in Singapore 
1945 -55, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1973, p. 71 
3Yeo, ibid., p. 70 
4 The exclusion of non -Europeans from public administration is demonstrated by the 1931 census which revealed 
that of those working in public administration and defence, the Chinese comprised 0.2 per cent, Malays 2.5 per cent, 
Indians 3.6 per cent and others (principally Europeans and Eurasians) 20.2 per cent. See: Chiew Seen -Kong, `The 
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opened to Asians in 1932 and in 1934 a Straits Settlements Civil Service was again 
formed separate from the Malayan Civil Service. This was followed in 1937 by the 
establishment of a Straits Legal Service. From this period onwards, the orientation of 
the civil service was one of "... establishing the writ of the colonial regime and creation 
of an environment favourable to economic modernization. "5 
After the war, Singapore was declared a Crown Colony separate from the Federation 
of Malaya, and a separate Singapore Civil Service was established. Following agitation 
for change by local officers who had demonstrated that they could manage the public 
sector during the Japanese occupation, and in line with British de- colonialisation 
policy, the subordinate services were abolished .6 
The Trusted Commission, established to investigate and report on the structure and 
function of the Straits Civil Service in 1947, recommended new classification, salary, 
recruitment and promotion systems and the establishment of a Public Service 
Commission to promote the recruitment of locals to senior positions. The major 
recommendations were based on reforms that had been instituted in the British Civil 
Service and today still "... provides the basis for determining the various points of 
entry into the Singapore Civil Service, the salary scales and fringe benefits." 7 The new 
divisional structure and salary scales were introduced following the presentation of 
the report, but a Public Service Commission (PSC) for Singapore was not established 
until 1951. The objective of the new PSC was to " ... keep politics out of the SCS by 
rejecting the spoils system and to accelerate the pace of localization in the SCS. "8 
Further changes were made from 1955 based on the recommendations of the Rendel 
Commission to restructure the civil service; the establishment of ministries to be 
controlled by elected ministers,9 the creation of Permanent Secretary positions and the 
centralisation of financial administration10, legaltt and core security and public 
Socio-Cultural Framework of Politics', in Quah, J. S. T. et al Government and Politics in Singapore, rev. ed, 
Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987. pp. 45 -67, p. 53. 
5seah Chee Meow, "Bureaucratic Evolution and Political Change in an Emergent Nation: A Case Study of 
Singapore, Ph.D. dissertation, Victoria University of Manchester, 1971, p. 20 
6Yeo comments that with respect to the white dominance of the post -war civil service in Singapore, that 
"Singaporeans emerged from the war with a hypersensitive revulsion against any form of racial discrimination. This 
came to be focussed on the public service where, apart from the all -white clubs, racial discrimination had its most 
concrete and visible manifestations." This attitude resulted in a number of confrontations between local officers and 
the British administrators on a number of issues including pay, conditions, access to the higher civil service and 
payment for war -time internment See: Yeo, op. cit., p. 72 
7 H. H. Teo, "Singapore Civil Service: General Trends in Civil Service Reforms" in, Trends in Civil Service Reforms 
in ASEAN Countries, Bangkok, Office of the Civil Service Commission, 1985, pp. 311 -332, p. 312 
8 Jon S. T. Quah, "The Public Bureaucracy and National Development in Singapore ", in K. K. Tummala, ed., 
Administrative Systems Abroad, Washington D. C., University Press of America, 1982, pp. 42 -75, p. 50 
9 Five ministries were established to be headed by local elected ministers - Commerce and Industry; Education; 
Health; Housing, Lands and Local Government; and Labour and Welfare. 
10 All revenue raising activities were centralised under the Ministry of Finance headed by a colonial appointed 
Financial Secretary. 
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administration functions.° This was the initial step in preparing the civil service for 
cabinet government, experience of which no local civil servants had and of which 
many if not most expatriate civil servants had little substantial experience. 
From the introduced of these reforms, the pressure for localisation gained momentum 
with the establishment of the Sreenivasan Commission in 1956, a special commission 
established to advise on the localisation process.° The Sreenivasan Commission 
outline in its Interim Report a process of localisation by the various government 
departments and, by 1957 the most senior positions of permanent secretary had been 
localised.14 The outcomes of the localisation process were the bedrock on which the 
civil service of self -governing Singapore had to build its own national civil service. 
With the election of a fully self -governing Parliament in 1959 and the ascent of the PAP 
government under Lee Kuan Yew, the civil service was still experiencing considerable 
turmoil as a result of the Rendel reforms and the localisation program as well as from 
the domestic political turmoil of the times. The new PAP government restructured the 
civil service to conform to its portfolio structure. The most significant of these changes 
was the abolition of the local government administration, the creation of new 
ministries of national development and culture and the establishment of statutory 
boards to undertake the more urgent policies associated with enhancing political 
control and developing the nation's economic and social infrastructure. The Public 
Utilities Board was established in 1959, the Housing Development Board and the 
Economic Development Board in 1961. As a principal mechanism for enhancing 
political control, the People's Association was established within the Prime Minister's 
Office (PMO) in 1960 as a propaganda, social intelligence and control organisation. 
This period of rapid change and subsequent weakness in the capacity of the 
indigenous civil service to meet the needs of the newly elected PAP administration, left 
a lasting impression on the government and its leader who understood only too well 
the need to have a highly effective and efficient public administration on which to 
I 1 All legal matters were centralised under the Attorney- General who remained a colonial appointed officer. 
12 Defence, internal security, external affairs, broadcasting, public affairs and civil service establishment matters 
were centralised under the Colonial Secretary's Office, headed by a colonial appointee. In association with the 
finance function, these still form the core areas of control by the inner political and public sector executive in 
Singapore. 
13 The fact that the commission was established, and particularly established under its chair, Dr. B. R. Sreenivasan, 
was quite significant. Sreenivasan had been a senior officer of the Straits Medical Service, a component service of 
the Straits Civil Service, and had resigned in disillusionment at what he saw as the purposeful curtailment of his 
career advancement, through use of the `colour bar' by less competent British administrators I Jnder Sreenivasan's 
chairmanship, the commission's work could hardly have been unbiased, but in appointing him to chair the 
commission, the Governor would have been well aware of what the possible outcomes of the commission's report 
would be. One can therefore conclude that the appointment of the commission under Sreenivasan was tacit admission 
by the colonial administration that it should commit itself fully to the localisation process. See: Interim Report of the 
Malayanisation Commission, (B. R. Sreenivasan, Chairman), Singapore, Government Publications Bureau, 1956 
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build political legitimacy. In fact, the PAP leadership saw very clearly an intimate link 
between the civil service and the government. It wanted a civil service which not only 
provided advice, in the traditional Westminster sense, but which worked 
collaboratively with the government in a national partnership to implement a specific 
political program on which the government had been elected, as in the traditions of the 
senior appointed political ranks of the United States Civil Service. While such a link is 
perhaps obvious, it must be remembered that the new government had been expected 
by the colonial administration and the local elites to operate very much in the 
traditional Westminster mould, despite the unicameral nature of its legislature, and 
thus to support the concept of a neutral civil service. 
The PAP administration was not particularly enamoured of the artificial distinctions 
inherent in the theoretical positioning of the civil service vis a vis the government in 
the Westminster system.'5 This is a not surprising view given that there had been 
considerable overlap between the colonial executive, the senior offices of its civil 
service, its advisory Iegislature and its Executive Council. This was the model most 
immediately available to the PAP and one which it understandably adopted: the 
integration of the party, political and bureaucratic leadership. Thus colonial political 
hegemony provided the building blocks for a more comprehensive neo- Gramscian 
hegemonic system. It had been an effective model of colonial administration, making 
Singapore a relatively wealthy and advanced polity within its region and had 
provided well over a hundred years of stable government. Although not bereft of 
problems, including those of conflict of interest, reinforcing elite cohesion particularly 
among the Chinese, oligarchic control of society and a potential for encouraging 
corrupt behaviour, it was a model that worked and which could be reasonably 
expected to continue to work until some pressing requirement that it be changed 
emerged. 
The desirability of the integration of sectional leadership cohorts was clearly captured 
by Lee Kuan Yew in his address to senior civil servants at the newly established Civil 
Service Political Study Centre in 195916 Having established the Centre to prepare local 
senior civil servants more fully for their role in national administration, particularly 
through developing a greater understanding of the broad political environment, the 
14 Seah Chee Meow, "The Civil Service ", in Jon S. T. Quah, Government and Politics of Singapore, Singapore, 
Oxford University Press, 1987, p.99 
15 Changes in public administration in Britain and New Zealand since the 1980s have reflected this concern that the 
traditional Westminster model is insufficiently responsive to the needs of government. This has led to major public 
sector administrative reforms aimed at making, in particular, the senior executive ranks of the civil services, operate 
much more collaboratively with incumbent governments. See: Mark Evans, Charter 88: a successful challenge to 
the British political tradition ?, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1995 
16 The correct, original name for what is usually referred to as the Political Study Centre. See: Lee Kuan Yew, "The 
trouble with the civil service ", in, Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez and Sumiko Tan, Lee Kuan Yew: The Man 
and His Ideas, Singapore, Times Edition, 1998, pp. 317 -320, p. 317 
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Prime Minister commented: 
You (the civil servants) and I (the political leadership) have a vested interest in the maintenance 
of the system. Should democracy and its framework fail to survive, you and I have an equally 
important responsibility ... for its failure.17 
In addition to basing administrative expectations on the prevailing model of colonial 
administration, Seah places the development of the political -administrative 
relationship in the context of the contemporary political situation: 
...the government had come to a fundamental reconciliation with harsh realities, namely, that 
the sentiments that fired the nationalistic imagination were not sufficient to sustain the 
workings of an orderly administration. Expertise as opposed to blind political loyalty or 
enthusiasm was to predominate, although ideally it would be best to have civil servants who 
were both politically loyal and competent. It was this attitude, coupled with the separation of 
mainly Chinese- educated radicals from the ruling party, which helped establish the basis for a 
strong relationship between the civil service and the ruling leadership.)8 
Following the implementation of the Sreenivasan Commission's Report, all was not 
plain sailing_ The civil service had many young and untried managers, it did not have 
the experience or training to develop and implement the range of economic and social 
policies required for post -colonial national development, its top management was 
inimical to local politicians, it purported to adhere strictly to the Westminster ideal of a 
neutral civil service, it was plagued by petty corruption and it was a civil service 
unaccustomed to the discipline of cabinet government 19 Additionally, it was a service 
in which the leadership, in particular, was comfortable with the colonial system and 
did not identify with the anti- colonial attitudes of the new political parties, nor with 
the notion of nation- building20 which formed the policy framework for the new PAP 
government. The PAP was therefore faced with a situation whereby; 
... the nature of the civil service and the voluntary organisations at the time when the PAP 
assumed power made it imperative for its leaders to concentrate all power and authority in 
their own hands. ... The civil service had been the creation of the British colonial rulers whose 
objectives and purposes were entirely different from that of the PAP.21 
This control of the civil service was seen as fitting within a more general hegemony 
strategy of social, political and economic control by the new government; a more 
genuinely neo- Gramscian hegemony that supplanted the political colonial hegemony: 
17 "Text of a Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the Official Opening of the Civil Service Study 
Centre ", (mimeo), Singapore Government press statement, 15 August 1999, p.2 
18 Seah Chee Meow, "The Civil Service ", in Jon S. T. Quah, Government and Politics of Singapore, Singapore, 
Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 92 -119, p. 101 
19 Quah op. cit., 1996, pp. 64-65 
20 Raj Vasil, Governing Singapore, Singapore, Times International, 1988, p. 127 
21 Vasil, ibid., p. 126 
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Central to the PAP thinking on the role of government was its view that the compulsions of 
economic progress and ethnic harmony in multi- racial developing societies made it imperative 
that the government controlled all instruments and centres of power. ...The civil service, trade 
unions, organisations of ethnic segments and trade and industry, all had to be totally 
subordinated to the government.22 
The development of an effective, efficient and technically superior public sector has 
been a major goal of the PAP since it took office. Following independence, the need to 
have a civil service which could identify with and support its political program and 
provide the best possible public management and in particular, the need to have the 
best minds available in the civil service's elite administrative corps, the Administrative 
Service, has received even greater emphasis. 
This was initially a formidable task. The civil service which the PAP inherited was still 
recovering from the localisation program, it was 'inexperienced and over- strained'23 
and many of its leaders were hostile towards and afraid of the PAP.24 On assuming 
office, the PAP implemented a number of structural, procedural and cultural reforms 
within the civil service were aimed at producing a civil service which would work 
with the government and be obedient to it in carrying out its program. The reforms 
included: 
1. Establishment of a Political Study Centre to politically re- educate civil servants to 
the PAP's view of the national situation and to bring their attitudes in line with the 
government's ;a 
2. Political socialisation of the civil service to re -orient them as servants of the people 
through such activities as week -end mass participation of civil servants in civic 
projects; 
3. Introduction of a results oriented culture strongly linked to the government's 
policy goals; 
4. Creation of several new ministries to facilitate the government's policy program;26 
5. Rationalisation of statutory boards and creation of new boards to allow rapid 
implementation of policies without bureaucratic hindrance by freeing boards of 
many civil service accountability and procedural constraints; 
22Vasil, op. cit, p. 123 -124 
23 Seah Chee Meow, "The Singapore Bureaucracy and Issues of Transition ", Occasional Paper Series, No. 12, 
Department of Political Science, University of Singapore, February 1975, p. 7 
24 Jon S. T. Quah, Administrative Reform and Development Administration in Singapore: A Comparative Study of 
the Singapore Improvement Trust and the Housing and Development Board, Ph.D. thesis, Florida State University, 
1975, p. 325 
25 The PAP did not accept that the colonial service had been neutral, but was an instrument of colonial rule. 
Therefore it's re- education program could be justified as necessary to eradicate the colonial mindset seen as prevalent 
in the civil service. Seah, op. cit, 1975, p. 8 
26 At this time, the Civil Service comprised nine ministries and five statutory boards. See: Teo, op. cit, 1985, p. 311 
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6. Reduction of public sector salaries through withdrawal of the variable allowances, 
part of the salary package, although this was later reversed; 
7. Recruitment to the civil service of Chinese- educated graduates to balance the 
predominance of the English educated; 
8. Selectively retaining competent older civil servants beyond retirement age and 
retiring incompetent civil servants below retirement age in association with . 
recruitment to senior positions based on ability and merit instead of seniority; 
9. Introduction of a harsher disciplinary regime for civil servants breaking 
regulations.V 
To explain the PAP's program and to ensure that civil servants understood what the 
PAP government would attempt to achieve, The new prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, 
visited every government department personally, so that civil servants could both hear 
his views directly and question him about the new government.3 
Building on the political success it had experienced through the use of community 
centres operated by the People's Association, the PAP also began to use them as a 
conduit for complaints about the civil service and the implementation of various 
policies. In addition, a Central Complaints Bureau was established in 1961 to receive 
complaints about bureaucratic misbehaviour? 
The PAP government clearly saw the civil service as an arm of the executive - it was to 
be a partner with the government in delivery policy to the electorate. In opening the 
Political Study Centre in August 1959, Lee Kuan Yew commented: 
... at the end of your course in this Study Centre, if you do not share our impatience, you will at 
least understand it. You will at least appreciate why we consider it so vital, if the democratic 
state is to survive, for the machinery to be in tune with the temper of the people and the tempo 
of political change in the rest of Asia. ... It is in our interest to show that .... there can be an 
honest and efficient government which works through an efficient administration in the 
interests of the people 30 
The PAP wanted a committed, politically aligned service which could work closely 
with ministers to achieve policy goals. Whether there was a cultural mindset that "he 
who is not with me is against me ", or whether this attitude was driven by the simple 
27 Quah, op. cit., 1975, pp. 345 -346; S. C. Meow, "Bureaucratic Evolution and Political Change in an Emergent 
Nation: A Case Study of Singapore, Ph.D. dissertation, Victoria University of Manchester, 1971, pp. 86-89; Jon S. T. 
Quah, "Public Bureaucracy, Social Change and National Development ", in, Peter S. J. Chen, ed., Singapore 
Development Policies and Trends, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 197 -224 
28 Chan Heng Chee, "Political Development, 1965- 1979 ", in Ernest C. T. Chew and Edwin Lee, eds., A History of 
Singapore, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 162 
29 L. B. Hiok, "Personnel Relations in the Public Services of Singapore ", in A. Rakasasataya and H. Siedentopf, 
eds., Asian Civil Service Technical Papers, 8, Kuala Lumpur, Asian and Pacific Development Administration 
Centre, 1980, pp. 91 -145p. 105 
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practicality of policy demands is difficult to say. In addition it wanted a service in 
which selection and promotion was based, within the broad concept of alignment to 
the government's policies, on merit and which had the technical capacity to develop 
and implement policies.31 
To achieve a politically aligned service staffed by bright young officers, the 
government began attracting bright graduates through a scholarship scheme and 
providing them with challenging and rewarding work, especially in the 
Administrative Service. This new elite were to work with ministers and the 
government as partners - they were to share the tasks of policy formulation as well as 
implementation, so that all the best resources of the nation could be bought to bear on 
the task of nation building. Lee Kuan Yew made this approach abundantly clear in 
telling senior public servants: 
We the elected Ministers have to work through you and with you to translate our plans and 
policies into reality. You should give of your best in the service of our people 32 
Once the new government started to work with the civil service on a daily basis, a 
good relationship between the two was quickly established. The pragmatism and in- 
corruptibility of the new government impressed the service as a whole. In turn, the 
initial hostility of the PAP to the Civil Service quickly passed as they realised that the 
vast majority of civil servants could easily identify with their policy goals and were 
generally willing to surrender the doctrine and practices of political neutrality. With 
the departure of the senior civil servants who were vehemently opposed to the PAP, 
the PAP's reinstatement of salary cuts, its implementation of procedural and structural 
reforms and its obvious incorruptibility and nationalism, the relationship between the 
PAP government and the civil service became positive .33 
Particularly as a result of the policy and political challenges the PAP faced in the early 
1960's in it's struggle with the Barisan Socialis, this relationship, in a relatively short 
period, became more than symbiotic; it became conjugal.34 In this struggle, as has been 
previously discussed, the civil service was a strong and willing instrument in the 
30 Alex Jossey. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore, Donald Moore Press, 1968, pp. 111-112 
31 Lee Kuan Yew noted "I am in favour of an efficient service. The bright chap goes up and I don't care how many 
years he's been or hasn't been in. If he's the best man for the job, put him there." See: Meow, op. cit., 1971, p. 88 
32 Cited in: Chan Heng Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grassroots, Singapore, 
University of Singapore Press, 1974, p. 22 
33 Seah, op. cit, 1975, pp. 7 -13 
34 The civil service -PAP relationship is often described as symbiotic. However, all public bureaucracies have a 
symbiotic relationship with their controlling political institutions if one uses this biological metaphor - each is 
dependent on the other for certain essential functions. A more accurate description in the Singapore case uses the 
mathematical term "conjugal" whether from optics or geometry. If one takes a geometrical meaning, two points are 
conjugal if they are so related as to be interchangeable in the enunciation of certain properties. So too, in many ways, 
is the senior civil service in Singapore interchangeable with the political executive in relation to certain activities. 
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hands of the PAP in its defeat of the Barisan and its relationship with the government 
developed such that; "... today is totally committed to the PAP government and 
regards it as a national government, a custodian of the nation's interests. "n 
This realignment of the Civil Service with the PAP, has been largely attributed to the 
political re- education conducted by the Political Study Centre36 and the incorporation 
of this attitudinal 'training' within the public sector culture.n This has been credited 
with being the principal reason for the public service being able to design and 
implement policies quickly and efficiently.a In Singapore, a professional civil service 
works in partnership with a professional political service, both of which are based on 
recruitment of an intellectual and managerial elite. In many ways, the political 
leadership and the civil service leadership comprise the same types of people, with the 
obvious exception that there are many more senior women in the civil service than in 
the political stream. In return for its support, the government has developed the civil 
service as a national institution, provided it with excellent salaries, conditions, 
training, professional infrastructure and high social prestige. The distinction between 
the two parts of the executive government became, in many parts, blurred. Under 
successive Lee Kuan Yew governments, particularly as the first generation leaders 
retired and more civil servants entered politics, some civil servants became more 
influential than some ministers, or at least as influential. One indicator of this is that 
Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister had a habit of dealing directly with Permanent 
Secretaries on both administrative and policy issues, would write memos and 
telephone them rather than go through the relevant minister,39 a habit which has not 
even now been entirely curbed 4° The development of this conjugal relationship has 
been explained by S. Rajaratnam: 
We moved up people very quickly on the basis of merit. Furthermore, we involved them in 
something far more challenging and satisfying than just being a civil servant - building houses, 
roads, keep the city clean. They were being stretched. It did not take long before we established 
a close link between us and the civil service. In fact, after the first two elections, the PAP 
became really an administration. It was no longer a party. And the civil service became a part of 
that. 41 
35 Vasil, op. cit.,, p. 133 
36 Jon S. T. Quah, "Public Bureaucracy, Social Change and National Development ", in, Peter S. J. Chen, ed., 
Singapore Development Policies and Trends. Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 197 -224, p. 201 
37 Jon S. T. Quah, "Administrative reform: Singapore Style ", International Review of Administrative Science, 57, 
1991, pp_ 8S -100, p. 98 
38 In 1986, it was noted that civil servants "... were politicised to align their interests with those of the PAP and such 
success has enabled speedy and efficient implementation of many policies." See: "Replacing Top Officials May 
Upset Stability, Says Report ", Business Times, 11 September 1986 
39Interview with Dr. Hiew Siew Nam, former Director, Public Works Department, 1995 
40 Confirmed in several interviews with civil service officers. 
41Vasil, op. cit., p. 134 
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MAJOR FEATURES OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 1959 -98 
Although a distinctly Singaporean bureaucracy has emerged since 1959, the trends in 
public sector development have taken place within a public management framework 
that in many ways has not changed since the end of the colonial administration, 
particularly in the way that the political and public sector leadership is integrated. A 
colonial model has simply been adapted and modernised, changed in appearance but 
not substance, to suit the framework of independence. However, a number of major 
trends can be identified as characterising the development of the Singaporean public 
sector: 
1. The development of an hexadical public sector comprising; (1) the Singapore Civil 
Service (SCS), (2) statutory boards, (3) government linked corporations (GLCs), (4) 
quasi- autonomous agencies, (5) the Singapore Armed Forces and, (6) quasi - 
institutional bodies. 
2. Development of the elite Administrative Service so as to recruit and retain officers 
within this service as a key part of the core executive. 
3. The introduction of a generic strategic planning framework for the public sector to 
assist in policy planning and governance; 
4. Introduction of information technology and the development of a high capacity 
public service communications and information system, through which public 
sector business processes have been redesigned and, more strategically, advanced 
surveillance capabilities developed; 
5. Strengthening of anti- corruption mechanisms and the anti- corruption regime; 
6. Adoption of a policy learning framework in policy development and 
implementation; 
7. Introduction of contemporary management and business methods including the 
introduction of reforms in human resource management (HRM), productivity, 
information technology, financial administration, strategic and corporate planning 
and the structure of the public sector through commercialisation, corporatisation 
and outsourcing; and 
8. Introduction of a comprehensive public sector reform program through PS21. 
While all of these features are important and play key roles in defining how the public 
sector operates as part of the goverance system, for the purposes of this study only the 
first four will be examined as they are the areas which have been given most attention 
by the contemporary political executive in responding to social and political pressures 
over the past 10 years. 
An Hexadical Public Sector 
Under the colonial administration a bifurcated system of government ministries and 
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statutory boards had already developed in Singapore, derived from the British 
domestic model of public administration. Ministries were essentially policy bodies 
with some program management functions, while boards were responsible for the 
administration of particular enterprises such as ports, hospitals, airports and utilities. 
Under successive PAP administrations, the executive functions of government were 
increasing transferred to boards, new boards created, a third public sector group, 
government linked corporations (GLCs)42 established and the Singapore Armed Forces 
established. In addition, two other categories of organisations have been developed. 
The first are largely publicly funded and indirectly controlled organisations, ostensibly 
independent, which act as peripheral policy boards. The number in this category is 
small; the Institute of Policy Studies, the Singapore International Foundation and the 
Institute of International Affairs. The second category consists of quasi -institutional 
bodies created by cabinet directive and largely secretive in their functions. Most of 
these bodies are unknown by the general Singaporean public and some, such as the 
Defence Council, are supposed to be state secrets. This group includes the Defence 
Counci1,43 the Security and Intelligence Committee, the Coordinating Board, the 
Consultancy and Directorships Appointments Council and could arguably include the 
Committee on Technical and Professional Education which has overseen education 
and manpower policies for more than 20 years. In this study, it is inappropriate to 
include an analysis of the development of the SAF and so the major focus will be on 
ministries, boards and GT.Cs_ The other two types of public sector bodies will be 
considered as appropriate. 
In developing the public sector over the past 40 years, the PAP government has not 
generally been guided by contemporary public management theory (except where is 
served higher purposes), but by the principles which have already been noted as 
comprising its style of governance; maintaining political control, politicisation of the 
public sector leadership, integration of all ministries, boards, GLCs and other public 
sector organisations within the hegemonic framework through corporatist and other 
structures and establishing organisations to replace civil society functions which have 
been purposefully weakened. This has been achieved through a variety of strategies; 
restructuring ministries, creating new ministries, boards and GLCs, and the 
commercialisation, corporatisation or outsourcing of public sector functions or 
operations. Control of entities outside the civil service has been maintained by their 
senior management and boards being appointed under the oversight of either the 
Coordinating Board, chaired by the prime minister, or the Consultancy and 
Directorships Appointment Council (CDAC). 
42 Until recently called Government Linked Companies, but since 1996 the term Government Linked Corporations 
has been used. 
43 Also called the Council on Defence (COD)_ 
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For the purpose of brevity, it is perhaps illustrative to take an example from the 
economic policy sector, the evolution of the EDB, to demonstrate the way in which the 
three core parts of the public sector, ministries, boards and GLCs have developed. 
Executive program management has been achieved through two forms; statutory 
boards and GLCs. Boards were used to provide greater administrative flexibility 
unhindered by civil service regulations and practices44, while still having a rigorous 
accountability framework44 while GLCs provided even greater freedom for 
government action as they were incorporated as private companies and therefore had 
to provide information only to the political executive as the shareholder. 
The EDB: Incubator of Public Sector Complexity 
The EDB was established by the inclusion of the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime 
Minister's Office and the Economic Development Division in the Ministry of Finance 
with the Singapore Industrial Promotion Board in 1961 as a 'one -stop shop' for 
industrial development. Although it was ostensibly an industrial promotion agency, 
Singapore was so dependent upon this single economic strategy that the 
responsibilities of the EDB grew until it was involved in almost every aspect of 
economic policy except for some aspects of macro -economic policy still retained by the 
Ministry of Finance and the political executive, particularly the Prime Minister's 
Office. 
This resulted, early in its history in a cycle of acquiring and divesting itself of 
particular functions so that it could continue to focus on its core business. However, 
the history of the EDB indicates that it followed a two pronged core business strategy 
until approximately 1986; its 'inner core of industrial development' and it 'outer core' 
or incubator for associated functions that required nurturing and development until 
they could be turned over to another organisation - whether by design or accident - 
usually by corporatisation of the EDB function. 
In 1968, in response to recommendations in a review conducted by Dr. Albert 
Winsemius, the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS), a GLC, was created from the 
EDB's Finance Division and the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC), a statutory board, 
was created from the Industrial Facilities Division so as to refocus the EDB on 
investment promotion. A GLC trading company, the International Trading Company 
(INTRACO) was also established in 1968 by the privatisation of the EDB's Export 
Promotion Centre to facilitate the sale of Singaporean manufactured products, 
44 Seah, op. cit., 1987, p. 104 
45 Linda Low, The Political Economy of Privatisation in Singapore: Analysis, Interpretation and Evaluation, 
Singapore, McGraw Hill, 1991, p. 73 
76 Ross Worthington 
particularly to the communist centrally planned economies. Earlier in 1962 it had 
already established its first GLC, the National Iron and Steel Mills which still operates 
as the NatSteel Group, a transnational GLC based in Singapore. 
From 1963 to 1968, the EDB had promoted technical education as a necessary adjunct 
to industrial development and in 1968 transferred a director, Lim Ho Hup, to the 
Ministry of Education (MOE) to head its Technical Education Department (TED) and 
direct further development in this area, while retaining control of the central policy 
committee, the Committee on Technical and Professional Education (CTPE), within the 
EDB. The CTPE was transferred to the Ministry of Trade and Industry on its 
establishment in 1979. Under this arrangement, the policy responsibilities for technical 
education remained substantially within EDB, but were shared with MOE. However, 
in 1973, the TED was itself replaced by the Industrial Training Board (11 B) and in 1979 
this was merged with the Adult Education Board to form the Vocational and Industrial 
Training Board (V11B). The VTTB board included representation from the MOE, EDB, 
NPB, HDB, the NTUC and the private sector, with its principal policy inputs coming 
from EDB, MOE and NPB. In 1992, the VTTB was replaced by the Institute of Technical 
Education (11E) with a board of similar composition to the VTTB and the same policy 
framework. In November 1964, the Management Development Unit of the EDB had 
already been transferred to the Singapore Institute of Management (SIM) which in 
1998 is being prepared to become the Singapore Management University.46 The EDB 
was thus began a number of technical education initiatives, nurtured and corporatised 
them, but retained policy and program input to them as it moved increasingly from an 
in -house to a networked policy management system. 
Industrial standards and productivity were also originally core EDB responsibilities. 
The Engineering Industry Development Agency (ElDA) and the Singapore Institute of 
Standards and Industrial Research (SISIR), which replaced the Technical Consultant 
Services Division of the EDB, were established in 1972 and provided with independent 
boards of management, but still under the control of the EDB. In 1973 the SISIR was 
established as an independent board and the ETDA commercialised Previously, in 
1972, the National Productivity Centre within EDB which had its roots in an agreement 
among the NTUC, the Singapore Association of Manufacturers SMA) and the 
Singapore National Employers Federation (SNEF) in January 1965 and was jointly 
managed by these groups and the EDB, had been corporatised as the National 
Productivity Board independent of EDB under the Ministry of Labour. Also in 1972, 
the secretariat of the National Wages Council was formed within EDB, thus giving it a 
direct role in industrial relations and wages policy. 
46 SIM was initially funded by the Ford Foundation with a $300,000 grant and donations from the EDB and local 
corporations but staffed with EDB officers as well as others from government and the private sector. 
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In 1979, the general economic policy functions of the Ministry of Finance were 
transferred to a new Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) under which the boards 
responsible for economic development programs were eventually gathered; the EDB in 
1979, the TDB in 1982, the NPB and SISIR in 1986, SISIR (and the amalgamation of 
these two, the National Productivity and Standards Board - NPSB - in 1996) the Public 
Utilities Board (PUB) in , the JTC in , the Singapore Tourist Promotion Board ( now 
the Singapore Tourism Board - STB) in , and the National Science and Technology 
Board (NSTB) in 1991. 
In 1979, the Skills Development Fund was established to fund industrial training for 
the employed and unemployed to promote the development of a higher skilled 
technical workforce. The secretariat for the SDF was established within the EDB until it 
was transferred to the NPB in 1986. The trade programs of the EDB, together with 
most functions of the Department of Trade within the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MTI) were combined to form the Trade Development Board in 1982. In 1988 the TDB 
began establishing its own GLC family through a holding company known as TDB 
Holdings Pte Ltd.47 
Science and technology policy and program management is another area which the 
EDB eventually divested itself of. The EDB's Research and Development Assistance 
Scheme (RDAS), established in 1981 and administered by the Science Council, was the 
core of the new National Science and Technology Board's (NSTB) activities when it 
was created from the Science Council in 1991. Under the NSTB, RDAS was 
transformed into the National Technology Plan and funding increased to $2 billion in 
order to promote the rapid development of a high technology economic sector. 
Through this plan the NSTB created a number of national research centres which are, 
in effect, boards at a lower level than the major statutory boards. These research 
institutes and centres are affiliated with a university and, in some cases, also with 
GLCs, private companies and the NCB 48 The NSTB, in addition to being a program 
management agency also seems to have a science and technology policy advisory 
function, which was substantially missing after the abolition of the Ministry of Science 
and Technology in 1981, although the Science Council, the EDB and the Ministry of 
47 TDB Holdings has at least five subsidiaries: Singapore Kokubu Corporation, Iwataya- Singapore Trading 
Company Ltd., S *pore (Japan) ltd, International Merchandise Mart, and Singapore Showcase. See: Lee Tsao Yuan, 
"Economic Restructuring Policies in the 1980s ", in, Linda Low and Toh Mun Heng, Public Policies in Singapore: 
Changes in the 1980s and Future Signposts, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1992, pp. 30-54, p. 38 
48 These include the Gintec Institute of Manufacturing Technology, the Kent Ridge Digital Labs (in association with 
NUS), the Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology and the National Supercomputing Research Centre, among others. 
The other research institutes and centres created under the NSTB are: Institute of Microelectronics, Institute of 
Molecular Agrobiology, Bioprocessing Technology Centre, Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing, 
Centre for Wireless Communication, and the Magnetics Technology Centre. In 1998, the Institute of Systems 
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Communications all fulfilled this function to some degree with selected input from the 
Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) 49 
Following the report of the Economic Committee in 1985, an Economic Planning 
Committee (EPC) was established in December 1989 with the task of building on the 
recommendations of that report and developing a national Strategic Economic Plan 
(SEP) 5° While the overall policy responsibilities for the SEP were delegated to MTI, the 
policy ministry, the secretariat for the EPC resided in the EDB51 This indicates that the 
policy /program management divide is not always clear between MTI and the EDB. 
For example, in the resolutions adopted from its 1991 Strategic Planning Meeting, the 
EDB has accepted the task of making Singapore a developed nation by the year 2020. 
This reflects the responsibilities placed on the EDB by the SEP. For example, of the 14 
industry clusters identified in the plan, the EDB is the lead agency for the development 
of six. This would imply the development and implementation of a range of social and 
economic policies beyond the brief of industrial and service industry development, an 
ambit claim that seems to have been accepted by government, within the context of the 
EDB working as part of a team of boards and ministries to achieve this goal as both a 
policy initiator and program manager. Thus, from 1986, the specialist policy and 
program infrastructure had developed to such a stage that the EDB's operational 
strategy began to focus on a policy networking approach rather than in -house 
management of the economic development policy agenda.52 This growth of other 
economic policy agencies has also been credited with moving the EDB and other 
economic policy actors in recent years into relationships based more on technocratic 
affiliations than the personal affiliations more common in the 1960s and 1970s.55 
Development of the Administrative Service 
The Administrative service is the 'premier service' in the Civil Service, based on and 
developed from the colonial Administrative Service (AS). It has been known as the 
'mandarinate' and its officers designated as the 'heavenborn'.51 The Prime Minister has 
defined the Administrative Service as "... the apex of the Civil Service pyramid. Its job 
Science and the Information Technology institute were amalgamated to form Kent Ridge Digital Labs in association 
with NUS. 
49lnterview with Vijaykumar Mehta, Chief Executive NSTB, 1995. 
50 The Economic Planning Committee, The Strategic Economic Plan: Towards a Developed Nation, Singapore, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1991 
S1 Linda Low, "The Economic Development Board ", in, Linda Low et. al., eds., Challenge and Response: Thirty 
Years of the Economic Development Board, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1993, pp. 61 -120, p. 106 
52 Economic Development Board, Economic Development Board Yearbook 1988/98, Singapore, Economic 
Development Board, 1989, p. 19 
53 Linda Low, "Conclusion ", in, Linda Low et. al., Challenge and Response: Thirty Years of the Economic 
Development Board, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1993, p. 327 
54 Thomas J. Bellows, `Bureaucracy and Development in Singapore ", Asian Journal of Public Administration, 7, 1, 
June 1985, p. 61 
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is to help the political leadership spot trends, meet needs, maintain standards, and 
formulate and implement policies for the security and success of the country. "55 Yet 
this elite , except for several high profile Permanent Secretaries and Board CEOs is 
virtually unknown by the public: 
.. Administrative Officers are often in the background, assisting the Ministers in policy 
formulation, fine -tuning policies for execution and seeing through their implementation. 
Administrative Officers form the interface between the political leadership and the machinery 
of government. Filling many key positions in the public sector...._ (they) play a vital role in the 
development of the country, yet very often what you do is away from the public eye. ... the 
nature of an Administrative Officer's job is not easily defined and his contributions are less 
apparent." 56 
As the cabinet rule the legislature, the Administrative Service rules the public sector. It 
has two components; the Administrative Service and the Administrative Service 
(Foreign Service), the latter limited to officers serving in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. It is the career stream for the elite management group; recruitment is 
purposely elitist, the career structure stresses early and increasing administrative, 
policy and political responsibility with officers working closely with ministers and the 
government. The top management of the public service is dominated by the 
Administrative Service; all permanent secretaries, deputy secretaries and chief 
executives of boards are members of the AS.57 It is from the AS that the civil service 
partners of the political /bureaucratic team are predominantly drawn; they are policy 
makers as well as policy implementers. The AS is a small service, never having had 
more than 300 officers. By the late 1980s, because of both its small size and elitist 
composition, the government was experiencing difficulties with the AS principally due 
to the large numbers of officers that were leaving the AS for the private sector. This 
loss of officers was supposedly as a result of salary and benefits being better in the 
private sector, but in many cases it was reported that officers were disenchanted with 
the political system and the nature of their work with ministers.58 
In response to this, the government instituted a number of initiatives to enhance the 
size, attractiveness, career and remuneration prospects of the AS: 
1. Creation of a Corps of Senior Administrators (CSA),59 
2. Changes in personnel management in the AS, including staff appraisal, training 
55 Administrative Service. Available at: htt p:// www. gov. sgipmo /admínsvc /service_content.html 
56 Finance Minister Dr. Richard Hu Tsu Tau, "Recognising the contribution of Administrative Officers ", Speeches: 
A Bimonthly Selection of Ministerial speeches, 16, 4, July- August 1992, pp. 54-57, pp. 54-55 
57 Straits Times, 2 March 1996, p. 12 
58 These concerns were acknowledged in interviews with present and former Administrative Officers. 
59 Announced by the prime minister in his address to the Administrative Service annual dinner dance in 1991. See: 
"Corps team to take on top government jobs ", Straits Times Overseas Edition, 16 July 1991, p. 24 
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and development and remuneration; 
3. Increasing the annual intake to the AS; 
4. Introduction of the dual career scheme; 
5. Creating the rank of Permanent Secretary as a rank as well as an office; 
6. Improving training and career development opportunities; 
7. Attaching younger officers to grassroots organisations to provide political and 
policy orientation. 
The Corps of Senior Administrators (CAS) was created in July 1990 in order to 'harness 
the best talent in the public sectors' and was apparently supposed to be secret.61 The 
CAS included officers in the AS, but also senior officers in the Professional Services 
(such as the Accounting Service and the Legal Service), the Singapore Armed Forces 
(SAF) at colonel rank and above, statutory boards and even government linked 
companies. The CAS did not replace the existing separate services, but was supposed 
to integrate their best talent into a coordinated and supervised pool of the public 
sector's best management and policy talent.62 The creation of the CAS was supposed to 
add up to an additional 50 officers to the top pool of public sector managers, taking it 
from 242 in 1991 to approximately 300, thus overcoming the problem of declining 
recruitment to the AS63 as well as providing a mechanism by which senior 
administrators can be moved throughout the public sector while retaining their 
original substantive position. Itv was not possible to get details of the composition and 
numbers in the CAS in 1998 as PMO officers advised that the CAS scheme had been 
discontinued .64 If the scheme has been discontinued, it is most probably because GLCs 
and statutory boards resisted the incorporation of their senior management into the 
CSA. These officers could not have been compelled to serve in the civil service; many, 
if not most, would have responded by moving to the private sector. It is most probable 
that the CSA ceased in 1994 when the Dual Career Scheme was extended to include the 
60 Straits Times, 6 July 1991, p. 17 
61 Interview with Lim Soo Hoon, Deputy Secretary PMO September 1998. Why an organisation of senior public 
sector officers should be secret, especially in a nation as mall and prone to rumour as Singapore, beggars the 
imagination. However, this is indicative of the common mindset among the political and public sector leadership; 
that because of their policy performance they are essentially unaccountable except in the most shallow of ways and 
they have a right to keep the core of the public policy and control system secret. It is commonly thought by this 
group that independent external scrutiny of such `honourable officials' would waste time and resources and achieve 
nothing; competition is only good in certain circumstances, not in the realm of ideas. 
62 Oversight of the Corps was provided by a Supervisory Committee comprising two Deputy Chairmen of the PSC, 
two Permanent Secretaries and two chief executives of statutory boards and was chaired by the Chairman of the 
PSC, all of whom were current or previous members of the AS. In 1991 this included Lee Hee Seng, PSC chairman, 
Dr. Wong Heck Sing and Dr. Cheong Siew Keong, PSC deputy chairmen, Dr. Andrew Chew, Lim Siong Guan and J. 
Y. Pillay. It included only one statutory board head, Pillay, who also represented the GLCs as chairman of Singapore 
International Airlines. See: "Corps team to take on top government jobs ", Straits Times Overseas Edition, 16 July 
1991, p. 24. In 1998, it is believed to include; Lee Hee Seng and Dr. Cheong Siew Keong from the PSC, Lim Siong 
Guan, Eddie Teo both permanent secretaries, Ho Meng Kit, managing director of the EDB, Lim Chin Beng from 
Singapore Technologies Aerospace and Peter Ho Hak Ean, Permanent Secretary )Defence Development) in 
MINDEF. 
63 Interview with PMO (PSD) officer 1995. 
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AS, as another attempt to boost recruitment. 
In association with the November 1994 AS recruitment exercise, the Dual Career 
Scheme was extended to the AS from other services in which it had been operating 
since 1982. The original scheme had been aimed at facilitating the transfer of Singapore 
Armed Forces (SAF) officers to the civil service and boards for two year secondments 
or in preparation for post -SAF retirement postings 6s It was now extended to 
encourage officers from other services to enter the Administrative Service and, in 
particular, SAF officers of Lt. Colonel rank and above.65 Following an application for 
admission to the AS, these officers are rigorously screened through a review of their 
annual appraisals and through interviews with the Permanent Secretary PMO, and 
members of the PSC board. Once admitted, officers continue to work in their current 
positions until a suitable vacancy in the Administrative Service is available. Whether 
filling an AS position or not, these officers are treated otherwise as part of the AS 
through participation in training and the AS social activities (e.g. the Alpha Society), 
by having a permanent secretary as a mentor and by receiving the AS additional one 
month salary. The Dual Career Scheme is supposed to provide a reservoir of talent for 
the AS, freeing up existing officers to move beyond the Civil Service as required into 
boards, GLCs and quasi- government positions, thus providing much needed flexibility 
in the use of these elite officers. In the first intake of Dual Career Officers in 1995, 26 
officers were selected, although whether they were eventually admitted to the AS is 
unknown.67 
In 1996, a policy complementary to the Dual Career Scheme was introduced to accept 
applicants to the AS from mid- career private sector executives. Although the stated 
rational was that "Such a inward flow will help the Civil Service stay continuously 
attuned to outside trends and private sector needs.",68 it is generally believed that the 
policy had the same basis as the Dual Career Scheme - to increase AS numbers, to 
provide a greater reservoir of talent and to free -up the more senior AS officers so that 
they could be used more flexibly for priority policy tasks. This initiative received a 
positive response of 700 applications. However only two appointments were made. 
64 The list of CSA officers maintained by the PMO/PSD is apparently supposed to be secret. See: Bertha Henson, 
"Testing time for Mandarins ", The Straits Times Overseas Edition, 20 July 1991, pp. 1415, p. 15 
65 
"Who Wields the Real Power ", Singapore Business, November 1990, p. 52 
66 In three interviews I asked about the large number of SAF officers at Lt. Colonel and Colonel rank who seem to 
leave the SAF annually, as indicated through data analyses of SAF appointees to boards and public service 
committees. All three respondents stated that while there are large numbers of SAF positions up to the rank of major, 
from that rank onwards (i.e. Lt. Colonel), the number decreased dramatically and there were simply not enough 
positions to which to promote officers. This is a purposeful strategy by the government to attract large numbers of 
university educated officers unto a dual public sector career; first in the SAF followed by a second career in the 
public sector bureaucracies or in a GLC. The Ministry of Defence refused all requests for meetings, so this could not 
be officially confirmed. 
67 Straits Times, 9 March 1995, p. 10 
68 As stated by the Deputy Prime Minister BG. Lee Hsien Loong. Straits Times, 1 April 1997, p. 2 
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This initiative was supplemented by a proposal to attach AS officers to private sector 
companies so that they could gain experience of the private sector both in Singapore 
and abroad,s to provide overseas experience so that officers can see Singapore in an 
international context, better understand the global business environment and the 
international political environment.70 In 1998, the PMO advised that no AS officers 
were seconded under this scheme. 
Major changes were made to the conditions of service in the AS in late 1994, 
particularly in regard to recruitment, retention, promotion and remuneration. 
Recruitment standards were raised to include both higher educational standards and 
the specification of person abilities which would indicate high potential. For those 
serving AS officers, only those with the Currently Estimated Potential (CEP) to reach 
Superscale E grade or higher (i.e. Deputy Secretary level) were to be retained in the AS. 
Those failing to reach this CEP would be counselled on other options within the Civil 
Service or were allowed to retire from the service. For those officers reaching this CEP, 
their remuneration was increased by the payment of an additional one month's salary. 
In addition to these changes, the rate of promotion in the service has also been 
increased, so that officers will reach senior positions and high remuneration levels 
relatively quickly. The benchmark for rate of promotion in the AS was set at officers 
achieving Superscale G by the age of 32 years!' The impact of these changes on 
introduction in 1994 was the assessment of 30 AS officers as having an inadequate CEP 
and they subsequently left the service?' In fact, research indicates that remuneration 
levels which are competitive with the private sector by and of themselves are 
insufficient to retain officers in the Administrative Service and that job satisfaction, 
motivation and loyalty are also important factors.73 This obviously reflect the quality 
of the relationship between the AS and the political executive. 
In association with these changes to personnel management, the remuneration and 
promotional structure for the AS was also revised in 1994. The major aspects of these 
reforms were provided for in amendments made to the Constitution in March 1994 
and consequent administrative action by the government and included; salary 
69 Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Tony Tan, Straits Times, 29 March 1996, p. 1 
70 Straits Times, 29 March 1996, p. 2 
71 This provide a 32 year old officer after approximately 7 years service with an annual salary of $162,200 per 
annum exclusive of bonuses but including the AS one month additional salary. In addition officers receive an 
employer paid contribution to their CPF account of $33,440. Thus total remuneration at this level is approximately 
$194,640 
72 Straits Times, 21 November 1994, p. 2 
73 Matthew Lee Khai Wah, Competing for the Best and Brightest: The Strategic Use of Compensation in the 
Singapore Administrative Service. honours thesis, Department of Political Science, National University of 
Singapore, 1995; Modh Aminuddin Bin Buang, Attracting and Retaining Personnel in the Administrative Service, 
honours thesis, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 1991 
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increases on the same scale as for political office holders,74 the creation of permanent 
secretary positions as a rank as well as a dedicated position, the introduction of 
additional bonuses,a and the annual intake to the Administrative Service was raised 
from approximately 12 to 30 in late 1994, including an allowance for 15 additional 
officers from the Dual Career Scheme.76 
Training and career development opportunities for Administrative Officers were also 
expanded. It was apparent that younger AOs required greater training in policy 
development and a support structure so that the policy knowledge of more 
experienced AOs could be shared with new and younger recruits - the old approach of 
development through a "baptism of fire" was becoming inadequate?? After studying 
European and Asian institutions, a study team recommended that a Civil Service 
College be established.78 In 1992 the Minister for Finance, Dr. Richard Hu Tsu Tau 
announced the government's decision to establish the Civil Service College for "... 
developing senior officers in policy and strategic planning as well as in managerial and 
leadership skills. ... the College will also aim at building esprit de corps of top civil 
servants, imbuing in them a strong sense of public service and inculcating a practical 
approach to public administration "79 The college functions also to socialise and 
acculturalise new entrants to the AS and, partly to this end, a number of core courses 
are compulsory for confirmation and promotion.93 Initially this compulsion was 
resisted by some AOs on the basis of job -demand. However, the political support for 
the CSC was of such strength that the First Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, 
commanded the attendance of these officers .8' In 1997, the original CSC was renamed 
the Institute for Policy Development (DP) within an expanded CSC. As with the 
Political Study Centre of the 1960s, certain ministers and top civil servants are key 
speakers at some CSC courses run by the lPD and one of its programs brings officers 
and ministers together in a casual setting for discussionffi Since commencing 
operations in 1993, the CSC in association with the Alpha Society, the Administrative 
Service's social club, have been key institutions in building esprit de corps, 
74 See statement by the prime minister, Goh Chock Tong in: Parliamentary Debates Singapore, Official Report, 63, 
7, 31 October 1994, 646 
75 Parliamentary Debates Singapore, Official Report, 62, 16, 21 March 1994, 1431 -1445 
76 Straits Times, 21 November 1994, p. 13 
77 Comments from an interview with Mr. Tan Boon Huat, Deputy Secretary (Policy), PMO(PSD), 1996. See: Tony 
Lai Ming Thung, Administrative Training in the Singapore Civil Service.' An evaluation, honours thesis, Department 
of Political science, national University of Singapore, 1996, p. 33 
78 Interview with Deputy Dean, Civil Service College, 1995. The study team comprised Mr. Tan Boon Huat, PM0 
(PSD) and Madam Teo Hee Lian, then Director of the Civil Service Institute. 
79 Finance Minister Dr. Richard Hu Tsu Tau, "Recognising the contribution of Administrative Officers ", Speeches: 
A Bimonthly Selection of Ministerial Speeches, 16, 4, July- August 1992, pp. 54-57, p. 56 
80 Cdre (NS) Teo Chee Hean, "The Establishment of the Civil Service College ", Speeches, April -June 1994, 18, 2, 
PP- 
81 Tony Lai Ming Thung, Administrative Training in the Singapore Civil Service: An evaluation, honours thesis, 
Department of Political science, national University of Singapore, 1996, p. 37 
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professionalism and personal networks in the Administrative Service the broader core 
executive. 
In mid -1996 was the creation of the Community Immersion Scheme for AS officers 
which is aimed at providing them with direct experience of the impact of policy on 
ordinary citizens, their needs and problems as part of the political socialisation process 
within the AS. This scheme, jointly coordinated by the Prime Minister's Office (Public 
Service Division) and the People's Association, offers AS officers with two to three 
years experience a placement in a grassroots organisation for four months to one year. 
In addition to their placement, these officers attend meetings of Resident's 
Committees, Citizen's Consultative Committees and Community Centre Management 
Committees, accompany local MPs on constituency walk -abouts and meet -the- people 
sessions. Since 1996, approximately 10 officers are placed in the CIS each year.83 
These enhancements to the Administrative Service appear to have greatly improved 
the career structure for Administrative Officers. The job possibilities are such that: 
All top public sector jobs, plus chairman, CEO and directorship positions of statutory boards, 
chairman and directorship positions in government -linked corporations, as well as 
ambassadorships, will, in principle, be open to assignment of Administrative Service officers.84 
However, there appears to have been a backlash against this obviously elitist program. 
In interviews with a number of civil servants, Lai reports that there is a perception that 
these changes within the AS are seen as "entrenching elitism" without providing some 
complementary enhancements to the other services within the SCS.ffi It also appears 
that despite the effort made to enhance the attractiveness of the Administrative 
Service, it has failed to attract greater numbers of recruits; the service had 242 officers 
in 1990 and only 247 in 1997,88 In 1998, the PMO advised that there were "about 
270 "officers in the AS, but could only locate the appointment of 195 of them, raising 
doubts about the actual strength of the service and indicating a continuing failure to 
recuit the numbers required. In interviews, several Administrative Service officers 
ascribed this failure to the unwillingness of many new graduates to be involved in 
government, irregardless of issues such as remuneration. The one area which was 
identified as attracting new recruits was the Foreign Service. If this is correct, this 
means that the number of Administrative Service officers available for other ministries 
82 ibid., p. 36 
83 Data provided by the PMO/PSD, 1998. 
84 Lim Siong Guan, op. cit, 1996, pp. 35-48, p. 43 
85 Tony Lai Ming Thung, op. cit., p. 43. When questioned on this in 1998, the PMO was unable to provide 
information on this issue. It is most probable that accusations of elitism are meaningless to the AS and the political 
executive because the service is designed to be elitist. 
86 Data from Publisc Service Division PMO. 
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and boards is actually declining. This may be the major reason why the CSA 
framework is being used to bring SAF officers into positions formerly filled by 
Administrative Officers. This would indicate that recruitment to the public sector 
executive is in decline, a trend that will impact on the number and quality of the 
members of the core executive. 
INTRODUCTION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY8 
The Singapore Civil Service has been an aggressive pioneer in the systemic use of 
information technology (IT) in its operations and is possibly the most computerised 
public service in the world -a factor of size as well as resources. This approach has 
been closely linked with the government's economic development strategy which is 
strongly oriented to developing the domestic capacity for TT innovation and design in 
both software and hardware across all aspects of IT from PC and telecommunications 
software to chip design and manufacturing. The Civil Service has been used as a 
'stalking horse' for the implementation of IT in business and industry in Singapore, 
providing best practice cases of IT usage and concurrently developing a large number 
of technical personnel as a national 1T resource, as many have moved from the Civil 
Service to the private sector to manage business TT implementation. 
In addition to its economic development function, this program has also been 
promoted by MINDEF and the internal security agencies as an essential tool in 
political and social surveillance; a strategy which has allowed the core executive to 
adopt more open communications and other policies as the capacity of the information 
technology and telecommunications (TT &T) infrastructure has become greater and 
more sophisticated. This aspect of the development of the national IT &T infrastructure 
will be examined later in this study. 
The systemic introduction of IT into the Civil Service began in September 1981 with the 
establishment of the National Computer Board(NCB) charged with promoting, 
implementing and guiding the development of information systems in the civil 
service88 through the Civil Service Computerisation Programme (CSCP). The NCB 
came under the management of Philip Yeo Liat Kok who had earlier established the 
Systems and Computers Organisation in MINDEF. 
87 of this section is based on interviews with officers of the National Computer Board, Telecommunications 
Authority of Singapore, National Science and Technology Board, Singapore Telecommunications Academy, and 
professorial staff in science and engineering at the National University of Singapore and Nanyang Technological 
University in July- August 1995 and, in some cases, follow -up interviews in 1998. 
88 Jon S. T. Quah, "Sustaining Quality in the Singapore Civil Service ", in Commonwealth Association for Public 
Administration and Management, ed., Government in Transition, London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1995, pp. 
147 -157, p. 151 
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As the CSCP was implemented, it was supplemented by service -wide 
telecommunications and office automation systems as the need for these technologies 
for improving efficiency became apparent. On -line transactions with some ministries 
are now possible for such transactions as Work Permit applications for maids, child 
care registration and general information inquiries.89 By 1996, the government had 
spent more than $1 billion on IT and associated infrastructure and training and was 
continuing to spend approximately $200 million per year on IT related initiatives,90 
with expenditure on desktop and notebook computers alone in 1997 -98 amounting to 
approximately $34 million.91 
Since 1995, with the implementation of the second phase of the National Information 
Infrastructure (Nil), a high capacity Civil Service Information Infrastructure (CSII) has 
been implemented. A new government central telecommunications centre was 
established on Sentosa, and the processing capacity of all ministries and boards was 
upgraded through the acquisition of high performance mainframe and distributed 
networks using a new optic fibre based telecommunications network. Some of this 
infrastructure is dedicated to the data analysis and planning strategies underlying the 
core executive's new approach to political strategy. New software standards were 
established so that ministries and boards could develop not only a compatible desktop 
applications environment, but also compatible central databases which would facilitate 
inter- agency data interchange, particularly for data on citizens, property and financial 
transactions. 
A government intranet was also implemented in association with Lotus Notes. This 
provides email and document exchange facilities to all Division 1 and II officers and 
internet access to all Division I officers. The AS has its own intranet domain within the 
government information infrastructure, the Alpha domain and associated internal 
email system on Lotus Notes which is accessible by the political executive including 
ministers, but not by MPs. This contains details of the activities and publications of the 
Institute of Policy Development of the Civil Service College (the development body for 
Division I and AS officers), the AS in -house society, the Alpha Society and its 
newsletter, memoranda from the Head of Civil Service and the higher civil service 
management bodies. The Alpha domain also has its own closed email system with 
bulletin boards and discussion groups limited to AS officers, ministers and associated 
non -AS officers in the SAF, boards and other quasi -state bodies (e.g. NTUC) on a need 
to know basis. This is an important resource for the core executive in policy planning 
ang political strategy development. 
89 Straits Times, 4 December 1996, p. 17 
90 Business Times, 29 -30 June, 1996, p. 4 
91 Straits Times, 19 January 1997, p. 3 
87 Chapter Two 
ADOPTION OF STRATEGIC AND CORPORATE PLANNING 
Under the present political executive, the use of various planning methodologies has 
become an important tool in the development of policies and political strategies. These 
tools are used in association with a number of sophisticated quantitative and 
qualitative approaches for the analysis of social, political, strategic and economic 
trends. These analyses are used by public sector agencies, but particularly by the 
political executive in identifying policy and political problems and developing 
appropriate responses. 
Before 1991, the Singapore public sector, with the exceptions of MINDEF, MHA and 
the EDB , was not characterised by Iong -term strategic planning. Most ministries and 
boards had planning units and developed plans which reflected budget cycles and 
particular project cycles, such as the construction of Changi airport and the 
introduction of the MRT rail system.92 Before 1983 93 there is no indication of a concern 
for organisational strategic planning or for developing a planning infrastructure across 
the public sector. However, the push to do so would come from MINDEF with support 
from the EDB. 
Planning had been a key function in MINDEF from its creation.94 However it was to 
receive a boost after the appointment of Lim Siong Guan as Permanent Secretary in 
1981. Lim, an engineer by training and with a keen intellect, has a passion for 
management, efficiency and productivity.94 Under his leadership, strategic planning 
was restructured to use more contemporary methodologies and, most importantly, 
scenario planning, a technique pioneered and adopted from Royal Dutch Shell, was 
also introduced shortly after Lim arrived at MINDEF, possibly in 1983. In the EDB, 
strategic planning was introduced by Ngiam Tong Dow, following his appointment as 
chairman in 1975, but it was not an entrenched as a formal corporate function until 
92 MTI, for example, used medium term planning for predicting and planning for human resource development 
through the Committee on Technical and Professional Education (CTPE), but this was not part of any national human 
resource planning integrated across those public agencies represented on Council on Technical and Professional 
Education (CTPE). Interview with Dr. Cham Tao Soon, President, Nanyang Technological Institute, January 1991 
93 By 1983 the Singapore Police Force had established a Contingency Planning Division and a Security Planning 
Division which were eventually transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs through several restructures. In 1988, the 
only ministries with explicit planning groups included the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of National Development (MEnv), the HDB, The Urban 
Redevelopment Authority, MTI had an economic planning group and the Jurong Town Corporation. Of this group, 
almost all had planning groups concerned with infrastructure development; only MFA and MTI had more general 
planning functions. 
94 Interview with former MINDEF officer, August 1998. 
95 Lim is reported to have used the defence sector GLCs in particular as models from which private sector planning 
and management practices were trìalled and adopted in MINDEF and the SAF, if appropriate. As a member of many 
of the boards of these companies Lim both contributed to and learnt much from their adoption of management 
innovations. One example is the introduction of the Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP2), an early form of 
enterprise resource planning methodology to the Chartered Industries of Singapore (CIS) group in 1982. "CIS scores 
top marks with planning concept ", Straits Times, 3 November 1984, p. 16 
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1986 after Philip Yeo, the current chairman was appointed.% 
By 1991, the cabinet had several members who had experience of MINDEF's planning 
approach and were convinced of its applicability to the entire public sector; Goh Chok 
Tong, Lee Hsien Loong and Yeo Ning Hong. Goh Chok Tong, in particular was 
enthusiastic about using scenario planning as a major tool in policy and political 
strategy development. In 1991, scenario based planning was accepted as the major 
strategic planning tool for the public sector and, indeed, for national policy planning. 
In adopting this approach, the more traditional approaches of political risk analysis, 
econometric analysis, geopolitical and strategic analysis were not replaced or ignored. 
Rather they were incorporated into a long term forecasting strategy based on scenario 
planning, principally controlled by MINDEF. A Scenario Planning Unit was 
established in the Prime Minister's Office and the staff sent from training in this 
technique in Australia.97 
Although scenario planning began to be used in MINDEF in the late 1980s, it was 
reported that the first national scenarios were developed between 1992 -93 and since 
then two scenario planning cycles have taken place; 1995 -96 and the most recent cycle 
in 1998. The full scenarios are confidential to a group within the core executive 
comprising a select number of Administrative Service officers, SAF senior staff, GLC 
and board senior executives and ministers. These are developed within MINDEF by 
the Defence Planning Group with input from the SAF planning departments in the 
three services, the external intelligence service (the Security and Intelligence Division - 
SID), the internal security service (the Internal Security Department - ISD), commercial 
and other external data used in economic, social and political risk analyses as well as 
selected data from government ministries and the Department of Statistics.98 
Truncated scenarios are made public and provided to the press while more complete 
versions are provided to ministries, statutory authorities and GLCs for their planning 
purposes.99 Usually four scenarios are developed, but it is not usual to release the most 
positive and the most negative outside the core executive; the two mid -range scenarios 
are usually released and discussed. For example, in 1998 the two scenarios released 
were termed "Home Divided" and "Hotel Singapore ", the first focussing on social 
divisiveness based on income inequality, ethnicity and religion, the latter on a more 
positive socio- economic outcomes but with low national identity and loyalty by most 
96 Edgar H. Schein, Strategic Pragmatism: The Culture of Singapore's Economic Development Board, Cambridge 
(Mass.), MIT Press, 1997, p. 106 
97 Interview with PMO staff, 1995 
98 This information was provided in confidential interviews. The scenario and defence planning system are 
classified processes. 
99 The scenario documentation provided to the public service by MINDEF is severely edited and is considered 
insecure documentation. 
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citizens. 
Although the profile of this planning effort is very low in the public mind, it is at the 
centre of the core executive's medium to long -term policy planning strategy. This has 
been verified by Lim Siong Guan, Permanent Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office 
in 1998: 
Scenario-based planning ... lies at the heart of anticipating change. Change is taking place in 
the world at a dizzying pace. ... The Public Service has decided to adopt the techniques of 
scenario-based planning. ... The idea is to test proposed plans and policies for attractiveness 
and robustness against each of these scenarios, and in that way to be better able to decide what 
would be the "best" way forward after taking into account the uncertainties of the future.100 
There was initially not great enthusiasm from most ministries for this approach, which 
is probably predictable for administrators who generally have scientific academic 
training, a preference for quantitative data and a suspicion of anything which seem 
'soft' in planning terms.101 However, by 1995, it could be reported that acceptance was 
growing under pressure from the PMO and support from ministers 102 There seems to 
be continuing support from the political leadership for the scenario -based planning 
approach which is seen as having proven itself in the defence planning environment 
where it had been first used103 - a touchstone for broader implementation. This is 
demonstrated by the inclusion of brief scenarios in the Strategic Economic Plan 
published in 1991104 and the continued pressure on ministries, boards and GLCs by 
ministers and the PMO to use the PMO Scenario Planning Office's scenarios as part of 
strategic planning activities. In 1999, the subordinate courts were using the 1998 
scenarios as a central part of their corporate and strategic planning.l05 Most ministries 
and boards now use a three year strategic planning cycle and a one year 
corporate /business planning cycle with varying degrees of sophistication among these 
organisations. Some, such as MINDEF, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the EDB, NCB 
TDB, STB and the subordinate courts106 have highly structured planning process that 
use sophisticated tools such as Balanced Scorecard planning'Ó; value chain analysis, 
strategic partnerships and strategic conversations. The latter is a key term among 
Administrative Service officers and strategic conversation forms the framework for the 
consultation mechanisms characteristic of the core executive. 
100 Lim Siong Guan, "The Public Service ", in, Yeo Lay Hwee, ed., Singapore: The Year in Review 1995 
Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies, 1996, pp. 35-48, p. 40 
101 Interview with PMO staff, 1995 
t02Lim Siong Guan, op. cit., p. 41 
103 It seems that scenario planning was first used in the Ministry of Defence from at least 1986. 
104 Economic Planning Committee, The Strategic Economic Plan: Towards a Developed Nation, Singapore, The 
Economic Planning Committee, 1991, pp. 30 -37 
105 Yong Pung Howe, Justice 21 @ Subordinate Courts: Administering Justice in the Knowledge Society, The 
Honourable Chief Justice's Keynote Address *The Subordinate Courts Workplan Saturday I0O .April 1999, p. 11 
106 ibid. 
90 Ross Worthington 
THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND THE CORE EXECUTIVE 
As can be seen, the PAP political executive has developed much of its governance 
capability through aligning itself with the public sector executive and, over the course 
of the past 40 years, integrating that executive into its own ranks. There is no sense of a 
dichotomy between the two executives; merely a partial separation of functions. The 
public sector provides the executive agencies for the political executive, which in turn 
draws members of the core executive from the management elite of these agencies; 
ministries, statutory boards and GLCs. In particular, the core executive draws upon 
the Administrative Service officers working in ministry and boards, who control the 
public sector. In 1998, of the 15 cabinet ministers with portfolio responsibilities 108 
seven came from the Administrative Service including the prime minister, 09 three 
came from the SAF general staff and were equivalent to senior Administrative Service 
officers, two came from major GLCs and one came from the NUS, a statutory board. 
Only two of the cabinet, Tony Tan and Abdullah Tarmugi did not come from the 
public sector, although Tarmugi was drawn from the print media, a quasi -state 
company. 
The PAP has been hugely successful in its political socialisation of the civil service in 
particular and the public service in general. It has reinforced this through policy 
programs which have led to rapid economic development, social stability and 
maintained the public sector as a highly autonomous institution. This, in turn, has 
been assisted by maintaining an "iron rice bowl" approach to public sector 
employment, relatively high salaries and benefits, a generous pension scheme, 
excellent working conditions and facilities and, in recent years, high levels of training 
support. These strategies have not, however, attracted a higher level of recruits to the 
elite Administrative Service which appears to be in relative decline; a direct threat to 
core executive recruitment. The full implications of this are not yet evident, but it is 
probable that the present response of relying on SAF officers to fill gaps in this service 
is not viable in the long term. 
The autonomy of the public service has been somewhat reduced through the 
introduction of management reforms, particularly the PS21 program, to make it more 
conform to citizens' demands for a more responsive executive arm of government and 
107 Some of these agencies have implemented these approaches through different software products. Although 
Oracle products are used by many agencies, the emphasis is on compatibility not uniformity. 
108 This excludes Lee Kuan Yew who is Senior Minister. 
109 The former Administrative Service officers were: Goh Chok Tong, Lee Yock Suan, Wong Kan Seng, Yeo 
Cheow Tong, Dr. Lee Boon Yang, Mah Bow Tan and Lim Hng Kiang. The SAF general staff officers are: BG (NS) 
Lee Hsien Loong, BG (NS) George Yeo Yong -Boon and RAdm. (NS) Teo Chee Hean. S. Jayakumar came from 
NUS. Richard Hu Tsu Tau came from the Government of Singapore investment Corporation (GIC), Lint Boon Heng 
came from Neptune Orient Line (NOL), both companies being GLCs. 
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to reinforce a positive image for the political executive. These reforms have also, under 
the Goh Chok Tong governments, provided the core executive with two major parts of 
the contemporary governance framework; an integrated national planning framework 
based on scenario and strategic planning with their concommitant analytical systems, 
and a comprehensive IT &T based national surveillance capacity located within a 
secretive and well disciplined civil service. 
As can be seen from the EDB case study, in the Singapore public sector there is no 
substantial differentiation between boards and GLCs in policy or program 
management terms and there is also no clear differentiation among the three major 
sectors in policy development. While program management is quite clearly defined, 
ministries, boards and the holding company GLCs seem to share policy development 
responsibilities, although this is coordinated, to varying degrees, by ministries. - some 
boards especially have considerable autonomy, especially the EDB. In respect of the 
accountability of boards and GLCs, neither is necessarily more distant from the control 
of the political executive than ministries; each offers the advantage of a different form 
of policy development, implementation and review, a different form of accountability 
and more importantly, is a strategy of control for the core executive, whether it be 
social control through the People's Association or substantial control of the domestic 
economy through the GLC sector. Although the implementation of these strategies 
seems to distance the political executive from boards and GLCs in particular, in reality 
this distance is an illusion; strong political control is maintained no matter what the 
form of public sector organisation. This is an issue which is further examined in 
Chapter Eight. The hexadical structure of the Singaporean public sector does not 
necessarily separate policy and executive functions, although there is a nominal 
separation, but operates on the same principles of pragmatism and personal contacts 
among the state management elite that drives the political system. This structure is 
also mutually supportive. Boards and ministries regularly 'spin -off' GLCs as an 
economic development as well as a political control policy. How this effects the 
dynamics of the core executive and functions within the hegemonic governance 
framework is examined more closely in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine. 
3. THE CORE EXECUTIVE: SINGAPORE 
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
In previous chapters the development of the contemporary political and bureaucratic 
structures and leadership of the political and public sector executives were outlined. 
This chapter begins the analysis of how those structures operate at the centre of policy 
making in Singapore using the concept of the core executive. It examines the roots of 
the Singaporean core executive in the Westminster political system, what we mean by 
the core executive in Westminster systems and critically reviews the debate on what 
might comprise the Singaporean core executive. 
The core executive concept has considerable heuristic utility for a study of how a policy 
system actually works, the major focus of this study, especially within a political 
system based on the Westminster model from which the core executive concept is 
derived. In attempting to define and understand the structure and dynamics of the 
core executive in Singapore, it is instructive to understand its derivation from the 
British Westminster system and its particular utility in studying policy making in 
political systems characterised by cabinet government. These systems have particular 
institutional arrangements and dynamics which have encouraged the development of 
core executives and therefore policy systems distinguished by particular coordination 
and control arrangements. This chapter will look at the origins and definition of the 
term in the Westminster context, what it does and how it operates within the policy 
system and its application to Singapore by defining and examining the Singaporean 
core executive. 
WHY A CORE EXECUTIVE? COORDINATION AND FRAGMENTATION IN 
WESTMINSTER DEMOCRACIES 
We have already noted that, in common with other former British colonies, the 
Singaporean state is based on the British Westminster model. In particular, it should be 
noted at the outset, that Singapore, perhaps more than any other Westminster based 
system, has looked to the Palace of Westminster for its institutional practices and 
precedents, rather than develop its own indigenous practices. This is probably at least 
partly due to Lee Kuan Yew's personal experience of British politics and his long -term 
links with many senior political figures in Britain,' but is principally due to the 
inherently anti- democratic tendencies of the Westminster constitutional model. 
During Lee's student days he became acquainted with many figures in the British Labour Party and actually 
campaigned for one of his friends in a general election. Among those people with whom he maintained contact was 
Harold Wilson, prime minister from 1964-70. 
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The Westminster model is treated here as a particular set of institutional arrangements 
based on the British practice of parliamentary democracy. It is debatable whether a 
pure Westminster system now exists in any of the nations following this tradition, 
including Britain, and whether its traditional form is now relevant to those nations 
whose political systems are derived from it.' However, two nations are still identifiable 
as being close adherents to the Westminster model, the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand.3 The broad characteristics of this tradition are: a head of state with mainly 
ceremonial powers and some very limited reserve powers;' the allocation of the 
principal powers of the state to the cabinet; the fusion of executive and legislative roles 
through the executive being drawn from the legislature; ministers answerable to the 
legislature for their policy actions; a tradition of cabinet solidarity on policy decisions; 
a legislature answerable to the electorate; and an accountability framework which 
follows this hierarchy. This system is also characterised by a strong state, strong 
governments, a legal system based on a combination of codified and judge -made law 
(the common law) which incorporates a certain level of protection of citizen's rights 
and specifies their obligations to the state within a liberal political culture. In 
examining this system of government, it is instructive to bear in mind Walker's 
comments on the historical development of the Westminster system: 
"...the Westminster constitution, which took its basic form in 1689, was designed mainly as a 
check on royal power. It has never intended to be a democratic system of government. It later 
became one, but only grudgingly, incompletely... "5 
This view was supported by commentators of the Left and Right in post -war 
assessments of the utility of the British constitution. Amery noted that the Westminster 
system was "one of democracy, but of democracy by consent and not, by delegation, of 
government of the people, for the people, with, but not by the people.i' Laski, from a 
Left perspective, supported this view, noting that the post -war Labor government had 
no constitutional difficulties introducing its reform agenda and taking the view that 
2 See: Parker, R. S., "The Public Service Inquiries and Responsible Government", in Smith, R. F. I. and Weller, P. , 
Public Service Inquiries in Australia, St. Lucia, Queensland University Press, 1978, pp. 334 -359; and, Thompson, 
E., "The Washminster Mutation ", in Weller, P. and Jaensch, D, eds., Responsible Government in Australia, 
Melbourne, Drummond, 1980, pp. 32 -40 
31n this discussion I exclude the Westminster- derived systems of Australia and Canada as these political 
systems have had to substantially compromise their constitutional arrangements to account fora federated 
state structure. It could also be argued that both these nations have amended their institutional 
arrangements under the influence of the United States' congressional practices over the past 30 years. 
In all Westminster democracies the role of the head of state is essentially ceremonial, except for the power to 
appoint or dismiss the prime minister, as the person who is believed to be able to form a workable government in the 
parliament, or in the case of a dismissal, the person who has lost the ability to continue government. Those countries 
classified as Westminster style democracies and on which significant research is available are: Britain, Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada 
' See: Geoffrey Walker, "Some Democratic Principles For Constitutional Reform in the 1990s ", in Bruce D. Gray 
and Robert B. McClintock, eds., Courts and Policy: Checking the Balance, Wellington, Legal Research 
Foundation/Brookers, 1995, pp. 183- 205,p.204 
L. Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1947, pp. 20 -21 
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they most important function of the electorate was to elect a strong, stable executive 
which could control the legislature and implement its program? This idea of the strong 
executive as the "efficient secret" of the Westminster constitution was acknowledged 
as recently as 1989 by Wright,$ although it has been identified by others as a cause for 
concern in its ability to frustrate greater democratisation of the British political system .9 
In such systems, civil servants are theoretically non -partisan, are responsible to 
ministers not the legislature, and serve all elected governments with equal loyalty. The 
separation of legislative and executive branches, as in the United States is not part of 
this tradition, nor is the artificial dichotomy between ministers as policy makers and 
civil servants as policy implementers, despite the literature supporting it.10 The 
traditional Westminster relationship between ministers and their ministry officials is 
one of temporary partnership for the minister's term of office, but a partnership in 
which the minister takes ultimate responsibility for policy decisions." Officials may 
make policy; politicians approve its implementation; the Westminster model accepts 
that the policy process in complex, that power relations within it are not simple and 
generally leaves it to the participants to work out the balance. 
The legislature is supreme as the maker of laws and laws cannot be struck down by the 
courts, although there is provision through the common law for the courts to make law 
on the margins through interpretation. Laws can be changed by subsequent legislation 
at the discretion of the legislature. Laws usually cannot be ruled invalid by the courts 
because there is no absolute reference point which can be used to assess laws against, 
such as a Bill of Rights or a written constitution as in the United States. The parliament 
is the sole body for determining what will be law and what won't be and the validation 
mechanism for the general acceptability of its judgement to the electorate is the ballot 
box. Elections are based on single member constituencies, decided by a simple 
plurality system with candidates usually drawn from a two party system resulting in 
simple majoritarian governments. 
Harold Laski, Reflections on the Constitution, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1951, pp. 55 -56, 58 
s A Wright, "The Constitution ", in, L Tivey and A. Wright, eds., Party Ideology in Britain, London, Routledge, 
1989, pp. 41 -57 
s For example, see: B. Jones and M. Keating, Labour and the British State, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989; J. Jowell 
and D. Oliver, eds., The Changing Constitution, 2°" ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989; I. Budge and D McKay, 
eds., The Developing British Political System: The 1990s, 3' ed., London, Longman, 1993 
° Dunshire explains the American origins of this concept and its inapplicability to the Westminster system. The 
separation of powers in the political system of the United States is quite different from that existing in Britain. See: 
Andrew Dunshire, Administration: The Word and the Science, London, Martin and Robertson, 1973, pp. 87 -91 
" See: Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, London, Secker and Warburg, 1989; Norman Fowler, Ministers Decide: A 
Personal Memoir of the Thatcher Years, London, Chapmans, 1991; Rob Eaddy, "The Structure and Operations of 
the Executive ", in Hyam Gold (ed.), New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 3"' ed., Auckland, Longman Paul, 1992, 
pp.163 -173 
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In the Westminster system, power is distributed not only between the three branches of 
government, but within those branches, in a way so as to make control of the 
legislative and executive branches, and to some degree, the judiciary, relatively easy 
for the head of the executive subject to conventions that govern these relationships, 
rather than formal constitutional provisions. This would not be possible, for example, 
in the United States, where there is no formal avenue for the President as head of the 
executive wing to directly participate in the legislature. But in all Westminster type 
systems, the executive is drawn from and is part of the legislature, resulting in what 
has been called cabinet government being the norm in these democracies.° The 
exercise of power by the executive depends on four major factors; the role and powers 
of the head of state, the relationship between the prime minister and cabinet, the 
relationship between the cabinet and the legislature and the nature of the political 
party which has formed the government. 
What then are the characteristics of cabinet government in these nations? 
Cabinet Government in the Westminster Tradition 
Cabinet government, as the term implies, means that the real power to make policy 
resides in the hands of the prime minister and his ministers, not in the legislature or 
other organs of state. Cabinet government is made possible by the existence of 
disciplined political parties whose members have an allegiance to a core set of values 
and beliefs and who have a pragmatic interest in winning and keeping government. 
The parties may be formally factionalised, as is the British Labour Party,13 have 
informal factions as has the British Conservative Party or be made up of loose 
coalitions of interest or belief as is the New Zealand National Party. Regardless of 
internal party organisation, parties are highly disciplined and when in government, 
within the bounds of intra -party dynamics, strongly influenced by their leadership 
which, in the case of the party forming government, is the cabinet. The prime minister 
can therefore, except in exceptional circumstances, rest assured that the policy 
decisions of the cabinet will not be defeated in the parliament. This is particularly so in 
" See: Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics An Introduction, 2" ed., London, 
Macmillan, 1987, p.223. The term `cabinet government' while widely used does not still have universal support. 
George Jones has commented that in Britain the term `ministerial government' not cabinet government should be 
used. Cited in John Summers et. al, Government Politics and Power in Australia An Introductory Reader, 45 ed., 
Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1990. p. 37 
" The factionalisation in the British Labour Party is formalised in a way fundamentally different to other 
such parties, such as the Australian Labor Party. Nonetheless its membership comprises many formally 
established groups, some of them with significant histories. For example, Tribune, founded in 1964, 
publishes its own newspaper and has its own organisational structure spread throughout the party. Other 
formally structured groups include the Manifesto Group established in 1974, the Campaign Group formed 
in 1982 and others. See: John Kingdon, Government and Politics in Britain, Cambridge, Polity Press, 
1991, pp. 232 -233 
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Britain, where the powers of the House of Lords are now insufficient to stop legislation 
and in Singapore which, like New Zealand, has a unicameral parliament. 
Cabinet government is, therefore, a dictatorship of the executive, as the parliament is a 
captured house. Increasingly, it is also argued that the cabinet is itself captured by the 
prime minister, thus suggesting that cabinet government is government by prime 
minister. This proposition is not particularly new, being proposed almost 40 years ago 
in Britain." However, it reached renewed prominence following the ascent of Margaret 
Thatcher in Britain. However, even taking her prime ministership into account, there 
are those that contend that the argument over whether British premierships are 
presidential (government by prime minister) or follow the chairman of the board style 
(government by cabinet) is not yet settled.15 In a recent study, Anthony King describes 
the British prime minister, the model Westminster premier thus: 
" The British Prime Minister is, within his own domestic sphere, one of the most powerful 
heads of government in the Western world, far more powerful than most prime ministers in 
Europe. He owes his power to his position as the leader of the majority party, to the historic 
prestige of his office, to the fact that he chairs the cabinet and its major committees, and his 
control over the structure of government (he can at will create and destroy government 
departments). Above all, the prime minister owes his power to two circumstances that bear 
directly on the question of the autonomy of cabinet ministers. One is the prime minister's 
virtual control...over ministerial appointments...he and he alone decides...The second 
circumstance bearing on ministerial autonomy is the British prime minister's position as the 
person who is almost universally identified with the government of the day (it is "his" or "her" 
government), who is held responsible for almost all the government's actions... "16 
King concludes; "British politicians ... know that their future depends on the prime 
minister." 17 
Despite this dominance of the prime minister, the incumbent of that office cannot take 
his power for granted. Certainly, prime ministers cannot be dictators, or at least not for 
long - ministers and a united backbench will over -ride them when required. The 
cabinet, described as "a clearinghouse, an exchange market where different 
interdepartmental clashes are sorted outi1s, has an obligation to retain government, not 
to always agree with the prime minister 19 We can therefore conclude that in 
Westminster systems the prime minister can exercise enormous control over the policy 
14 Brian Smith discusses this issue in reference to several papers dating from 1960. See: Brian Smith, Policy Malting 
in British Government An Analysis of Power and Rationality, London, Martin Robertson, 1976, pp. 93 -99. See also; 
George W. Jones, 'The Prime Minister's Power", in Richard Rose, ed., Policy Making in Britain A Reader in 
Government, London, Macmillan, 1969, pp. 307 -328. Jones dismissed the arguments for a `presidential' prime 
minister, at that time. 
15 See: lames Barber, The Prime Minister Since 1945, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1991, pp. 131 -134 
16 Anthony King, "Ministerial Autonomy in Britain ", in Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Cabinet Ministers 
and Parliamentary Government, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 203 -225, p- 210 -211 
'7 ibid., p. 224 
8 David Howell, cited in: Christopher Brady and Peter Catterall, "Managing the Core Executive ", Public 
Administration 75, 1997, pp. 509 -529, p. 510 
" For example, Thatcher was often over -riled by her cabinet, even on such crucial issues as major budget initiatives 
such as public spending cuts in 1981, the review of public expenditure in 1982 and the exchange rate mechanism. 
See: Simon James, "Relations Between Prime Minister and Cabinet From Wilson to Thatcher", in, R. A. W Rhodes 
and Patrick Dunleavy, eds., Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive, London, St Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 63- 
86, p. 85 
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process and that in general the policy system is centred on the prime minister and his 
cabinet.20 This power structure is not, however, merely bi- directional; it is a complex 
mix of actors linked by policy, political obligations, ideology, resource and other 
exchanges both within the cabinet and among the prime minister, cabinet, individual 
ministers and other policy actors outside the cabinet. 
Power Over Policy: Cabinet vs Other Policy Actors 
While the prime minister and the cabinet dominate the policy system, they do not have 
exclusive control over it at all times; institutions and politics still count, to varying 
degrees, depending on the policy issue. The concentration of power in the hands of the 
executive has substantially deprived the legislature of its most powerful theoretical 
function; that of being the principal accountability mechanism for the executive," such 
that 
" It is now widely accepted that parliament's power in policy making is more real in a legal and 
constitutional sense than in terms of practical politics. Any control the parliament might be said 
to exercise over the executive is largely indirect...This concept of parliamentary power has been 
formulated as a response to the olitical reality of executive dominance, an historical principle 
reinforced by the party system.' 
Executive dominance and the party system have also colluded to reduced the role of 
legislators as well, so that; 
"The policy -makers, therefore, usually have IittIe to fear in the way of parliamentary 
harassment, though the influence of individual MPs as representatives of particular interests 
may well be noticeable on occasion."' 
This is not to say that the parliament or its backbenchers are absolutely without policy 
making power or influence. In Westminster systems it is required that all Iaws pass 
through the parliament; the executive cannot govern in secret - its policies must be 
publicly scrutinised. Ministers must appear and they must answer questions and 
explain policy decisions; except by convention, those relating directly to national 
security.24 While this process may not make policy it does influence it and it does 
30 This tendency to prime ministerial control reached its zenith during the Thatcher years and may now be seen to be 
entrenched, with the possible caveat that it must to a substantial degree depend upon the personality of the incumbent 
and the malleability of the cabinet. 
In [Jew Zealand, the traditional powers of the parliament to undertake legislative tasks independent of the executive 
have been formally compromised through the provisions of the Constitution Act 1986. In particular, the power of the 
parliament to pass bills involving the expenditure of public funds without the approval of the executive has been 
withdrawn. Section 21 of the Constitution Act 1986, and Standing Order 297 of the House of Representatives define 
this limitation. (See: Skenes, op. cit. pp. 248 -249). Additionally, only the government can initiate legislation 
involving expenditure, thus depriving the Opposition of any possibility of initiating legislation independently of the 
government. This is also the case in Singapore. See: Richard G. Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, Auckland, 
Auckland University Press, 1994, p. 97 
n Smith, op. cit. pp. 82 -83 
Francis M. Willson, "Policy- Making and the Policy Makers ", in, Richard Rose, ed., Policy Malang in Britain: A 
Reader in Government, London, Macmillan, 1969, pp. 355 -368, p. 365 
$° Although even in some Westminster derived systems, such as Australia's, the legislature maintains bipartisan 
legislative oversight of military and intelligence issues in addition to the executive, but under the same secrecy 
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allow, if not necessitate, debate. Importantly, parliamentary process allows access by 
the media and the community to the thinking and actions of the executive. In Britain 
during the Thatcher administrations, several government policy proposals were 
defeated in the parliament despite the large majorities enjoyed by the government u 
But these cases are the exception rather than the rule and may equally indicate poor 
consultation on the part of an arrogant executive more than parliament exerting its 
constitutional prerogatives. 
The parliament can also influence policy through its examination of policy decisions 
using parliamentary committees. The recommendations of these committees will be 
examined by both ministers and officials and will often, at least in part, be adopted; 
capable executives act on the assumption that they do not have a monopoly on truth or 
policy ideas. However, the influence of committees on policy seems to be minimal 23 In 
Britain standing committees remain in the control of the executive' and select 
committees which focus on policy delivery' are no more effective. Despite their 
widening the policy discourse, it seems that committees are still "...largely creature of 
the government of the day. °23 Thus, while avenues are available through the 
parliament to widen and occasionally influence policy, the initiative and control of the 
policy process remains an executive prerogative. What committees may not be able to 
directly achieve in terms of policy influence, they may achieve indirectly by providing 
access to the media and the community to analysis, counter -argument and policy 
options other than those of the executive through public access to committee meetings. 
This extends parliamentary scrutiny of the executive to the media and the community. 
principles. In Singapore, the legislature has no role in maintaining a watch on defence or national security policy, the 
responsibility for which comes under quasi- institutional, executive created organs such as the Council on Defence 
and the Intelligence and Security Committee on which there is no opposition representation. 
u Martin Burch and Bruce Wood, Public Policy in Britain, 2' ed., Oxford, Blackwell, 1990 p. 35 
6 In New Zealand, the committee system has been indirectly influential, through its scrutiny process, based on the 
requirement for all legislation to be referred to it Mulgan concludes; "The question is not whether the committees 
can necessarily confront and ultimately defeat the cabinet or the governing majority. It is rather whether they 
facilitate the process of public scrutiny through which governments must pass on the way to enacting their policies 
and thereby help to make governments more accountable In this respect there is no doubt that the committee process, 
particularly in the review of intended legislation, does provide a valuable adjunct to parliamentary scrutiny...The 
discussions behind the scenes between ministers, caucus and the government members of committees, particularly 
chairpersons, far from undermining the committee process, provide a useful and flexible channel for adjusting 
government policy in the light of public criticism and thus making governments more responsive to public opinion." 
See: Mulgan op. cit., 1994, p. 120 
n Orion W. Hogwood, From Crisis to Complacency? Shaping Public Policy in Britain, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1987,pp. 108-110 
28 Hogwood comments in relation to select committees that "Committees are, however, often concerned with the 
efficiency of delivery of policies (i.e. monitoring) rather than with the evaluation of policy designs. Committees are 
especially important for spotting failure rather than successes. The reports of committees are rarely debated on the 
floor of the House of Commons, but may have an indirect impact through press coverage and because civil servants 
appear to treat their committee appearances with some apprehension. The monitoring and evaluative roles of 
parliamentary committees would be enhanced if periodically but systematically they reviewed policies (or their 
replacements) which had been the subject of previous reviews." See: Hogwood, ibid., pp. 238 -239 
28 Geoff Skene, " Parliament Reassessing its Role ", in Hyam Gold, ed., New Zealand Politics in Perspective. 3m ed, 
Auckland, Longman Paul, 1992, pp. 247 -261, p. 254 
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Backbenchers fare little better in the policy system stakes. In their text on public policy 
in Britain, Burch and Wood barely discuss backbenchers except in passing and usually 
in association with secondary or tertiary channels into the core executive. The only role 
of any substance occurs when ministers, the real policy makers, require support when 
cabinet is divided on an issue.30 Backbenchers are thus troops to be marshalled as a last 
resort in fighting the policy battles conducted within the executive or, in a minor way, 
may act as advocates on particular policy issues for groups. In New Zealand, "... MPs 
rarely act independently and are prevented from performing their representative 
functions by a party lash which has debilitated debating and made voting a sham. "31 In 
Britain, there is no mechanism for the cabinet or ministers collectively to meet with 
backbenchers outside the parliamentary chamber although ministers may individually 
attend meetings of the 1922 Committee on the rare occasions they are requested by 
backbenchers to do so. The executive therefore inhabits a world substantially different 
to backbenchers and the two rarely intersect, except when backbench feedback from 
electorate reaction to a policy proposal is particularly uniform and negative 32 
The parliamentary backbench is usually nowhere to be seen in the policy panorama, 
certainly, not at the centre of policy making. The parliament itself, and its non - 
ministerial members are relegated to the nether lands of the policy process. 
Legislatures in Westminster systems are therefore not active at the core of 
policymaking, but rather at the periphery. Indeed; 
.. it is arguable whether the main function of parliament is to pass legislation at all. In fact 
parliament clearly has three functions. Firstly it scrutinises and, if appropriate, criticises 
government administration. Secondly, it legitimates, though rarely initiates, legislation. Finally, 
it provides training and socialisation for potential recruits to the executive. It is perhaps the 
greatest indictment of the partisan parliamentary system that the third function, in practice, 
though not in theory, is the most important. "33 
Although in a majoritarian two party system, "... Opposition must be regarded as 
being no less legitimate than power.i34, the constitutional strength of the executive is 
such that in association with its neglect of parliament, it can equaIIy ignore the 
opposition. In Westminster systems, the opposition undertakes the major 
accountability function of the parliament and also provides a fail -safe mechanism for 
society in the event that the government fails. However, the effectiveness of the 
opposition is heavily dependent on a number of factors controlled by the executive: 
10 Burch and Wood, op. cit. p. 162 
31 Skene, op. cit., p. 248 
32 This is not the case in New Zealand, Canada and Australia where ministers and backbenchers do have formal 
regular party meetings. However, as mentioned, Singapore tends to follow the more illiberal, unreformed, traditional 
Westminster approach to such matters. 
r' Ian Budge, David McKay, Rod Rhodes, David Robertson, David Sanders, Martin Slater and Graham Wilson, The 
Changing British Political System: Into the 1990s, god ed., London, Longman, 1988, p. 46 
Dorothy M. Pickles, Democracy, London, Methuen, 1971, p.13 
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access to information about the government's proposed policies; representation in the 
parliamentary committee system to ensure that alternative policy views are heard; 
familiarity with the bureaucracy; the existence of well developed, rational opposition 
policies; and leadership ability. 
Oppositions are governments in waiting and government changes sufficiently 
frequently to verify that this is how they are seen by the electorate. However, their 
influence on the policy processes of government appears to be poorly documented. 
Mulgan concludes that the opposition is most effective in influencing policy through 
parliamentary debates and committee work, although this is principally influence on 
the policy margins!' When a government is itself divided on a policy issue and strong 
opposition is displayed in parliament, the legislation may be postponed at or the 
government may accept technical amendments to legislation which are proposed by 
the opposition.' 
The third and weakest branch of government, the judicial, rarely has a presence at the 
core of the policy system, although it may on occasion exert considerable influence 
from the periphery. The courts have no influence on the major issue of financial 
allocation and the budgets which drive the policy system. The judiciary's Westminster 
constitutional role is subsidiary to that of the parliament under the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty; the parliament is the sole law making body.43 In 
Westminster jurisdictions such as Britain and New Zealand with no justicable 
constitution, it is the few judges of the higher appellate courts who have the greatest 
opportunity for policy making and who are responsible for decisions with substantial 
policy implications. But these decisions are rarely about 'who gets what, when and 
how' in a substantive sense, but more about 'why' resources are allocated; issues of 
equity, rights and responsibilities. Also, judicial decisions on these matters can be 
overridden by legislation, even retrospective legislation, if necessary. 
35 In both Britain and New Zealand, substantial histories of parliamentary government have developed oppositions 
with these characteristics, although in Britain the opposition was, until 1996, excluded from any significant contact 
with the civil service, and so had little familiarity with bureaucrats with whom they may have to work on assuming 
office. The Code of Conduct for the Civil Service introduced in 1996 allowed permanent secretaries to meet with the 
opposition to discuss any matter raised by them prior to elections in rasp the opposition is elected. The Singapore 
government continues the previous practice of not allowing contact between bureaucrats and the opposition. 
For example, the term "opposition' is not indexed in Mulgan (1994), Barber (1991), Grant (1995), Burch and 
Wood (1989), or Hog-wood (1992), op. cit However, Griffiths empirical study of legislation in Britain does include 
opposition voting and influence patterns on legislation. See: John A. G. Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of 
Government Bills, London, Allen and Unwin, 1974 
Mulgan, 1994, op. cit, pp. 114 -121 
3B Hogwood, 1987, op. cit p. 106 
39 ibid., p. 109 
°0 For a detailed discussion of the development of the doctrine see: David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation 
Determined, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989. In Britain and New Zealand, the courts have no power to 
unmake law and no constitutional court, such as the Australian High Court which can overturn legislation and make 
substantial law, exists. For a concise overview of the New Zealand legal system, its Westminster framework and its 
political role see: Mulgan, 1994, op. cit pp. 155 -175. 
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There is no consensus, either within or among particular Westminster jurisdictions, 
about the constitutional balance to be struck between the courts and the parliament 41 
Lord McClusky placed this issue in the context of a changing political culture' which 
has, even now, not resolved the tensions implicit in the changing nature of public 
policy and the role of the courts: 
"In the hard cases - those in which, because the law is ambiguous or silent, judges frequently 
disagree both as to the law and the result - the choice of the result, the formulation of the Iaw is 
a policy choice. Sometimes the judge will consciously make and declare that he is making, a 
policy choice.i43 
In doing so, they are playing the role of provocateur to the parliament which, in 
exercising its constitutional duties, should respond through legislating and thus 
relieving the courts of this policy burden. Atiyah's answer to this is to suggest that the 
courts will always be marginal to the policy process, as they are essentially powerless 
in the face of executive or parliamentary power: "the total effect of judicial decisions on 
public policy is so small, the whole exercise would seem futile to most judges.i44 
While Atiyah's comparison of the relative strengths of the judiciary and the executive 
cannot be disputed, it is an observation based on a rather naked concept of the exercise 
of power. The executive, through parliament, can in a Westminster framework in 
which the judiciary have no role of constitutional protector, strike down any 
judgement of the courts. The real question is; do executives wish to do this and do it 
consistently? Do they want a war with the courts over some rather grey areas of 
constitutional jurisdiction? 
The answer is resoundingly 'no'. What executives and courts actually do is to use their 
respective powers tacitly in working out policy solutions to issues which both 
jurisdictions find difficult to resolve by themselves; they play policy games. In such 
games, the courts are obviously subsidiary to the executive in finding a lasting solution 
to such issues, but their influence should not be underrated. They play a crucial role in 
the resultant policy dialogues, drawing to the attention of the executive the practical 
deficiencies in its legislation and, usually, suggesting remedies. Much of this dialogue 
is carried on, not between the judiciary and the executive, but between the legal 
profession and the executive, as the judiciary, by convention, does not participate in 
01 J. A. Smillie, "Introduction" in Michael Taggart, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 1980s : Problems 
and Prospects, Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. xi -xx 
'2 Waltman makes the point that slow change characterises English political culture: "...the English judiciary is 
embedded in a political culture and institutional structure that prizes gradual change." See: Jerold L. Waltman, "The 
Courts in England ", in Jerold L. Waltman, The Political Role of Law Courts in Modern Democracies, London, 
Macmillan, 1988, p. 21 
"J Lord McClusky, Law, Justice and Democracy, BBC Books, 1987, p. 32 
" See: Patrick Atiyah, "Judicial -Legislative Relations in Britain ", in Robert A. Katzmann, ed., Judges and 
Legislators: Towards Institutional Comity, Washington DC, Brookings Institute, 1988, p. 36 
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public discussion of the policy implications of its judgements. The legal profession 
therefore plays a role in policy development as a proxy for the judiciary. 
While many of these remedies may be 'nudges' because they are associated with 
micro -policy or policy implementation issues, they occasionally have substantial 
macro -policy implications. As such, the influence of the courts is not uniform and it 
should not be dismissed as uniformly minor; there will be occasions when their 
influence is considerable. In both respects, they are important, though minor, actors in 
the policy process, a position supported by Drewry' who contends that "... judges do 
play a small but significant part in patrolling the boundaries of government. "'" 
Occasionally shots from the boundaries can produce very significant policy changes at 
the centre, such as in the case of judgements by the Australian, Canadian and New 
Zealand courts on aboriginal land rights. However, despite their occasional 
significance, the courts remain boundary riders, not bosses in the policy system. 
If in Westminster systems, the executive is so clearly constitutionally superior to the 
other two branches of government, does this mean that the centre of the policy system, 
only ministers wield constitutionally sanctioned power? No. Two other groups co- 
inhabit the policy centre with ministers; political parties and bureaucrats. 
In Westminster countries there is a distinction between the extra -parliamentary party 
and the parliamentary party. The former is the party of all members, including 
parliamentarians. The latter includes only parliamentarians and it is dominated by 
their concerns, usually considered in the context of the broader objectives of the extra - 
parliamentary party, but more immediately on winning the next election. The extra - 
parliamentary party is the forum for development and authorisation of the party's 
policy platform for government and is usually controlled by the same executive as 
constitutes the cabinet, although this control is diluted by other, non -parliamentary, 
executive members. It therefore has access to, and can exert influence upon, the 
parliamentary party, but cannot in most cases direct the latter in policy terms." What 
the New Zealand experience from 1983 -94 has demonstrated, however, is that the 
parliamentary parties can adopt a policy stance which is at great variance from the 
extra -parliamentary platform, essentially ignoring the latter. The result, as the New 
Zealand Labour Party discovered, may in the case of extreme differences, be schism." 
" Gavin Drewry, "Judicial Politics in Britain. Patrolling the Boundaries ", in Mary L. Volcansek, ed., Judicial Politics 
and Policy -Making in Western Europe, London, Cass, 1992, pp. 9 -28, p. 25 
46 ibid. 
' For example, in New Zealand, the Parliamentary National Party is less influenced than the Parliamentary Labour 
Party by its extra -parliamentary wing, although in both cases it is usual practice for the extra -parliamentary party to 
be consulted on major policy issues. See: Richard Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand: A Study of New 
Zealand Politics, Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 60 -63 
" See: Mulgan, 1994, op. cit. pp. 226 -227 
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As in other democratic systems, it is the bureaucracy which shares most in the exercise 
of executive power.° The function of the public bureaucracy in all states is to serve the 
administrative requirements of executive government, although it has been argued that 
it is also a trustee of the public good.50 In Westminster states, civil servants are 
supposedly non -partisan, but it is perhaps more accurate to say that they become 
'thought colonised' be successive administrations, perhaps a necessary condition to be 
able to work in a political environment that regularly changes 51 The bureaucracy is not 
accountable to the parliament52 or to the people in any direct sense; its accountability is 
through the executive, resulting in its reputation for "inwardness and secrecy. "53 
Major policy activity is coordinated by a group of political offices (such as the prime 
minister's personal advisers) and central ministries, especially by those which control 
resource allocation, those which provide policy advice directly to the prime minister 
and the ministry responsible for the allocation of human resources. All ministries are 
administered by a minister to whom a career bureaucrat, the permanent secretary, 
answers as the administrative head of a ministry. In institutional terms, the 
mechanisms of public administration are therefore firmly under the control of the 
executive. The nature of the relationship between civil servants and their ministers is 
elucidated in comments by ex- ministers on the topic: 
"Ministers may bring with them broad ideas of how future policy should develop. But in the 
transformation of policy goals into realistic plans, in the execution of those plans, and still more, 
in policy responses to new and unexpected developments, ministers are largely, if not wholly, 
dependant on their official [civil service] advisers." 
This finding is borne out in Davis' recent study of executive coordination in Britain, 
Canada and Australia55 Senior bureaucrats see themselves as policy makers and some 
a' B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy, 4d' ed., White Plains (NY), Longman, 1995, p. 179 
'o C. T. Goodsell, The Case for Bureaucracy, god ed., Chatham (NJ), Chatham House, 1985 Goodsell comments that 
the civil service bureaucracy stands as a bulwark against the short -term partisan interests of governments as a "... 
repository of specialized knowledge, historical experience, time -tested wisdom and ... to some degree as counter- 
weight to short-term political expediency and opportunism." (p. 155) 
s' Ian Beasley, Chief of Staff of Thatcher's Efficiency Unit commented with regard to the possible politicisation of 
the bureaucracy: 'The Civil Service is dedicated to the status quo. It only changes with a tremendous breath of air; a 
war, probably the Thatcher period. it's not politicization in the party sense - it's `thought colonization'." See: Peter 
Hennessy, Muddling Through: Power, Politics and the Quality of Government in Postwar Britain, London, Indigo, 
1996, p. 59 
42 Although British civil servants can be called to appear before parliamentary committees, under the Osmotherly 
rules which govern their appearance, they may only answer questions of fact and cannot give opinions on the quality 
of policies or advice. Fora variety of perspectives on contemporary Westminster accountability issues see: P. 
Giddings, ed., Parliamentary Accountability. A Study of Parliament and Executive Agencies, London, Macmillan, 
1995 
n Spencer Zifcak, New Managerialism: Administrative Reform in Whitehall and Canberra, Buckingham, Open 
University Press, 1994, p. 197 
'Peter Shore cited in: Richard Rose, "The Variability of Party Government: A Theoretical and Empirical Critique ", 
Political Studies, 17, 1969, p. 428 
ss Glyn Davis, "Executive Coordination Mechanisms ", in Patrick Weller, Herman Bakvis and R. A. W. Rhodes, eds., 
The Hollow Crown: Countervailing Trends in Core Executives, London, Macmillan, 1997, pp. 126 -147, pp. 138 -141 
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view them as being at least as influential as the political executive in the policy process, 
while others disagree se 
Given the nature of the public policy environment, particularly its complexity, the 
number of actors involved and the core role of the bureaucracy in the policy system, 
the bureaucracy assumes a number of functions in relation to its various constituencies. 
In addition to advising the executive, it operates as a central component of policy 
communities and a member of various policy networks 57 This is demonstrated 
through the use of formal and informal advisory groups, consultative mechanisms and 
the corporatisation of public sector functions which allow the civil service to colonise 
the private sector, extending the boundaries of policy making and blurring the patterns 
of responsibility and accountability beyond their formal constitutional limits.58 For 
example, despite the separation of policy advising and service delivery functions since 
1989 in Britain, the policy advising function appears to be shared by both service 
delivery agencies and ministries.59 
This separation has also led to greater decentralisation of authority within the public 
sector, greater fragmentation and conflict60 and a consequent demand for increased 
coordinating and reporting arrangements 61 There is no unitary civil service, but rather 
a large number of agencies managing competing policy agendas, producing a number 
of smaller public sector cores.62 All of these cores must interface with the political 
executive as part of the core executive to ensure policy coordination and cohesion. 
Fry (1985, p. 21) calls civil servants a `permanent government ", while Greenwood and Wilson ( 1989, p. 97) 
comment that; "... civil servants have more influence, and ministers less, than constitutional theory suggests is 
undeniable." Goodin (1982, pp. 37 -38) rejects the power of officials over public policy as greater than that of 
ministers because of a lack of convincing consistent evidence. See: Geoffrey K. Fry, The Changing Civil Service, 
London, George Allen and Unwin, 1985; J. Greenwood and D. Wilson, Public Administration in Britain Today. 
London, Unwin Hyman, 1989; and, Robert E. Goodin, Political Theory and Public Policy, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1982 
" See: Brian W. Hogwood and T. T. Mackie, "The United Kingdom: decision sifting in a secret garden ", in T. T. 
Mackie and Brian W. Hogwood, Unlocking the Cabinet.- Cabinet Structure in Comparative Perspective, London, 
Sage, 1985, pp. 36-60, p. 7 
Ss D. Pitt and B. Smith, Government Departments, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 39 
59 Price Waterhouse, Executive Agencies: Facts and Trends, Edition 8, London, Price Waterhouse, 1994, pp. 7 -8 
6o The author found that when interviewing senior executives in the British Department of Social Security and the 
Benefits Agency in 1992 while on a short secondment in London, that both organisations admitted a significant level 
of inter -agency conflict over roles, responsibilities and access to the minister. The Efficiency Unit has reported that 
some chief executives complain of excessive operational interference by ministries. See: Efficiency Unit, Next Steps: 
Moving On, London, HMSO, 1994 
6' Dynes and Walker, in analysing the post 1979 reforms have concluded that civil service and policy coordination 
are so bad that "the British state has a hole at its heart - machinery to coordinate `difficult' policy seems weak." See: 
M. Dynes and D. Walker, The New British State, London, Times Books, 1995, p. 28 
63 Kemp comments that the recent changes to Whitehall structures is of such a magnitude that it is effectively 
dismantling the Westminster concept of a monolithic and unified bureaucracy and replacing it with a system in which 
a "loose federation of many smaller agencies, units and cores predominates." See: P. Kemp, Beyond the Next Steps: a 
civil service for the 2P' century, London, Social Market Foundation, 1993, p. 8 
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The Executive, Policy Legitimation and Coordination in Westminster 
Democracies 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the Westminster system has a number of 
distinct characteristics. Despite Rod Rhodes' (correct) assertion that " There are 
enormous gaps in our knowledge of the key actors and institutions in British 
government."," when considering the real -world operations of Westminster systems as 
exemplified by Britain, New Zealand and Singapore, there is much that we do know. 
The Westminster system is cabinet government, a negotiated dictatorship of the elected 
political party leadership which "... has proved particularly susceptible to capture by 
elites..."' The executive is prone itself to capture by the prime minister who, 
depending upon his electoral record, control of the legislature and standing in the non- 
parliamentary party, can exercise enormous, but not monopolistic, power over policy 
and the state. The legislature is the captive of the executive and, through a combination 
of party discipline and the divisions enforced by the adversarial basis of the system, is 
usually capable of challenging, but rarely of overturning, executive policies and 
generally changes policy only at the margins. The parliament, in those jurisdictions 
without a written constitution, is sovereign and its laws cannot be overturned except 
by itself. The judicial branch is not a substantial impediment to the executive or 
legislature although it can make policy not only on the margins or in relation to 
technical issues, but occasionally in relation to key issues. 
Through the use of a simple plurality voting system, resulting in majoritarian 
governments, the state is strong and can act decisively and quickly on policy if 
required. This provides the state with the capacity to resist populist demands and, 
when necessary, to implement pragmatic and unpopular policies. However, the power 
of the state has been restrained by convention and the development of a political 
culture which limits power abuse by governments.' This is reinforced by the 
development of political parties characterised by mass membership, strong discipline 
and a constituency based party structure. The tradition of single party majoritarian 
governments has simplified political accountability (as compared to coalition systems) 
so that the electorate could clearly judge each political party forming government on 
its performance. Accountability in terms of the relationships between financial inputs 
and policy outcomes, has been a consideration secondary to broad responsibility for 
63 R A. W Rhodes, "Preface ", in, Patrick Weller, Herman Bakvis and R. A. W. Rhodes, eds., The Hollow Crown: 
Countervailing Trends in Core Executives, London, Macmillan, 1997, p. x 
66 See: Richard Mulgan, "The Westminster System and the Erosion of Democratic Legitimacy ", in Bruce D. Gray and 
Robert B. McClintock, eds., Courts and Policy: Checking the Balance, Wellington, Legal Research 
Foundation/Brookers, 1995, pp. 265 -282, p. 268 
es Mulgan has commented: "In Westminster systems the democratic legitimacy of governments has depended 
ultimately on political conventions of government accountability." See: Mulgan, 1995, op. cit. p. 270 
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the operation of the political system in Westminster systems, linked as it is to the 
concept of ministerial responsibility.` 
The conventions upon which the legitimacy of Westminster systems are based rest 
quite explicitly on the maintenance of a political culture based on trust between 
political parties, the government and the electorate. This trust comprises an 
understanding that the electorate will allow strong government, with almost 
unrestricted powers between elections, on the basis that governments are seen to 
exercise this power in the general interest of the state, within a broad informal 
framework of consultation and negotiation and that no one group in society is 
explicitly and consistently advantaged, or disadvantaged, by the exercise of this power. 
The perpetuation of majoritarian government rests on this narrow base. 
The principal of trust implicit in this legitimacy framework, extends to all institution of 
the state and most importantly to the judicial wing, the civil service and the armed 
forces. The powers and privileges of these institutions are held in trust for the people, 
albeit to an unspecified and probably incalculable degree, independently of that trust 
given to the parliament. There is an implicit expectation that, in the face of a 
government which betrays its trust and consistently breaks the framework of 
convention, these other institutions will act to maintain their responsibilities within the 
framework, resulting in a conflict between institutions which the electorate would have 
to resolve. While such inter- institutional conflict is extremely difficult to initiate, given 
the power of the executive under the Westminster system, it appears to be the popular 
expectation." Thus the power of the executive is tempered by the necessity to maintain 
these conventions and to be seen to do so. 
The legitimation framework of the Westminster state is maintained and strengthened 
by a continuous, broad interaction between the electorate and the institutions of power, 
whether constitutional (government and opposition) or extra -constitutional (political 
" See: Bruce Stone, "Administrative Accountability in the `Westminster' Democracies: Towards a New Conceptual 
Framework ", Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 8, 4, 1995, pp. 505 -526, p.507 
This argument is implicit in Mulgan 's analysis of the crisis of legitimacy in New Zealand politics. See: Mulgan, 
1995 op. cit.. Jane Kelsy's analysis of the impact of a decade of neo-liberalist policy on perceptions of democracy 
also seem to support this analysis: "The 1993 knife -edge election result...reflected unhappiness with National and 
continued distrust of Labour. Both governments had been equally guilty of breaking election promises and shown 
contempt for democratic process and the electorate. Both were seen as captives of the Treasury, the Business 
Roundtable and their clones. Some people continued voting for either Labour or National...Increased support 
for...third parties...showed that others wanted to break the two party monopoly on power. The vote in favour of 
electoral reform in 1992 and for MMP in 1993, despite a big -business campaign, confirmed that a majority trusted 
neither party and wanted the electoral system itself changed." See: Jane Kelsy, The New Zealand Experiment: A 
World Model for Structural Adjustment ?, Auckland, Auckland University Press, 1995, p. 301. That the electorate in 
Britain has an expectation that such breaches of convention and poor administration will be resolved politically, 
rather than through other mechanisms, such as the courts, is acknowledged by Ridley: "...the idea of "political" rather 
than "legal" protection of citizens against administration is deeply embedded in British political traditions and has 
imprinted itself on British ways of thought." See: F. F. Ridley, "The Citizen Against Authority: British Approaches to 
the Redress of Grievances ", Parliamentary Affairs. 37, 1984, pp. 1 -32, p. 4 
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parties). This interaction has formal elements (such as structured relationships between 
power groups, business, unions and others; participation by the public in inquiries, 
select committee proceedings) and informal elements (constituency work by 
parliamentarians, policy research, opinion polls). The framework is strengthened by 
the government making explicit its policy reasoning through parliament and the media 
and especially by acknowledging the limitations on its powers and abilities in the face 
of such forces as globalisation. 
Westminster Democracy: A Summation 
The core activities of policymaking in Westminster style democracies comprises a 
complex network of institutions, conventions and practices which revolve around the 
cabinet, the prime minister and their principal, usually civil service, advisers who 
interact variously with party, party factions and interest groups in negotiating the 
policy agenda of the state. These networks, of which there are many, include the 
formal structures of government; meetings of the cabinet, cabinet committees, 
interdepartmental committees, meetings of the major coordinating departments 
involved in intradepartmental deliberation or 'bilaterals'; meetings of party and caucus 
committees; and, a range of less formal, but nonetheless important components - 
informal ministerial gatherings, social events, meetings of formal factions or informal 
cliques of the like -minded all of which may involve policymakers from the 
government, the party, the bureaucracy or civil society groups. Despite the spread of 
these networks, the breadth of the Westminster institutions and the inclusiveness of the 
conventions upon which the system rests, the centre is small but power fragmented 
and the institutional structure strong and centralised. It is this institutional smallness of 
the centre, the multiple roles such size imposes on its inhabitants, the increasing 
fragmentation of the policy system and the lack of substantial empirical analyses of the 
contemporary Westminster state that has led to the definition and investigation of a 
'core executive' as a tool for helping us focus beyond the legalistic framework on how 
such systems actually work. 
THE CORE EXECUTIVE AND WESTMINSTER DEMOCRACY 
In his analysis of who really makes policy in British governments, Willson identified 
the following groups; cabinet ministers; the Law Officers, but only as "expert legal 
consultants "; junior ministers, including ministers of State and parliamentary 
Secretaries, although they are essentially trainee ministers; and, officials, principally 
those in the Administrative Class, the "most senior of the executive Class ", and a very 
few specialist civil servants such as military advisers. 
108 Ross Worthington 
Willson concludes that, at least in 1969, that " The policymaking centre of British 
government thus consists of a group at the most 3,500 strong, of whom only 100 are 
politicians or in any sense at all 'party political' appointees. These figures can be 
reduced to a nucleus of some 350, of whom not more than 50- and probably nearer 30 - 
are 'party political'. "' But this information is now 30 years old! Is this still the case and 
if not, what has changed? This lack of contemporary empirical research on the British 
political system is what has led Dunleavy and Rhodes to propose the 'core executive' 
as a unit of analysis for contemporary systems of cabinet government, Westminster or 
otherwise, in order to overcome what they see as a lack of empirical research on what 
governments actually do within systems characterised by cabinet government Pa 
What do we Mean by Core Executive? 
As the analysis of the Westminster system above indicates, constitutionally the centre 
of policy making in these systems is the government's political executive, the cabinet 
presided over by the prime minister. Although the political executive is supreme, it is 
not omnipotent; it cannot do everything nor anything it wishes. Embedded in an 
institutional, social, cultural and economic matrix, the political executive operates 
through a range of relationships which dynamically facilitate or inhibit its policy 
program in relationship to the relative strength of institutions and the personal power 
of the executive. Some of these relationships are of its own choice, but many are 
specified by the arrangements imposed by formal institutional structures and 
conventions and by informal political, social, economic and cultural conventions. If the 
political executive exists at the centre of the policy system, it is a centre that must be 
shared with the others in these many relationships and it is this combination of actors 
at the centre that has been deemed by Dunleavy and Rhodes to be the 'core executive': 
"The term 'executive' is used here to refer to the centre of political authority which take policy 
decisions. In other words, the executive institutions are not limited to prime minister and cabinet 
but also include ministers and their departments. The term 'core executive refers to all those 
organisations and procedures which coordinate central government policies, and act as final arbiters of 
conflict between different parts of the government machine. In brief, the 'core executive' is the heart 
of the machine, covering the complex web of institutions, networks and practices surrounding 
the prime minister, cabinet, cabinet committees and their official counterparts, less formalised 
ministerial 'clubs' or meetings, bilateral negotiations and interdepartmental committees. It also 
includes coordinating departments, chiefly the cabinet Office, the Treasury, the Foreign Office, 
the law officers and the security and intelligence services. "70 
fi" Willson, op. cit. pp. 360 -361 
" The core executive concept was first proposed in: Patrick Dunleavy and R. A. W. Rhodes, `Core Executive Studies 
in Britain ", Public Administration, 68, 1, 1990, pp. 3 -28. See also: R. A. W. Rhodes, "From Prime Ministerial Power 
to Core Executive ", in, R. A. W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy, eds., Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive, 
London, St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 11 -37, p. 35 
'0 Rhodes, 1995, op. cit., p. 12 
109 Chapter Three 
In the United Kingdom, at least, the core executive is therefore "a moveable feast"' not 
a static group and may change from one policy issue to another and from one 
government or prime minister to another. 
Rhodes argues that the description of the work of the Westminster political executive 
as 'cabinet government' is no longer completely accurate. While enormous institutional 
power resides with the political executive and it still forms the centre of the policy 
system, the complexity of government is now such that power over the policy system 
is fragmented and the major challenge to the political executive is coordination and the 
resolution of conflicts between different parts of the policy system so as to ensure 
policy coherence. The notion of government has had to be complemented with ideas 
and methods of governance; making institutions work under conditions of increasingly 
complex modernity in which hierarchy becomes less important and the state is 
required to work with private and sub -national institutions within the market and civil 
society in order to achieve its policy goals. 
The 'core executive' concept "directs attention to the extent and efficacy of, and the 
various mechanisms for, coordination. ' 7z It is defined by its location at the centre of the 
policy system, its variability over time and its ability to substantially control policy 
choices. It asserts that there is not necessarily one constant political executive as 
captured by the 'cabinet government' concept, with relatively constant powers and 
influences over all policy areas. Rather, the 'core executive' is a concept characterised 
by institutional, power and temporal dispersion comprising "multiple actors whose 
relative power shifts over time and between policy areas. "' The term does not 
necessarily define how the policy centre works, but redescribes it so that the focus is on 
the multiplicity of actors, roles and functions at the centre and methods of governance 
and is not distorted by an inappropriate focus on the prime minister, the cabinet or 
legalistic institutional arrangements which are not empirically reflected in the reality of 
how the policy system functions.74 
The core executive is defined by its location at the centre of the policy system, its 
variability over time and its ability to substantially control policy choices. Rhodes 
contends that the functions of the core executive are coordination and the resolution of 
conflicts within the policy system.' Andeweg finds this to be too narrow a focus and 
suggests that "functions such as the provision of democratic legitimation to 
government, or the creation of a channel for political accountability, or simply decision 
Glyn Davis, "The core executive ", in, Brian Galligan, Ian McAllister and John Ravenhill, eds., New Developments 
in Australian Politics", Melbourne, Macmillan, 1997, pp. 85 -101, p. 99 
n Rhodes, 1995, op. cit, p. 12 
Th Rhodes, 1995, op. cit., p. 26 
° Martin J. Smith, "Reconceptualizing the British State: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges to Central 
Government", Public Administration, 76, 1998, pp. 45 -72, pp. 46-51 
Th Rhodes 1995, op. cit, p. 12 
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making: the "authoritative allocation of values" are equally valid functions.76 Andeweg 
seems to equate cabinet government with a core executive and, in amending Rhodes' 
functional approach, has instead analysed cabinet government on two dimensions of 
decision making; collegiality and collectivity. This has provided a typology of three 
types of cabinet government; collective, segmented and fragmented which form a 
continuum based on the success with which they integrate multiple interests within the 
policy discourse." 
What Does the Core Executive Do? 
Whichever approach one takes to examining the core executive, what it does is simply 
defined: it governs. Above all, the core executive concept seeks to empirically define 
the centre of government, to clarify what are the actual relations among institutions 
and other actors in the governance system. Within government, political power is not 
based solely on legalistic institutional position, but substantially on resource 
dependencies' Thus ministers, senior civil servants and others in a position to 
influence policy choices interact through the exchange of resources which "take the 
form of games in which actors seek to realise their objectives and manoeuvre for 
advantage, deploying their resources to maximise their advantage while minimising 
their dependence on other actors.im These resource exchanges do not follow 
hierarchical paths, but take place across networks within which resources are being 
constantly bargained for and exchanged in return for support for policy related goods. 
Thus the policy system is not characterised only by hierarchy, but by also by 
fragmentation across policy networks requiring considerable resources to coordinate 
and shape coherent policy goals and options. To govern effectively, the core executive 
undertakes this coordination function. According to Burch and Holliday, British 
cabinet government does this through the coordination of policy networks which 
"have almost uniformly become more coordinated, more regularised and more focused 
on the cabinet system. "80 The cabinet becomes the centre of the policy network web and 
in effect is "the network that polices the functional policy networks. "81, resulting in the 
observation that the relationship structure of the British core executive is : 
...like a dance, a quadrille in which the participating groups exercise figures in the middle of 
the floor but never entirely give up their independent identities. British government is a 
competition in which, one side never finally gaining complete mastery, the contending forces 
advance and retreat n 
'Rudy Andeweg, "Collegiality and Collectivity: Cabinets, Cabinet Committees, and Cabinet Ministers ", in, Patrick 
Weller, Herman Bakvis and R. A. W. Rhodes, The Hollow Crown: Countervailing Trends in Core Executives, 
London, Macmillan, 1997, pp.58 -83, p. 59 
Andeweg, 1997, op. cit., p79 -83 
R. A. W Rhodes, Control and Power in Central -Local Government Relations, Farnborough, Gower, 1981 
Rhodes, 1997, op. cit., p. 203 
Martin Burch and Ian Holliday, The British Cabinet System, New York, Prentice Hall, 1996, p. 106 
Rhodes, 1997, op. cit., p. 203 
" M. Dynes and D. Walker, The New British State, London, Times Books, 1995, p. 15 
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Under Westminster arrangements, this 'network of networks' has both a stable centre 
in the form of institutional arrangements for political and bureaucratic leadership, as 
outlined above, and a more flexible outer core, which as Burch and Holliday note, 
cannot escape the orbit of the cabinet system residing at the centre. While arguably, the 
inner core may once have been peopled by a mix of politicians and non -partisan 
bureaucrats, it has now been somewhat politicised. Key bureaucrats are increasingly 
political appointees, whether it be in Britain or Australia" and whether the bureaucrat 
be a ministerial adviser,' a contracted consultant, a technical expert from a think 
tank87, or a departmental secretary as under the Howard government in Australia. In 
Singapore, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, former Senior Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, contends that both the British colonial civil service and its successor within an 
independent Singapore, were both political in nature and to assert otherwise is to 
ignore public administration realities." 
The outer core is less institutionalised than the inner core and changes more over time 
than the inner core according to policy issue and who inhabits the inner core. Aucoin, 
in a Canadian study has demonstrated that this outer core in particular is shaped by 
prime ministers so as to reflect their "personal philosophies of leadership, management 
styles, and political objectives."", although Smith rejects the application of such a 
notion to the British core executive 9t It is inhabited by a variety of people representing 
a wide range of interests, some more consistent than others. These include bureaucrats 
involved in topical policy issues, political party officials, government advisory bodies, 
task forces and official commissions, interest group representatives, think tank staff, 
consultants, ministerial political advisers (other than the prime minister's) and kitchen 
cabinets whether the prime minister's or those of individual ministers?' 
83 Peter Aucoin, "Politicians, Public Servants and Public Management: Getting Government Right", in, B. Guy 
Peters, and D. J. Savoie, eds., Governance in a Changing Environment, Montreal, McGill- Queens University Press, 
1995 
sa Richard Alaba, Inside Bureaucratic Power: The Wilenski Review of New South Wales Government Administration, 
Sydney, Hale and Iremonger, 1994, pp. 206 -209 
85 See: D. Willens, "The Role of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit ", Public Administration, 65, 1987, pp. 443 -454; 
and, D. D. Dunn, "Ministerial Staff in Australian Commonwealth Government ", Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 54, 4, pp. 507 -519 
86 For a study of the role of private sector consultants as ministerial advisers see: Denis Saint- Martin, "The New 
Managerialism and the Policy Influence of Consultants in Government: An Historical- Institutionalist Analysis of 
Britain, Canada and France ", Governance, 11, 3, 1998, pp. 319 -356 
For an analysis of the role of various forms of political consultants including think tanks in Britain, Australia and 
Canada, see: Herman Bakvis, "Advising the Executive: Think Tanks, Consultants, Political Staff and Kitchen 
Cabinets ", in, Weller, Bakvis and Rhodes, op. cit., 1997, pp. 84 -125, specifically pp. 97 -106 
88 Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, "The Bureaucracy ", in Chan Heng Chee and Obaíd ul Han, eds., The Prophetic and the 
Political: Selected Speeches and Writings of S. Rajaratnam, Singapore, Graham Brash, 1987, pp. 181 -189, p. 184 
89 Peter Aucoin, "Organisational Change in Canadian Machinery of Government: from rational management to 
brokerage politics ", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 19, 1, 1986, pp. 3 -27, p. 
9D Martin Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, ESRC Whitehall Programme, brochure, undated, p. 2 
n Adapted from Bakvis, 1997, op. cit., pp. 92 -95. Bakvis focuses in his study on non -bureaucratic sources of advice 
to the inner core executive. 
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These groups, while analytically distinct, are generally not mutually exclusive and 
there is a significant degree of overlap. Interest group officials may be members of the 
governing political party, sit on party committees, government commissions, act as 
consultants and be members of one or more kitchen cabinet; multiple roles are 
common. The inner core is principally concerned with major policy priorities, macro 
resource management (budget development), international relations, defence and 
security issues, maintaining control of the party and the image of the government in 
the electorate. Occasionally maintaining control of the parliament may be an issue of 
concern to the inner core, but usually not in unicameral Westminster systems such as 
New Zealand and Singapore where achieving government means complete control of 
the legislature. 
The roles played by groups in the outer core complement the more institutionalised 
roles carried by the inner core: assisting the development of the party policy platform; 
assisting with the transition to government and policy implementation; undertaking 
partisan political tasks of which the bureaucracy is incapable; evaluating bureaucratic 
and non -bureaucratic policy advice; providing vision and ideas to develop and 
support the government's program; providing information of public opinion of 
policies and the government's performance, mobilising the bureaucracy and providing 
an environment for reflection and rejuvenation for the inner leadership." 
However, the core executive is not a jumble of people and groups embroiled in 
coordination meetings revolving around an unstable centre fragmented by power 
distribution and game playing. Its principal task is to administer the state effectively 
and it establishes political, administrative and policy routines which incorporate all 
principal policy actors - ministers, bureaucrats, parliament, party, opposition and 
interest groups among others - to produce a stable government. Governing is 
eminently practical and stability essential to it ' 
The core executive uses constitutional and bureaucratic structures, rules and 
conventions to impose patterns of coordination, consultation and problem solving on 
political issues in which both institutions and networks are principal components. 
Policy preferences are set out by governments in platform statements. Administrative 
instructions including statements of specific policy programs, ideology and 
administrative arrangements for policy implementation and administration are issued 
and implemented. Methods for mediating among competing policy preferences are set 
in place_ Formal institutional power is allocated by the appointments of ministers, 
5z Ibid., pp. 95 -97 
a A recent exposition of the way in which politics becomes a `government of routines' is found in: Glynn Davis, A 
Government of Routines Executive Coordination in One Australian State, Melbourne, Macmillan, 1996 
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advisers, bureaucrats and others which become linked to informal power 
arrangements through resource exchange games and bargaining. The system 
inherently stabilises as the practicalities of government are met by these arrangements; 
policy is made, implemented, assessed and changed. The cyde of bargaining, resource 
sharing and rare displays of naked prime ministerial power continues. 
Westminster, the Core Executive and Singapore 
Having considered the structure and dynamics characteristic of Westminster political 
systems and the nature, roles and dynamics of the core executive in such systems, how 
useful are these concepts for analysing how contemporary Singapore is governed? 
Singapore is indisputably a democracy based on the Westminster model," albeit, one 
that has been imposed in the context of post -colonial independence onto a cultural 
setting which is Asian, multi- ethnic, with no previous tradition of democracy and 
which has had to adapt itself to this society in order to operate effectively 9s Although it 
is also a city-state - it is small, not the type of "large, modern nation state" within 
which Dunleavy and Rhodes conceive their view of a core executive - it has a 
Westminster -style constitutional framework, its legal system is firmly within the 
English Iaw community' and its public administration is founded and operates upon 
Whitehall principals 9s In this environment, the concept of the core executive is a useful 
tool for the examination of both the structure and dynamics of governance, whether it 
be located in Europe or Asia. If, in such an environment, the core executive comprises 
"all those organisations and procedures which coordinate central government policies, 
and act as final arbiters of conflict between different parts of the government 
machine." what, then can be expect a Singaporean core executive to be? This issue is 
examined in the next section. 
'Philip N. Pillai and Kevin Tan Yew Lee, "Constitutional Development", in, Kemial Singh Sandhu and 
Paul Wheatley, eds., Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 
1989, pp. 647 -668, p. 655 
Thio Li -ann, "Choosing Representatives: Singapore Does it Her Way", in, Graham Hassall and Cheryl 
Saunders, eds., The People's Representatives: Electoral Systems in the Asia -Pacific Region, Sydney, 
Allen and Unwin,1997, pp. 38 -58, p. 38 
Patrick Dunleavy and R. A. W. Rhodes, "Core Executive Studies in Britain ", Public Administration, 
68, 1990, pp. 29 -60, p. 9 
m Andrew B. L. Phang, "Convergence and Divergence - A Preliminary Comparative Analysis of the Singapore and 
Hong Kong Legal Systems ", Hong Kong Law Journal, 23, 1, 1993, pp.1 -30, p.4. Phang argued that by maintaining a 
legal system that was almost identical to the United Kingdom was a functional possibility in Singapore. 
Lee Boon Hiok, "The Bureaucracy", in, Kemial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., Management of 
Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 90-101 
w R A. W. Rhodes, "From Prime Ministerial power to Core Executive ", in, R A. W. Rhodes and Patrick 
Dunleavy, eds., Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive, London, Macmillan, 1995, pp. 11 -37, p. 12 
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THE SINGAPOREAN CORE EXECUTIVE 
Examination of the literature on the participants at the centre of the political process in 
Singapore is relatively sparse. In general, we have to resort to the broader literature on 
elites, the bureaucracy and aspects of government administration to identify those who 
may comprise the Singaporean core executive. With this constraint in mind, in this 
section we review the Singaporean literature in order to identify who might comprise 
the core executive in Singapore. 
Political and Bureaucratic Components in the Core Executive 
In his 1978 work, Peter Chen identified Singapore's power elites as being made up of 
three groups: civil bureaucrats, a political elite and a select professional elite.10° The 
core of this elite is small comprising "professionals, intellectuals and trade union 
leaders" and excludes two- thirds of the members of members of parliament as well as 
the military and business elites, although leaders in the GLC sector were seen as being 
part of the civil bureaucratic elite which formed part of the core. Members of this core 
group are almost wholly drawn from the bureaucracy and the political executive with 
the professional elite "on the periphery". Members of the professional elite only enter 
the core group if they are sponsored and co -opted by the political elite; they have no 
power to demand or negotiate entry within their own resources.101 This core group, 
what Chen terms the "power elite ", has a number of distinctive characteristics. This 
group was seen as being strong, cohesive and homogenous in terms of "political 
ideologies, interests and objectives regardless of their socio- economic background "; 
highly qualified in terms of "achievement, expertise, leadership ability, education and 
social recognition. "; development oriented; exclusive in that it limited power sharing 
and acted to co -opt expertise while excluding members of the professional elite from 
acquiring political power separate from the power elite; and to be free of corruption as 
the political leadership and the bureaucrats do not "share the same interests and help 
each other to achieve their objectives".' 
All of these characteristics appear, at least at this time, to be defensible except for the 
last. As we saw in Chapter One, unity between the political and bureaucratic elites was 
purposely fostered by the PAP from the beginning of it taking power in 1959 leading to 
a commonality of values "of economic rationality, i.e. efficiency, competitiveness and 
achievement orientation_ "103 Chen differentiated strongly between the bureaucratic 
elite and the political elite, whereas in an earlier work, Chan Heng Chee was already 
Peter S. J. Chen, "The Power Elite in Singapore ", in, Ong Jin Hui, Tong Chet Kiong and Tan Em Ser, eds., 
Understanding Singapore Society, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1997, pp. 7 -16, p. 13 
01 ibid 
1 °3 ibid, p. 14 
103 Shee Poon Kim, "Domestic Politics ", in Anm Mahízhnan, ed., Singapore: The Year in Review, Singapore, 
Institute of Policy Studies, 1991, pp. 26-41, p. 33 
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warning that 'meaningful' political power was already shifting from the political 
executive to the bureaucracy and such divisions were blurring.10' Minchin indicates 
that this was unavoidable; the PAP on assuming office had, through Lee Kuan Yew, 
Goh Keng Swee and Kenny (K. M.) Byrne sealed a power sharing pact with the higher 
civil service which was the foundation of their social control and policy capacity.105 
They had no other basis of power independent of the radical wing of the PAP which 
eventually formed the radically socialist Barisan Socialis. This dependency, and the 
significant degree of autonomy achieved by the higher civil service, was readily 
acknowledged by the first generation leaders such as Sinnathamby Rajaratnam106 and 
Hon Siu Sen who had assisted in its politicisation.107 The corollary of this relationship 
was that the roles and powers of the parliamentarian and the party officials and 
workers was drastically reduced, and by 1975 a new political leadership drawn from 
the university educated professional class was being recognised.108 
The role and influence of these intellectuals within the political leadership is disputed 
by Chen, Chan and Quah. Chen maintained that it was part of the core political 
leadership but Chan noted in 1975 that "The views of an independent intellectual 
receive no favour and if his views are critical of government power his function is not 
recognised as legitimate. "109 Quah, writing in 1984, maintained that this group of 
intellectuals participated in the policy system through their representation on statutory 
boards and government committees, but it is questionable that this representation was 
other than as individuals, given the PAP's then firm stance against sponsoring sectoral 
interests and its specific rejection of the notion of entrenching intellectual interests by 
reserving a certain number of seats for university staff in the parliament.11° However, 
Quah specifically rejects the concept of intellectuals serving in their individual 
capacity, a stance which seems decidedly at odds with the facts 111 As the group of 
Singaporean academic grew, they were co -opted into the political system, as members 
of the party or in other ways, a route that Chan herself eventually adopted. Thus, from 
04 Chan Heng Chee, "Politics in an Administrative State: Where has the Politics Gone ", in, Seah Chee Meow, ed., 
Trends in Singapore: Proceedings and Background Paper, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1975, pp. 51-68, 
p.51 
105 James Minchin, No Mart is an Island: A Portrait of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1990, 
p. 118 
o' S. Rajaratnam, "Mandarins of a New Order, ", The Mirror, 7 September, 1970, p. 1 
0 Hon Sui Sen, "Speech at the Official Opening of the Staff Training Institute ", Singapore, Ministry of Culture, 
1974, p. I 
48 Seah Chee Meow, "Whither the City - State ", in, Seah Chee Meow, ed., Trends in Singapore: Proceedings and 
Background paper, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1975, pp. 3 -38, p. 31 
09 Chan Heng Chee, "The Role of Intellectuals in Singapore Politics ", in Wee Teong -Boo, ed., The Future of 
Singapore - the Global City, Singapore, Singapore, University Education Press, 1977, pp. 39 -51, p. 46. This 
publication was a collection of papers originally given at a seminar organised in December 1975 by the Democratic 
Socialist Club of the University of Singapore. 
10 Jon S. T. Quail, "The Public Policy -Making Process in Singapore ", Asian Journal of Public Administration, 6, 2, 
1986, pp. 108 -126, p. 115 
11 ibid., p. 117. The analysis of NUS and NTU staff-representation on statutory boards and GLC boards undertaken 
in Chapter 7 refutes Quah's assertion. 
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the 1970s, significant numbers of academics became, directly or indirectly, drawn into 
the government and the bureaucracy. 
The growing power of the bureaucracy was problematical. For Chan, the "increased 
role and importance of the bureaucrat in Singapore is staggering" and bureaucratic 
influence, if not control, over the core executive was cause for concern, principally 
because of the lack of accountabìlity.'u She was particularly concerned that the control 
of the GLC sector by bureaucrats was highly autonomous and particularly 
problematical, although Quah, the major writer on public administration in Singapore, 
seems not to have shared these concerns. Although generally ignoring intra- executive 
dynamics in his studies, he concluded in a 1989 paper that "Most, if not all, of the 
public policies in Singapore are formulated by the Cabinet... "13 and that "instances of 
policy formulation by senior civil servants are rare and constitute the exception rather 
than the rule.i14 This naïve view is placed in perspective by the Public Service 
Commission which notes in its recruitment handbook that "Administrative Officersll5 
... are responsible for formulating and implementing Government policies.i16 
Studies of statutory boards, by Ow Chin Hock,117 Ker Sin Tzels and Quah19 are 
problematical, as Ow and Ker are PAP cadres and became PAP MPs and Quah's study 
was descriptive and avoided an analysis of the obvious dominance of the boards by 
civil servants (and therefore had a policy making function) and the interactions 
between these two public sector groups.'° This is somewhat rectified in Seah's analysis 
of the civil service in which he notes the close relationship between the higher civil 
service and the political executive, the role of civil servants in managing parastatal 
bodies, but clearly is not convinced of Chan's concerns about the institutionalisation of 
12 Chan, 1975, op. cit, p. 65 
13 Jon S. T. Quah and Stella R. Quah, "The Limits of Government Intervention ", in Kemial Singh Sandhu and Peter 
Wheatley, eds., Management of .Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 102 -127, 
p. 109. This reflected the same view expressed in a 1984 paper by Jon S. T. Quah. See: Jon S. T. Quail, "The Public 
Policy -Making Process in Singapore ", Asian Journal of Public Administration. 6, 1986, pp. 108 -126, p. 117 
1° Quah and Quail, 1989, op. cit, p. 108 
15 These are members of the elite Administrative Service within the Singapore Civil Service which 
manages the public sector and from which the public sector leadership is almost wholly drawn. 
16 Public Service Commission, Your First Choice in Careers, 5" ed., Singapore, Public Service Commission, 1994, 
p. 16 
Ow Chin Hock, "Singapore ", in Nguyen Truong, ed., The Role of Public Enterprise in National Development in 
Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects, Singapore, RIHED, 1976, pp. 153 -156 
"" Ker Sin Tze, Public Enterprises in ASEAN, Singapore, ISEAS, 1978 
1" Jon S. T. Quali, "Statutory Boards ", in John S. T. Quali Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, Government and 
Politics of Singapore, rev. ed., Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 120, 145 
120 Jon Quail Siew Tien is associate professor in the Department of Political Science at NUS and is believed to have 
political control responsibilities within NUS, as exemplified in his involvement in the Christopher Lingle case. It is 
doubtful that he is a cadre member of the PAP however. He is arguably the most prolific contemporary author on 
public administration in Singapore, but his works have consistently ignored any critical examination of the public 
sector in depth. I was informed by two senior Administrative Service officers that Quail and all other political 
scientists have very limited access to the civil service, which would partly explain the paucity of literature on public 
sector elite dynamics in Singapore. 
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an 'administrative state'.121 He is subsequently persuaded by Chart's analysis, asserting 
in a 1999 paper that not only was Chan correct in her original hypothesis, but that the 
administrative state has grown beyond her predictions?22 with the bureaucracy 
becoming fused with the political and economic elites,' less accountable' although 
accepted by the people' but, under the Goh Chok Tong governments, more 
consultative-t2e 
The foundation of Chan's concerns, the nature of intra- executive dynamics and their 
reflection in state -society relations, were acknowledged within the political leadership 
itself, but as a strength, not a potential weakness. In 1978, Monsour Sukaimi, former 
Administrative Officer and freshly elected member of parliament noted that the 
politicisation of the higher civil service was necessary and should be 
institutionalised,127 an approach supported by fellow MP and also former 
Administrative Officer, Bernard Chen Tien Lap128 in his calling for an continued 
"intimate relationship between the next generation political leadership and the new 
generation civil servants.i129 In the same publication, Goh Chok Tong acknowledged 
the "tremendous power of these bureaucrats" in the "inner fortress ", noting their 
autonomy and power.130 Goh went on to equate backbenchers, one assumes 
descriptively rather than normatively, with counter -clerks in the civil service, both part 
of the "outer circle" of power with the MPs having even less power than the lowest 
bureaucrats.t3t This supported Chan's earlier conclusion that "the bureaucracy is a 
close handmaiden of the party",' a view reinforced by the then Deputy Prime 
Minister S. Rajaratnam in 1982 when he defined "the political leadership and the 
bureaucracy ... (constituting) the ruling establishment.ily Rajaratnam, however, 
included MPs within the political establishment i3' This role for the bureaucracy 
following its transfer from colonial to PAP control is not surprising; it is in accordance 
with British civil service tradition, albeit exaggerated in comparison to the British 
12` Seah Chee Meow, "The Civil Service ", in John S. T. Quah Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, Government 
and Politics of Singapore, rev. ed., Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp.92 -119, particularly pp. 109 -110 
'David Chee -Meow Seah, "The Administrative State: Quo Vadis ? ", in Linda Low, ed., Singapore: Towards a 
Developed Status, Singapore, Oxford University Press, I999, pp. 250 -270, p. 253 
v idib. 
124 ibid., p. 260 
125 ibid., p. 258 
126 ibid., p. 269 
121 Mansour Hj Sukaimi, "Our Leadership Style is Elitist ", Petir, 1, July 1978, p. 47 
12' Bernard Chen Tien Lap was also an officer in the Administrative Service, a former Deputy Secretary in the PMO 
and the Ministry of Finance before being elected to parliament. 
124 Bernard Chen, "Co-operation Amongst Civil Servants and MPs ", Petir, 1, July 1978, p. 47 
O0 Goh Chok Tong, "An MP and a Civil Servant ", Petir, 1, July 1978, p. 45 
13` ibid 
'32 Chan Heng Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance. The PAP at the Grass -Roots, Singapore, University of 
Singapore Press, 1976, p. 224 
'33 Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, "The Bureaucracy ", in Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq, eds., The Prophetic and the 
Political: Selected Speeches and Writings of S. Rajaratnam, Singapore, Graham Brash, 1987, pp. 181 -189, p. 189 
4 Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, "Leadership Succession (1978) ", in, Chan and Obaid, 1987, op. cit., pp. 175 -181, p. 180 
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context.' Clearly, backbenchers are not considered to be part of the inner core 
executive, although they may be considered part of an outer core, whilst ministers and 
the higher civil service are. 
The Military and the Core Executive 
In his analysis, Chen excluded the military from the elite. While this may have been 
justifiable in 1975, only 8 years after the Singapore Armed Forces were established, it 
has certainly not been the case since the early 1980s when the officer corps began 
penetrating the military oriented GLCs136 and from the mid -1980s when the corps, now 
beginning to mature, started to transfer officers to the civilian public sector and the 
legislature. Chan had identified the beginnings of a "military- industrial -administrative 
complex "13' but did not proceed to later analyse its development except in 1985 to 
rather disingenuously assert that the SAF officer corps lacked "political 
consciousness".' Chan, however, did comment during the question and answer 
session at the end of a seminar on 24 November 1974, that if civilian rule failed in 
Singapore it could be replaced through a coup d'etat by military rule.' A similar 
assessment was made by Shee in 1983, when he noted the "possibility of the military 
elites entering the political arena to compete with the civilian politicians." and even 
noted the possibility of the military sponsoring a non -PAP government should the PAP 
fail.140 
The possibility of the military participating in government in Singapore was dismissed 
by Crouch as late as 1988," although by then large numbers of the first generation of 
SAF officer-scholars' had already been transferred into the public sector and some, 
such as Abbas bin Abu Amin,' Lee Hsien Loong, George Yeo and Teo Chee Hean, to 
13' For a candid analysis of the British civil service as a pressure group, see: James Michael, The Politics of Secrecy. 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1983, pp. 11 -35 
336 Initially to Intraco and its subsidiaries and then to Sheng -Li Holdings, the defence industries holding company 
created by the Ministry of Defence ( MINDEF) in 1974. Only small numbers from the officer corps actually went to 
Sheng -Li Holdings prior to the mid -1980s as the emphasis was on building military manpower and capability. 
However, civilian officers from MINDEF were transferred to these companies. 
°' Chan, 1975, op. cit., p. 61 
138 Chan Heng Chee, "Singapore ", in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., Military- Civilian Relations in 
South -East Asia. Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1985pp. 136 -156, p. 153 
139 "Comments on Current and Future Trends ", in Seah Chee Meow, ed., Trends in Singapore: Proceedings and 
Background Paper. Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1975, pp. 121 -151, p. 136 
1°0 Shee Poon Kim, "Political Leadership and Succession in Singapore ", in Peter S. J. Chen, eds., Singapore 
Development Policies and Trends, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 173 -196, p. 195 
Harold Crouch, "The Military Mind and Economic Development ", in J. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun 
Cheong, eds., Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia, Singapore, ISEAS, 1988, pp. 49 -72, p. 64 
342 Those inducted through the scholarship scheme from 1971. Between 1971 -1977, 149 SAF scholars were funded. 
From 1974 under the Wrangler Project, 10 per cent of the officer corps, approximately 250 men, those identified as 
having the potential for command and staff appointments, were provided with scholarship and other opportunities for 
development. The first Wrangler intake began to assume the most senior positions in the mid- 1980s, including Lee 
Hsien Loong and George Yeo. See: Lee Kuan Yew, "Top Talent Flows into the SAF ", in, Defend What's Ours, 
Singapore, Ministry of Culture, 1984, pp. 1 -5 
1a3 Major Abbas was n61 a scholar. A graduate of the Teacher's Training College, he was Commanding Officer, 
School of Methods of Instruction and Commanding Officer, SAF Boys School before his retirement in 1979. He was 
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the legislature in 1980, 1984, 1988 and 1992 respectively.'*F However, Crouch's 
assessment that Singaporeans would have little tolerance for military government is 
undoubtably correct and clarifies the debate; it is not the role of the military in 
governance per se that is at issue, it is the role of the officer corps and, in particular its 
senior ranks. Since this time, only two substantive studies have been made of the SAF's 
role in government; by Singh and Huxley respectively. Huxley's study is the only to 
date which has specifically examined the political role of the SAF officer corps. 
In his study of the defence industries in 1990, Singh does not differentiate between the 
Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the SAF, but concludes that MINDEF controls the 
defence industry sector through Singapore Technology Holdings, the GLC then 
responsible for this sector.' This provides the defence establishment with considerable 
control of a large part of the public sector. Huxley concludes in his study that Lee 
Hsien Loong was the principal minister in charge of MINDEF in the second half of the 
1980s," that MINDEF is increasingly controlled by the SAF and not the Administrative 
Service,' that Singapore Technologies "was effectively controlled by SAF retirees."," 
that civilian control over MINDEF and the SAF had been 'significantly eroded' since 
the mid -1980s,'ß although " in the medium term at least, the SAF scholars in politics 
will remain the clients of the civilian political leadership. ", although in the longer term 
they could become autonomous 00 Huxley even raises the spectre of the 'hardline' 
leaders' of the PAP using the SAF to support a martial law regime, although 
speculatively.' Huxley concludes that the positioning of the SAF officer corps within 
the core executive is such that 
By the early 1990s, transfers of SAF officers into the civil service and statutory boards had 
arguably laid the basis for the transformation of what Chan Heng Chee referred to as an 
'administrative state' into a military- administrative state.' 
Although Huxley's analysis is compelling, there is no consensus on the nature of the 
relationship between the military, civilian and bureaucratic components of the core 
asked to stand for parliament as a Malay candidate because of a dearth of acceptable candidates from this ethnic 
group. He served from 1980 -1991. 
1d0 Crouch was not alone in ignoring the entry of SAF officers and ex- officers to the bureaucracy and politics. In an 
article on political institutionalisation in Singapore in 1986, Lee Boon Hiok made no mention of this. See: Lee Boon 
Hiok, "Political Institutionalisation in Singapore ", in Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato and Jusuf Wanandi, eds., 
Asian Political Socialization, Berkeley, Institute of East Asían Studies University of California, 1986, pp. 201 -220 
15 Bilveer Singh, "Singapore's Defence Industries ", Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, 70, 1990, p. 50 
Tim Huxley, "The Political Role of the Singapore Armed Forces' Officer Corps: Towards a Military- 
Administrative State ? ", SDSC WorlángPaper, 279, December 1993, p. 9 
Huxley doesn't mention the Administrative Service, but it is obvious that it is these officers that he asserts have 
been supplanted by SAF or ex -SAF officers. See: Huxley, op. cit. p. 10 
"` ibid. p. 12 
t bid p. 14 
150 ibid. p. 16 
15' One can only speculate what Huxley means by `hardline', but one would suppose that he means those 
closely aligned to Lee Kuan Yew. 
n bid p. 17 
153 rbid p. 19 
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executive.' Chan Heng Chee for example in her 1985 paper contends that "... contacts 
between top ranking military leaders and the civilian political leaders will take place 
on budget allocations and discussions of strategic matters, but the distinction between 
'political' and 'military' areas of responsibility will be maintained.i155 This, as with 
Huxley's analysis, ignores the complexity of the relationship, the way in which the 
Administrative Service and the SAF officer corps are integrated through National 
Service and informal social networks, the role of the MINDEF permanent secretary and 
ministers in supervising the officer corps and the ways in which the political executive 
can maintain covert control over all significant people in the country through use of the 
ISD and its covert surveillance capabilities. Similarly, in 1988, Zakaria contends that the 
military "is not involved in any economic development function. ", although it directly 
controls one of the largest domestic industrial- manufacturing corporations,' a stance 
explicitly contested by Yong who places the role of the officer corps in the perspective 
of the Total Defence paradigm which includes economic defence.17 
The SAF leadership obviously forms part of the core executive in Singapore, but the 
exact nature its dynamics within the executive remains largely hidden and requires 
further analysis. This group is probably not unitary, with the top leadership of the SAF 
General Staff probably residing within the inner core and other officers either in the 
outer core or intermittently form part of the core executive in relation to particular 
issues. 
In addition to the public service bureaucracy and the SAF, three other PAP controlled 
bureaucracies were being developed as the regime flourished and consolidated; 
Government Linked Corporations (GLC), statutory boards and the National Trade 
Union Congress (NTUC). 
GLCs and Statutory Boards Within the Core Executive 
The development of a large number of government owned business enterprises, 
established either as private state -owned companies (the GLCs) or as statutory boards 
1$4 I do not agree with Huxley's assessment that Lee Hsien Loong was the paramount minister in the defence 
portfolio from 1955-91_ Such an assessment undervalues the degree of control exercised by two other key figures; 
Goh Chok Tong as Minister for Defence and Lim Siong Guan as Permanent Secretary of MINDEF; both were more 
in control of the officer corps than Huxley either knew or acknowledges.'$' I also suspect that Huxley has over- 
subscribed to the general belief in Singapore that Lee Hsien Loong was destined for the prime ministership; the 
conventional wisdom in Singapore consistently underestimates Gob Chok Tong's political prowess and ability to 
manage his relationship with the Lees without great detriment to his own authority. 
Chan Heng Chee, "Singapore ", in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., Military- Civilian Relations in 
South -East Asia, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 136 -156, p. 154 
'sb Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "The Military and Development in Malaysia and Brunei, with a Short Survey on Singapore ", 
in J. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun Cheong, eds., Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia, Singapore, ISEAS, 
1988, pp. 231 -254, p. 246 
Yong Mun Cheong, "The Military and Development in Singapore ", in J. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun 
Cheong, eds., Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia, Singapore, ISEAS, 1988, pp. 279 -290, p. 289 
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which operate on a commercial rather than a subsidised basis, has been frequently 
noted as a distinctive feature of the Singaporean public sector.' This network of 
companies and boards has developed since the late 195Os, originally under colonial 
guidance through statutory boards and defence facilities, expanded following 
independence until, by 1991 the GLCs and the 15 largest statutory boards accounted 
for 74.7 per cent of the total profits of domestic (i. e. non -MNC) companies159 and the 
GLCs alone for half of the capitalisation of the Singapore Stock Exchange.160 By 1997, 
boards and GLCs combined accounted for over 60 per cent of Singapore's GDP.161 
Described by Huff as "state directed capitalism .. resembling socialist central planning 
more than private free market capitalism ", fi2 it was justified by successive 
governments as an essential feature of rapid sustainable economic development.t6s So 
intrusive is this sector in the local economy that Lim has questioned Singapore's 
economy as being a free market economy except for the MNC sector.164 Singh and Siah 
note, for example, that GLCs are major players in the manufacturing, transportation 
and engineering sectors, that the entire marine and shipping sector in Singapore 
should be considered government controlled' as is the telecommunications sector 
despite the introduction of "guided competition" to the former wholly state -owned 
monopoly provider.166 The GLC sector, which has assets of approximately $S170 
billion, is completely under executive control despite minority public shareholdings in 
some companies such as Singapore Telecom and Singapore International Airlines. As 
an indication of the almost complete autonomy of this sector, until 1998, the 
government even refused to disclose the reserves of government owned banks167 and it 
158 See: Lawrence B. Krause, "Government as Entrepreneur", in Kemial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., 
Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 436 -451. A more recent 
work which examines how the Economic Development Board acted as an state entrepreneur is: Edgar H. Schein, 
Strategic Pragmatism: The Culture of Singapore's Economic Development Board, Cambridge (Mass.), The MIT 
Press, 1997 
"s Werner Vennewald, "Technocrats in the State Enterprise System of Singapore ", Asia Research Centre Working 
Paper, 32, November 1994, p. 25 
160 "Half of SES capitalisation comes from Govt -linked firms ", Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, 30 November 
1991, p. 20. Temasek Holdings, the holding company for domestic GLCs as opposed to those associated with the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, had a market capitalisation of $S88.2 billion in June 1999 and 
accounted fora quarter of the total market capitalisation of the stock exchange. See: Conrad Raj and Patrick Daniel, 
"Temasek fine -tunes stewardship of its companies ", Business Times, 25 June 1999 
'61 Embassy of the United States Singapore, Country Commercial Guide FP 1999: Singapore, Singapore, 
Embassy of the United States, July 1998, p. 6 
162 W. G. Huff The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth century, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, I994, p. 336 
63 Goh Keng Swee, "A Socialist Economy That Works ", in Goh Keng Swee, The Practice of Economic Growth, 
Singapore, Federal Publications, 1995, pp. 94 -106, p. 103 
166 Linda Y. C. Lim, "Singapore's Success: The Myth of the Free Market Economy", Asian Survey, 23, 6, I983, pp. 
263 -275 
iss Kulwant Singh and Siah Hwee Ang, "The Strategies and Success of Government Linked Corporations in 
Singapore", Faculty of Business Administration Research Paper Series, National University of Singapore, 98-06, 
February 1998, p. 12 
166 Kulwant Singh. Guided Competition in Singapore's Telecommunications Industry. Paper presented at the Fourth 
Annual Conference of the Consortium for Research on Telecommunications Policy and Strategy, University of 
Michigan, 1998. 
16' Lee Hsien Loong, Speech by DPM Lee Hsien Loong at the 25" Anniversary Dinner of the Association of Banks in 
Singapore on 8 June 1998. Available at http:www mas.gov.sg/newspeeches/sp 2 November 1998 
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will still not publish annual reports of the major holding companies except those which 
have been partially privatised, including those of the republic's largest state 
investment company, the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) or 
Temasek Holdings.'68 The executive consistently refuses to provide any significant 
disclosure on the actual performance of its holding companies, even trader 
parliamentary questioning.' The executive also allocates a proportion of the state's 
official reserves to Singapore Technology Holdings and Temasek Holdings to invest 
and manage, thus assigning to them a role well beyond that of the usual type of state - 
owned enterprise.' The government has though, only in recent years, begun to 
answer some questions about the holding companies in response to widespread public 
suspicion as to why the government is so secret about them.' 
Despite what seems to be a greater degree of management autonomy than the 
statutory board sector, the GLC sector is integrated with the rest of the public sector, 
principally though the appointment of senior public servants to GLC boards.' This 
integration is reinforced by a Singaporean form of amakudari173 in which former civil 
servants are appointed to a position in a GLC on retirement.' A number of prominent 
amakudari appointments include those detailed in Table 3.1 below. 
In managing these sectors, the political executive integrates them through the civil 
service, principally using key appointees from the Administrative Service and the 
party.' This integration of the civil service, statutory boards and GLC bureaucracies 
16Z See: Lawrence B. Krause, "The Government as an Entrepreneur", in Lawrence B. Krause, Koh Ai Tee and Lee 
Tsao Yuan, The Singapore Economy Reconsidered, Singapore, ISEAS, 1987, pp. 107 -127, p. 122 
169 For example, in parliament in 1994, Finance Minister Richard Hu refused to reveal the amount of national reserves 
managed by any government agency or how the companies' investments performed. See: "Investment of Official 
Reserves ", Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report, 63, 5, 25 August 1994, p. 489 
0" "Investment of Official Reserves ", Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report, 63, 5, 25 August 1994, p. 
489 
m For example, see: "GIC credit limit breaches totalled S$7m ", Straits Times, 2 October 1996; "GIC incurred losses 
on investments ", Straits Times, 3 December 1996 
in There are also transfers of staff to the GLC sector from the civil service and statutory boards. Examples of 
transfers from the civil service to GLCs include the transfer of Ho Ching from an engineering research management 
position in the Defence Science Organisation to a similar position in Chartered Industries of Singapore in 1985m 
and, in late 1990, of Quek Chee Hoon from General Manager, Singapore Totalisator Board to a position as Senior 
Vice -President, Temasek Holdings. In 1998, Peter Ong Boon Kwee, Deputy Secretary in MTI, was posted to 
Temasek Holdings as Executive Vive-President for a two year appointment and Dileep Nair, Deputy Secretary in 
MOF, was CEO of POSBank before its merger with DBS Bank. 
Amakudari is the practice in the Japanese civil service of senior executives being appointed to quasi -government 
or private sector companies with close links to the government, on retirement. Many of these positions have 
executive responsibilities, but equally, many are sinecures or lowly paid jobs to provide additional retirement income. 
174 They may also be appointed to an executive position in the NTUC or a private company strongly affiliated with 
the government. These positions are not usually sinecures in the way that many Japanese amakudari appointments 
are made, nor are they viewed as low paying retirement income supplements; they are genuine appointments and 
carry full responsibilities. In the case of the appointment of retiring SAF officers, amakudari appointments are a 
major strategy in retaining civilian control of the SAF officer corps through the institutionalisation of a structured 
early retirement and career succession strategy integrated with a high recruitment level to the SAF officer corps and 
early retirement. This effectively emasculates its development into a national interest group, while retaining 
experienced, highly educated officers as key players in non -military roles after retirement from the SAF. 
Vennewald provides one recent analysis of this integration. See: Vennewald, op. cit 
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created what Heyzer terms the "(new) government -industrial bureaucratic network' 
which obviously lies within the core executive. It is the nature of this network in an 
expanded form which will be examined in Chapter Seven. 
16 Noeleen Heyzer, "International Production and Social Change: An Analysis of the State, Employment and Trade 
Unions in Singapore ", in, Peter S. J. Chen, ed., Singapore Development Policies and Trends, Singapore, Oxford 
University Press, 1983, pp. 105 -128, p. 113 
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Table 3.1: Examples of amakudari Appointments in the Singapore Public 
Sector 
Person 
Heiman Hochstadt 
Sim Kee Boon 
Hsu Tse -Kwang 
Kemel Siddique 
1-liew Siew Nam 
BG Boey Tak Hap 
Original Position 
BG Lee Hsien Yang 
MG Goh Yong Siang 
Col. Lim Poh Seng 
Lt -Gen. Ng Jui Ping 
Tan Chok Klan 
Col. Michael Low Oon Hoe 
Dr. Kwa Soon Bee 
RAdm (ret.) James Leo Chin 
Lian 
Lim Jit Poh 
BG T.im Meng Kin 
MG Lim Neo Chian 
Lim Hock San 
RAdm Kwek Siew Jin 
Bernard Chen Tien Lap 
BG Tan Yong Soon 
13G Lam Joon Khoi 
Col. Ho Meng Kit 
BG Yam Ah Mee 
BG Patrick Choy Choong Tow 
BG Michael Teo Eng Cheng 
BG Chin Siat Yoon 
Ngiam Tong Dow 
Permanent Secretary, MOF 
Permanent Secretary, PMO 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
Deputy Secretary and Ambassador 
to Germany, MFA 
Director- General, Public Works 
Department, MND 
Chief of Army 
Director, Joint Operations and 
planning Division, MINDEF 
Chief of Air Force 
Assistant Chief of General Staff 
(Training) MINDEF 
Chief of Defence Force 
Permanent Secretary 
Assistant Chief of General Staff 
(Logistics) 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
Health 
Chief of Navy 
Executive Director, National 
Productivity Board 
Commander, Singapore Medical 
Corps, SAF 
Chief of Defence Force 
Director- General, CAAS 
Chief of Navy 
Deputy Secretary, PMO 
Regular SAF & Deputy Secretary 
(Policy) MINDEF 
JID & Commander 3`5 Division SAF 
Director, Resource Plans, MINDEF 
Commander Air Defence Systems 
Division & former Head, Air Plans 
Department 
Director, JID, MINDEF 
Chief of Air Force 
Director, JID, MINDEF 
Permanent Secretary, MOF 
Amakudari Position 
Executive Chairman, ECICS 
Executive Chairman, SembCorp 
Executive Chairman, Sembawang 
Holdings 
Managing Director, Sembawang 
Business International 
Director (Project Completion), 
Marina Centre Holdings - POSB 
subsidiary. 
Deputy Chief Executive (Operations) 
PUB then 
President & CEO, Singapore Power 
President and CEO, Singapore 
Telecommunications Ltd. 
Executive Vice -President 
(International Marketing), ST 
Industrial Corporation 
Director, Central Emergency 
Planning Office, MHA 
Deputy Chairman, CPF; Chairman, 
Chartered Industries of Singapore 
Singapore Trade Representative, 
Taiwan and now independent 
director on several GLC boards 
Vice -President, Human Resources, 
Times Publishing 
MD, Jurong Bird Park (Pte.) Ltd 
Executive Chair, ST Shipbuilding 
and Engineering 
Executive Director, Lum Chang 
Holdings Limited 
MD, Health Corporation of 
Singapore Pte Ltd 
CEO, Jurong Town Corporation 
President and CEO, United 
Industrial Corporation 
Managing Director, Singapore MRT 
Ltd 
First Fraser and Neave and then 
CEO, Intraco (Following 
appointment as an MP) 
Deputy Secretary (Policy) MOF 
Deputy Secretary (Services) MOF 
Deputy Secretary (Services) MITA 
Deputy Secretary (Development), 
PMO1 
Ambassador to Myanmar, MFA 
High Commissioner to New 
Zealand, Ambassador to Korea, 
MFA 
Ambassador to Germany & China 
Chairman, CPF and HDB 
"' The Scenario Planning Office within the Public Service Division of the PMO reports to BG Yam. 
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Unions as a Component of the Core Executive 
After creating the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC), the relationship between 
the party and the unions became such that it went beyond what is even now termed a 
symbiotic relationship,' to one in which the NTUC is incorporated within a 
government -party nexus,' which was then extended beyond government into the 
development of an "integral society" which the NTUC has endeavoured to establish 
through its own business enterprises and entrepreneurial activities180 and a 
reconceptualisation of itself from an advocate of anti- colonial politics and class 
struggle to a "co- owner" of society.18t This has resulted in the creation within the 
NTUC domain of a series of private investment and holding companies and 
cooperative societies, including the Singapore Labour Foundation (now incorporated 
within the Ministry of Community Development) and a number of wealthy co- 
operatives which operate supermarkets, travel agencies, pharmacies, dental clinics, 
medical services, an insurance company, financial services, construction, personal care 
services, childcare, a taxi and general transport company,' radio and media 
businesses, a residential building cooperative, sports clubs, resorts and nightclubs.188 
The NTUC also funds and operates the national industrial relations training institute 
which offers courses to unionists, private sector executives and government officials; 
the Singapore Institute of Labour Studies (SILS). 
The reality of this incorporation at the bureaucratic level was confirmed in interviews 
with senior civil servants in the Ministry of Labour in 1995, one of whom had been 
transferred three times to and from the ministry to the NTUC in order to supervise a 
group of unions, work on special research projects and assist the NTUC design and 
implement government policies.184 This interchange at the bureaucratic level is 
Venkatraman Anantaraman, Singapore Industrial Relations System, Singapore, McGraw -Hill, 1990, p. 173. An 
historical explanation of this `symbiosis' is provided in: Ong Teng Cheong, "PAP -NTUC Symbiosis ", in, Petir, 30tß 
anniversary edition, 1984, pp. 68 -73, 
19 Frederic C. Deyo, Dependent Development and Industrial Order: An Asian Case Study, New York, Praeger, 1981, 
p. 42. Deyo interprets this incorporation as part of a general strategy of authoritarian state corporatism. See: ibid., pp. 
1 -21 
80 Noeleen Heyzer, "International Production and Social Change: An Analysis of the State, Employment and Trade 
Unions in Singapore ", in, Peter S. J. Chen, ed., Singapore Development Policies and Trends, Singapore, Oxford 
University Press, 1983, pp. 105 -128, p. 122 
181 Lim Chee Onn, "The Relationship between Political Parties and Trade Unions in the Context of Economic 
Development ", in Saw Swee Hock and R. S. Bhatal, eds., Singapore Towards the Year 2000, Singapore, Singapore 
University Press 1981, pp. 44-62, p. 62 
's The original Comfort Taxi Cooperative was privatised in 1993 and formed the Comfort Group which is made up 
of several transport related companies and a residential property development company. While listed on the stock 
exchange, its major shareholders are still NTUC companies and cooperatives. See: Comfort Group, Annual Report 
1998, Singapore, Comfort Group, 1999 
183 A recent paper that details the components of the tripartite system and other NTUC related domains is: Evelyn S. 
Wong, "Socio-Economie Projects: Strengthening the Trade Union Movement in Singapore ", in Arnold 
Wehmhorner,ed., NICs in Asia: A Challenge to Trade Unions, Singapore, Friedrich- Ebert -Stiftung, 1993, pp. 31-45, 
110 Interview with Ong Yen Her, Divisional Director, Labour Relations Division. Ong indicated that such transfers 
were normal and widespread, based on providing assistance to the NTUC when needed and on educating Division 1 
and Administrative Service officers on the realities of industrial relations, particularly in the Ministry of Manpower. 
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accompanied by the appointment of PAP MPs as advisers to unions, including MPs not 
previously associated with the union movement, although this role is not one of 
regular, but political, supervision of unions.' Despite the integrated nature of this 
relationship, including since 1972 the central role of the National Wages Council in 
labour policy', the consistent recruitment of PAP MPs from the NTUC and the 
appointment of NTUC officers such as S. R. Nathan," C. V. Devan Nair' to public 
and political office, Quah insisted in 1984 that "... trade unions ... do not play an active 
role in the formulation of public policies in Singapore. "' The true role of the NTUC 
within the policy system, already entrenched by 1984, was identified by Vasil in 1989 
when he described the "special relationship between the second -generation leaders of 
the government and the union movement... X190: 
In June 1980, the Central Committee of the NTUC approved an institutional arrangement 
devised ... by Devan Nair. It included participation by the Secretary- General of the NTUC in 
cabinet meetings and the creation of a special liaison committee of the PAP and NTUC. On 15 
September, NTUC Secretary- General Lim Chee Onn was appointed Minister without (sic) 
Portfolio_ Soon afterwards, the NTUC -PAP Liaison Committee was constituted. It consisted of 
four second -generation leaders of government - Goh Chok Tong, Ong Teng Cheong, S. 
Dhanabalan, and Ahmad Mattar, and four NTUC representatives headed by Devan Nair.191 
These NTUC based strategies did not empower workers, unions or employer groups 
themselves as loci of political influence; rather, it allowed the political and bureaucratic 
executives to be projected into and assume control over the unions thus removing 
workers from any control over policy.192 This is exemplified by the increased 
appointment of NTUC executives to statutory boards commencing in 1984, of 
Administrative Officers' appointments to unions and the supervision of unions by the 
Ministry of Manpower.19" Although Tan argues that this incorporation has empowered 
workers through an emphasis on citizenship rather than a class basis of state -union 
relationships, he acknowledges that this does not include direct political power and 
trade unions remain subordinated by the state.194 This is therefore, the incorporation of 
'a 
"Back -up support", Petit-, May /June 1994, pp. 19 -21 
186 The NTUC has statutory representation on the NWC. 
e' Appointed President of Singapore in 1999, former NTUC official, civil servant, foundation director of 
the Security and Intelligence Division (the external security service), managing director of Singapore 
Press Holdings, ambassador and director of the Institute of Strategic and Defence Studies. 
'Former Secretary- General of the NTUC, MP and president of Singapore. 
10.0 Jon S. T. Quali, :The Public Policy -Making Process in Singapore ", Asian Journal of Public Administration, 6, 2, 
1984, pp. 108 -126, p. 117 
190 Raj Vasil, "Trade Unions ", in Kemial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., The Management of Success- The 
Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 144 -170, p. 167 
9' ibid., p. 167 
192 Deyo's comments on this strategy of alienation of workers from political influence in Singapore and East Asia in 
general. See: Frederic C. Deyo, Beneath the Miracle: Labour Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989, p. 1 
'93 "Younger NTUC men for stat boards: Officers to look out for workers' interests ", The Straits Times, 8 November 
1984, p. 14 
194 Tan Em Ser, "Theorizing the Dynamics of Industrial Relations and Trade Unionism: Lessons from the Singapore 
Case ", in Lee Boon Hiok and Susan Ootjitham, eds., Malaysia and Singapore: Experiences in Industrialization and 
Urban Development, Kuala Lumpur, The Faculty of Arts and Sciences University of Malaya, 1993, pp. 188 -209, p. 
206 
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a technocratic union leadership within the core executive, not a representation of the 
working class or genuine representatives of rank and file unionists as one would find 
in a British Labour government. 
The Judiciary Within the Core Executive 
Nowhere in the Singaporean literature do we find the judiciary within the core 
executive. It is not that the judiciary is specifically excluded from discussions of the 
centre of political power; it is simply not mentioned. This may be, as Catherine Lim 
noted in 1998, because discussion of the judiciary in publications is a "no-no".'95 It is 
only since the increased use of legal action rather than the ISA against political 
opponents from the late 1980s onwards that the political role of the judiciary has been 
widely considered, but it has been ignored by domestic political analysts.t% Its prior 
neglect can probably be explained by the inherited habits of British legal culture and 
the longevity in office of the first Chief Justice who had no obvious allegiance to the 
PAP or to Lee Kuan Yew, although he had a general allegiance to the regime. In this 
study, the judiciary will be considered as part of the core executive and is examined in 
detail in Chapter Five. 
The Party and the Core Executive 
The party has not generally been seen as being part of the core executive except for the 
party's Central Executive Committee which is largely synonymous with the cabinet. 
Pang's 1971 analysis revealed a party which was disenfranchised from policy making 
with branches being supplanted in importance by the development of a number of 
grassroots organisations (GROs) such as the Residents' Committees established in 1965 
and Citizen's Consultative Committees .9r The party has no external affiliates, such as 
trade unions, and so cannot use this route to mediate its entry to the core executive.tst 
The party is dominated by a CEC that is autonomous and autocratic, allowing the 
party machine no political power,tw restricts the size of the party bureaucracy so that it 
cannot develop any autonomy?:* has total control over parliamentary pre -selection,' 
'95 Koh Buck Song, "What plants will grow under the tembusu tree ? ", Straits Times, 9 May 1998, p. 14 
% On discussing the lack of political commentary on this issue with a senior lawyer, I was informed that any 
domestic comment which mirrored foreign criticisms of the judiciary would be met by civil action by the 
government, the least of which charges would be scandalising the judiciary. If an academic were to publish such 
material, the government through the employer would almost certainly also press administrative charges and it was 
even possible for a state or quasi -state employee to be dismissed for being critical of the government. This is a very 
sensitive political issue and one cannot expect domestic political analysts to deal with it. 
" Pang Cheng Lian, Singapore's People's Action Party Its History, Organisation and Leadership, Singapore, 
Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 27 
9 ibid., p. 56 
bid., p. 26 
20D bid., p. 34 
9" bid., p. 42 
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restricts party MPs from organising as a group 202 in which party service is subsidiary 
to the quality of a person's relationship to the political executive and in which policy 
discourse and political struggle have been moved from the party arena and 
internalised within the political executive 203 Pang summarised power relations within 
the party as: 
The leaders of the PAP may be divided into three categories. At the apex are the policymakers 
who form the CEC, within which another inner circle may be detected. At the base are the 
executives - the members of the branch committees who are also expected to act as 
intermediaries between the policy- makers and the Party members. Between these two groups 
are the MPs. Being appointed by the CEC they cannot be regarded as belonging to the group of 
decision makers though the views of some are sought in the policy- making process. At the same 
time they cannot be classified as branch activists because many of them have very little to do 
with their branches and most of the work is done by the committee members. The party's paid 
officials wield little power.' 
This was still the case in 1975 when Chan 's study provided an analysis of the PAP 
party organisation and its community roots, describing it as being kept intentionally 
"dormant and underdeveloped"," and remained so until approximately 1985 when, 
under Goh Chok Tong, the, initially unsuccessful, re- development of the party as an 
integral part of political discourse and experience slowly re- commenced.206 However, 
this re- development emphasised the recruitment of new members, a renewal of the 
cadre membership, the development of the PAP Community Foundation (PCF) and, 
most importantly, the role of the party in providing grassroots experience and training 
for potential political candidates, particularly those selected for possible membership 
of the political executive. The political socialisation of new ministers by MPs and 
branch secretaries is a particularly important task for the party organisation. Speaking 
in 1994, Loh Meng See, MP for Kampong Glam GPC commented that; 
New leaders like BG George Yeo, Lim Hng Kiang and RAdm Teo have been brought into the 
ranks. They need to be filled in on the political background of our constituencies. Only our 
Branches can do that sc 
This is achieved by ministers, acting as adviser to branches or in their capacity as 
chairmen of district executive committees, undertaking bi- monthly 'walkabouts' in 
constituencies, meeting with GROs, Young PAP, Women's Wing and PCF branches, 
and taking responsibility as advisers to community centres, CCCs and RCs. An outline 
of the organisation of the PAP in 1996 is provided in Appendix 1. 
202 bid., 38. There has never been a party caucus or any way in which party MPs can meet as a group, not even within 
the parliament, except within the parliamentary chamber and during parliamentary refreshment breaks. MPs in group 
representation constituencies meet amongst themselves on a regular basis, but this is only in small groups. 
203 Pang, 1971, op. cit., pp. 34 -36 
$00 ibid., p. 34 
205 Chan Heng Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass -Roots, Singapore, University of 
Singapore Press, 1976, p. 225 -226 
206 Chan Heng Chee, "The PAP and the Structuring of the Political System ", in Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul 
Wheatley, eds., The Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 70- 
89, p. 83 
zm 
"Learning from change ", Petir, July /August 1994, pp. 37, p. 37 
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The idea of having a small camarilla at the party's, and government's, centre of power, 
as suggested by Pang, has remained popular, although its continuation was questioned 
in 1985 by Bellows in light of the change to the current leadership208 In 1994 it 
continued to draw support from well informed domestic commentators Cherian 
George209 and Chia Shi Teck,Z10 the latter a PAP cadre who described the camarilla of 
Goh Chok Tong, Lee Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong as the "Holy Trinity"211 This 
interpretation was supported by my 1995 interviews, but only partially by my 1998 
series as will be further discussed in later chapters. 
Particularly since 1992 when Lee Kuan Yew handed the PAP secretary- generalship to 
Goh Chok Tong, Goh has reshaped the party and developed within it a strong personal 
base. Prior to this, Goh had already been rebuilding the party base in association with 
Lee Hsien Loong, Tony Tan and the other second generation leaders. Party 
restructuring had not had much success before this and the loss of four seats in the 
1991 general election combined with the transfer of the prime ministership to Goh 
provided an incentive to get party reform back on track. In this task, Goh has been 
assisted in developing the party as his strongest personal base by a number of MPs and 
former MPs who have informally coalesced into the core of his party support group. Of 
this group, some have obvious affiliations to Goh, such as his old school friend, Tan 
Cheng Bock, and ministers such as George Yeo and Matthias Yao Chih, while others 
have worked more quietly in the background such as Lim Chee Onn, Wan Soon Bee 
and Ow Chin Hock. 
By 1995, under Goh's guidance, the party had been substantially reformed and 
invigorated, was under his control with the branch executives incorporated into the 
outer circle of the political executive. They have been given responsibility for a number 
of specific political intelligence and political socialisation tasks; selling government 
policies at the grassroots, controlling GROs and the PCF network, the political 
socialisation of MPs and ministers, recruitment of members, the initial testing of 
ministerial candidates and political intelligence feedback and feed -forward to MPs, 
ministers and government agencies. However the party remains firmly under the 
control of the political executive, the party bureaucracy remains substantially 
powerless and the pattern of participation of party officials in the core executive is 
probably intermittent. 
'°' Thomas J. Bellows, "Bureaucracy and Development in Singapore ", Asian Journal of Public Administration, 7,1, 
June 1985, pp. 55 -69, p. 58 
209 Cherian George, "Domestic Politics" in, Yap Mui Teng, Singapore: The Year in Review 1994, Singapore, Institute 
of Policy Studies, 1995, pp. 52 -60, p.53 
2lÓ Chia Shi Teck, "Commentary", in, Yap Mui Teng, Singapore: The Year in Review 1994, Singapore, Institute of 
Policy Studies, 1995, pp. 61 -66, p.5361 
2" This is probably a pun on a common Singaporean expression asserting that the three form the secular equivalent of 
the Christian godhead: Father, Son and the Holy Goh. 
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Backbenchers as a Component 
The greater involvement of MPs and ministers in party activities has been 
accompanied by the introduction of Government Parliamentary Committees (GPCs) 
within the parliamentary party in 1987. Although the PAP does not recognise a 
parliamentary party distinct from the party as a whole, the GPCs are perhaps the 
beginning of building a greater role for the parliamentary wing. Another Goh 
innovation, they form an essential part of his plan to widen consultation and broaden 
policy input while avoiding any significant erosion of executive power. The GPCs, of 
which there are now 11ZÚ, comprise four to five backbenchers, are chaired by senior 
backbenchers and are assigned to shadow the policy domains of one or at most two 
ministries. However the GPCs cannot actually do this; they usually limit themselves to 
two to three policy Issues which they investigate through consultation with GROs, 
party branches and their resource panels 213 The relevant ministries provide policy 
briefings at least every three months to each GPC and, at least in some ministries, 
consult with the GPC prior to new legislation being introduced214 
The relationship between the GPCs and ministries is, however, biased in power terms 
towards the ministries; they do not see the GPCs as having power within the policy 
system and the GPCs accept this, despite the theoretical constitutional power they 
could bring to bear if the legislature had any genuine autonomy Zts Peter Sung, then a 
junior minister, commented that within the policy system "... the contribution (of 
GPCs) to policy formulation consists mainly of inputs and views on the political 
consequences of policies.'ató The GPCs are assisted by resource panels, made up of 
approximately 10 interested or expert members many of whom are believed to be party 
members or affiliates. In 1994 for example, the GPC for Health had members from the 
NTUC, the pharmaceutical industry, the People's Association Senior Citizens' group, 
employers, academics, a general practitioner and the matron of an aged persons' 
home.217 According to Bernard Chen Tien Lap, an former Deputy Secretary in the civil 
service and then a minister; 
Without a GPC, a MP is limited in only a superficial understanding of how the various policies 
come about. But with an area of concentration, like education or health, members now have an 
24 The GPCs are: Communications, Community Development, Defence and foreign Affairs, Education, 
Environment, Finance, Trade and Industry, Health, Home Affairs and Law, Information and the Arts and Manpower 
and National Development. 
3p See the comments from the 1995 GPC chairmen, all of whom indicated that their committees could pay attention 
to no more than three policy issues in their three year terms of office. See: "Our plans are... The five new GPC 
chairmen talk about what they intend to do during their term of office. ", Petir, July /August 1995, pp. 49 -55 
216 "A political formula for the next century", Perir. March/April 1994, pp. 13 -17, p. 14. John Chen, Chairman of the 
GPC on the Environment commented that the Ministry for the Environment consulted his GPC before introducing 
new legislation. 
2'S 
"A political formula for the next century", Perir, March/April 1994, pp. 13 -17, p. 16 
2'6 ibid., p. 15 
2" ibid. 
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in -depth knowledge and are in a better position to recommend feasible alternatives 2's 
While PAP backbenchers may be considered to be on the periphery of the core 
executive by virtue of their parliamentary office, the implementation of the GPC 
scheme and the involvement of all PAP MPs in it, has brought backbenchers closer to 
the inner core, at least intermittently, although they remain secondary to the political 
executive in institutional terms. This relationship is further explored in Chapter Four. 
Grassroots Organisations and the Core Executive 
The role of the GROs is also problematical when one analyses the Singaporean core 
executive. The GROs are quite a distinct sector and must be differentiated from civil 
society in Singapore as they are directly under government control and supervision 
through the People's Association and have a direct reporting relationship to the 
People's Association through the Constituency Secretariats, the Feedback Unit, MPs 
and to various government agencies219 through their office bearers and particularly 
their advisers.220 The place of GROs within the policy system is exemplified by a 
direction from the prime minister's Principal Private Secretary in February 1992 which 
directed that "... Government organisations will only consider representations from 
Members of Parliament or Advisers to grassroots organisations on behalf of their own 
constituents. "221 Advisers are PAP cadres or MPs. 
As noted earlier by Goh Chok Tong, most MPs are on the periphery of the core 
executive. Much of the work undertaken by these MPs is with GROs, as is the GROs 
that provide the constituency liaison and political intelligence which the MPs relay to 
the core, either directly or through institutional channels such as the Feedback Unit. 
Chan concluded in 1975 that the community leaders, particularly those with wealth 
and high social status associated with GROs, were important in the political process, 
although the PAP was attempting to displace and disempower them with its own 
appointees 222 GROs have been developed by the government to be local managers of 
community issues, to help manage the consequences of government policy and its 
218 ibid. p. 13 
2'9 Vasoo, a PAP MP and cadre and head of the Department of Social Work and Psychology at NUS, has commented 
on the implications of government sponsorship and control of the GROs. See: S. Vasoo, Neighbourhood Leaders' 
Participation in Community Development, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1994, 127 -137 
'is The People's Association within the Ministry of Community Development appoints advisers to all Community 
Centre Management Committees, Community Consultative Committees, Residents Committees, Town Councils and 
Community Development Councils in consultation with the prime minister's personal office. These advisers must be 
"persons who understand and support the Government's policies ..." See: "Adviser to Community Centre ", 
Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report, 63, 4, 27 July 1994, p. 317. Advisers are invariable either PAP 
MPs, PAP members being groomed for political office or other cadres. 
ul Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report, 11 July 1997, p. 469 
222 Chan Heng Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass -Roots, Singapore, University of 
Singapore Press, 1976, p. 227 
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implementation with a particular focus on housing, social, cultural and sporting 
organisations. 
The centrality of the GROs to the political process, as political socialisers not power 
centres, was acknowledged in 1981 when Goh Chok Tong called for Administrative 
Service officers to be associated with Residents' Committees to increase their political 
awareness and broaden their policy perspectives' However this, as with the party 
organisation, was not to transfer any political power to the GROs, but rather to use 
them as information feeders to the core and as agents of political socialisation for the 
political leadership in concert with party branches. Individually, GRO leaders may be 
able to directly exert personal influence through building relationships with individual 
members of the core executive, but the GROs themselves do so indirectly. This forms 
part of a strategy to have a diverse, interlocking periphery of government organised 
community bodies which penetrate, subvert and diffuse civil society pressures but 
which are ultimately devoid of political autonomy. The GROs can therefore be 
excluded from the core executive. 
Business Interests and the Core Executive 
In respect of broader civil society groups outside the GRO domain, Stella Quah has 
identified the elite professions as being involved in some aspects of policy making, but 
not to the point where their professional associations could be considered as part of the 
core executive.' Professional associations have increasingly been co -opted under the 
supervision of the People's Association's through the Singapore Professional Centre 
which has reduced their autonomy and integrated into the hegemonic structure any 
policy functions they might have. In a recent study, Low indicates that in interest 
group terms, the elite professions were silent in respect of policy making, are generally 
not trusted by government and viewed as potentially autonomous power centres thus 
excluding them from the core executive." 
While Stella Quah's study mentioned some business groups (eg. the Singapore 
Manufacturers Association), there is little research on their policymaking role, and my 
attempts to interview executives of these groups in both 1995 and 1998 for this study 
were not successful. For example, works by Chong and others on business in 
Singapore,us Low on the political economy of Singapore's development ' Chua on 
Seah Chee Meow, "Grassroots Political Participation in Singapore ", Petir. 25 Anniversary Edition, November 
1979, pp. 276 -281, p. 281 
'24 Stella R. Quah, Balancing Autonomy and Control - The Case of Professionals in Singapore, Cambridge (Mass.), 
MIT Centre for International Studies, 1984 
"' Linda Low, Professionals at the Crossroads, Singapore, Time Academic Press, 1996, p. 154 
vs Chong Li Choy, Tan Chwee Huat, Wong Kwei Cheong and Caroline Yeoh, Business. Society and Development in 
Singapore, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1990 
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communitarian ideology in Singapore do not mention the policy role of business 
associations and even Huff's substantial work on economic development in Singapore 
makes no mention of the role of these groups under PAP governments 229 Although 
some business groups have participated in the policy system through representation 
on statutory boards, Lee and Low's 1990 study indicates that the SME sector was 
alienated from government policy making and that local entrepreneurs had no power 
within the policy system.' 
Low's 1993 study of changes to public sector dynamics mentions the government's use 
of extensive consultation with the private sector, but no more substantive analysis is 
attempted.' In this study, Low notes that despite the heightened importance of the 
private sector in policy formulation, "The government sector, however, appears still to 
be the custodian of macroeconomic management policies... "232 The most 
comprehensive contemporary analysis of the role of the private sector in policy making 
has been Chalmers, although he did not specifically focus on business interest 
groups.' Chambers notes the increasing role played within the policy system by local, 
as opposed to MNC, businesses after the 1985 recession, concluding that "state 
autonomy from business pressure ... has diminished"" and that a 'new form of policy 
making" had developed.5 However, while this may be so, this new form of policy 
making was limited to the economic policy domain. Social policy, and to a lesser 
degree education policy, had since 1968 and moreso after the 1981 Anson by- election, 
been largely autonomous although somewhat influenced by the GRO sector while 
education policy has been oriented to the demands of the MNC sector. Since 
Chalmers' study, the degree of involvement of the business sector in policy making has 
increased. The trend was evident from 1986 when a number of economic policy 
agencies led by the Ministry of Trade and Industry initiated regular consultation 
rounds with private sector association such as the Singapore Federation of Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry, the Singapore Contractor Association, Association of 
Consulting Engineers and other business groups.' 
" Linda Low, The Political Economy of a City- State: Government-made Singapore, Singapore, Oxford University 
Press, 1998; and, Linda Low, ed., Singapore: Towards a Developed Status, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1999 
Chua Beng Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, London, Routledge, 1995 
u9 W. G. Huff, Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 1994. 0 Lee Tsao Yuan and Linda Low, "Entrepreneurship Policy" in Lee Tsao Yuan and Linda Low, eds., Local 
Entrepreneurship in Singapore: Private and State, Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies, 1990, pp. 4 -19 
°` Linda Low, "The Public Sector in Singapore ", in Garry Rodan, ed., Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political 
and Economic Directions in the 1990s, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1993, p. 177 
Low, 1993, op. cit., pp. 177 -178 
z3r Ian Chalmers, "Loosening State Control in Singapore: The Emergence of Local Capital as a Political Force ", 
Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 20, 2, 1992, pp. 57 -84 
03 Chalmers, 1992, op. cit., p. 67 
n5 ibid. 
'6 Anne Koh, "Govt in new dialogue with chambers: MTI in regular talks to help solve problems ", Straits Times, 18 
April 1986, p. 6; and, "Government to meet business groups ", Business Times, 18 April 1986, p. 4 
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Following the successful completion of the Next Lap policy agenda in which this many 
industry and business organisations played a significant role,' the development of a 
raft of economic policies has been informed by private sector input under the corporate 
notion of 'Singapore Incorporated,' principally through the cluster strategy initiated 
by the EDB and reflected in the policy development strategies of the NCB, NSTB and 
the TDB. The cluster strategy is based on a group of bureaucrats case managing an 
industry sector and involving them in frequent consultation on policy matters, either 
informally or through formal committees and working parties " This was well 
exemplified by the development of the National Information Technology Plan (IT2000) 
in 1991, when the IT2000 Steering Committee involved 250 people in 11 economic 
sectors to advise on the plan.240 In 1991, MTI also instigated a policy consultation 
forum, the MTI Economic Panel, comprising public sector, academic and private sector 
representation.241 The reform of the financial sector, under the direction of the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), is the most obvious area in which the private 
sector has influenced policy in recent years, being driven by the need for "a closer 
partnership between government and the industry. "242 
The MAS approach, which until 1997 despite pleas from the banks? paid little 
attention to financial sector institutions and associations in policy formulation, now is 
very much industry focussed and "involves the sector in most areas of policy 
development.i244 This has not, however, transferred significant political power to 
finance sector business associations, although particular individuals may be influential 
because of their knowledge and experience 24s The government does exercise care in 
how it structures policy consultation with the private sector, to ensure that it maintains 
political control of the policy agenda. For example, in the case of the Cost Review 
Committee in 1993, the membership was overwhelmingly PAP cadres or affiliates246, 
although its consultations involved the Real Estate Developers' Association of 
Government of Singapore, Singapore : The Next Lap, Singapore, Times Editions, 1991. This book set out the 
medium to long term policy framework for the Goh Chnk Tong government. More than 1000 people were reported to 
be involved in this exercise with over 200 coming from non -GT.0 businesses. 
vs For a discussion of the nature and implications of this corporate metaphor see: Usha C. V. Haley, Linda Low and 
Toh Mun -Heng, "Singapore Incorporated. reinterpreting Singapore's business environment through a corporate 
metaphor", Management Decision, 34, 9, 1996, pp. 17 -28. The EDB uses the nomenclature "Singapore Unlimited" in 
its documentation to give this notion of a national corporation. 
239 Interview with Ms Anna Chan Hock Cheng and Miss Judy Tan, EDB, 1995. 
290 The eleven sectors or clusters, were: finance, manufacturing, leisure and tourist services, construction, retail, 
publishing and media, transportation, health care and education. See: "National IT masterplan gets off the ground 
with 11 economic sector groups ", Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, 16 February 1991, p. 19 
'- °' "Ministry will set up high -powered economic panel ", Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, 19 October 1991, p. 
18 
242 Lee Hsien Loong, Strategic Shift for the Financial Sector, Speech at the SESDAQ's 10' anniversary. Singapore, 
Ministry of information and the Arts, 4 November 1997, p. 13 
243 `Banks need to strengthen ties with MAS ", Singapore Monitor, 28 June 1985 
j44 Interview with Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Deputy Managing Director, MAS, September 1998. 
°$ ibid. 
°` Report of the Cost Review Committee, Singapore, Ministry of Trade and industry, 1993, pp. 131 -132 
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Singapore (whose president was a PAP MP) 24' the Singapore International Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, the Singapore National Employers' Federation, the 
Association of Small and Medium Enterprises, the Singapore Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, the Federation of Merchant's Associations and an opposition 
party, the Singapore National Front.24a 
The Committee to Promote Enterprises Overseas was similarly structured, but also had 
a resource (i.e. advisory and oversight) panel totally made up of senior public sector 
officers 249 This degree of control seems to have been relaxed by the push to rapidly 
reform the financial sector and, given the total control already exercised by MAS, 
provides little risk of the bureaucratic or political leadership losing control of the policy 
agenda. For example, the comprehensive review of regulations and structure of the 
securities industry, commenced in late 1997, was largely facilitated by the Stock 
Exchange of Singapore.250 The Financial Sector Review Group, especially its working 
parties, are predominantly private sector,ut and the Committee on Singapore's 
Competitiveness involved large numbers of private sector members, albeit with 
considerable public sector supervision. Most recently, the Committee on Banking 
Disclosure established by MAS was chaired and dominated by private sector bankers" 
and the Consultative Committees on Singapore's Big Bang had almost wholly private 
sector membership.' This degree of industry empowerment in the policy system was 
not reflect elsewhere in economic policy making. For example, the E- Commerce Policy 
Committee, established by the National Computer Board in January 1997, had no 
member from the private sector, except an observer from Netrust Pte Ltd which is a 
GLC and so government controlled tm 
Two recent indications of the government's willingness to give serious consideration to 
policy proposals by the business associations are the allocation of the retail sector to the 
TDB for policy development following a robust presentation to Deputy Prime Minister 
Lee Hsien Loong in July 1998 on the sector's problems25s and the government's 
willingness to listen to quite severe criticisms of its business cost reduction strategy in 
'6' REDAS was at that time headed by a PAP cadre and MP, Heng Chiang Meng 
Report of the Cost Review Committee, pp. 134 -136 
259 Final Report of the Committee to Promote Enterprises Overseas, Singapore, Ministry of Finance, 1993 
ss0 Interview with Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Deputy Managing Director, MAS, September 1998. 
u' For example, these have included the Investment Management Association of Singapore, the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore and a large number of fund managers. See: Lee Hsien Loong, Strategies to Improve Fund Management in 
Singapore, Speech at the Investment Management Association of Singapore, 26 February 1998. Singapore, Monetary 
Authority of Singapore, 27 February 1998, p. 2 
ss' Report on Banking Disclosure, Singapore, Monetary Authority of Singapore, May 1998 
sss Basskaran Nair, "Disclosure and the Media: making Singapore a Financial Hub ", The Sunday Times, 2 August 
1998, pp. 28 -29 
ss6 National Computer Board, Program Information: ECH Organisation. Available at: http: / /www.ec.gov.sg 
/view /ech/schorg.html #2.2.4, 30 April 1998 
sss 
"TDB given the task of nurturing retail industry", Business Times, I1-12 July I998, p. 3 
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response to the 1997 recession." However, by 1998, a large number of private sector 
groups had been drawn into the government's formal consultative framework, either 
through the Feedback Unit u' or directly with ministries and statutory boards. These 
cases indicate a continuing determination by the core executive to control the policy 
system, internalise policy disputation within it, a greater willingness to be consultative 
and a probably healthy, lack of consistency in the means by which the executive's 
interests are protected. It does not appear, however, provide any substantial position 
within the core executive for business interests, although this is difficult to discern. 
This issues will therefore be further examined in Chapter Seven. 
Civil Society Groups and the Core Executive 
The lack of engagement between civil society and the state is witnessed by the need in 
1998 for the Institute of Policy Studies to hold a closed -door conference on the issue. At 
this conference, BG George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts, commented 
that "Singapore society was largely created by the state ", a reflection on the degree of 
hegemonic control exercised over civil society by successive PAP governments. Yeo 
went on to call for greater engagement between the state and civil society and 
promised greater freedom for civil society organisations to operate.' This commitment 
was linked to the activities of the government's Singapore 21 Committee (521) which 
had responsibility for developing a broad future social and cultural framework for the 
nation and which had involved many civil society organisations in its subcommittees 
and through consultations. The general reaction to these initiatives by the political 
executive were generally met with negative responses with the Straits Times reporting 
that at the conference "The 20 papers presented ... suggest that an undergrowth of 
frustration, suspicion, scepticism and distrust still exists. "" between state and civil 
society. 
This relationship of distrust is based on the way in which the PAP has successively co- 
opted or marginalised major civil society groups which attempt to engage the 
government in policy debate.26° In recent years the most prominent of these groups, the 
Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE), the Singapore Nature 
"Off- budget measures didn't help us, say companies ", Business Times, 15 July 1998, p. 1 
In interviews with the directors of the Feedback Unit in 1995 and 1998, it was revealed that the unit maintained 
regular contact with a core group of approximately 50 key organisations, including about 20 private sector groups, 
which it regularly consulted on policy and political issues as required. For an example of contemporary arrangements 
for more formal consultation between the Feedback Unit and the Singapore Confederation of Industry, see: "SCI says 
it'll present workable proposal on helping industry", Business Times, 22 July 1998, p- 2 
258 Zuraidah Ibrahim, "Civil groups will have a `bigger role "', Straits Times, 7 May 1998, p. 2 
° Koh Buck Song, "What plants will grow under the tembusu tress ? ", Straits Times, 9 may 1998, p. 14 
26° For a more complete discussion of state- society relations in Singapore see: Garry Rodan, "State - 
society relations and political opposition in Singapore ", in, Garry Rodan, ed., Political oppositions in 
Industrialising Asia, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 95 -127 
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Society and the Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP), have all been either 
neutralised or co -opted by the government. Although a president of AWARE was a 
Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) from 1992 -1994, the interests of this group 
have generally to be made to the government through the Singapore Association of 
Women's Organisations which is a government controlled organisation, although 
AWARE also attempts to consult the government directly on issues ' The Nature 
Society of Singapore (NSS), after some initial successes in challenging government 
environmental planning, and policies on land clearing and drainage construction,' 
since 1995 has been co -opted into the Singapore Environment Council.' The AMP, 
which through some of its objectives directly challenged the role of MENDAKI, the 
government's Malay community development organisation, was co -opted by the 
government in 1991 and is now substantially under its direction through the PAP 
Malay MPs?M 
This tendency for the government to co -opt civil society organisations, in what Tay 
calls the "fourth stage of state -civil society relations "' does not draw these groups into 
the core executive. Instead it places them in consultative organisations which may, on 
limited and particular policy issues, have limited input to core executive deliberations. 
Tay concludes that the establishment of a genuine discourse between state and society 
is still "an open question ", but other are more certain of the present state of the 
relationship: 
In Singapore, the state is extremely powerful. The Government calls the shots here. Civic 
organisations only test rather than determine the limits of the growth of civil society.' 
Non -governmental community organisations remain marginalised in Singapore and 
excluded from the core executive. 
u' information from interviews with AWARE and SAWO office holders, 1995 and 1998. SAWO's office 
accommodation is provided by the government. Details of other possible subsidies could not be obtained. 
uz Garry Rodan, " The Growth of Singapore's Middle Class and its Political Significance ", in, Garry 
Rodan, ed., Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s", 
Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1993, pp. 52 -71, p. 65. Information also obtained from correspondence 
with the Nature Society of Singapore. 
263 The SEC was registered as a company by Dr, Cham Tao Soon, president of NTU, Kwa Chong Seng, 
president of the GLC, Singapore International Media and Dr. Tan Wee Kiat, CEO of the National Parks 
Board. It is chaired by Ms. Kay Kuok, a director of the family company Kuok (Singapore) Ltd. Several 
members of this family sit on GLC or statutory boards and are believed to be either PAP cadres or proto- 
cadres. Of the 15 members of the SEC in 1999, 9 were public sector appointees, 1 was an MP, three were 
from the private sector and the NSS had 2 representatives. Information available at: 
http:www.sec.org.sg/our_peopledounderhiml f .ht l 
156 Chua Beng Huai, "Singapore in 1991: celebrating the end of an era ", Southeast Asian Affairs 1991, 
Singapore, ISEAS, pp. 253 -266 
265 Simon S. C. Tay, "Towards a Singaporean Civil Society", Southeast Asian Af{airs1998, Singapore, 
ISEAS, 1998, pp. 244 -261, p. 247 
us Raymond Lim, founder of the political discussion group, The Roundtable. Cited in: Zuraidah Ibrahim, 
op. cit., 1998 
138 Ross Worthington 
CONCLUSIONS 
The early analyses of the who might inhabit a core executive in Singapore (although 
not expressed in these terms) have been confirmed by the most recent analytical 
studies, except for Huxleÿ s analysis of the military elite which stands alone. Chen 's 
1975 assertion that the military and the business elite, except for the leadership of the 
GLCs, are excluded from the core executive can no longer be sustained. 
In a speech on 28 April 1971, Lee Kuan Yew commented that Singapore's fate 
depended upon 300 key people: 
The main burden of present planning and implementation rests on the shoulders of some 300 
key persons. They include key men in the PAP, MPs and cadres who mobilise mass support 
and explain the need for policies even when they are temporarily inconvenient or against 
sectoral interests. Outstanding men in civil service, the police, the armed forces, chairman of 
statutory boards and their top administrators... Together they are a close knit and coordinated 
hard core. If all the 300 were to crash in one Jumbo jet, then Singapore will disintegrate. That 
shows how small the base is for our leadership in politics, economics and security. We have to, 
and we will, enlarge this base, enlarging the number of key digits.' 
Silcock made an even smaller estimate of the size of the core executive in earlier days: 
The number of those who made the difference and enabled Singapore to make so much of a not 
very obvious opportunity was probably not above fifty. They have meant far more to Singapore 
than any spreading of economic doctrine among the population in general or even among the 
educated parts of the population.' 
It is doubtful whether the numbers within the core executive have fallen below 50 or 
risen above 300 since 1971 and certainly, its members are sourced from the same 
positions and organisations, with the exception, as noted by Chambers, that there now 
appears to be a greater co -option of members from the private sector. We do know that 
older cadres such as Michael Fam Yue Onn and Sat Pal Khattar are still active and may 
be within the core executive. What is of interest is whether relatively recent private 
sector actors, such Ho Kwong Ping and Peter Seah Lim Huat, are now within the core 
executive. This is an issue which will be investigated in Chapter Seven. The military 
elite, non -existent in 1971, are now also a substantial component. Recent research on 
Singaporean social structures, such as that of social class by Quah and others,as has 
done nothing to inform our knowledge of elites in Singapore; perhaps as already 
noted, there is an assumption that they are well know and that an examination of infra- 
267 Lee Kuan Yew, "Singapore's fate depends on 300 men ", in, Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez and Smniko 
Tan, eds., Lee Kuan Yew. The Man and His Ideas, Singapore, Times Editions, 1998, pp. 313 -316, p. 315 
269 Thomas H. Situ-ink, A History of Economics Teaching and Graduates: Raffles College and the University of 
Malaya in Singapore 1934 -1960, Singapore, Department of Economics and Statistics, National University of 
Singapore, 1985, p. 293 
269 Stella R. Quah, Chiew Seen Kong, Ko Yin Chung and Sharon Mengchee Lee, Social Class in Singapore, 
Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1991 
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elite dynamics would be unwelcome' Certainly, in conducting this study, I was 
frequently told that it was unwelcome. Perhaps, as Chua mentions, the meritocratic 
system based on educational achievement enforced by the government is so powerful 
that it overrides other considerations of elite structures and dynamics, including 
political leadership zn Certainly Lee's observation that the core executive is close and 
closed remains true, as noted by Ho in 1995, who also noted the importance of informal 
consultation and coordination mechanisms within the core.' 
In a study in April 1998, the Straits Times identified what it termed the PS100 list, an 
analysis of who ran the country. This study noted that: 
... of the top 100 -plus positions reveals that while some changes were lateral moves, about one- 
third of the office -holders are new faces who were not at the apex of the administration in 1993. 
But although the faces may have changed, the personality of the administrative elite remains as 
stable as ever: High -achieving scholars dominate; they have little private sector experience; and 
are overwhelmingly male. The PS 100 list is a snapshot of the individuals holding full -time 
office in the executive, the civil service, the uniformed services, statutory boards, and 
government -owned corporations on Jan 1, 1998.7 
This indicates the continuing perception that the Singaporean core executive is drawn 
from the public sector exclusively with the only private sector figures with power 
being those inducted into a concurrent or alternative public sector position such as 
Michael Fam Yue Onn, Ho Kwon Ping and Tony Tan. It is very much a core executive 
that has largely been created by government intervention and design rather than by 
corporatist other forms of resource exchange?" A study of the core executive in 
Singapore can therefore be restricted to an analysis of the public sector leadership 
which can be defined as comprising the cabinet and ministry, the parliament, the 
judiciary, the senior ranks of the Administrative Service, the major statutory boards, 
the major GLCs, the SAF, the NTUC, and the GROs. This study will examine all of 
these groups with the exception of the GROS, the NTUC and the SAF none of whom 
would cooperate in this study.' In the following chapters we examine the 
° As several academics and civil servants commented, they themselves were members of one or more elites and it is 
not particularly pleasant to have one's relationships, including personal and professional connections held up for 
public examination in a small society such as Singapore's. Some even contended that such studies could exacerbate 
social tensions, perhaps with some justification. In conducting this study, the author was frequently informed that no 
substantial studies of Singaporean elites which involved the political elite would be tolerated. 
Chau Beng Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 63 -64 and 
157 
272 Ho Khai Leong, "The Politics of Problem Definition and Agenda Setting in Singapore ", Asian Journal of Political 
Science, 3, 2, December 1995, pp. 66 -89, p. 75 
Cherian George and Jason Lee, "Who Runs Singapore ", Straits Times, 26 April 1998 
nc Sumiko Tan, "Why there is a political elite: `Select group created to form the best government ", Straits Times 
Overseas Edition, 23 November 1991, p. 7 
vs Efforts to meet with GRO representatives were uniformly unsuccessful, although the People's 
Association officers were helpful and frank in their discussion of GRO and related social policy issues. 
Several NTUC affiliated officials originally agreed to take part in the study but all but one eventually 
withdrew. 
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Singaporean core executive in terms of its structural functions and governance 
operations in relation to these groups. 
4. THE CORE EXECUTIVE, 
LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURES 
AND DYNAMICS 
This chapter examines the structure of the legislative system in Singapore, how it 
interacts with the core executive, particularly the political executive which resides at 
the centre of the core executive, and how the political executive designs and uses the 
legislative system to implement institutional based strategies of governance. We also 
examine in this chapter whether certain people, offices or institutions reside within the 
core executive and, if not, attempt to determine the nature of their relationship to that 
executive. 
As we have seen from the first two chapters, Singapore has a parliamentary system of 
government and public sector based on the Westminster model both of which the PAP 
political leadership have "modified ... according to their needs to fit into the local 
situation."' These modifications had led to the development of an unreformed 
Westminster style state into an illiberal authoritarian democracy under one party rule 
through which the PAP is pursuing a neo- Gramscian hegemonic program in order to 
perpetuate its rule. These modifications have been designed not to change the 
institutional macro -structure which serves an important legitimation function,' but 
rather to discard the conventions of cross -institutional and state -society trust, resource 
and power distribution and sharing implicit within the Westminster model. In 
association with the substitution of these conventions with its particular ideological 
program and hegemonic conventions, the PAP has also actively undermined civil 
society and maintains an intense program of co -option of it so as to discourage the 
development of political pluralism and of power centres outside its hegemonic grasp.' 
The rules of the game are different in Singapore; they are the old colonial rules onto 
which has been grafted an hegemonic game plan which has made the most of the 
unreformed Westminster tendency of maintaining social and political control, limiting 
political opposition and maintaining the prerogatives of state secrecy, executive 
dominance and responsibility over accountability. These rules and the game plan 
Shee Poon Kim, "The Evolution of the Political System ", in, Jon S. T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee 
Meow, eds., Government and Politics of Singapore, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 3 -24, p. 18 
At the most basic level, consent is developed and maintained through the existence, election of and the regular 
meeting of, the parliament and the effective functioning of the executive, as found by Packenham; the simple 
existence and apparently normal functioning of the legislature in particular, whether highly democratic or not, 
provides latent legitimation of the state's institutions and generates consent See: Robert Packenham, "Legislatures 
and Political Development ", in, A. Komberg and L. D. Musolf, eds., Legislatures in Developmental Perspective, 
Durham (NC), Duke University Press, 1970. For a contemporary discussion of Packenham's findings, see: Philip 
Norton, Does Parliament Matter?, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993 
Cherian George, "Chia Shi Teck factor no match for PAP's politics of co-optation ", Straits Times Weekly Overseas 
Edition, 14 December 1996, p. 13 
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revolve around a 'core executive', the origins and nature of which were examined 
previously. 
Smith recommends that in examining the core executive we need "... to take account of 
structure, context and agents. " In this chapter, we examine the 'modified' institutional 
structures within which the Singaporean core executive operates. Further, 
complementary analyses which examine the core executive in relation to the judiciary 
and public sector agencies are presented in subsequent chapters. These analyses, in 
providing details of structure, context and some details of agency where this has been 
researchable, form the framework of the Singapore political system and provides the 
foundations upon which the Singaporean core executive has built its peculiar style of 
government. It is necessary therefore to understand these foundations in some detail as 
they differ from the liberal democratic norm of contemporary Westminster nations. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SINGAPOREAN 
CORE EXECUTIVE 
According to Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's institutional arrangements had to be "... 
adapted and adjusted to suit the practical realities of our position.i5 a sentiment shared 
by his successor, Goh Chok Tong and his colleagues. What these 'realities' are how 
they justify the adaptations forms a substantial part of PAP ideology. The adaptations 
that have shaped the nature of government in Singapore are comprehensive, complex 
and focussed on locating almost total control of the nation in the hands of the political 
executive. To understand this system, it must not only be examined in terms of its 
surface characteristics, but more importantly, in terms of its deeper structure. It is only 
through an analysis of this deep structure that the true nature of the Singaporean core 
executive's relationship with Singapore's institutional framework can be understood. 
A surface examination of how Singapore is governed will reveal an ostensibly 
democratic nation equipped with all the standard accoutrements of liberal democracy. 
The head of state, the President, has been popularly elected since 1993 and has some 
executive powers. The parliament is unicameral, elected for a five year term. The 
electoral system comprises 15 group representation constituencies (GLCs) which elect 
89 per cent of legislators as a guarantee of minority representation, although nine 
single member constituencies remain. Electoral boundaries are controlled by the 
Elections Department in the Prime Minister's Office, not by an independent electoral 
° Martin J. Smith, "Reconceptualizing the British State: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges to Central 
Government ", Public Administration, 76, 1998, pp. 45 -72, p. 68 
' Cited in Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew: The Straggle for Singapore. Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1974, p. 229 
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commission, and the government controls the electoral redistribution process.' Voting 
is based on a universal adult franchise and the simple plurality system. However, 
unlike Britain and in imitation of Australia, voting is compulsory as well as secret. The 
British tradition of having a highly disciplined party system which can compete in an 
highly adversarial political system is also replicated in Singapore, with 23 registered 
political parties of which seven are active.' While under the colonial system both 
national and local governments existed, Singapore is now administered as an 
integrated city-state with only one elected national legislature. Non -elected town 
councils were created in 1986 and appointed regional community development 
councils (CDCs), covering several town councils in 1997. The nation is governed in 
accord with a written constitution which includes fundamental liberties for citizens. 
The judiciary "... administers the law with complete independence from the Executive 
and Legislative branches of Government. "8 
This picture of the cloning of an Asian democracy from its colonial parent is deceptive. 
A deeper analysis reveals that almost every aspect of the institutional framework 
mentioned above is conditional on executive approval either directly or indirectly. 
Singapore is governed and managed by rigorously selected, smart, highly educated 
people who understand the nuances of maintaining political, social and economic 
control in a complex modern society, although from my experience, they are masters of 
their own system rather than being capable of a broader, more cosmopolitan 
conception of what a modern multicultural society can be. This mastery of their 
domestic arrangements doesn't mean that they are always right or don't make 
mistakes, but it does mean that when the system was designed, they generally got the 
fundamentals right for achieving their basic aim; maintaining and entrenching the 
PAP's hegemonic program as the basic element of national security; economic, social 
and military. As the system has been adapted and hegemony advanced, they have only 
occasionally got it badly wrong; spectacularly in the case of the 1988 "Marxist 
conspiracy ", although there is plenty of evidence of poor policy development and 
implementation. 
We should also note that this political program was not initially hegemonic by design; 
it developed into hegemony by growing out of an obsessive need to leave nothing to 
6 In the redrawing of electoral boundaries prior to the 1997 general election for example, the prime minister instructed 
the Elections Department to redraw the electoral boundaries so that in the single member constituency of 
McPherson, his promise that the leader of the Singapore Democratic Party, Ghee Juan Soon could contest Matthias 
Yao, a junior government minister, could be fulfilled. Obviously, the boundary re- drawing was done under directions 
issued by the executive. See: Warren Fernandez, "15 GRCs, 9 single seats for polls: Most constituencies changed in 
major redrawing of electoral boundaries ", The Straits Times Weekly Edition, 23 November 1996, p. 24 
' Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (PKMS), The Workers Party, People's Action Party, Singapore 
Democratic Party, National Solidarity Party, Singapore Democratic Party and the Singapore People's Party. 
Foo Siang Luen, ed., Singapore Facts and Pictures 1998, Singapore, Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1998, p. 
25 
144 Ross Worthington 
chance in the PAP's, and particularly Lee Kuan Yew's, ruthless determination to have 
total control of any resource or function which mattered in the running of the nation. 
The historical role of Lee Kuan Yew in shaping the political system to conform to his 
personal desire to rule and his personal ruling style should not be underestimated. 
Cotton, for one, has pointed out that Lee has moulded political discourse in Singapore 
from its independent beginnings 9 he has a "special, higher and overriding mandate 
from the peoplei10 which he has used to this end. Thus the desire of one man for near- 
absolute power and his idea of national governance also mark the deep structure of 
Singaporean institutional arrangements and the nature of the core executive. However, 
in the contemporary setting, we should not over -estimate Lee's power and influence as 
it is in decline. 
Partly because of the profound contradiction between surface and deep political 
structures Singapore has been described as a state in which "... you have the forms of 
democracy, but the reality is dictatorship."' However, Castells disputes the label of 
dictatorship and classifies Singapore as a "hegemonic state, in the Gramscian sense ... 
namely, it is based not simply on coercion, but also on consensus."' Crone sees the 
Singaporean state as highly autonomous,13 a status reflected in Chan s description of it 
as an administrative state,14 while Rodan, Brown and Khong all classify Singapore as a 
corporatist state_' All of these labels point to an institutional framework which 
facilitates an highly autonomous core executive which does not conform to the liberal 
democratic ideal pursued by other, contemporary, Westminster states. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEMONIC EXECUTIVE 
AGENCY 
In Singapore there is no such thing as a balance of power between the three branches of 
government and as has been outlined elsewhere, the Westminster tradition is 
9 James Cotton, "Political Innovation in Singapore: The Presidency, the Leadership and the Party ", in, Garry Rodan, 
ed., Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s, Melbourne, Longman 
Cheshire, 1993, p. 3 
10 This is how Raj Vasil has described Lee's position in the political system. See: Raj Vasil, Governing Singapore: 
Interviews with the new leaders, Singapore, Times Books International, 1988, p. 155 
" Milton Friedman cited in: Walden Bello and Stephanie Rosenfeld, Dragons in Distress: Asia's Miracle Economies 
in Crisis, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1990, p. 327 
" Manuel Castells, "The Developmental City-State in an Open World Economy: The Singapore Experience ", 
Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy Working Paper. 31, 1988, p. 78 
" Donald Crone, "The Growth and Equity Experience in Southeast Asia ", Centre for the Advanced Study of 
International Development, University of Michigan Occassional Paper, 8, 1985, p. 258 
d Chan Heng Chee, "The PAP and the Structuring of the Political System ", in K. S. Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., 
Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 70-89, p. 81 
is Garry Rodan, The Political Economy of Singapore's Industrialization: Nation, State and International Capital, 
London, Macmillan, 1989, p. 29; David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia, London, Routledge, 
1994, p. 78; Cho-Oon Khong, "Singapore: Political Legitimacy Through Managing Conformity", in, Muthiah 
Alagappa, ed., Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, pp. 108 -135, p. 135 
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inherently weak in this regard. But this systemic weakness has been exploited by the 
core executive in Singapore to produce a political and policy system which, with very 
few exceptions, is completely under the total control of this executive, particularly the 
political executive. One of the keystones to this control is careful constitutional design 
complemented by a body of legislation designed to provide multiple levers for 
executive control over all institutional arrangements. In this section we will examine 
the aspects of constitutional design and legislation that provide the power base and 
nominal legitimacy for executive control. 
The Singaporean state, in keeping with British decolonisation policy and unlike its 
Westminster mother, has always had a written constitution, the current one being 
adopted in 1967 following separation from Malaysia. This constitution contains a 
provision that it can be changed by the support of two- thirds of the members of 
parliament in all matters other than the surrender of national sovereignty, which must 
go to referendum. The Iegitimacy of a constitutional framework is usually seen to be 
based on "... its delivery of rights protection for individual citizens, the limitation of 
state powers within the rule of law, and the operation of an independent and impartial 
judiciary. A strong and vibrant democracy, premised on some notion of "civil society" 
is another essential component of the constitutional process.í" This liberal democratic 
perspective is supplemented in many East Asian nations with the incorporation within 
written constitutions of the notion of civic responsibility and duty to the state, for 
example in the constitutions of the Republic of Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines 
and Thailand!' 
Singapore's constitution draws upon the English constitutional tradition and the 
Malaysian Constitution (which drew heavily on the Indian Constitution), but has been 
sufficiently adapted to produce an instrument that, while demonstrating some 
Westminster traits, has many non -Westminster components which were designed into 
the 1967 constitution and since reinforced. The 1967 constitution is itself principally 
derived from the 1963 State of Singapore constitution by which Singapore was 
incorporated into Malaysia. Kishore Mahbubani, then Permanent Secretary in the 
Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs,16 has suggested that an Asian constitutional 
framework should be premised on the ideas of the protection of the interests of the 
community by the state and on duties owed by citizens to the state, a restatement of 
16 Graham Hassall, "Democracy in Asia Revisited ", Asian Studies Review, 21, 2 -3, 1997, pp. 1 -18 
For example; Chapter II of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea - "Rights and Duties of Citizens"; Chapter III 
of the Constitution of Japan - "Rights and Duties of the People "; Chapter II of the Constitution of the Republic of 
China - "Rights and Duties of the People"; Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand "Duties of the 
Thai People ", Article 2 s.4 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 
18 Kishore Mahbubani is one of the most articulate prominent apologees for the PAP regime, a position that under 
traditional Westminster constitutional arrangements would have been incompatible with his career as an 
Administrative Service officer. Since 1998 he has been Singapore's Ambassador to the United Nations. 
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the civic republican ideal.19 This stance has been supported by a plethora of PAP 
figures including Lee Kuan Yew, legal academics at the National University of 
Singapore (NUS), civil servants and parliamentarians. The general PAP view of 
institutional arrangements is perhaps best summarised by the Vice -Dean of the Faculty 
of Law at the NUS who is also a PAP cadre member and Minister of State for Law, Ho 
Peng Kee: 
"I look at democracy as a basket of rights and a list of freedoms, at the top of which you can put 
the freedom to express your choice of the group of people you want to put in power, who will, 
after that, have the authority and the power to circumscribe the other freedoms that you 
have. "20 
This a restatement of the Hobbesian notion of electoral representation as the authority 
to act upon, rather than the authority to serve, the electorate, although it fails to 
acknowledge Hobbes' concern for moderation and for the development of a "civil 
society in the commonwealth that protects people from subjugation by relentless 
power seekers and allows them to develop their own capabilities as they wish. "21 This 
interpretation of a Westminster style constitution was explicitly rejected by the Privy 
Council in one of its first cases involving Singapore constitutional law; Ong Ah Chuan v 
Public Prosecutor (1984'2 In this case, the council found that an act of the Singapore 
parliament could not override a citizen's fundamental human rights. In an earlier case, 
Teh Chenh Poh v Public Prosecutor Malaysia (1980) involving the Malaysian Internal 
Security Act, the Privy Council found that the principle of judicial review of the 
executive branch was also inherent in the Westminster system as the protection of 
fundamental human rights is inherent within that system and cannot be removed by 
the executive or the parliament' The findings in this case also apply to Singapore but 
have yet to be applied in that jurisdiction. 
Is the Singapore Constitution therefore a constitution in the same sense as those of 
other modern states, particularly its contemporaries in East Asia? No. The Singapore 
constitution is essentially an instrument of "rule by law" rather than "rule of law ", 
which when combined with the complete dominance of the legislature by one party 
has produced a "rule of State law" regime.' Walter Woon Cheong Ming, a Vice -Dean 
of the NUS Law Faculty and a one -time Nominated MP has commented: 
Kishore Mahbubani, "The Pacific Way ", Foreign Affairs. 74,1,1995, pp. 100 -110 
20 "Democracy East or West ? ", Straits Times, 25 May 1992, p. 2 
2' Peter Hayes, "Hobbes' Bourgeois Moderation ", Polity, 31, 1, 1988, pp. 75 -105, p. 75 
22 Anthony Lester QC, "Note on Constitutional Law ", in, Singapore Association of Women Lawyers, You and the 
Law. Singapore, Singapore Association of Women Lawyers, 1989, pp. 40-42, p. 41 
23 sup. p. 41-42 
20 As defined by Cooler. See: Robert D. Cooter, "The Rule of State Law and the Rule -of -Law State: Economic 
Analysis of the Legal Foundations of Development ", Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 
1996. pp. 191 -217 
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"We effectively don't have a Constitution. We have a law that can be easily changed by 
parliament, and by the party in power, because the party is the parliament ... it is unsettling 
how flexible the Constitution is ..." 
But this flexibility is essential argues Professor Jayakumar, PAP Minister for Law, 
former Dean of the Law Faculty at NUS and one of Singapore's most eminent 
constitutional scholars: 
Parliamentary system, parliamentary procedures, sophisticated election systems, bills of rights, 
rights to counsel - do you find these in our histories? ... all these are alien concepts. But 
overnight they've been put in a constitution ... given to us at the birth of our nation. And we're 
supposed to use that constitution and work it and run the nation without any departures from 
these Western notions. But can it work? Will it always work? Will it be the recipe for growth? 
Not necessarily. ... our short history since independence has been replete with all sorts of special 
problems, special circumstances. So, in the ultimate analysis, we will have to devise our own 
solutions to deal effectively with our own peculiar threats and problems.' 
Rather than a constitution that acts as a supreme standard against which the validity of 
parliamentary and executive actions can be measured in terms of national progress, 
institutional integrity and the welfare of citizens, the Singapore constitution is 
essentially a plaything of executive whim; a rule book for running the school which the 
council of prefects, with the connivance of the headmaster, may change at will. An 
examination of the major provisions of the constitution will provide sufficient evidence 
of just how 'flexible' and 'rule by law' oriented the Singapore constitution is. Harding 
contends that the notion of constitutional supremacy in Singapore "is an illusion which 
rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of Singapore's constitutional history. "Z' 
Rather, in Singapore, "legislative supremacy" holds sway .28 Within a Westminster 
state, this is merely a restatement of executive supremacy; the legislature has little if 
any substantial independence from the executive. 
The Constitution 
Examination of the constitutional foundations of PAP control is not greatly assisted by 
an analysis of the literature. While non -Singaporean researchers note the inherent 
weakness and imbalance of the Singapore constitution,ri and the political control 
u 
"Stand up and be quoted ", Straits Times, 6 July 1991, p. 12 
16 Professor Jeyakumar, Minister for Home Affairs. Speech to PAP Youth Wing seminar, 5 July 1987. This speech 
was made in justification of the detention of 22 citizens on charges of participation in a Marxist conspiracy against 
the government Jayakumar is a professor of law at NUS and has authored works on the Singapore constitution. 
n A. J. Harding, "Parliament and the Grundnorm in Singapore ", Malaya Law Review, 25, 1983, pp. 351 -367, p. 367 
ibid., p. 354 
Choo-Oon !Chong, "Singapore: Political legitimacy Through Managing Conformity", in, Muthiah Alagappa, ed., 
Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995, pp. 
108 -135; Laurentia Magchilina van Lottrum -van Leewen, From Source to Scourge.- Drugs and Legislation in 
Singapore 1819 -1992, Rotterdam, Universiteit Erasmus, 1992, pp. 145 -158; Walden Bello and Stehanie Rosenfeld, 
Dragons in Distress.- Asia's Miracle Economies in Crisis, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1990, pp. 318 -319; David 
Martin Jones, Political Development in Pacific Asia, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997, p. 49 
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rationale underlying its structure30 domestic commentators are restricted in what can 
be said as highly critical comments attack the legal foundations of the state which is 
not tolerated. Speculation on the effectiveness of particular provisions by students 
writing for the Singapore Law Review31 are tolerated as is debate in the small circles of 
the legal profession, the Faculty of Law and the Academy of Law, but not within the 
Law Society except on narrow technical issues. 
Broader public debate and the publication of highly critical comment is not tolerated, 
particularly in the Chinese press 32 We are thus left with a literature in which foreign 
commentators, generally lacking in any detailed knowledge of the constitution, attack 
it generally while knowledgeable domestic commentators, only too aware of its 
structure, provisions and intent, are largely quiet on the political and social 
ramifications. Even well informed foreign academics, such as Gordon Means, assume 
that in Singapore, English constitutional arrangements "survive with relatively slight 
modifications_ "33 We are therefore forced to examine the constitutional framework in 
some detail to draw our own conclusions. 
The constitution has 14 parts and, excluding preamble and transitional arrangements 
provisions, 192 effective articles 34 These address the following areas: 
Table 4.1: Analysis of Constitutional Provisions 
CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER 
The Republic and the Constitution 3.1 The Legislature 15.1 
Fundamental Liberties 4.2 The Judiciary 5.2 
President 10.9 The Public Service 10.9 
Executive 7.3 Citizenship 11.5 
Council of Presidential Advisers 6.8 Financial Provisions 9.9 
J0 Lily Rahim, "Singapore: Consent, Coercion and Constitutional Engineering ", Current Affairs Bulletin, 70, 7, 1993, 
pp. 20 -26 
3i The Singapore Law Review is overseen by a board which is controlled by the Law Faculty of NUS and the 
judiciary. The Law Faculty is under the control of PAP cadres, including, indirectly, two ministers, Professor 
Jayakumar and Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee - The current dean, Associate Professor Chin Tet Yung is probably 
a PAP cadre . Professor Tommy Koh, a senior PAP cadre still holds his appointment as a member of the Law 
Faculty. The Vice -Chancellor of NUS, Professor Lim Pin, is a senior PAP cadre. 
32 English language commentary is tolerated more than Chinese language criticism as the political executive does not 
mind the largely English educated middle classes `letting off steam ", but is concerned about the effect of such 
criticism in the HDB heartlands where there are large populations of Chinese educated who rely more on the Chinese 
language press and magazines, including those originating in Hong Kong. For example, the English language journal 
Commentary, published by the National University of Singapore Society, was allowed to publish a mildly critical 
edition in 1998 after initial objections from MITA, but it was only published in English. Two articles in this edition 
of the journal raised the need for electoral and constitutional reform respectively. See: Commentary: In Different 
Voices, 14, 1997 
33 Gordon P. Means, "Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore ", Journal of Democracy, 7, 4, 1996, pp. 103- 
1 17, p. 103. Means, an emeritus professor at McMaster University in Canada is a long time scholar of Malaysia and 
Singapore 
In December 1998, the constitution as amended to November 1996 actually had articles numbered to 163. 
However, some sections of the constitution have articles which are divided in multiple articles each of which has a 
separate though complementary effect For example, Part Va, Council of Presidential Advisers, comprises just one 
article - article 37. However, this article actually comprises articles 37a - 37m, none of which is subsidiary to article 
37, but all of which contain specific provisions relating to the Council of Presidential Advisers. This section has 
therefore been counted as comprising, in effect, 13 articles. This provides a more accurate measure of the 
composition of the constitution. 
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13 Special Provisions 2.1 
TOTAL 100°! 
Even a surface analysis reveals that this constitution has some peculiar components 
and weightings. For example, if the constitution is an instrument of principles of 
governance combined with an outline of institutional functions, relationships and 
limitations, methods for resolving institutional and state -society conflict including 
mechanisms for constitutional change and development, why include detailed 
provisions for citizenship, the public service or financial management which could be 
dealt with more adequately in legislation framed within constitutional constraints? The 
answer to this question lies in an analysis of the deep structure of the constitution and 
its concomitant legal framework which are oriented to executive control of all 
institutional arrangements. These macro -institutional arrangements have been 
reinforced by a carefully designed legal system which only partially conforms to the 
expectation that modern industrialised states are characterised by rights -based, 
normative legal systems ' 
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS AND STRATEGIES OF CONTROL 
In Singapore, the prime minister is head of the executive arm of government, the 
cabinet, is an elected member of the parliament and is head of the political party 
forming the government as is usual in the Westminster system. The constitution, under 
Chapter 2 makes specific provision for the executive, including the cabinet (Article 24), 
the prime minister and ministers (Articles 25 -33), allows for the validity of cabinet 
decisions even when a non -cabinet member is involved in voting on or participating in 
them (Article 29) and includes Permanent Secretaries (Article 34), the Attorney -General 
(Article 35) and the Secretary of Cabinet (Article 36) as part of the executive. Article 
24(2) specifically provides for the cabinet to "...have the general direction and control 
of the Government" and for it to be "...collectively responsible to parliament. "' 
Cabinet members are elected Members of Parliament (MPs), although Nominated 
Members of Parliament (NMPs) also qualify, and are appointed by the president on the 
recommendation of the prime minister; a recommendation which the president must 
follow. The cabinet can only meet by the authority of the prime minister although he is 
not compelled to attend cabinet meetings. Any other meetings of ministers have no 
legal authority." The prime minister may appoint ministers to be in charge of any 
15 Roberto Unger, Law in Modern Society: Towards a Criticism of Social Theory, New York, Free Press, 1976, pp. 
84 -85 
36 Article 24(2) 
" Article 28(1) 
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department (ministry) or subject' Ministers may be assisted by parliamentary 
secretaries. The prime minister may also appoint one or more permanent secretaries 
to a department or departments under the general supervision of the relevant 
minister.40 In practice, only full ministers form the cabinet; senior ministers of state and 
ministers of state are not included although they may be invited to participate, 
sometimes on a regular basis, at the discretion of the prime minister 41 In Singapore the 
cabinet has no committee system; all executive committees are overseen by individual 
ministers or the prime minister in the context of portfolio administration. 
The executive is given certain other specific powers under the constitution. The 
Minister for Finance is empowered, in the absence of a supply bill being assented to by 
the president by the first day of a financial year for which that supply bill applies, to 
authorise expenditure from any government fund, not exceeding one -quarter of the 
amount contained in the relevant estimate, for "...the continuance of the public services 
or for any purpose of development shown in the estimates... "42 This provides the 
executive with spending powers independent of the parliament's approval. The 
Attorney -General is also provided with considerable powers conditional on executive 
direction as "referred or assigned to him by the President or the Cabinet and to 
discharge the functions conferred on him by or under this constitution or any other 
written law. "' The Attorney -General is provided with immense discretion in respect to 
state prosecution, being able to "have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, 
conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any offence.i44 The Attorney- General also 
takes precedence over any other person appearing before a court and has an automatic 
entitlement to a hearing by a court on his own request. 
Cabinet ministers oversee the civil service including departments of state and statutory 
boards. They also have oversight of the GLCs which are responsible for the myriad 
government private sector investments and activities. Government companies are 
specifically mentioned in the constitution 45 However, responsibility for this task is 
shared by a limited number of ministers, principally the ministers for Defence, Finance, 
Trade and Industry, Communications and Information and the Arts. In late 1998 there 
were 16 cabinet ministers including two deputy prime ministers and Lee Kuan Yew 
J8 Article 30. By `subject' is meant any particular administrative task or area of responsibility. 
19 Article 31 of the Constitution 
a0 Article 34 of the Constitution 
" Although Senior Ministers of State were involved in cabinet meetings from 1984 -1991 under Lee Kuan Yew, this 
was to test the new generation of leaders Under Gob Chok Tong, a Senior Minister of State may regularly attend 
cabinet meetings if he is being considered for promotion_ 
` Article 148(b)(4) of the Constitution 
" Article 35(7) 
" Article 35(8) 
` (Articles 22(c), (d) and (f) 
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whose position as Senior minister is essentially a Special Minister of State without 
portfolio, equivalent to a deputy prime minister. 
The office of the Auditor- General established under Article 148(f) can also be 
considered as part of the executive, given the extensive powers of the office and its 
direct relationship to the president. The Auditor -General is appointed and removed by 
the president on the recommendation of the prime minister, but may withhold assent 
at his personal discretion as this is one of the designated protected offices. The 
constitution makes no specific provision for the Auditor -General to be an officer of the 
parliament. 
The scope of the Auditor -General's powers of inquiry are constitutionally defined in 
that "... it shall be the duty of the Auditor -General to audit and report on the accounts 
of all departments and offices of the Government, the Public Service Commission, the 
Legal Service Commission, the Supreme Court, all subordinate courts and 
parliament. "" The legislature may also require the Auditor -General to "perform such 
other duties and exercise such other powers" as it sees fit to legislate for. 47 
As can be seen, as in all Westminster systems, the Singaporean political executive has 
substantial powers. These powers are enhanced to provide enormous control over the 
instruments of government through careful constitutional design aimed at maintaining 
control in the hands of the core executive. What these powers are and how they relate 
to each major institutional policy actor is examined below. 
The Political Executive and the Presidency 
The major mechanisms for executive control of the presidency are the constitutional 
provisions for presidential candidature, the curtailment of presidential power by the 
parliament and special presidential advisory bodies under the total control of the 
executive, the administrative powers of the executive under various Acts and recourse 
to the Internal Security Act. 
Eligibility for election to the office of President is limited. Candidates must meet the 
qualifications for members of parliament as established in Article 45 of the 
constitution' and have held one of the following offices for at least three years: 
°6 Article148(f)(3) 
" Article 148(f)(4) 
" As provided for by Article 19(1)(d), this provision states that candidates must not be of unsound mind, an 
undischarged bankrupt or have been convicted and jailed for more than a year or fined $2000 or more. 
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1. A cabinet minister, Chief Justice, Speaker of Parliament, Attorney -General, 
Auditor -General, Accountant- General, Permanent Secretary, chairman of the Public 
Service Commission; 
2. Chairman or chief executive officer of a company registered under the Companies 
Act with a paid -up capital of at least $100 million, 
3. Chairman or chief executive officer of a statutory board to which Article 22A of the 
Constitution applies, or 
4. In any other comparable position of responsibility in any other organisation of 
equivalent size or complexity in the public or private sector which, in the opinion 
of the Presidential Elections Committee, has provided equivalent experience in 
managing financial affairs so as to enable the candidate to effectively carry out the 
functions and duties of the office of President st 
All candidates who would qualify under conditions (1) and (3) above are PAP cadres 
or affiliates. Of those who would qualify under condition (2), the majority would be 
employees of GLCs and therefore PAP affiliated, if not cadres. Of those who would 
qualify under condition (4), selection is purely at the discretion of the Presidential 
Elections Committee (PEC) which is composed entirely of PAP appointed bureaucrats, 
politicians or trade union officials." It is virtually impossible for a non -PAP candidate 
to stand for president. If any such candidate did stand and was demonstrably anti - 
PAP, he would then have to contend with the PAP's complete control of the domestic 
media in any election campaign, not to mention the possibility of administrative action 
being taken to disqualify the candidature such as a tax audit or a possibility of the 
government releasing details of covert surveillance by the ISD to reveal information 
damaging to the candidate.' 
These, clearly undemocratic, conditions have been imposed as the role of the elected 
presidency, as introduced in November 1991, is supposedly one of national guardian 
as In Singapore most companies with this amount of capitalisation are GLCs with the exception of the Overseas 
Chinese Banking Corporation, Overseas Union Bank, Asia Pacific Breweries, Creative Corporation, ??? 
50 Article 22A of the Constitution provides the President with veto powers over appointments to statutory boards at 
his personal discretion. 
a Article 19(2)(g) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 
n Under article 18 of the constitution, the Presidential Elections Commission (PEC) comprises: The Chairman of the 
Public Service Commission as chairman and two members; the chairman of the Public Accountants Board (who is 
usually the Commissioner of Internal Revenue -a Permanent Secretary level bureaucrat) and a member of the 
Presidential Council for Minority Rights, the members of which are all PAP affiliates except for the Roman Catholic 
Archbishop who would be unlikely to be appointed to the PEC. 
In 1988, just before a general election, a tax audit was done of Francis Seow, former Solicitor-General and 
opposition candidate, resulting in criminal charges of tax evasion, thus disqualifying his candidature as an MP, 
although without the conviction he would have been offered a Non -Constituency MP position. A tax audit was also 
undertaken of opposition candidate Tang Liang Hong in 1997 after he was sued for libel by 13 PAP members 
including Gob Chock Tong, Lee Hsien Loong and Lee Kean Yew. Tang was subsequently charged with 33 taxation 
offences and a warrant issued for his arrest. Seow's case raised accusations from opposition parties that such 
administrative action was undertaken to `frame' Seow. Of course, it is impossible to objectively know the truth of 
this situation, but the PAP's track record on persecution of its political opponents adds credibility to the opposition 
accusations. Seow's account of the tax charges is provided in: Francis T. Seow, To rat h a Tartar:: A Dissident in I.ee 
Kuan Yew's Prison, New Haven, Yale Southeast Asian Studies, 1994, pp. 243 -256. Tang's taxation charges are 
revealed in: Chris Lydgate, "Amid black robes, a flash of colour". Available: 
http: www. ozemail .com.au/- tangtalk/kelly.httnl, 3 February 1999. 
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of last resort. These changes to the presidency were apparently made with the 
intention of Lee Kuan Yew assuming the position on relinquishing the prime 
ministership. The notion was floated initially by Lee Kuan Yew in 1984 but linked 
directly to Lee's exit from the parliament by Rajaratnam in 1988.54 This linkage was 
subsequently dropped because of negative voter response, demonstrating that the 
regime, in certain cases, is responsive to public opinion. The importance of the elected 
president centres on his exercise of certain reserve powers of veto over: appointments 
to supreme statutory positions of senior personnel in the civil service, major statutory 
boards, and government controIIed business enterprises;' expenditure of national 
reserves accumulated by the government and its various boards and business 
enterprises, not accumulated during the term of a current government; and detentions 
under the Internal Security Act, corruption investigations and administrative orders 
assuring the maintenance of religious harmony. It was justified as an insurance policy 
taken out by the PAP government to ensure that the wealth of the nation and the 
power of its highest offices is not lost to a possibly, 'irresponsible' future government 
or executive, presumably a non -PAP government. 
In fact, these constitutional changes were also implemented to provide the PAP with a 
continued hold on the presidency in the event of a change of government, so that it 
would continue to have power over many aspects of government as long as a non -PAP 
government did not control two- thirds of the seats in parliament, the proportion 
required to amend most provisions of the constitution. Given the all-or- nothing nature 
of single plurality voting in a legislature chosen principally from multiple candidate 
constituencies,' the strategy of having an elected president with these veto powers is 
revealed as a massive game of bluff with the electorate; it either overwhelming 
supports the PAP or the opposition - balance and moderation are not allowed; as Chan 
notes, it reduces Singaporean politics to a zero -sum game?' This is an approach to 
electoral control which goes directly against the spirit of the Westminster constitutional 
framework because it is so divisive and potential destructive; the national good should 
not be subservient to the Party's good. This is the lesson of democratic transition in 
South Korea and Taiwan. 
The ability of the President to exercise his powers at his own discretion is limited by a 
variety of constitutional provisions. For example, although the executive power of 
Singapore is vested in the President, it is not exercisable by him alone, but under 
sa 
"Raja: PM Lee may be elected Executive President this year", Straits Times, 23 July 1988, p. 1 
ss Chief Justice, Chief of the Armed Forces and the Commissioner of Police among others. 
s' The weaknesses of the single plurality system and it suitability for one -party control has been noted by Chan 
previously. See: Chan Heng Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass -Roots, Singapore, 
Singapore University Press, 1976, p. 189 
5' Chan Heng Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass - Roots, Singapore, Singapore 
University Press, 1976, p. 203 
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Article 21(1), can only be exercised by the President, except in those areas where he has 
discretionary power, "... in accordance with the advice of the cabinet or of a minister 
acting under the general authority of the cabinet." Thus the cabinet has the general 
exercise of executive power, a fact reinforced by Article 24(2).58 The President's 
executive power is further eroded by the powers of the Presidential Council on 
Minority Rights which has the power to vet all legislation, including subsidiary 
legislation and the decisions of which can only be overturned by a two- thirds majority 
vote of all elected members of parliament 59 Members of this Council, half of whom can 
be appointed as life members, cannot have their membership terminated at the 
discretion of the President'" 
Further erosion of the president's powers is provided by article 21(3) which requires 
the President to consult the Council of Presidential Advisers (CPA), dominated by the 
executive and its nominees61, before exercising powers under Articles 22, 22a(1), 22b(2) 
and (7), 22c(1), 22d(2) and (6) - appointments to public offices - and 144 (restrictions 
on loans and guarantees by the state), 148a (withholding assent to supply bills), 148b 
(authorisation of expenditure for unspecified purposes) and 148g (the duty of the 
Auditor -General and Accountant -General to advise the president of certain 
transactions which will draw upon the national reserves). Under amendments 
introduced in November 1996, if the president acts against the advice of the CPA in 
respect of appointments to the restricted public offices, the parliament can overturn the 
president's decision by a two- thirds majority vote " Members of the CPA continue to 
hold office for the term of their appointment even if the president changes .a The 
council provides advice to the prime minister and the speaker of its advice or 
recommendations to the president.64 Thus the CPA acts both as a control mechanism 
and as an early warning system for the executive in case a president might take any 
action in relation to these matters which would be unacceptable to the executive. 
The parliament may also curtail the president's powers. Article 148d allows the 
parliament to overrule the President's withholding of assent to a supply bill by a vote 
of two- thirds or more of members. Additionally, article 21(5) allows the parliament to 
58 Article 24(2) states: "Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the cabinet shall have the general direction and 
control of the Government and shall be collectively responsible to parliament." 
Articles 68 -92 
6° Articles 72 and 73 
61 The Council of Presidential Advisers (CPA) consists of two persons nominated by the president, two nominated by 
the president on the advice of the prime minister and one appointed on the advice of the Chairman of the Public 
Service Board. The latter office is itself subject to agreement by the CPA and is certain to be under the control of the 
Prime Minister and occupied by a PAP cadre or equivalent. Thus the nomination of the majority of nominees on the 
council rests, indirectly as usual, with the prime minister. 
62 
"Elected President: Laws on his powers amended ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 2 November 1996, p. 3 
63 On the assumption of office by a new president, the Chairman of the CPA must resign as chairman, but not from 
the council, as the chairman's appointment is at the discretion of the president. 
64 Article 37(k) 
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make Iaws requiring the President to consult with bodies other than the cabinet as 
specified in those laws and if necessary to act only on the recommendations of those 
bodies except in respect of those powers that can be exercised as a personal discretion 
or which do not conflict with other constitutional provisions. This requirement is so 
broad that it could require the president to follow the orders of the Chief of Staff of the 
SAF, the Commissioner of Police or the Chairman of the PAP. 
Article 22(j) which provides for the Civil List, does not guarantee the office of the 
president a level of resourcing of staff or funding which would allow the president to 
fully exercise his functions under the constitution. Rather, the level of resourcing is at 
the discretion of the Iegislature, the prime minister and the Public Service Commission. 
Between 1990 when the president had no executive powers and 1998, only two 
additional staff were appointed to assist the president with his non -ceremonial duties, 
and both were administrative appointments incapable of assisting the president with 
his executive responsibilities.` 
The president's apparent executive powers, already limited by constitutional 
provisions that allow the parliament to over -ride a presidential veto in many 
circumstances, were further eroded by an April 1995 High Court decision that found 
that the President has no veto power over constitutional bills and that the parliament 
can amend presidential powers without presidential consent ' As a result of this 
referral, the government introduced three constitutional amendments to clarify what 
legislation the president could veto or refer to a referendum. The prime minister 
explained these changes by stating that the intention of the original Article 22H had 
not been to grant the president extensive veto powers over legislation and the 
provision was "premature ", indicating that the government had made the changes 
originally in case a PAP aligned president required them in a dispute with a legislature 
in which the PAP did not have a two -thirds majority.' 
These amendments to articles 5(2A), 5(A) and 22(H) further restricted the president's 
powers. The new article 5(2A) restricts the president's power to refer legislation to a 
referendum to bills concerned with fundamental liberties and elections. Bills 
concerned with management of the nation's fiscal reserves and appointments to 
presidentially controlled positions are now dealt with under article 5(A), a new 
These additional appointments were clerical and could not provide the president with any 
support for his prudential supervision responsibilities. The only source for this support would 
be the secondment of civil service officers to the Istana; an option that would provide the 
president with no statutorily independent capability to carry out the particular duties of the 
elected president. 
"Constitutional Reference No. 1 of 1995", Singapore Law Reports, 2, 1995, pp. 210 -213. See also: "Elected 
President Laws on his powers amended ", Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, 2 November 1996, p. 3 
67 "Elected President: Laws on his powers amended ", Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, 2 November I996, p. 3 
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provision. This article now governs all bills seeking to amend the constitution except 
for those specified in article 5(2A) and those concerned with safeguarding the 
sovereignty of Singapore. Under its provisions, if the president withholds assent to a 
hill which he thinks curtails his powers and the cabinet disagrees, the bill is referred to 
a constitutional tribunal composed of supreme court judges. If the tribunal decides that 
a bill does not curtail the president's powers, the president is deemed to have assented 
to it. If the tribunal supports the president's position, the cabinet may refer the 
legislation to a national referendum. Article 22(H) refers to the procedure to be used in 
disputes between cabinet and the president over non -constitutional bills, such as 
supply bills. As for article 5(2A), if the president withholds assent, the matter is 
referred to the constitutional tribunal. In this case, the tribunal's decision is final; no 
matter may be referred to a referendum. 
The current provision requires the parliament to challenge what few presidential veto 
rights that remain through resort to a referendum. Given the PAP's control of the 
media, its considerable power to mobilise large numbers of supporters for an election, 
the likelihood that it would use public funding in such a case and the lack of legal 
guidelines on how a referendum would be organised to present both alternatives fairly 
to the electorate, such a strategy clearly favours the government. 
Administrative mechanisms are also available to limit the president's power. For 
example, the government in 1998 decided to change the definition of national reserves 
so that its earnings from investments of existing reserves would not be accumulated as 
part of the reserves protected by the president, hut would be defined as "net 
investment income" and counted as part of current assets. This gave the government 
an additional income stream, decreased the president's power to control the reserves 
and in fact circumvented the president's constitutional control over a significant part of 
the reserves. The president was not consulted on this definitional change and its 
implications ' At his resignation press conference, President Ong Teng Cheong 
commented that he had struggled for most of his six year term to convince the 
government to take his office seriously and to put administrative procedures in place 
to facilitate the president's powers. He also had to deal, alone and without any 
bureaucratic support independent of the civil service, with the opposition of the 
Council of Presidential Advisers which has the constitutional power to advise and act 
against the president if required.' A compromise eventually resulted in the 
58 "and this was one of them" (sic), Straits Timer, 17 July 1999, p. 17 
g Ong himself did not mention or criticise the CPA; to do so would have been to criticise the inner core executive. 
However, the role of the CPA in devising the White Paper and particularly its resistance to Ong's interpretation of 
presidential powers, is implied by Goh Chok Tong in his farewell address to the president. See: Goh Chok Tong, 
Speech By Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the Farewell Reception for President Ong Teng Cheong on Monday, 
30 August 1999, at the Istana at 6.30 pm, Singapore, Ministry of information and the Arts, 1999 
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parliamentary white paper on The Principles for Determining and Safeguarding the 
Accumulated Reserves of the Government and the Fifth Schedule Statutory Boards and 
Government Companies, released in June 1999 and tabled in the parliament on 2 July 
1999. To have any effect this must now be translated into legislation. 
Despite these limitations, the president does have some powers which are protected 
from executive override. For example, under Article 22(i), the president has absolute 
discretion in respect of orders made under the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, 
in those cases where the advice of the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony 
(PCRH) conflicts with the advice of cabinet. As the PCRH is always dominated by 
executive appointees, such conflict is unlikely. In 1998, of the nine members of the 
council, six were PAP cadres or have demonstrated long term loyalty to the PAP.° 
Also, under Article 5(2)(a), the constitutional provisions relating to the powers of the 
President cannot be changed except through a national referendum supported by two - 
thirds of the voters. Despite this, the office of president is still substantially powerless 
in the face of executive authority and control. 
In addition to the legislative and constitutional controls available to the executive to 
control the presidency, other more direct means are available: the use of executive 
power over the parliament, the public service and the media to attack and, if necessary 
severely discredit the president and force his resignation as was done in the case of 
President C. V. Devan Nair in March 1985.71 In this case Lee Kuan Yew, after ousting 
Devan Nair from office on charges of alcoholism, eventually in 1988, issued a 
parliamentary White Paper' which graphically detailed a number of charges, several 
of which were unsubstantiated, against the former president.' These charges included 
w Singapore Government Directory January 1998, Singapore, Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1998, p. 471. In 
January 1998, the council comprised: Wee Chong Jin, former Chief Justice, chairman; Venerable Seek Kwang Phing, 
President of the Singapore Buddhist Welfare Services; Dr. Choong Chee Pang, lecturer, Trinity Theological College; 
Archbishop Gregory Yong, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Singapore; Haji Syed Ise. Semait, Mufti of Singapore; V. 
R. Nathan, a retired banking inspector and chairman of the Hindu Endowments Board since 1991; Bhajan Singh, 
President of the Sikh Advisory Board; Chua Gim Siong, Managing Director, Singardo Trading Company, member of 
the National Arts Council, member of the council of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry and secretary 
of the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations; and Tan Chok Kian, former permanent secretary in the 
civil service, former Executive Chairman of the Singapore Stock Exchange, former chairman of both the POSB board 
and CPF board. The following are assumed to be PAP cadres: Dr. Choong, Bhajan Singh, V. R Nathan, Chua Gim 
Siong and Tan Chok Kian. Wee Chong Jin is probably not a cadre, but has a demonstrated history of strong loyalty to 
the PAP in his career as Chief Justice. Archbishop Yong demonstrated in the "marxist conspiracy' case that he is 
intimidated by Lee Kuan Yew's direct threat to introduce harsh legislative restrictions on his church by forcing the 
resignations of four of his priests in conformity with government directions and not criticising the jailing of several 
leading lay members of the Roman Catholic Church under the ISA. See: "First religious harmony body appointed ", 
Straits Tunes Weekly Edition, 8 August 1992, p. 2; Singapore Human Rights Alert, Update No. 5. Available at: 
hppt// www .pactok.net/docs/singapore/txt 1 /spore txt/shra txt/upd5.htm. For a succinct analysis of Lee Kuan Yew's 
treatment of Archbishop Yong, see: Bernard Levin, "New martyrs to Lee's tyranny ", The Times, 12 April 1990 
" Devan Nair's case also illustrates the political use which can be made of the mental health provisions of the Health 
Act. 
n Command No. 8 of 1988 
n Details of this bizarre episode in Singaporean politics is provided in: T. S. Selvas, Singapore: The Ultimate Island, 
Melbourne, Freeway Books, 1991, pp. 187 -194. C. V. Devan Nair's full response can be found in: Francis T. Seow, 
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alcoholism, wife beating, adultery and sexual harassment, details provided by security 
surveillance, the acceptance of hearsay and possibly invention. As the White Paper 
attracted parliamentary privilege, it could be quoted in the press without fear of legal 
action and it was, including details of the ex- president's personal medical records 
provided to the government by medical practitioners. When Devan Nair rebutted the 
White Paper through the Straits Times," the political executive realised that continued 
debate of the matter would blacken it as much as its former president and refused to 
reply, despite having promised to do so.' This case demonstrated in a most potent and 
frightening way, the power the Singaporean executive can bring to bear on any person 
in the nation, even if it be the president. Additionally, the president has limited 
immunity from civil or criminal action76 and, in particular, has no immunity from the 
Internal Security Act. The latter is particularly important given the role ISD officers 
played in the executive's dismissal of President Devan Nair. Lee Kuan Yew himself 
admitted the hold that the executive, and he personally, holds over the presidency 
when, in the parliamentary debate on the constitutional amendment to directly elect 
the president, he commented: 
Given me and my links with so many people, all I have to do is stay Secretary- General of the 
PAP. I don't have to be president.77 
The harsh realities of the difficulties of the presidential office were revealed in 
statements by the first elected president' Ong Teng Cheong, formerly Second Deputy 
Prime Minister, in July 1999. In stating that he had no intention to run for a second 
term, Ong, who had a history of conflict with Goh Chok Tong before his elevation to 
the presidency, criticised the political executive and the Administrative Service for 
their attitude and behaviour towards his office. In particular, he cited their failure to 
treat his office in accordance with its constitutional role, with taking four years to 
provide him with an estimate of the reserves which he is supposed to protect, with 
changing the definition of reserves so as to restrict his powers, concluding that; "I 
suspect that they consider the Elected President a nuisance ... checking on them, 
looking over their shoulder. "' This indicates that the president is not part of the core 
executive, that the office is still considered peripheral, its powers easily compromised 
and the core executive as being hostile to it. As Thio points out, since the office was 
To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison. New Haven, Yale Southeast Asian Studies, 1994, pp. 273- 
282 
m Straits Times, 10 July 1988 
is 
1 ee Hsien Loong promised a response to Nair's letter on 11 July, the day after its publication, but Gob Chok Tong 
seems to have exercised greater political restraint and wisdom by closing the debate on 12 July. The government had 
nothing to gain from this debate except embarrassment and ridicule. See: Straits Times, 11 and 12 July 1988 
M Article 22(k) 
"Asiaweek. 26 August 1988, p. 43 
78 Although President Wee Kim Wee exercised the powers of the elected president under transitional provisions, Ong 
Teng Cheong was actually the first elected president. 
"9"A heavyweight or a maintenance person ? ", Straits Times, 17 July 1999, p_ 17 
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instituted, the political executive has made "steady attempts to ensure that his powers 
are contained. "80 
The true rationale for the establishment of an elected president with limited executive 
powers is not to protect national financial reserves nor the integrity of the civil service; 
the civil service is more than capable of protecting itself and there have been no 
indications by any political party that has gained legislative representation that they 
intend to follow a program that would severely reduce the reserves. Ong Pang Boon, 
party co- founder and former PAP minister from 1959 -1988 , in objecting to the elected 
presidency rightly identified the genuine reason for the creation of the office; 
In a parliamentary democracy, peaceful transfer of power, whether intra -party or inter -party, is 
fundamental to the system, and must be seen to be so. Once this possibility appears to be 
closed, then violent revolutionary means would loom large. I do not know if this is what we 
want. 
Ong's concern was that the elected presidency was being erected as a barrier that 
would purposefully block the peaceful transition from a PAP regime to a non -PAP 
regime, bringing with it the possibility of severe social discord, possibly on a 
revolutionary scale. These thoughts echo the objections of the Singapore Democratic 
Party in also opposing the constitutional provisions for the elected president which it 
interpreted as being designed to "bring about the fall of an opposition government.' 
The original intent for the office of the elected president may have been to stop the 
peaceful transfer of power should the PAP lose office by having Lee Kuan Yew or 
another PAP luminary elected. However, given the experience of its first incumbent, 
the political executive may have acted to make it largely irrelevant, at least while the 
PAP retains power. 
Executive and Parliament: From Tokenism to Dialogue? 
In Singapore, as in other unicameral Westminster style parliaments, the legislature is a 
captured house as it is completely controlled by the executive which is formed from the 
legislature and is part of it. In Singapore, the legislature has three types of members: 83 
ordinary elected members, up to six non -constituency members (NCMPs) and up to nine 
nominated members (NMPs), the latter two categories being appointed at the discretion of 
the executive. 
Control of the election of members is arranged through the executive's use of the paucity of 
constitutional provisions for guaranteeing fair and equitable elections. There is no 
Chua Lee Hoong, "Containing powers of the EP: Cabinet has two arrows "', Straits Times Overseas Edition, 26 
October 1996, p. 15 
ai Cited in: T. S. Selvan, Singapore: The Ultimate Island, Melbourne, Freeway Books, 1991, pp. 172-173 
tz Chan Eng Cheng, "SDP's stand on elected President', Straits Times, 14 November 1984, p. 15 
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constitutional provision for an independent electoral commission to oversee electoral 
boundaries and distributions; this is done by the Elections Department within the Prime 
Minister's Office. There is a constitutional guarantee of the equal value of votes in Article 12, 
but this has been ignored in introducing Group Representative Constituencies which elect 
five or six legislators per district. Thio has pointed out the GRC system probably breaches 
Article 12.' 
The two non -elected categories have been introduced to provide a non -government voice, 
although initially against the opposition of ordinary members who saw the nominated 
members in particular as an adverse reflection on their ability to criticise the executive.' It 
was also seen by MPs as providing a backdoor to cabinet for people with required specialist 
talents who did not want to go through the election process; an Americanisation of the 
cabinet as NMPs may belong to a political party, but preferably should not, so as they are 
seen to be independent critics of the government. However, there is no requirement that an 
NMP resign from a political party on appointment sb Nominations for NMP positions are 
accepted from the public, screened by a parliamentary select committee, approved by the 
prime minister and appointed by the president. 
In 1997 selection for NMPs was changed from being on an individual basis to being on the 
basis of 'functional groups' which they might represent, although this too met opposition 
from some MPs 87 There is no constitutional requirement for the parliament to appoint 
NMPs; it is discretionary, 
Only three NCMP positions have become available; after the 1984 elections M.P.D. Nair was 
offered an NCMP position but refused it;mm after the 1988 elections, Dr. Lee Siow -Choh 
accepted one and after the 1997 elections, J. B. Jeyaratnam accepted one. However, the 
government has stated that no role exists for NCMPs outside the parliamentary chamber, so 
their role is very limited. This was clarified by the Minister for Home Affairs, Wong Kan 
Seng in 1997 when he explained that government organisations will not answer letters 
written by NCMP J. B. Jeyaratnam as; "An NCMP does not represent any constituent and 
83 Thio Li -ann, `Choosing Representatives: Singapore Does it Her Way," in Graham Hassall and Cheryl Saunders, 
eds., The People's Representatives: Electoral Systems in the Asia- Pacific Region, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1997, 
pp. 38- 58,p.49 
Garry Rodan, "Singapore's leadership in transition: erosion or refinement of authoritarian rule ? ", Bulletin of 
Concerned Asian Scholars, 1992, 24, pp. 3 -17, pp. 8 -9 
85 The Straits Times, 30 May 1992 
86 Kevin Tan, Yeo Toing Ming and Lee Kiat Seng, Constitutional Law in Malaysia and Singapore, Singapore, 
Butterworths, 1991, p. 210 
80 In this debate in parliament, despite opposition from the backbench, the party whip was imposed and so this change 
in policy for selecting NMPs was passed. See, Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report, 67, 15, 31 July 
1997,1498 -1514 
88 "Non- constituency MP: Nair elected ", Straits Times, 25 December 1984, p. 1 
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therefore ... the NCMP's letters will not be answered because he does not represent any 
constituent. "89 
In Singapore there is no constitutional provision for an opposition and the PAP 
categorically rejects the concept of a loyal opposition; Goh Chok Tong has stated that 
he does not believe in opposition politics; "certainly not the type we have in 
Singapore.'", although in an early statement he had invited the opposition parties to 
play "a positive role in Singapore's development." and was seemingly willing to accept 
genuine, but limited, political contestation.91 The stance of the PAP is that one -party 
government can be democratic without an opposition.92 In Westminster tradition, the 
parliament is controlled through the strong party discipline of the PAP. There is also a 
constitutional provision that if a member is expelled from the party in which he was 
elected, he must resign from the parliament, a provision not found in any other 
Westminster style polity, not even Malaysia.93 Government members therefore rarely 
oppose any substantive executive action, either legislative or administrative.94 As 
Carey95 and Weldon" point out, such party discipline, electoral rules and bans on re- 
election act as a considerable disincentive for Iegislators to question the executive or to 
highly value the executive review role of the legislature. This does not, however, 
totally prevent backbenchers from voting against the government, although in recent 
times it is extremely rare. In 1967, for example, NTUC affiliated PAP MPs voted 
against amendments to the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act as they thought 
that it would erode union rights.97 
In addition to these party and constitutional controls, members can be disqualified for 
breaching any constitutional provision relating to their position or may be removed 
from parliament by expulsion98 or for not attending sittings without the permission of 
the Speaker for two consecutive months 99 They can also be removed through libel or 
defamation action in the civil courts as members' parliamentary immunity has been 
parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report, 67, 4, 11 July 1997, p. 469 
9Q "Chee -style politics 'will sink' Singapore ", Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, 2 November 1996, p. 2 
91 Parliamentary Debates Singapore. Official Reports, 59, 5, I6 January 1992, p. 374 
Lim Hng Kiang, "No Need for Opposition Checks and Balances ", Pear, November/December 1992, pp. 74-77 
Article 46(2)(6). This provision exists in the constitution of the Malaysian state of Sabah, but not in the national 
Malaysian constitution. 
" Opposition on minor issues sometimes arises from PAP backbenchers, but opposition to major policy is not 
tolerated. For example, in 1989 when backbencher Heng Chiang Meng voiced his objections to the extension of 
mandatory caning for many offences, he was criticised by Lee Hsien Loong, but he is still a PAP MP. See: Time, I3 
March 1989 
John Carey, Term Limits and Legislative Representation, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996 
" Jeffrey Weldon, "Political Sources of Presidentialismo in Mexico ", in, Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, 
eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America ", New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 225 -258 
n Raj Vasil, "Trade Unions" in Kemial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., Management of Success: the 
Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 144 -170, p. 156 
Article 46(2)(f). The power of expulsion is stated but not defined in the Constitution. 
s9 Article 46(2)(d) 
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severely compromised by changes to the Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and 
Powers) Act 1985. 
This art was substantially weakened by amendments in 1986 in response to continued 
criticism of the government and the judiciary by opposition member J. B. Jeyaratnam 
under parliamentary privilege. The act was amended to increase the penalties that 
could be imposed by the Parliamentary Privileges Committee so as to allow the 
parliament to imprison, suspend, reprimand or impose a fine of up to $50,000 on a 
member for "... any dishonourable conduct, abuse of privilege or contempt..." or 
remove the members immunity from civil action.100 The definition of any alleged 
misconduct is at the discretion of the Parliamentary Privileges Committee. In addition, 
the power to summarily deal with contempt charges was extended from the 
Parliamentary Privileges Committee to the Speaker and the chairman of any 
committee, all of whom are government members.10' This provided power to the 
chairmen of committees to arbitrarily charge MPs appearing before committees with 
contempt and possible prosecution in the civil courts. 
In association with these amendments, the constitution was also amended so as to 
remove the right to counsel for any member charged with contempt, thus transferring 
such costs to the member,102 to remove the guarantee that members so charged would 
be brought before a magistrate within 48 hours and, if expelled from the parliament for 
the respective seat to become vacant, thus doing away with the need for a by- 
election.103 
The standing orders of the parliament have also been designed to ensure that the 
Speaker104 has almost total control of all parliamentary powers and that ministers 
cannot be compelled to answer questions. The speaker has considerable influence over 
committee appointments except to GPCs,'OS (which are party, not parliamentary, 
committees) although committee appointments are recommended by a parliamentary 
100 Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1985 s.20 
101 Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1985 s.21(3), (4) and (5) 
10' Time, 8 September 1986, p. 17 
103 Article 9(4) and (5) of the Constitution now state: (4) Where a person is arrested and not released, he shall, without 
unreasonable delay, and in any case within 48 hours (excluding the time of any necessary journey), be produced 
before a magistrate and shall not be further detained in custody without the magistrate's authority. 
(5) Clauses (3) and (4) shall not apply to an enemy alien or to any person arrested for contempt of parliament 
pursuant to a warrant issued under the hand of the Speaker. 
104 The constitution provides for the Speaker and Deputy Speakers, of which there are two, to be appointed from non - 
parliamentary ranks. The candidates must, however, meet the qualifications to stand for parliamentary office. This 
provides the government with a means of slightly increasing the number of voting members should this ever be 
required, by replacing a non -voting Speaker elected from parliamentary ranks with a non -parliamentarian. See: 
Articles 40 and 42. Regardless of whether the appointee is a parliamentarian or not, the Speaker has no deciding vote 
in the case of a tied vote. Tied votes are lost. See: Article 57 
io5 In interviews with the author, parliamentarians commented that the Speaker has considerable influence on these 
appointments, but the Cabinet makes the final decision. 
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committee. The Speaker has no genuine independence of the political executive 106 
Opposition members are appointed to committees in proportion to their 
representation, but in reality are slightly over -represented because of the number of 
committees and their small number. Opposition MPs comment that this does not 
increase their power or influence.107 The Standing Orders also require all questions to 
be put to ministers to be provided at least 48 hours before a sitting and the Speaker has 
discretion to allow or disallow questions and supplementary questions asked during a 
sitting. Questions without notice are not usually allowed. MPs also cannot raise the 
inadmissibility of a question as a matter of debate." 
Parliament's traditional Westminster powers as a court within its own jurisdiction, 
against which no appeals may be heard, may also be used to intimidate opposition 
witnesses appearing before parliamentary committees. This constitutional provision103 
has only been used twice, both times against opposition members."° In 1996, four 
members of the Singapore Democratic party were fined a total of $51,000 by the 
Committee on Privileges for "perjury, wilfully giving false answers, prevaricating and 
misconducting themselves as witnesses" before the Select Committee on Health Care 
Costs.111 As the parliament is not required to place charges or to prove a case on any 
legal standard of evidence, either civil or criminal, and no appeals can be made against 
such a decision, this provides the political executive with another convenient weapon 
in its arsenal against criticism and political opposition.lu In this particular case, 
although the SDP leader Dr. Chee Soon Juan apologised for errors in the party's 
evidence before the committee, there existed no prima facea case that he or the others 
fined intentionally or deliberately provided false answers to the committee; they were 
simply incompetent. 
The executive also exercises direct control over the legislature through its role in 
selecting candidates for election through the party organisation. As shown in Table 4.2, 
the legislature is dominated by members who come from the public sector; whose 
employment at the time of recruitment or after, is directly or indirectly dependent on 
06 For example, following the 1997 elections, the prime minister, Goh Chok Tong, comments that he "had asked the 
Speaker of Parliament to give all MPs, particularly new ones, ample opportunity and latitude to speak in their first 
year of Parliament" See: "Help Govt Refute Coffeshop Talk", Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, 11 January 
1997, p. 3 
10' In interviews with the author, July- October 1998 
108 For example, see the exchange between J. B. Jeyaratnam and the Speaker on the Speaker's decision not to admit a 
question: Parliamentary Debates Singapore, 76, 5, 5 June 1997, col. 332 
09 The Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act is constituted under s.63 of the constitution. 
10 Once, though Standing Orders, against J. B. Jeyaramam as previously discussed and once against the four SDP 
members as discussed in the present case. 
1" The charges were laid under The Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act, See: Koh Buck Song, "17 
types of offences covered under contempt of Parliament", Straits Times, 21 September 1996, p. 14 
"Z "Punishment needed to uphold Parliament's dignity", Straits Times Overseas Edition, 14 December 1996, p. 24 
and, "Four SDP members pay contempt fines hours before deadline ", Straits Times Overseas Weekly Edition, 21 
December 1996, p. 5. The four fined were: Dr. Chee Soon Juan, Wong Hong Toy, S. Kunalen and Kwan Yue Keng. 
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the government. Although the quality of the data in Table 4.2 improves from 1963 
onwards, it seems apparent that the political executive attempts to ensure that the two - 
thirds majority required to pass constitutional amendments can be totally depended 
upon by drawing this proportion of members from the public sector. This is almost 
certainly the case from 1976 onwards, although the Eighth Parliament in 1991 seems to 
have been more dependent on members from the private sector if one assumes that the 
four members in the unknown category did not come from the public sector. If we 
ignore the requirement to ensure constitutional changes and examine those legislators 
drawn from the public sector in terms of the PAP's own members, they tend to be the 
majority of members. From 1984 when Goh Chok Tong began to take executive 
responsibility for the government, MPs drawn from the GLCs, the civil service, 
statutory boards or the SAF comprised 48 per cent of PAP members in 1984, and 53 
per cent from 1988 to 1997. In terms of the total parliament, they comprised 47 per cent 
in 1984, 52 per cent in 1988, 51 per cent in 1991 and 52 per cent in 1997. This conforms 
to Chan's earlier findings that "the political leaderships ... see the civil service as an 
appropriate training ground for politiciansi13 This data also lends credence to Rodan 's 
assertion that the working class and small business sector is substantially excluded 
from political participation.14 
This combination of party discipline, constitutional provisions and parliamentary 
standing orders makes the Singapore parliament an easily controlled creature of the 
executive. It should be noted however, that given that all members of parliament 
understand the limitations on their power and freedom to challenge the executive, the 
legislature has become hegemonised; it is self -regulating and does not challenge the 
constitutional and ideological framework which frames it. 
This extraordinary degree of control does not however produce a parliament which is 
simply a rubber stamp, as in the case of the New Order Indonesian or Vietnamese 
legislatures, although it cannot at the ultimate test overthrow the executive without 
splitting the party and probably the nation. The current PAP executive, particularly the 
prime minister, is aware that the backbench is talented, capable of making significant 
contributions to policy debates and is one of its most important links to the electorate, 
particularly because of the extra -parliamentary consultative mechanisms which they 
preside over in their constituencies and ethnic communities» As illustrated in Table 
Chan Heng Chee, "Legislature and Legislators ", in Jon S. T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, eds., 
Government and Politics of Singapore, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 72 -91, p. 85 
Garry Rodan, "Preserving the one -party state in contemporary Singapore ", in Kevin Hewitson, Richard Robinson 
and Gamy Rodan, eds., Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, Sydney, Allen 
and Unwin, 1993, pp. 75 -108, p. 104 
15 Cabinet ministers often refer to the importance of the role of MPs in the policy system. For example, Lee Hsien 
Loong has stated the political leadership is not made up of just the Cabinet; grassroots leaders and Members of 
Parliament also played a part, and their views were taken seriously. See: Wang Hui Ling, "Opposition exerts `barely 
any pressure' on Govt, says BG Lee ", Straits Times Weekly, 15 April 1995, p.2 
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4.3, the educational levels of PAP legislators is very high. While until 1984, some MPs 
lacked tertiary education, by 1988 all were graduates. While from 1963 -1997 on average 
39 per cent had a bachelors degree, 14 per cent a master's degree and 19 per cent a 
doctoral degree, from 1984 -1997, the comparative figures are 44 per cent, 21 per cent 
and 24 per cent respectively. The backbench provides intellectual resources and is also 
one of the executive's most important links to the broader middle class, particularly its 
non -PAP aligned members. 
The executive is also cognisant of generally being in control of the backbench, so it 
risks little and gains much by being more consultative and by using backbenchers as 
active, though somewhat removed, participants in policy making. This is a distinctive 
change in executive attitude towards backbenchers from the Lee administrations even 
though later Lee administrations could boast talented backbenches. It is also a partial 
change in the role of legislators from the total domination by the executive, as noted by 
Chan in 1975176 and perhaps, at least partly supports her contention in 1989 of a 
repoliticisation of Singaporean society, "increased political cognition and personal 
efficacy",' albeit still within well controlled parameters. It also adds another 
dimension to Chuá s assertion that the political system has been restructured since 
1984 in three ways: the introduction of NMPs, GRCs and the elected presidency.118 
Under Goh Chok Tong, since 1984 and particularly since 1991, the relationship 
between the parliament and the executive has also shown signs of a slow but steady 
restructuring through the broadening of policy dialogue to include greater discourse 
within the legislative chamber and outside it through the use of Government 
Parliamentary Committees (GPCs) and their resource panels. 
Women and the Political Executive 
One issue of note, is that the both the backbench and the frontbench are almost 
exclusively male domains; no more than one woman has held ministerial rank at any 
one time to 1998. While the executive is aware of this, and Goh Chok Tong has made 
commitments to recruit more women into politics, this has not happened, despite the 
existence and activities of the PAP Women's Wing. In interviewing women in elite 
professions about this issue, it is obvious that many of those women who have been 
involved in politics and have subsequently withdrawn, have said little to their friends 
and colleagues that would recommend being a member of parliament. I encountered 
constant mildly derogatory remarks about the cabinet being a "private school boy's 
i6 Chan Heng Chee, "The Role of parliamentary Politicians in Singapore ", Occassional Paper Series Department of 
Political Science University of Singapore, 19, 1975, p. 6 
17 Chan Heng Chee, "The PAP and the Structuring of the Political System ", in Kemial S. Sandhu and Peter 
Wheatley, eds., Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 70-89, p. 
87 
1e Chue Beng Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 175 -178 
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club ", and the inability of many ministers and many male MPs to relate to women as 
their intellectual and professional equals.119 Equally, none amongst this group had any 
interest in opposition politics; they simply wanted to be heard free of intimidation and 
without the requirement to join a political party unless self -motivated to do so. It was 
also made obvious that Lee Kuan Yew's trawling through the ranks of the elite for a 
replacement executive in the 1980's has left enduring antagonism among many of those 
women most qualified to serve politically, although subsequent recruitments under 
Goh Chok Tong have been more positively assessed. This view was most strongly 
reflected by the comment of one highly qualified woman with a long association with 
the government that Lee ".. cannot be trusted and nor can a government in which he 
continues to play a leading role." This seems principally because Lee's influence is seen 
as negative in that he encourages an approach that over -values pragmatism, 
undervalues the potential contribution of those outside the core and is seen as 
overbearingly arrogant. Put simply, the executive, particularly under Lee, was seen to 
frequently change its mind, contradict itself too often, push his personal views in too 
many areas and to treat others as intellectual inferiors. This considerable, but passive, 
antagonism to the government was usually accompanied by the contradictory 
observation that almost all cabinet ministers had wives in the professions, many of 
whom were independently wealthy and obviously intellectually and professionally 
capable.°° While Goh Chok Tong's recruitment campaigns for the 1991 and 1997 
elections were more targetted and less divisive that those of the 1980s, there is 
obviously a substantial negative legacy of overcome in the political recruitment 
process, as those most capable of assuming political office are simply withdrawing 
their labour from that particular market. 
The other issue which arose in discussing this issue with Administrative Service 
officers is an underlying concern that women in general are perceived to lack the 
defence and security perspective in policy making and public sector management seen 
as essential to effective ministerial performance, certainly at cabinet level. All 
Singaporean men go through National Service which provides political socialisation 
19 Although I interviewed women in AWARE, Singapore's foremost feminist organisation on this issue, I also 
interviewed women academics, doctors, lawyers, businesswomen and civil servants, including the Singapore Council 
of Women's Organisations and the Singapore Association of Women Lawyers. What was surprising about the 
uniformly negative view of women entering politics was that even those obviously affiliated with the PAP had a poor 
view of the government's commitment to recruiting women, particularly into the executive. Of the two women NMPs 
interviewed, only one would comment on this issue and she too was sceptical of the present executive's commitment 
to this issue. The scepticism is not hard to understand. In 1996, prior to the 1997 elections, Lee Hsien Loong stated 
that divorced women were stigmatised and would not be preselected, that single women could be but did not specify 
the characteristics of the type of single women preferred and restated the PAP, position that it preferred married 
women with children, who "have got to he suitable politically as well as meet all the other requirements. Then you 
must have your won careers, and your family sufficiently settled, to be able to come in. Your husband has to be 
comfortable with it - that's important. Not easy" See: Koh Buck Song, "PAP ready to accept single women as 
candidates: BG Lee ", The straits Times Weekly Edition, 19 October 1996, p. 6 
`2° For example, Goh Chock Tong, George Yeo and Wong Kan Seng all have wives who are successful lawyers. Lee 
Hsien Loong's wife, Ho Ping is one of the most senior GLC technocrats as president of Singapore Technologies and 
Lim Hng Kiang's wife is an accountant. 
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focussed on these issues which is then reinforced by 20 years of part -time military 
service. Women are excluded from this process and therefore seen as somehow 
lacking.ut One could postulate from this that the first woman cabinet minister will 
probably be someone with a background in the Administrative Service, followed by 
postings to MINDEF, MHA or MFA and a second career in a defence related GLC 
within the Singapore Technologies Group. There has been speculation for some time 
that Ho Ching, the wife of Lee Hsien Loong fits this profile, but that her ascension to 
ministerial office is politically unacceptable both to many PAP MPs and electorally. As 
senior civil service women are too few and valuable, it is unlikely that a woman 
deputy secretary will be recruited as directly from the civil service to the ministry as 
have some current ministers such as Lim Hng Kiang. The representation of women in 
the parliament since self -government is shown in Table 4.4. It is notable that, in forty 
years there has only been one non -Chinese woman member of parliament, two women 
of junior ministerial rank, one women acting cabinet minister' and that as the PAP 
regime has continued, the number of women in parliament has declined. 
Backbenchers: From Sounding Box to Sounding Board? 
The relationship between backbenchers and the executive is also influenced by party 
arrangements. In Singapore, as in Westminster, there is no provision for regular 
meetings between the executive and the backbench. The party room meetings 
characteristic of Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Japan and South Korea, do not 
exist in Singapore. There are no party room nominations, votes or discussions between 
backbenchers and ministers on promotions to the ministry; this is a prime ministerial 
prerogative and even senior backbenchers can be surprised when appointments to or 
promotions within the executive are made." 
There is no sense of a Parliamentary PAP as distinct from the PAP; the party is one 
under executive and cadre control. Unlike many parties, the PAP does not necessarily 
There are some women officers in the SAF, the SCDF and the SPF. Whether these have an interest in, or aptitude 
for political life, is yet to be tested. 
Seet Ai Mee who lost her seat in the 1991 general election and, reportedly, subsequently questioned why, as the 
only woman cabinet minister, she was not given a more secure seat. Seet declined to re -enter politics. 
12 For example, Goh Chok Tong's second cabinet reshuffle in July 1991 took many backbenchers by surprise. See: 
"PM reshuffles Cabinet ", Straits Times Weekly Edition,6 July 1991, p. 1. Goh had previously reshuffled portfolios 
shortly prior to officially assuming office as Prime Minister in November 1990. 
TABLE 4.2 
SOURCES OF PAP MEMBERS IN THE SINGAPORE PARLIAMENT AT TIME OF ELECTION: 1963-1997 124 
Year 1963 1968`' 1972 1976` 1980 °' 1984 1988` 1991 1997 TOTAL % of 
Source TOTAL 
Unions 5 8 12 10 5 3 4 3 57 9.2% 
GLCs 0 1 1 3 8 11 9 6 45 7.3% 
Civil Service or 10 16 21 14 15 15 20 123 19.8% 
Boards 
Higher Education 2 ro 1,1 12 12 13 11 14 94 15.2% 
Journalists 4 5 5 6 4 7 5 5 8 49 7.9% 
SAF 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 2 3 11 1.8% 
TOTAL PUBLIC 14 29 38 48 51 48 50 47 54 379 61.1% 
SECTOR 27% 50% 58% 70% 67% 61% 62% 58% 65% 
Private Sector 7 10 11 14 19 23 26 25 25 
_ 160 25.8% 
Other 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 7 1.1% 
Unknown 16 18 15 6 4 5 4 4 2 74 11.9% 
TOTAL PAP MPs 38 58 65 69 75 77 80 77 81 620 100 
Opposition MPs 13 0 0 0 1 2 1 4 2 23 
No. MPs 51 58 65 69 76131 79 81 81 83 643 
124 Based on the MP's occupation on election to parliament if a minister or the MP's current occupation as revealed in either the Singapore Government Directory, or other source documents. The 1979 
by- election is not included; data is derived only from the outcomes of general elections. 
123 Includes members elected before 1961 
126 Includes 1970 by- election. 
'27 Includes by- elections in 1977 and 1979. 
8 Includes 1981 by- election. 
129 Includes 1989 by- election. 
130 Includes 1992 by- election. 
131 There were only 75 parliamentary seats, but because of the resignation of Devan Nair to accept the presidency resulting in a by- election, the total number of MPs was 76 during the period of this 
parliament, including J. B. Jeyaratnam, an opposition member elected in the 1976 by- election. 
TABLE 4.3: EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF PAP MPs AT TIME OF RECRUITMENT 
TO PARLIAMENT: 1963 -1997 
YEAR 
Source 
1963 1968 1972 1976 " 1980 1984 1988 1991 1997 TOTAL % of TOTAL 
< Tertiary education 7 11 10 8 9 3 48 7.7% 
Tertiary education < degree 
level19 
4 5 6 6 6 4 4 2 1 38 6.1% 
Bachelor's degree140 9 20 18 28 31 35 36 35 32 244 39.4% 
Masters degree141 1 3 6 9 10 13 17 27 86 13.9% 
Doctoral degree 2 6 9 13 15 19 21 18 17 120 19.4% 
Unknown 1e 15 19 8 5 6 6 5 4 84 13.5% 
TOTAL PAP MPs 38 58 65 69 75 77 80 77 81 620 100 
Opposition MPs 13 0 0 0 1 2 1 4 2 23 
No. MPs 51 58 65 69 76742 79 81 81 83 643 
"' Includes members elected before 1963. 
Includes 1970 by- election. 
Includes by- elections in 1977 and 1979. 
15 Includes 1981 by- election. 
16 Includes 1989 by- election, 
'" Includes 1992 by- election. 
'This category is reserved for those with only primary and secondary education. 
19 This category is used for graduates of a teachers' training college and post- secondary technical institutions. 
"'The medical degrees MOBS are included as bachelor's degrees as are graduates from Raffles College, although the later awarded a diploma rather than a degree because of colonial educational bias 
against the institution awarded qualifications equivalent to British domestic qualifications. 
"' This includes medical specialist with postgraduate certification by professional registering bodies, where this could be identified. 
"'There were only 75 parliamentary seats, but because of the resignation of Bevan Nair to accept the presidency resulting in a by- election, the total number of MPs was 76 during the period of this 
parliament, including J. B. Jeyaratnam, an opposition member elected in the 1976 by- election. 
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reward party workers with parliamentary nominations; the linkage between ordinary 
members and their parliamentary members is tenuous because of the recruitment 
methods used to appoint highly educated, technocratically oriented MPs who, prior to 
selection, may not even have been party members.' In this way, the party is irrelevant 
to a political career. Therefore the parliamentary chamber in effect becomes both the 
PAP party room and the legislature.t`a For example, in budget sittings, there is no 
formal pre -budget meetings between ministers and the backbench, nor ministers and 
NMPs.145 Ministers and civil servants in the Ministry of Finance's Budget Division and 
other ministries will sometimes consult with selected backbenchers, particularly the 
chairmen of GPCs146, the chairman of the Feedback Unit Supervisory Panel147, the 
chairmen of any select committees if necessary and individual MPs seen as playing a 
leading role in addressing the concerns of particular groups, if there is any particularly 
sensitive issue.148 However there is no general consultation with PAP MPs; they are 
seen as having only a peripheral role. This leads to the budget sitting of parliament 
also being the Parliamentary PAP budget party meeting; it is the major opportunity for 
the backbench to influence the executive's policy program in each year. 
An analysis of the parliament's role in the annual budget process provides the best 
indication of the power of the legislature in influencing the executive's policy program. 
Schattschneider noted that the most important determinant of a political issue is the 
scope of debate.149 In commenting on the French policy system which, like Singapore, is 
completely dominated by the executive and the higher civil service, Baumgartner 
comments that while parliamentary power may be low in such a system, participation 
in legislative review and the budget process expands participation beyond specialised 
policy communities and raises awareness of issues that may be treated as technical 
issues by the executive, but be considered as more fundamentally political by others.150 
143 "SM: We must pay to get the best in govt ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 15 January 1994, pp. I and 24, p. 24 
44 In the present, original, parliamentary building there is no actual provision for party meeting rooms as such, 
although a large room is used for breaks during sittings. In the new parliamentary complex provision has been made 
for more meeting rooms, particularly committee rooms, but not for exclusive party rooms. 
"' Interviews with Ministry of Finance officers; Lorna Wu in 1995 and Chen Shian Jan in 1998 and 
1a Interviews with Ministry of Finance officers revealed that not all GPC chairmen will necessarily be consulted in 
pre- budget discussions. This was confirmed in an interview with Dr. S. Vasoo, chairman of the GPC on Community 
Development, in September 1998 
141 Interviews with Head of the Feedback Unit in 1995 and 1998; Zee Voong Rang and Gob Chye Boon respectively. 
1e For example, in respect of the Chinese community, its parliamentary champions in the period 1991 -1997 were 
seen as being Dr. Ow Chin Hock, Peh Chin Hua and Choo Wee Khiang. See: "New PAP voices grab attention ", The 
Straits Times. 28 March 1998, p. 14. MPs who are perceived as being spokespersons for the business community 
include Chandra Das, Arthur Beng Kian Lam and Wong Kwei Cheong, all of whom retired from parliament in 1997. 
See: "MPs praise budget but still find it lacking in several areas ", The Straits Times, 12 March 1996. Current 
members of the pro-business group of MPs includes Chew Heng Ching, Leong Horn Kee, Heng Chiang Meng and 
Wan Soon Bee. See: "Pro-business MPs object to higher CPF rate for bosses ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 16 
March 1991, p. 4 and "All will benefit from incentives to venture abroad ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 13 March 
1993, p. 5 
149 E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi -Sovereign People, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960, p. 4 
u° Frank R. Baumgartner, Conflict and Rhetoric in French Policymaking, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1989, pp. 162 -165 
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Table 4.4: Women In Singapore Parliament 1959 -19981'' 
Date Women MPs No. Women NMPs No. Total 
1959 Mdm Chan Choy Siong, 6 Not Applicable - 6 
Mdm Ho Puay Choo, Ms 
Fung Yin Ching, Che 
No constitutional 
provision for NMPs 
Sahorah bte Ahmat, Ms 
Seow Peck Leng, Ms Chua 
Seng Kim 
1963 Mdm Chan Choy Siong, 3 Not Applicable 3 
Mrs. Devan Nair, Ms Low 
Miaw Gong 
1968 Mdm Chan Choy Siong 1 Not Applicable 1 
1972 -1983 No women members 0 Not Applicable - 0 
1984 Dr. Aline Wong Kan Lai- 3 3 
Chung, Mrs., Yu foo Yee 
Shoon, Dr. Dixie Tan 
1988 Dr. Aline Wong Kan Lai- 4 Not Applicable 4 
Chung, Mrs., Yu -foo Yee 
Shoon, Dr. Dixie Tan, Dr. 
Seet Ai Mee 
1991 Dr. Aline Wong Kan Lai- 3 2 
Chung, Mrs., Yu -foo Yee 
Shoon 
1992 Dr. Aline Wong Kan Lai- 2 Dr. Kanwaijit Soin 1 3 
Chung, Mrs., Yu -foo Yee 
1997 
Shoon, 
Dr. Aline Wong Kan Lai 3 Dr. Lee Tsao Yuan, Mdm 2 5 
Chung, Mrs. Yu -Foo Yee Claire Chang 
Shoop, Dr. Lily Neo, 
TOTAL 13 3 16 
1959 -1997 
The questioning of executive policy preferences in the budget debate is somewhat 
influenced by the size of the executive in comparison to the parliament as a whole. As 
illustrated in Table 4.5, the executive comprises slightly more than one -third of MPs 
since at least 1988 and if one includes members who were previously members of the 
executive, the proportion is much higher, averaging 46 per cent over the period 1988- 
1998 with peaks of 51 per cent in 1988 and 1996 -97. This obviously enhances executive 
influence over the legislature. 
The budget sitting of the Singapore parliament is divided into two sections; the budget 
speech by the Minister for Finance which includes a general house response and the 
detailed review of estimates by the parliament sitting as a Committee of the Whole. 
Although the budget sitting undoubtedly includes some pre -set pieces and Dorothy 
Dixers, and is additionally inhibited by the self -regulating behaviour of MPs in relation 
to core political issues, it is a surprisingly open forum. The speaker is now generous in 
See: "Women's place in the House ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 18 December 1993, P. 14 
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allowing debate and time constraints are minimal; in 1997, 40 hours of debate was 
allowed and in 1998, 60 hours.152 This is, however, a recent trend. Previous budget 
debates under Goh Chok Tong governments were much shorter; 7 hours in 1991,'sá 
and 1992,' 12 hours in 1994,'55 but approximately 30 hours in 1993 when a goods and 
services tax was introduced and major changes made to CPF arrangements'. In the 
1998 budget sitting 465 questions -on -notice were received by ministers, 93 of these 
from NMPs. This is also a recent phenomena. In 1991, 27 MPs placed questions on 
notice157; in 1992, 15'58; in 1993, 15'59; in 1994, 34.'60 Data for more recent sittings is not 
available. 
In the course of the budget debate, ministers will agree to some policy changes from 
MPs usually on technical issues, will commit to the establishment of new committees 
to investigate policy issues and will offer committee memberships to MPs on ministry 
committees; there is considerable debate characteristic of intra -party dialogues in other 
"Relief for some, anxiety for others ", The Straits Times, 28 March 1998, p. 14 
"Finance minister warns against overheating of economy", Straits Times Weekly Edition 16 March 1991, p. 1 
'" "Slowdown no cause for alarm: Dr Hu ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 14 March 1992, p. 1 
'ss 
"Who's that talking? That s Hu ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 12 March 1994, p. 4 
156 See: "93 Budget Debate ", Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, 13 March 1993, pp. I, 4-6; Straits Times 
Overseas Weekly Edition, 20 March 1993, pp. 4 -5. As the budget sittings were shared with several pieces of non- 
budget legislation, it is estimated that the maximum time allowed for budget debate was 30 hours. 
Is' "Finance minister warns against overheating of economy ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 16 March 1991, p. 1 
"'' 
"Affordable health care package unveiled ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 21 March 1992, p. 1 
159 "93 Budget Debate ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 20 March 1993, p. 4 
'fio "Budget surpluses 'attract investments ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 12 March 1994, p. 1 
Table 4.5: Number of Sitting Singaporean MPs with Executive Service: 19884998161 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Mean 
CATEGORY OF 
MINISTER 
Cabinet Minister bs 15 13 13 14 15 15 14 14 16 16 16 15 
Senior Minister of State - 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 3 3 2 
Minister of State 4 5 5 5 4 5 7 4 2 1 5 5 
Senior 5 4 4 3 2 2 2 3 3 5 2 3 
Parliamentary Secretary 
Parliamentary Secretary 3 2 2 2 4 4 4 3 4 2 3 3 
Political Secretary - - - - 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
TOTAL 27 26 26 26 30 31 30 27 29 29 30 28 
TOTAL ELECTED MPs16i 76 82 81 81 81 81 79 79 79 79 83 80 
MPs IN CURRENT 36% 32% 32% 32% 37% 38% 38% 34% 37% 37% 36% 35% 
EXECUTIVE 
Number of Current MPs 
with Service in Previous 
12 7 7 7 8 6 9 11 11 11 5 9 
Executives 
°/u OF MPs IN 51% 40% 41% 41% 47% 46% 49% 48% 51% 51% 42% 46% 
PARLIAMENT WITH 
EXECUTIVE SERVICE 
16' Data has been collated from the January edition of the Singapore Government Directory in each year from 1988 -1998 
162 Includes Acting Ministers 
161 NMI's and NCMPs are not included as they cannot vote on money bills. 
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jurisdictions.' In 1993', 1996 and 1998, MPs, including NTUC affiliated MPs 
criticised the government over the inadequacy of taxation measures and retraining, 
with the government agreeing to reconsider retraining policy." However, on key 
policies the executive is usually unyielding, agreeing at most to consult further. For 
example, in 1998 there was considerable pressure from some backbenchers for the 
government to pump- prime the economy'', but the Minister for Finance would not 
agree, although the government later supplemented the budget with several such 
measures. In 1996, the Minister for Law rejected a request from NMP Walter Woon 
Cheong Ming to allow the courts to award costs to defendants acquitted in criminal 
cases." This is a time for careful and good -natured criticism of the executive, an 
opportunity for MPs to broaden the executive's view of particular issues of concern to 
the electorate and for PAP MPs to demonstrate to particular constituencies that they 
are aware of bread and butter issues and will champion these to a limited degree. 
Although in Singapore the legislature is not a forum for deliberation and compromise 
among diverse political forces as is general in liberal democracies,169 the legislature is 
beginning to have some influence. It may achieve many small changes at the margin, 
raise executive awareness of some issues and maintain pressure on policy issues 
between particular interest groups and the executive, such as business taxes. But it 
does not have a role in the substantive review of executive performance or core policy 
preferences which are pre -determined by the PAP's ideological and hegemonic 
framework, but principally by executive preference. 
This parliamentary review of the budget has, since 1995 been supplemented by non- 
parliamentary fora. The Minister for Finance appears on a special one -hour television 
interview to review the major aspects of the budget and to react to questions from a 
panel, and reactions to the budget, following it receiving presidential assent, are 
assessed by the Feedback Unit in closed door sessions with its resource panels and 
several selected focus groups and the outcomes reported to cabinet, with selected 
outcomes, usually dominated by positive responses, reported to the media. Given the 
constant surpluses, the fact that budgets contain many welfare benefits and that 
166 Insight column, The Straits Times, 28 March 1998, p. 14 
'Dr Hu rejects MPs calls for tax concessions ", Straits Times Weekly, I3 March 1993, p. 4 
166 See: "Reduction in personal income tax 'disappointing"' and "Govt urged to do more to retrain those retrenched ", 
The Straits Tunes Weekly Edition, 14 March 1998, p. 5; "MPs praise budget but still find it lacking in several areas ", 
The Straits Times, 12 March 1996 
16' 
"Dr Hu praised for not spending more of the surplus now ", The Straits Times Weekly Edition, I4 March 1998, p. 5 
168 "No costs for those acquitted of crime ", The Straits Times, 13 March 1996 
169 For example, as revealed by the work of Lijphart and Przeworski. See: Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of 
Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984; Adam 
Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, 
New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991 
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Table 4.6: Goh Chok Tong 
and Lee Kuan Yew Governments 
Hours Of Debate in Budget Sittings 1980 -82 And 1988 -19991'0 
Year Time taken (Hrs)' % Change per 
session from 1980172 
1998 55.5 +29 
1997 46.5 +8 
1996 51.5 +20 
1995 45 +5 
1994 45.5 +6 
1993 43.5 +1 
1992 39.75 -8 
1991 35 -19 
1990 48 +12 
1989 47 +9 
1988 50.75 +18 
1982 4525 +5 
1981 425 -1 
1980 43 
- 
Table 4.7: Goh Chok Tong 
and Lee Kuan Yew Governments 
Questions -On -Notice in Budget Sittings 
1991 -1999173 
Year Total Questions -On -Notice 
1998 465 
1997 300 
1996 417 
1995 330 
1994 34 
1993 15 
1992 15 
1991 27 
at least 74 per cent of Singaporeans pay no income tax,14 a positive response to budgets 
is not surprising.' 
10 Newslink database search, Straits Times, Business Times and New Paper, supplemented by data from the 
Singapore Parliamentary Debates. 
All sittings hours calculated directly from the relevant Hansards, except 1997 and 1998 which were taken from the 
SPH's Newslink database. 
"Z Using 1980 as the baseline. 
Newslink database search, Straits Times. Business Times and New Paper 
72 "No income tax for 74% of Singaporeans ", Straits Times Overseas Edition, 13 March 1993, p. 24. All 
Singaporeans pay tax through a 5 per cent GST and must also pay between 10 -20 per cent of gross income to the 
Central Provident Fund. 
177 "State welfarism, S'pore style ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 24 September 1994, p. 6 
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The budget debate, while the major forum for backbenchers putting views on policy 
priorities, is not the only opportunity for ordinary MPs to make their views known. 
Although prominent backbench dissenters, such as Dr. Toh Chin Chye, have received 
coverage in the press, many MPs hold strong views on some issues and are not 
concerned about minor conflicts with the executive. For example, some PAP 
backbenchers, such as Dr. Arthur Beng Kian Lam disapproved of the NMP scheme and 
continued to voice opposition to it after its introduction.t'6 
Parliamentary Committees and the Executive 
Parliamentary committees in Westminster systems are not a major impediment to 
executive power, particularly in unicameral legislatures. The Singaporean parliament 
has no standing committees other than the Public Accounts Committee, a number of 
procedural select committees and also uses ad hoc select committees for particular 
legislative or policy inquiries. The constitution makes no provision for parliamentary 
committees which are constituted under Standing Orders as the parliament sees fit to 
determine. 
The chairmen of committees, other than the GPCs, have extensive powers under 
standing orders and the Parliamentary Privileges Act to act against dissent or attacks 
on the government. Opposition members of select committees reported in interviews 
that the outcomes of select committees, on which the government necessarily has 
majority membership, are often presented at the beginning of meetings, with papers 
already printed and motions decided.' Committee discussion revolves around minor 
aspects of committee business and marginal issues, not core issues on which executive 
direction has already been given." 
The only standing committee, other than those concerned with parliamentary 
business', is the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) which has a brief to review 
executive action, particularly in terms of the drafting of the annual budget. This 
committee is usually chaired by a senior PAP backbencher and includes no members of 
the opposition. In interviews with civil servants and MPs, there was uniform 
agreement that between budgets the PAC is dormant.180 Although the PAC conducts 
hearings in association with the budget, no civil servant interviewed either in 1995 or 
1998, considered the PAC to play a significant part in policy determination or in setting 
budget priorities. Unlike Britain, the PAC actually conducts its limited hearings in the 
16 "Six new NMPs for Parliament ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 5 September 1992, p. 2 
Interviews with opposition MPs and politicians August-September 1998 
18 Interviews with Low Thia Khiang and Chiam See Tong, 1998 
The parliamentary business committees are: Standing Orders Committee, House Committee, Public Petitions 
Committee, and the Committee of Privileges, all chaired by the Speaker. 
Aso This was confirmed in both the1995 and 1998 interviews. 
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ministry buildings, not in the parliament building and only a very few, very senior 
civil servants appear before it.181 The most positive role played by the PAC was to be 
an advocate for particular minor policy issues and to make senior civil servants aware 
of the policy concerns of particular policy communities and constituency grassroots 
issues. There was, among those civil servants interviewed, no sense of them being 
accountable to the PAC or the parliament in any way. 
Although the parliamentary committee system may not directly lead to substantive 
change in executive policies, the PAP governments have used select committees as a 
validation and feedback mechanism on selected legislation and have accepted 
amendments from these committees.18z However, this practice has not been uniform, as 
is illustrated in Table 4.8 below and Chart 4.1. 
As can he seen from Table 4.8, the PAP government has used select committees 
consistently to review major legislation that is seen as being politically, economically or 
socially sensitive. It has not generally referred public sector, internal security, police, 
armed forces, foreign policy or core economic policies for review by select committees. 
For example, only five public sector management bills have been referred, all for 
statutory bodies, the most recent of which was in 1979.183 This did not include referral 
of the legislation for the Economic Development Board, the National Science and 
Technology Board, the Productivity and Standards Board or any major boards except 
for the Housing and Development Board (colonial era legislation), the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (1973) and for amendments to the Singapore Broadcasting 
Authority Act in 1979. Rather, select committees have been used as a community 
consultation mechanism to solicit the views of particular groups on limited pieces of 
legislation, mainly economic and social legislation, changes to the constitution and 
regulation of particular professions. This has not, however, followed a consistent 
pattern, as illustrated in Chart 4.1 below. 
Under successive Lee Kuan Yew governments, select committee review of legislation 
declined continuously from1959 -1984, during which year only two pieces of legislation 
were referred for review. However, the widespread accusations of the lack of 
consultation with the private sector made against the government following the 1985 
181 The building in which the Singapore parliament is housed is a small colonial era building which is more like the 
town hall of a small town than a national parliament Moreover, it is hidden away in a side street between the Victoria 
Concert Hall and the far more imposing Supreme Court and City Hall buildings. The building has no facilities for 
committee meetings, public or closed hearings and lacks all of the amenities normally associated with a national 
parliament. The new parliament complex, due for completion in 2000, will remedy this. 
'One recent case of policy making in which a select committee played a prominent role is detailed in: Ho Khai 
Leong, "The Politics of Problem Definition and Agenda Setting in Singapore ", Asian Journal of Political Science, 3, 
2, December 1995, pp. 66 -89, particularly pp. 70 -75 
'83 Report of the Select Committee on the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation Bill [Bill no.31/79 79] : presented to 
Parliament on 28th November, 1979 
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economic recession, which the above figures substantiate, combined with other factors, 
appears to have led to a resurgence in the use of select committees since then.tat 
The other factors influencing a greater use of parliamentary committees, and through 
them greater citizen consultation, were almost certainly the 13 per cent drop in PAP 
votes and the loss of two seats in the 1984 general elections due, at least in part to 
proposals to introduce policies to reduce the retirement age,tte increase streaming and 
mandatory ethnic language instruction' in schools, to provide highly discriminatory 
tax, educational and housing advantages to graduate women who had two or more 
'" There has, until relatively recently, been a poor relationship between the PAP, the civil service and local business, 
particularly small to medium enterprises (SMEs). Many business men, including foreign executives, criticised the 
PAP government for contributing towards the 1985 recession by allowing unit labour costs to increase by 40 per cent 
from 1980 -85, maintaining CFP contributions at too high a level, maintaining a: strong currency regardless of general 
economic circumstances, not providing sufficient resources for manpower development particularly in post- 
secondary education and continuing to ignore SMEs as a potential contributor to economic growth. All of these 
policies were challenged by the government s own analysis of the causes of the recession. See: V. G. Kulkami, 
"Singapore's Ills are Mostly Its Own Work ", Far East Economic Review, 26 September, 1985, pp. 104 -105; Robert 
Cottrell, "The Alter of Change ", Far East Economic Review, 16 January, 1986, p. 82; Philip Bowring, "New market 
Road ", Far East Economic Review, 27 March, 1986, pp. 72 -77; Nigel Holloway, "Guidelines for Flexibility ", Far 
East Economic Review, 1 January 1987, p. 55 
This policy was proposed by the Committee on the Problems of the Aged, chaired by Health Minister How Yoon 
Chang. The sensitivity of this issue was that the traditional retirement age, to which access to CPF funds was linked, 
was 55 years. Many people were suspicious that the governments real rationale for increasing the retirement age was 
to stop access to CPF funds so that these could continue to be directed to infrastructure development 
86 Following the implementation of the Goh Committee report on educational reform in 1978, a national streaming 
system was introduced to replace the previous British Eleven Plus style curriculum structure. Associated with this 
was a policy of forcing children to learn both a mandated mother tongue and English, the mother tongue being 
mandated as the language of the ethnic group of the father. All Chinese, regardless of dialect, were mandated as 
having to learn Mandarin and a policy of actively suppressing dialects was pursued. None of these policies were 
popular. 
180 Ross Worthington 
children's and concomitant large increases in HDB flat prices in 1981.1' This was also 
probably influenced in part by considerable backbench criticism of executive arrogance 
and failure to consult, albeit muted criticism, at the same time that similar criticisms 
were being made by the private sector. This coincided with the rise of the current 
leadership generation dominated by Administrative Service and SAF officers, which in 
its early policy choices acted as autonomous bureaucrats rather than politicians. It has 
since adopted a more consultative approach. Despite the increase in the use of select 
committees since 1985, their activity does not approach that evident under the colonial 
regime, 1956-1963, although the amount of legislation is now considerably greater. 
Rather than use standing committees of the parliament to monitor particular policy 
areas, the PAP government has resorted to its preferred technique of relying upon an 
extra -parliamentary mechanism which can be more readily controlled; the Government 
Parliamentary Committee (GPC), established in 1987 as an initiative by Goh Chok 
18' The graduate mothers policy was a eugenically oriented program to supposedly encourage an increase in highly 
intelligent children. It was always very unpopular, particularly given that over 40 per cent of the population had not 
completed secondary school, let alone attended university, and therefore resented any further special favours being 
provided to those whom they saw as already being highly advantaged. 
188 HDB flat prices increased three time between 19804981, impacting adversely on new home buyers. These 
policies were introduced seemingly in ignorance of their political and social impact. 
Table 4.8: Singapore Parliament - Select Committees 1955 -1997 
Analysis of Business 
Period Total 
Cttees 
Total 
Legislation 
Considered 
Economic and 
Business 
Legislation 
Social 
Legislation 
69 
Political 
Legislation 
Regulation of 
Professions/ 
Employment 
Criminal Law 
and Policing 
Others Public Sector 
Management 
1993 -1996 11 11 5 4 2 
1989 -1992 9 9 2 1 4 1 1 
1985 -1988 10 10 5 1 2 1 1 
1981 -1984 
1977 -1980 
2 
6 
2 
6 
2 
2 2 1 1190 
1973 -1976 11 11 3 1 2 l'9' 
1969 -1972 10 10 3 2 1 3 1 
1965 -1968 14 14 9 5 
1960 -19631 2019' 24 3 7 4 3 3 2 21va 
1956 -1959195 25 25 5 6 4 4 1 4 1196 
TOTALS 118 122 39 : 29 17 15 10 7 5 
/o of legislation 100% 32% 24% 14% 12% 8% %' 4% 
M9 Includes the regulation of religious activity, education, health, housing, media and general social control. 
19° Singapore Broadcasting Corporation Bill 
Urban Redevelopment Authority Bill 
191 In 1964, when Singapore was a state in the Federation of Malaysia, no select committees were appointed. 
'9) In 1962, a single select committee considered five pieces of legislation: Public Utilities, Local Government integration, Planning (Amendment), Pensions (amendment) and the Housing Development 
(Amendment) bills. The totals of the business considered is therefore four more than the number of committees listed. 
194 Tariff Advisory Commission (Amendment) Bill and the Housing Development (Amendment) Bill 
'9s One select committee was appointed in 1955, the first year of representative government. 
'9s Housing Development Bill 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
Chart 4.1 
Singapore Parliament 
- Select Committees 1956 -19961 
Total Committees 
1956 -1959 
1960 -1963 
1965 -1968 
1969 -1972 
1973 -1976 
1977 -1980 
1981 -1984 
1985 -1988 
1989 -1992 
1993 -1996 
Tong.198 The GPCs have three principal roles; training new executive recruits in 
particular policy areas, policy networking with co -opted hegemonic components of 
civil society, (mainly GROs) and maintaining backbench participation in policy issues 
through liaison with ministries and statutory boards as a backbench co -option and 
education strategy.tw The GPCs are not allowed to work with the GLC sector which is 
an exclusively executive domain. These committees are placed under the control of 
senior backbenchers, ex- ministers or trainee ministers. 
When the executive wishes to ensure absolute control of a policy issue, it usually 
chooses to establish extra -parliamentary committees to do so. It does this so as to 
provide such committees with an aura of not being totally PAP controlled and to also 
allow non -parliamentary experts and interest group representatives to be appointed, 
In 1955, the first year of representative government, the Legislative Assembly established one Select Committee. 
Previously, only two Select Committees had been established by the Legislative Council, in 1950 and 1954. In 1964, 
during the period in which Singapore was a state within Malaysia, no Select Committees were established by the 
Singapore parliament. For a full list of the select committee reports refer to Appendix 2. 
1" Initially nine GPCs were established, expanded to 10 in 1989 and by 1995 had stabilised at 11. All MPs are 
members of at least one GPC which are headed by senior backbenchers as chairman and deputy chairman and 
assisted by resource panels comprising people chosen from academic, business and community organisations. The 
GPC's roughly conform to the ministries they are supposed to shadow. In 1998 they comprised the GPCs for 
Communications, Community Development, Defence and Foreign Affairs, Education, Environment, Finance, Trade 
and industry, Health, Home Affairs and Law, Information and the Arts, Labour and National Development. Until 
June 1995, GPC chairman were appointed by the prime minister, but since that time have been elected by the 
committee members themselves. Members nominate up to six committees on which they wish to serve and maybe 
appointed to two. Initial allocation is done by the PAP executive committee and approved by the prime minister. See: 
"Changes made to GPCs ", Straits Times, ] 6 July 1995, p. 3 
Chun Tsung Mien, "Cheng Bock: CiPCs seek change to make things better ", Straits Times, 22 July 1995, p 33 
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usually from co -opted organisations under cadre or proto -cadre control. Such 
committees have included the Economic Committee, established in 1985 to address the 
recession, the Review Committee on National Health Policies in 1991, the Committee to 
Promote Enterprise Overseas in 1993, the Cost Review Committee, the National 
Information Technology Committee and the Singapore 21 Committee in 1996 and the 
Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness in 1997. These major committees usually 
have a cabinet minister chairing them and may have the prime minister or a deputy 
prime minister as an adviser. For example, Rear Admiral (NS) Teo Chee Hean chairs 
the National IT Committee, which since November 1998 comprises three ministers, 
four permanent secretaries, the CEO of the EDB and has Lee Hsien Loong as adviser. 
In a limited number of cases, standing committee, based in the ministries, chaired by a 
minister and including other ministers and permanent secretaries, such as the Inter - 
Ministerial Committee on the Aging Population, are established 200 Of course, many 
committees internal to the civil service are also established and conduct no public 
consultations until firm policy positions are approved by the political executive, if ever. 
Two such contemporary committees are the Inter- Ministerial Committee on Energy 
which monitors energy supply policy in particular and the Inter- Ministerial Committee 
on National Education which oversights implementation of the National Education 
program.201 In recent years in the economic policy domain, industry based committees 
have been increasingly used because of the necessity of having experienced talented 
business people dominate them. This has been the case with the Finance Sector Review 
Group and its committees202 
Equally, there is a reluctance to establish standing committees of the parliament which 
may develop a power base and agenda of their own. These have been replaced by 
advisory councils under the chairmanship of ministers, such as the Advisory Councils 
on Culture and the Arts, Youth and on Family and the Aged 203 all established by Goh 
Chok Tong when he was still First Deputy Prime Minister in 1988. The need for 
standing committees is also reduced by the existence of a network of statutory 
advisory bodies established throughout the public service and directly under civil 
service control, such as the National Council of Social Service, Singapore Sports 
Council, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS) and others. 
200 This committee is based in the Ministry of Community Development and has its own civil service secretariat. 
However, because of the political sensitivities of its terms of reference, in late 1998 it was chaired by the Minister for 
Communications rather than the Minister for Community Development, who was only a member. 
201 These internal committees are rarely mentioned in the press as the civil service places great emphasis on secrecy, 
although there is no apparent need for it in most cases. 
202 Corporate Finance Committee, "Consultative Paper on the Securities Market ", SES Journal, June 1998, pp. 15 -22 
203 Originally established as the Advisory Council on the Aged, but replaced by the National Advisory Council on the 
Family and the Aged. Aging policy issues, in 1998 -1999 were being addressed by the Inter- Ministerial Committee on 
the Ageing Population. 
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The only house committee that is required to consult with the electorate is the 
committee established to consider and make recommendations on Nominated 
Members of Parliament. These committees call for nominations from the general 
public, but the response is usually small and dominated by nominations by 
organisations. For example, in 1992, only 10 nominations for NMP positions were 
received from the public 204 
The Singapore parliament is not a particularly active legislature, although it appears to 
have become much more so under Goh Chok Tong, and with the completion of the 
new parliament building, may become even moreso. Minchin describes it, between 
1961 -1981 when there were no opposition members, as being virtually irrelevant and 
he is undoubtably largely correct, although one should not underrate the value of the 
legitimation function exercised merely by the legislature's existence and the exercise of 
regular elections 205 However, even after the election of opposition members, the 
parliament was of marginal significance in the governance of the state. 
Under Goh, its significance appears to be growing as it is within the party organisation 
and the legislature that he has his strongest support base. The number of sittings of the 
legislature since 1990 has grown and the time allocated to debate is longer as 
demonstrated in Table 4.9 below, although 1997, the year following the last elections, 
saw a significant decrease in legislative sessions. 
It would seem that under Goh Chok Tong, the parliament is gaining increased 
importance or, at the very least, increased exposure and political participation. 
However, it is still not the dominant forum for policy debate, although it has certainly 
become more vocal in debating at least the more administrative aspects of government. 
This indicates that the parliament is still seen as only one of many mechanisms for 
policy consultation and validation by the executive, albeit in its contemporary form, 
one that is increasingly consulted. 
The contemporary Singaporean legislature is different from those of the Lee years, in 
terms of activity and influence, and it has the potential to contribute much more to the 
governance of Singapore if the political executive allows. Compared to other 
Westminster style legislatures, even Malaysia's, the Singaporean legislature is only a 
shadow of its institutional potential. Without an effective opposition, the Singapore 
parliament functions more like a party caucus than a legislature and backbenchers 
remain on the fringes of the core executive. 
204 "Six new NMPs for Parliament ", .Straits Times Weekly Edition, 5 September 1992, p. 2 
2°5 James Minchin, No Man is an Island. A Portrait of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, I990, 
pp. 218 -219 
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Table 4.9: Singapore Governments 
Total Parliamentary Sittings 1990 -1998 
YEAR Jan Feb Mar 
1998 2 2 10 
1997.47 
1996 2 2 9 
1995 1 10 
1994 5 1 10 
1993 
1992 5 2 10 
1991 3 4 10 
1990 
Sittings Per Calendar Month 
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec TOTAL 
1 2 1 1 1 1 4 
I 4 10 
4 1 1 3 1 
2 1 1 1 3 
3 2 1 2 
2 1 1 2 3 3 
2 
1 
1 
25 
15 
24 
20 
26 
13 
17 
17 
1 1 10 
The Executive and Legislation 
Macro -control of the parliament does not necessarily guarantee full control of the 
legislature to the executive however. The executive has also implemented control over 
legislation in two ways: through control of the governing party as discussed above, 
and through particular constitutional, legislative and parliamentary procedural 
provisions which emasculate the ability of the legislature to effectively challenge 
legislation or review its implementation. 
All bills approved by the parliament, must under article 78(1) be 'immediately' sent to 
the Presidential Council for Minority Rights (PCMR) for the certification of the council 
before being sent to the president for assent. Administratively this is a simple matter as 
the CIerk of the Parliament is the secretary to the PCMR, so he effectively sends the bill 
to himself in another capacity. 
The PCMR, established in 1973 206 is a review body ostensibly charged with ensuring 
that no legislation discriminates unfairly against any minority ethnic or religious 
group. Its function is to "...consider and report on such matters affecting persons of any 
racial or religious community as may be referred to the Council by parliament or the 
Government. "2D3 This is done by the council certifying whether or not particular 
legislation is or is not a 'differentiating measure' as defined in Article 68210 or required 
Budget sittings are traditionally in March as the financial year conforms to that of the United States and Japan; 1 
April -30 March, rather than the British financial year, I July -30 June. Thus the March sittings are usually the longest 
in the parliamentary year. 
20' New parliament following elections. 
ÓÁ Act No. 3 of 1973. This act abolished the Presidential Council which had previously existed and which had a 
broad charter to review legislation. As three cabinet ministers sat on this council, it did nothing to review executive 
action. The PCMR replaced the Presidential Council. 
09 Article 76(1) of the Constitution 
210 Article 68 defines a `differentiating measure' as "...any measure which is, or is likely in its practical application to 
be, disadvantageous to persons of any racial or religious community and not equally disadvantageous to persons of 
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by Article 77, although under Article 80(5), if the council provides no response within 
30 days, it is automatically assumed that it has no objections. PCMR membership is 
controlled by the executive and dominated by the political executive. In July 1998 of 
the 17 members (including the chair), 14 were present or past PAP parliamentarians or 
ministers, present or serving bureaucrats or N IJC officials and of the members for life, 
PAP affiliates form a majority, including the present and past prime ministers21 
Questions of membership of the council may be heard by a tribunal, in private without 
recourse to appeal, thus ensuring continued executive control of membership n2 
Members of the council must take the oaths of allegiance and secrecy before assuming 
office.u3 
The PCMR is supposed to consider all legislation, including subsidiary legislation, 
except money bills, those concerned with the defence and security of Singapore and 
those certified as urgent by the prime minister. Bills designated as urgent by the prime 
minister must be forwarded to the council for its consideration as soon as practicable ?t4 
However, although the council is not compelled to meet it regularly does so as shown 
in Table 4.10. If the council fails to respond to legislation provided to it, within 30 days 
for bills and 14 days215 for subsidiary legislation]', the parliament or the referring 
minister may assume that there are no objections with the legislation and it is 
automatically forwarded to the president for assent 21' 
other such communities, either directly by prejudicing persons of that community or indirectly by giving advantage to 
persons of another community." 
21 The PCMR comprises a chairman appointed for three years, a maximum of 10 members appointed for life, a 
maximum of 10 members appointed for three years, based on qualifications and restrictions identical to those 
applying to members of the Council of Presidential Advisers (CPA). Members appointed for three years may be re- 
appointed. Members temporarily incapable of participating in the council may be replaced for the period of the 
incapacity (Article 70 of the Constitution). The 10 life members include Goh Chock Tong, Prof. S. Jayakumar 
(Minister for Law), S. Dhanabalan (ex- minister), Lee Kuan Yew, Dr, Gob Keng Swee, Othman bin Wok, H. R. 
Hochstadt, (chairman of a GLC) Prof. Lim Chong Yah (Vice -Chancellor, NUS), Oscar Oliveiro (ex- NTUC), Dr_ 
Andrew Chew (ex -Head of Civil Service and now Chairman, Public Service hoard). All are PAP cadre members 
except Dr. Chew who has no need to be a cadre as his status within the PAP establishment is much higher than most 
PAP cadres 
. See: Singapore Government Directory July 1998, Singapore, Ministry of Information and the Arts, 
1998, p. 848 -9; and Republic of Singapore Government Gazette, 40, 32, 10 July 1998, p. 4331 and p. 4337 
232 Article 75 of the Constitution 
2" Singapore Association of Women Lawyers, You and the Law. Singapore, Singapore Association of Women 
Lawyers, 1989, p. 31 
216 Article 79 of the Constitution 
215 Articles 77 and 80(1) of the Constitution require all subsidiary legislation to be referred to the council and must be 
sent by the relevant minister within 14 days of publication. The fact that the minister can actually publish the 
subsidiary legislation in the Government Gazette before it receives PCMR approval indicates the irrelevance of the 
council. 
216 The government may also make referrals to the council. Such referrals must be made by a minister. (Article 76(2) 
of the Constitution) 
217 The council must report back to the Speaker within 30 days (Article 78(2) ) unless an extension has been granted 
by the Speaker (Article 78(4) ), or in the case of a government referral of subsidiary legislation, to the minister within 
14 days. If the council fails to provide such a report, it may be assumed that the council "is of the opinion that no 
provision of the bill would, if enacted, be a differentiating measure. "(Article 78(5) for legislation and Article 80(5) 
for subsidiary legislation); the Speaker must table all reports from the PCMR in the parliament for the information 
and consideration of members (Article 78(5)); an adverse report by the PCMR may be over -ridden by a two-thirds 
majority vote of the parliament and the relevant bill sent to the President for assent without the Speaker's certification 
that it has not been found to be a differentiating measure by the PCMR. 
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If the council does respond with an adverse report, a vote by two- thirds of the 
parliament can override it 218 However, given that the council is controlled by the 
executive, the only way in which a conflict between it and the legislature could arise is 
if the parliament is under the control of a non -PAP government. Following assent, the 
legislation still has no force until the date it is published in the Government Gazette, or 
some other date stipulated within that particular legislation or some other over -riding 
legislation219 The executive can withhold the legislation from becoming law simply by 
not publishing it in the Government Gazette and there is no way for them to be 
compelled to publish it, even by the legislature, except through a vote of no confidence 
and resort to the polls to decide the issue. 
The council's meetings are convened by the chairman only," operate on rules of 
procedure developed by the council and approved by the President221, are conducted in 
private, and decisions are made by simple majority voting in which the chairman 
cannot exercise a casting vote. Tied votes are lost 22a Members are paid an honorarium, 
the rate of which the council itself establishes!' 
The prime minister, ministers, ministers of State and parliamentary secretaries 
authorised by the prime minister may attend and participate in council meetings, but 
may not vote, thus providing an avenue for direct executive influence on the council, 
in addition to that already exerted." This provision also allows the executive 
representatives on the council to exercise a proxy if they cannot attend a meeting, by 
substituting another executive member. The council must annually provide a report on 
its activities to the president who must table that report in the parliament.' Since its 
establishment in 1973 the Council has made no adverse findings on legislation referred 
to it 227 
ux Article 78 (6)(c)). If an adverse report is provided by the Council, the minister must amend or revoke the 
offending provision within six months and publish the change in the gazette (Article 80(4)) 
vs Following assent and gazetting, all legislation is kept under constant technical review by the Law Revision 
Commissioners who ensure that acts are regularly updated and published to reflect all amendments. The government 
pays particular attention to ensuring that legislation is current and accurately documented in both print and electronic 
form. 
0 Article 82 
Article 88. Article 92 also allows the President in his own discretion to make rules "for the conduct of business 
between the Council and the parliament and between the Council and an authority empowered to make subsidiary 
legislation..." 
222 Article 84 
V3 Article 83 
u° In 1999 the honorarium was $200 per month for the chairman and $120 per month for each member. This data was 
based on confidential interviews with civil servants. 
Article 87 
u` Article 89 
207 As revealed in an analysis of reports. See also: Helena H. M. Chan, The Legal System of Singapore, Singapore, 
Butterworths, 1995, p.39 
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In June 1988, the Parliamentary Elections Act was amended to provide the PCMR with 
an additional function; to nominate the members of the Malay Community Committee 
and the Indian and Other Minority Communities Committee which are responsible for 
certifying the suitability of any member of their communities standing for election as a 
member of a Group Representative Constituency team.' The PCMR has absolute 
discretion on whom it consults with on such nominations, thus ensuring that these 
committees remain firmly under executive and PAP control. A similar responsibility 
for the appointment of members of the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony 
was placed upon the PSMR by the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act in 1991 229 
Details of the council's activities are provided in Table 4.10 below. 
Discussions with those familiar with the PCMR has revealed that the council meets 
regularly, although its meetings are not long, the longest in recent years having been 90 
minutes; that many members do not regularly attend and executive substitutions are 
not unusual '0 Most meetings of the council last approximately 30 minutes. The 
members of the council do not peruse the mass of legislation with which they are 
supposed to deal, but are provided with a list of legislation and rely upon the advice of 
the Clerk of the Parliament who is the secretary to the council. The council has no staff 
to assist it in assessing legislation or advising it on legislation. The council's meetings 
are usually organised as part of a series of meetings of senior government members. As 
the quorum is eight members, the non -government members are not required to 
appear for meetings to be convened and it is reported that they often do not. It is 
obvious from the table above, that the PCMR in all likelihood does not discuss 
legislation at its meetings except in a superficial fashion. For example, in 1998, in 
considering 372 pieces of legislation, the council would have allocated approximately 
1.1 minutes per piece on average. 
In reality, the PCMR is two files in the office of the Clerk of Parliament; one marked 
"Referrals to PCMR" and one marked "Reports from the PCMR "; until a non -PAP 
government takes power, the later will always remain supportive of all legislation 
referred to the council which has no reason to consider or deliberate on legislation. The 
PCMR is a paper tiger, albeit a symbolically important one, whose only real role may 
be to provide a semblance of institutional support for minority rights to meet 
international treaty obligations and domestic political realities and to maintain 
additional PAP control over legislation, especially its racial integration, housing, 
language, education and labour market policies in the event of it losing power or at 
22s Parliamentary Elections Act, ss.27(B)(C) 
'29 Chapter 167(A) of the Maintenance of Religious harmony Act 
2" Interview April 1999. The informant cannot be named as this information may breach the Official Secrets Act. 
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Table 4.10: Presidential Council For Minority Rights 
Analysis Of Meetings 1981 -1998' 
Year No. Total Time Amount of Amount of s.76 Adverse 
Meeting Taken by Legislation Subsidiary Referrals Reports 
s PCMR' Referred Legislation zu 
Referred 
1998 11 5.5 hours 656 307 0 0 
1997 6 3 hours 15 267 0 0 
1996 9 4.5 hours 35 223 0 0 
1995 9 4.5 hours 41 223 0 0 
1994 8 4 hours 18 Not 0 0 
Reported' 
1993 7 3.5 hours 29 Not Reported 0 0 
1992 7 3.5 hours 21 Not Reported 0 0 
1991 8 4 hours 33 Not Reported 0 0 
1990 5 25 hours 19 Not Reported 0 0 
1989 5 2.5 hours 28 Not Reported 0 0 
1988 7 3.5 hours 23 Not Reported 0 0 
1987 8 4 hours 23 Not Reported 0 0 
1986 5 2.5 hours 19 Not Reported 0 0 
1985 4 2 hours 14 Not Reported 0 0 
1984 5 2.5 hours 27 Not Reported 0 0 
1983 4 2 hours 19 Not Reported 0 0 
1982 5 2.5 hours 25 Not Reported 0 0 
1981 4 2 hours 26 Not Reported 0 0 
TOTALS 117 585 hours 480 - NIL NIL 
least the two- thirds majority necessary to change the constitution. It is yet another 
reserve safety mechanism. It plays no genuine role in safeguarding the rights of 
minorities as the political need to do this is so obvious and compelling that no political 
party could ignore it and survive in government without considerable social upheaval. 
The council otherwise has no particular function; it is barely mentioned in studies of 
ethnicity in Singapore' and conclusions about its functions are often erroneous; even 
Minchin, a particularly well informed commentator, assumed that the council had a 
genuine review function.' Hill and Lian for example, concluded that "The Council is a 
Data is derived from the Report of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, 1981 -1998 
vz Based on an average meeting of 30 minutes. 
°' These are referrals, other than legislation or subsidiary legislation, that are made to the council by the Speaker on 
behalf of the parliament, or a minister on behalf of the government, as provided for by s.76 of the constitution. The 
possibility of the parliament or the government referring a government or parliamentary measure to the council to 
which it objects is a logical absurdity under the parliamentary arrangements which have existed for 34 years, 
amounting to the parliament or the government objecting to its own policy and then asking itself to resolve it. Perhaps 
Alice in Wonderland is compulsory reading for potential PAP parliamentary candidates or the Parliamentary 
Counsel? 
234 27 of these acts comprised a body of legislation that was still in force on 9 January 1970 as permitted, but not 
required, by Article 81(1) of the constitution. 
us It can be assumed through a review of the Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation, that several hundred pieces 
of subsidiary legislation have been referred to the council each year. 
ne For example, the following studies of ethnicity in Singapore either do not mention the council or do not discuss or 
analyses its role in any detail: Chew Sock Foon, Ethnicity and Nationality in Singapore, Athens (Ohio), International 
Centre for International Studies Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1987; Ong Jin Hui, Tong Chee Kiong and Tan 
Em Ser, eds., Understanding Singapore Society, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1997; Wan Hussin Zoohri, The 
Singapore Malays: The Dilemma of Development, Singapore, Singapore Malay Teachers Union, 1990;Ooi Giok 
Ling, Sharon Siddique and Soh Kay Cheng, The Management of Ethnic Relations in Public Housing Estates, 
Singapore, The Institute of Policy Studies, 1993. 
O See: James Minchin, No man is an Island: A portrait of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 
1990, p. 218 
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non -elected advisory body of eminent citizens who can debate policies affecting a 
minority and act as a check on new legislation. "' And Quah, the most prolific 
Singaporean writer on public administration also assumes that it actually examines 
bills.2 Tham asserts that the council has powers that "add force' to the governments 
social cohesion policy framework.240 Many of the eminent citizens don't even attend 
meetings regularly and to be deemed eminent, it is helpful if one was at one time, or is, 
an eminent member of the PAP or at least a PAP proto- cadre. The membership is 
substantially PAP controlled and aligned, it has no desire or freedom to contest 
legislation and there is no evidence that it debates any policy issues; its genuine 
function lies within the group of institutional reserve control strategies. 
Executive Autonomy and Law Making: Subsidiary Legislation20.' 
As in all other jurisdictions, public management in Singapore is heavily dependent on 
subsidiary legislation; indeed in the case of Singapore it has been termed pervasive.2 
Subsidiary legislation is so voluminous that it has its own gazette!' The general 
rationale for the use of subsidiary legislation is that by empowering ministers and 
others to make regulations and rules within the general constraints of an act in force, it 
saves times, allows for trial and error in the practical implementation of policy, 
increases administrative flexibility and does not waste the time of the legislature in 
having it consider procedural matters with which it has already dealt with in the 
greater substance of the parent legislation. While this may be the administrative reality, 
the political reality is that subsidiary legislation allows the executive to make laws 
without having to seek the approval of the parliament or the president in any 
meaningful way. 
Ministers have substantial power to make and administer subordinated or delegated 
legislation. In Singapore, the general legislative approach is for the minister, board or 
authority to have the power to make subsidiary legislation, but notification of such 
regulations is done by the relevant permanent secretary,' or chief executive in the case 
23e Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore, Routledge, 
London, 1995, p. 64 
us Jon S. T. Quah, "Singapore's model of development. Is it transferable ? ", in Henry S. Rowen, ed., Behind East 
Asian Growth: The political and social foundations of prosperity, London, Routledge, 1998, pp. 105 -125, p. 113 
Zw Tham Seong Chee, "Values and National Development in Singapore", Asian Journal of Political Science, 3, 2, 
1995, pp. 1 -14, p. 4 
2 
"I For a general discussion of subsidiary legislation in Singapore, see: M. P. Jain, Administrative Law of Malaysia 
and Singapore, 2nd ed., Malayan Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur, 1989, Chapters V, VI and VII 
252 M. P. Jain, Administrative Law of Malaysia and Singapore, 2nd ed., Malayan Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur, 1989, 
p.60 
zII Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement 
Zu As allowed for under s.35 of the Interpretation Act 1985 and the Delegation of Powers (Consolidation) 
Notification 1990 
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of a board, although the minister cannot transfer his delegation to make regulations to 
the permanent secretary' 
Regulations are usually, but not in all cases, required to be published only after being 
made zn' there are few statutory requirements to consult on regulations with those 
affected', and regulations come into force on the day of publication - thus providing 
no warning to those affected and for which people can be charged ' There also 
appears to be a general principle in Singapore that ministers can make regulations 
retrospectively under the provisions of the Interpretation Act, regardless of whether 
this power is incorporated in the relevant parent act 249 It is not unusual for this power 
to legislate retrospectively, either through legislation or subsidiary regulation, to be 
used.' 
One significant example of subsidiary legislation is provided in the Statutes 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1997, first submitted to the parliament on 11 July 1997 
and subsequently enacted. This act empowers ministers to make subsidiary legislation 
in relation to 31 different pieces of existing legislation including: The Bills of Exchange 
Act, The Civil Law Act, The Companies Act, The Criminal Procedure Code, The 
Economic Development Board Act, the Evidence Act, The Official Secrets Act, The 
Planning Act, and The Prison Act among others.25f Virtually all significant legislation in 
Singapore includes a provision for the responsible minister to make subsidiary 
legislation. 
The use of subsidiary legislation has been criticised in many jurisdictions as being 
undemocratic and a key factor in the bureaucratisation of the state,' particularly when 
zas Under s.36(1) of the Interpretation Act 1985 
2°' Regulations are usually published in the Government Gazette, Subsidiary Legislation Supplement each Friday. 
26' Consultation requirements in Singapore are usually in relation to professional associations (e.g. The Dental Board 
in the case of the Dental Registration Act 1985) or statutory organisations, e.g. with the Economic Development 
Board under s.28, Economic Development Board Act 1992.ln contrast to the latter, there is no requirement for the 
minister to consult the Trade Development Board, the National Science and Technology Board or the Productivity 
and Standards Board under their respective legislation before making regulations. 
2°8 See: Jain, op. cit., pp.137 -140. 
2`9 See the discussion of the case of Attorney-General v Cold Storage (Singapore) Pte Ltd, in Jain, op. cit. p.94. The 
relevant provisions of the Interpretation Act 1985 are ss.23(2) and 28(2). 
as The Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 1988, contained provisions which applied retrospectively, 
including to a dead person found guilty of corruption, reflecting to some degree provisions in Australian and British 
legislation aimed at the confiscation of the proceeds of illicit drug sales. The Singapore legislation, however, does not 
allow the courts to exercise discretion in reversing the onus of proof inherent in these provisions, as does the English 
legislation. See: "The Government States its Case ", Asiaweek, 15 April 1988, p.I9 Likewise, regulations are also 
made with retrospective provisions e.g., the public service Board (Personnel Boards) (Amendment) Order 1998. This 
Order was made on 9 April 1998, but contained provisions for certain parts of the order to have effect from I April 
1998, 1 April 1997, 1 July 1996 and 1 September 1995. See: Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Subsidiary 
Legislation, 27 February 1998, p.851 
ss' The Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act , No. 6 of I997, Singapore, Government Printers 
2s2 See: Carleton Kemp Allen, Bureaucracy Triumphant, London, Oxford University Press, 1931; William W. Boyer, 
Bureaucracy on trial policy making by government agencies, Indianapolis, Bobbs -Merrill, 1964; William A. 
Niskanen, Bureaucracy 
- servant or master: lessons from America, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1973 
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used in association with 'skeleton legislation.u3 Although these arguments have 
increasingly been weakened by strategies to strengthen legislative oversight of 
subsidiary delegation in many jurisdictions,' the potential for subsidiary legislation to 
reinforce the autonomy of the executive is often a matter of concern, although this 
needs to be balanced with the valid needs of executive management of the state. In 
Singapore, although subsidiary legislation is subject to the ultra vires rule' and other 
technical constraints, there are few avenues for oversight or mechanisms for ensuring 
that subsidiary legislation does not infringe constitutional, individual and commercial 
rights. There is no constitutional provision for subsidiary legislation to lie before the 
parliament, although there are legislative requirements, depending on particular 
legislation. In Singapore, the technical oversight of subsidiary legislation generally 
rests with the courts and is provided by, among others the: 
1. Test of constitutional validity of the parent legislation or the subsidiary legislation; 
2. Provision in the Interpretation Act 1985 that subsidiary legislation cannot be 
inconsistent with the provisions of the parent act zsb and is not invalid if it cites an 
incorrect provision of the parent act as its derivation,' 
3. Requirement in the Interpretation Act 1985 that the courts take note of all relevant 
subsidiary legislation in making judgements 
4. Implied right of the courts to review subsidiary legislation except in those cases 
where a statute clearly removes this right zsv 
n3 Skeleton legislation is legislation that consists of only the most essential principles and procedures for achieving a 
policy goal and contains provisions which delegate extensive rule making powers to a person or body other than the 
legislature to the extent that the rule making power delegated equals or exceeds what would normally be included in 
legislation. In an extreme form, skeleton legislation can be so sparse in its provisions that policy making is effectively 
done by the party exercising the powers delegated by the legislation, thus removing the legislature totally from its 
policy making role. 
For example, see the arguments in defence of modem regulatory practice, particularly in Chapter 9 in: Donald 
Wittman, The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are Efficient, Chicago, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1995. In Britain and Australia for example, the national legislatures have been resourced and 
reformed to provide more effective oversight of subsidiary legislation. In the United Kingdom, all subsidiary 
legislation is reviewed by both the Delegated Legislation Committee in the House of Commons, the Joint Committee 
on Delegated Legislation and, in some respects, the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation- All 
these committees provide written and oral reports with recommendations to the parliament on all subsidiary 
legislation. 
us Literally, `without authority ". An act may be substantively ultra vires (i.e. in and of itself exceeds any authority 
given) or procedurally ultra vires (i.e. didn't follow the procedures which were specified in parent legislation). An 
act which is beyond the powers or authority of the person or organization which took it is, by this doctrine, an invalid 
act and cannot stand in law; e.g. a regulation that exceeds the power delegated by the parent act. This doctrine limits 
the powers exercised under subsidiary legislation so that they do not exceed the powers delegated or the powers 
incorporated in the parent legislation itself. Skilful drafting can circumvent this doctrine by simply allowing 
delegated powers to be very broadly defined with additional support provided by a second reading speech that makes 
the policy aims of legislation very broad and clear and the type and purpose of subsidiary legislation equally broad 
and clear. In Singapore the second reading speech can be used to assess the parliament's intentions in passing 
legislation, and can therefore bean important guide to law. 
256 s.19(0 
ssr Ss.21 and 26 
z a s.24 
u' See: Jain, op. cit. pp. 95 -96 
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Given the provisions of the Supreme Court of Adjudicature Act and the Subordinate 
Courts Act which limit the jurisdiction of the courts and the willingness of the political 
executive to use legal and extra -legal controls over the judiciary, there is very little 
opportunity in Singapore for the type of judicial activism in the review of subsidiary 
legislation that has become more common in India,260 Thailand26t and Nepal26z since the 
mid -1990s or even earlier in other common law jurisdictions While it is not unusual 
for subsidiary legislation to be widespread in many jurisdictions, what marks 
Singapore out in this respect is the extent to which it is used and the degree to which 
the executive in making such legislation is free of interference from any effective 
review exercised by either the legislature or the courts. The political executive, in the 
form of the Attorney -General, has clearly set out its policy on judicial review in stating 
that there is, and implicitly should be: 
A self -conscious deference by judges towards the decisions of persons who have relatively 
greater technical and substantive expertise and are consequently better equipped to decide 
...deference and competence are grounds on which judges have also consciously avoided 
adjudicating in certain areas of governmental activity such as foreign relations, national security 
and political appointments.' 
However, the courts can be pro -active in protecting executive power and the 
executive's ideological and core policy framework; "... a jurisprudence of pre -emptive 
strikes, indicative of the exultation of Efficiency over all other interests. "26s This is 
illustrated in the decision to reject an appeal by Jehovah's Witnesses against the 
banning of their church under the Societies Act. In finding against the appeal, Yong 
Pung How CJ commented: 
... any administration which perceives the possibility of trouble over religious beliefs and yet 
prefers to wait until trouble is just about to break out before taking action must be not only 
pathetically naïve but also grossly incompetent.266 
The courts therefore form part of the "administration" and judicial behaviour should 
therefore acknowledge executive supremacy, both political and civil service, and be 
congruent with executive interests. 
Executive attitudes to legislation as the mechanism for the creation and maintenance of 
the 'rule by law" state are based on a perception that this is the essential vehicle for its 
2ó0 See: "A System Shakes ", The Economist, 23 March 1996, p.29; Rajeev Dhavan, "India ", Asia Pacific 
Constitutional Yearbook, 1995, pp.109 -132 
261 See: "Judiciary voices strong opposition ", Bangkok Post, 13 March 1997; "Is the draft body overstepping the 
mark ? ", Bangkok Post, 8 June 1997; "High Court backs down on nominees ", Bangkok Post, 16 December 1997 
362 Bipin Adhikari, "Nepal ", Asia Pacific Constitutional Yearbook, 1995, pp.157 -170 
263 See: "Minister says government might change laws ", Straits Times, l5 January 1998 
260 Tan Boon Tick, "Judicial Review: The Singapore Law review Lecture 1987 ", Singapore Law Review, 1988, 9, pp. 
66-83, pp. 75 -76 
263 Thio Li- Ann, "The Secular Trumps the Sacred: Constitutional Issues arising from Colin Chan v. Public 
Prosecutor'; Singapore Law Review, 1995, 16, pp. 26 -103, p. 88 
266 Singapore Law Reports, Colin Chan vs Public Prosecutor, 3, 662 -688, p. 683 . 
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technical approach to government. Legislation is carefully drafted so that it allows few, 
if any avenues, for distributing power away from the executive itself, and, if it does so, 
the government will act to correct the error. As Walter Woon Cheong Ming, an 
Associate Professor of Law at NUS and currently Singapore's Ambassador to Germany 
has commented: 
It is absolutely futile for people to talk about challenging Executive decisions in court. If it is not 
legal, the government will make it legal, and it will make it legal retrospectively. The judges 
have no choice in this. Whatever their own personal inclination, they are bound by their oaths 
to uphold the 1aw.26 
Executive and Opposition 
The PAP does not conceive of its opposition in merely party political terms. It practices 
a doctrine which labels all opposing views as opposition, whether party politically 
based or not, although it has developed control mechanisms specifically for political 
parties as well as for individuals and the opposition that could emerge from a 
maturing civil society. 
However, it continues the facade that the only legitimate opposition to which the 
government will respond is a parliamentary opposition. As constitutional lawyer 
Kevin Tan Yew Lee comments; 
We have inherited a particular constitutional structure that is premised on the idea that it is the 
opposition in parliament that would check on the government. This means of checking on 
power is not an effective one and has not been for some time. 
Only three political parties, other than the PAP, have achieved parliamentary 
representation in Singapore since the adoption of the current constitution in 1967; the 
Workers' Party, the Singapore Democratic Party and its offshoot, the Singapore 
Peoples' Party. Since the demise of the Barisan Socialis in the early 1960s, no political 
party has had the membership or resources with which to build a strong electoral base. 
Writing in 1985, Chan Heng Chee commented that 
There is no tangible evidence to suggest that the opposition has sustained organizational 
operations that seek to nurture the ground between elections to build up support for the next 
electoral struggle. The shortage of manpower and finance and the structured dominance of the 
ruling party have virtually immobilized the opposition in the face of very great odds?' 
"Stand up and be quoted ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 13 July 1991, p. 14 
ass 
"Analysis: Singapore opposition silenced by system ", Reuters, 9 January 1999. Available at http: // 
www. Singapore- window.org/sw99/90109re.htm, 2 March 1999. 
269 Chan Heng Chee, "Political Parties", in, Jon S. T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, Government and 
Politics of Singapore, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 146 -172, p. 169 
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The odds are indeed great. The PAP is adamant that a political opposition is 
unnecessary and potentially dangerous. Speaking after the PAP had lost its first 
parliamentary seat in 13 years, Lee Kuan Yew argued; 
... if we are unlucky, like most developing countries, an opposition can make for confusion by 
raising false expectations of unattainable benefits from greater welfare spending, as in Britain 
and so many Third World countries ' 
This view was supported by his then deputy Sinnathamby Rajaratnam who bluntly 
contended that "the role of an opposition is to ensure bad government. "zn The 
opposition is linked to a range of policies or attitudes painted by the PAP as bad for 
national well -being, such as the introduction of a welfare state. This is a favourite Lee 
bogey which his statements reveal he actually does not understand, but which the PAP 
hypocritically states that it rejects. Although an analysis of the PAP welfare state is 
outside the scope of this study, a substantial case can be made for a residual 
Singaporean welfare state, the major characteristics of which are asset provision and 
enhancement, particularly through housing policies, education and skills oriented 
transfers and health, housing and education safety net provisions. 
Not only is the PAP wealthy, highly organised and disciplined with all the advantages 
inherent in being the party in power with an enormously successful track record, but it 
has additional advantages based on the careful implementation of legislative 
impediments to opposition development and legislative supports for its overt and 
covert strategies to monitor and neutralise effective political opposition. These 'rule by 
law' tools are supplemented by the PAP's hegemonic strategy based on cooption of 
key individuals and social groups into one or more aspects of the hegemonic program 
and by the judicious exercise of the executive's coercive powers under the ISA and the 
civil and criminal codes. Additionally, the PAP has demonstrated that it will abuse its 
custodianship of administrative resources to bring opposition figures into disrepute. 
This tactic was followed in the 1984 election against both Ling How Doong of the SDP 
270 Straits Times, 15 December, 1981, p. 1 
271 Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 May 1982, p. 21 
272 Lee Kuan Yew and his successors, enjoy denigrating the welfare state, but Lee's attacks upon it demonstrate more 
the depth of his ignorance and ideological bias than any genuine understanding of how the contemporary welfare 
state has evolved and operates. For example, he contends that the British and Australian welfare states "... paid their 
unemployed almost as much as the employed when they lost their jobs. ...So finally the Australians gave up, and a 
Labour (sic) government in Australia struck down umemployment benefits." No part of this statement is true. This is, 
unfortunately, only one small example of Lee's unwillingness to even bother to understand contemporary capitalist 
democracies. See: "Why the welfare states failed ", in Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez and Sumiko Tan, Lee 
Kuan Yew: The Man and His Ideas, Singapore, Times Editions, 1998, pp. 390 -392, p. 391. The supposed rejection of 
the welfare state by the PAP is made a lie of by Goh Chock Tong, who in 1993, noted that the average Singaporean 
would receive about $S70,000 in direct government subsidy during his lifetime. If Edusave is included, the total 
subsidy mises to $104,000. This does not include taxation exemptions, CPF, Medisave and health subsidies. 
Singapore has a welfare state; it is simply not a conventional welfare state. Indeed, its welfare state approach may 
have much to teach others, if the pretence that it didn't exist was dropped and studies of it could be conducted. See: 
Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, 20 March 1993, p. 5 
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when his personnel records from his police career were used' and when Lee Kuan 
Yew threatened to reveal confidential information held by the government to discredit 
Workers' Party candidate R. Murugason.274 During this particular election, the PAP 
boasted that; "Politics in Singapore is very much of the clean variety, as opposed to the 
dirty politics that are common in many Western and Third World countries.i275 In 
more recent times, this tactic has been used against opposition politicians Chee Soon 
Juan, Francis Seow and Tang Liang Hong as discussed elsewhere. 
While this makes for an emasculated opposition, it does not mean that the opposition 
parties have no influence in the policy system. By choosing and emphasising particular 
issues, the opposition has often forced the government to address them and change or 
introduce new policies. One such case was the issue of rising costs which Chiam See 
Tong of the SDP highlighted during the 1991 elections, putting the government on the 
defensive and subsequently leading to the establishment of the Cost Review 
Committee and the Ministerial Committee on Health Policies.' This debate continued 
until 1997 with frequent opposition involvement and the concurrent review of a range 
of related microeconomic and social policies. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Singapore legislative system is located within a legal framework characterised by 
contrasting streams of law forced to co -exist within a political framework centred on 
the maintenance of the hegemonic control of the People's Action Party. These 
contrasting streams of law are: 
1 . A constitutional framework which, combined with an electoral system 
gerrymandered toward the PAP, ensures effective executive control of the 
constitution and the organs of state including the public service; 
2. A commercial and economic legal framework that is designed to provide economic 
freedom so that Singapore can compete at the highest levels within the global 
economic and trading system; and 
3. A social, political and cultural legal framework that is designed to provide 
maximum control over society by the PAP government, to enforce social and ethnic 
harmony, minimise sources of political opposition and dissent and impose a 
conservative social framework. 
rn 
`Das: Public has a right to know Ling's Past record ", Straits Times, 21 December 1984, p. 15 
n" "He's a lawyer ... and he does this sort of thing' ", Straits Times, 24 December 1984, p. 10 
ns Professor Lau Tiek Soon made this statement in a press interview during the 1984 elections. See: "Dirty politics 
`doesn't exist in Singapore "', Straits Times, 17 November, 1984, p. 15 
"' These initiatives were announced in the prime minister's National Day Address on 9 August 1992. 
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How these contrasting streams of law are managed is discussed more in Chapter Five. 
This system is succinctly summarised by Chua Beng Huat thus: 
The legal system ... is an instrument of social control and of reification of social behaviour, 
tailored to the needs of the issues at hand by the legislative Parliament, the sole authority in 
Iaw- making. Instances abound in which laws are changed and invoked retrospectively to 
punish violators; statutes are changed to better suit enforcement immediately after they were 
successfully contested by litigants, such as the removal of the Internal Security Act from judicial 
review after one of the government's indictments was reversed by the Supreme Court; and 
finally, constitutional changes are undertaken with speed because of the absolute majority of 
the PAP.° 
I would only dispute this assessment on two points; the political executive is so 
autonomous that it makes the laws not the parliament, and further, that ministers 
through delegated legislation also make much additional law in Singapore, with 
nothing but formal parliamentary participation in the process. Chua makes a point 
overlooked by many contemporary commentators; the PAP is determined to shape a 
particular type of person and society in Singapore and the law, and its institutions, is 
one of its major instruments in doing so?13 
In assessing the institutional arrangements in Singapore, a liberal democratic 
framework cannot apply; the system is purposely designed to counter its assumptions. 
Instead a legalistic statist framework has been carefully designed to perpetuate the 
British colonial model of government, reinterpreted through an unreformed 
Westminster institutional framework, aligned with a Leninist style party system with 
minor modifications to account for Singapore's independent status. The Westminster 
conventions which supposedly underlie the Singapore political system do not exist; the 
doctrine of the separation of powers is observed in word only; the legislature and the 
judiciary are disenfranchised by the executive; fundamental liberties are compromised 
to such a degree that they effectively do not exist except for freedom from slavery; 
executive controls exist to maintain a civil society which is shallow and weak and the 
political opposition which has no freedom in the legislature to effectively challenge the 
government. 
In general MPs reside in the outer core executive because of their statutory functions, 
although some may be included in the core executive because of their personal 
affiliations with the prime minister or other ministers. This presence of MPs at the core 
may be temporary or of a greater duration according to the abilities of the MP, a policy 
topic or personal contacts within the core. However, in the contemporary parliament, 
PAP MPs are not mere pawns of the political executive; they will be heard and are 
m Chua Beng Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 193 
"$ The centrality of the "new man" being shaped by the PAP in its early years is well noted in commentary from the 
1960s to the early 1980s. To understand its absolute centrality to the PAP nation building project see: S. Rajaratnam, 
"On Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's Leadership (1983), in, Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq, eds., The Prophetic 
and the Political: Selected Speeches and Writings of S. Rajaratnam, Singapore, Graham Brash, 1987, pp. 196 -202, 
pp.200 -201 
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heard on a variety of issues including issues based on sectoral and interest 
representation. Further, they are influential as members of committees, usually non - 
parliamentary committees and they have a key function as interpreters of grassroots 
reactions to government policy. The parliament is more active than it has ever been 
and this would seem to indicate that there is an acknowledgment within the political 
executive at least, that in contemporary society, the parliament is expected to be more 
than symbolic and that the passive legitimation it attracted until 1991 has declined. 
However, the rules of the game are that in their criticism of the executive, MPs must 
not attack "the system ", nor ministers personally and they must conduct most 
lobbying through their GPCs, often through the civil service rather than directly to 
ministers, and through personal contacts with ministers outside the legislature. 
Nonetheless, policy action by the legislature is generally peripheral and most MPs 
remain in the outer core most of the time. 
5. THE CORE EXECUTIVE AND 
JUDICIAL DYNAMICS 
This chapter examines the structural relationship and the dynamics that are generated 
by this relationship between the political executive and the judiciary in Singapore. In 
particular, this chapter examines these structures and dynamics in order to determine 
if the judiciary forms part of the Singaporean core executive, what functions it may 
execute on behalf of the core executive and whether the Singaporean judiciary has 
adapted its Westminster framework as a consequence of its relationship with the core 
executive to provide a particular Singaporean approach to judicial- executive relations. 
THE JUDICIARY: STRUCTURE AND CHARACTER 
The judiciary in Singapore is not necessarily constitutionally independent of the 
legislature or the executive; in fact the constitution clearly states that its jurisdiction 
and powers are those which are "conferred on those Courts by this Constitution or any 
written law.", despite Article 93 investing the judicial power of Singapore in the 
Supreme Court. All appointments to judicial positions are made by the president on 
the advice of the prime minister, except the appointment of the Chief Justice in which 
the president exercises discretionary power. However, the president's ability to 
exercise his absolute discretion in such appointments is severely compromised by the 
high degree of executive control over the presidency as already discussed. Effectively, 
the executive appoints the judiciary, as in the United Kingdom and other Westminster 
systems. The dismissal of judges must follow an impeachment process established by 
Articles 98(3)(4) and (5) over which the president exercises discretionary power. 
However either the prime minister or the chief justice can initiate the impeachment of a 
judge. The parliament is restricted in its discussion of the conduct of a judge by Article 
99 which requires that a motion for such a discussion must have the support of one- 
quarter of the members of parliament. This is easily achieved in a disciplined 
Westminster legislature and places such action under the direct control of the 
executive. 
Judicial tenure in the subordinate courts is even more precarious as it is not conferred 
by the Subordinate Courts Act. Judges in these courts are civil service officers in the 
Singapore Legal Service, usually from the Attorney -General's Chambers, who are 
regularly rotated through the courts as part of their duties. A very few may remain in a 
Article 94(1); "Who should have the final say - the state or the courts?", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 14 March 
1998 
200 Ross Worthington 
judicial position for some time, but there is no tenure. Subordinate court judges may be 
dismissed or transferred at executive whim as in the cases of a judge in 19722 and the 
former head of these courts, Judge Michael Khoo in 1986.' Khoo was replaced by 
another career Legal Service officer, Errol Foenander who in turn was replaced by the 
incumbent Richard Magnus, formerly Director (Legal Services) with MINDEF. The 
office of judicial commissioner in the Supreme Court is likewise untenured and judicial 
commissioners may be dismissed by the executive. This office was specifically created 
for three reasons; to assist the supreme court deal with a substantial back -log of cases; 
as a probationary position to test new recruits to the senior judiciary both in their 
general capacity for higher judicial responsibilities and almost certainly for their ability 
to appropriately reflect the will of the executive in politically oriented cases; and as a 
facility for temporarily filling vacancies when permanent recruits were not available. 
This latter reason is a continuing frustration to the political executive, but one they are 
more than willing to bear to maintain political control of the superior court. The 
existence and use of judicial commissioners has been criticised by some analysts as 
being an unusual judicial office.' However, such temporary appointments had been 
used in Malaysia for many years before being introduced in Singapore and the similar 
appointments exist in the United Kingdom and the United States .5 
While the first of these reasons is strongly denied by the executive and it has gone to 
considerable effort to refute such charges, the record of certain judges in these cases 
and the proven unwillingness of ministers to undertake legal action against opponents 
in other common Iaw jurisdiction for identical action, refutes these denials. One 
George reports the case of a district court judge being demoted in 1972 for rejecting a government case against a 
national serviceman who had a letter of complaint about national service published in the then independent 
newspaper Nanyang Siang Pau. See: T. J. S. George, Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore, Singapore, Eastern Universities 
Press, 1984, pp. 213 -214. At this time national service was in its infancy and the government was intolerant of any 
dissent with regard to this policy and its implementation. 
3 In 1986, Senior District Court Judge, Justice Michael Khoo, was replaced as head of the subordinate courts and 
transferred to the Attorney- General's chambers following his acquitting opposition politician Joshua B. Jeyaratnam 
off all bar one of a number of politically inspired charges placed by the Attorney- General. Jeyaratnam's subsequent 
questioning in the parliament of the reason for Khoo's transfer inspired a inquiry into judicial independence which 
produced a predictable finding that there was no executive interference. The inquiry was conducted, not by an 
independent commission or counsel, but by one of the most government oriented justices of the Supreme Court, 
Justice Sinnathuray; the conflict of interest in such an inquiry was never acknowledged by the government 
However, no senior judge has since meta similar fate, nor acquitted an opposition politician of charges bought either 
by the Attorney -General or by members of the PAP political executive. The government's initial claim that Khoo's 
transfer was a routine transfer was revealed as untrue in the heat of parliamentary debate. If the transfer was routine, 
why then did Khoo subsequently resign from the prestigious Legal Service and enter private practice? The 
government may have been disposed to act harshly against Khoo because his brother, Francis Khoo, who had fled 
Singapore in 1978, was seen as a leftist radical. See: Francis T. Seow, The politics of judicial institutions in 
Singapore, 1997, p. 1. Available at http: // Singapore- window.org/1028judi.hnn, I March 1999 
Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, London, Macmillan, 1994, p.193 
s In the United Kingdom, The Lord Chancellor's Policies and Procedures, which govern the appointment of judges, 
specifically state that `Before being considered for any full-time judicial post, a candidate must usually have served 
in that or a similar post in a part-time capacity for long enough to establish his or her competence and suitability for 
full -time appointmenq ". See: Lord Chancellor's D.. pm touent, The Lord Chancellor's Policies and Procedures, p. 4. 
Available at http: / /www. open. gov. uk /lcd/judicial/ appointments/japplcppistml.In 1998, the British prime minister's 
wife filled such a position. In the T Tnìted States, part-time magistrate Judges are used within the federal judiciary; in 
1994 there were 94 such appointments to assist with court workloads. See: What is a Federal Magistrate Judge ?. 
Available at http J /www.fedjudge.org/main_hmil 
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consistent method used by the executive to demonstrate that the courts are free of 
political interference is the use of external assessments such as the World 
Competitiveness Report. These reports consistently rank Singapore's legal system very 
highly; sometimes as the best in the world.' However, this survey, based on rankings 
by private sector executives, almost all of whom do not live in Singapore and have no 
interest or genuine knowledge of the political system, only genuinely reflects the 
accumulated ignorance of the respondents rather than any genuine knowledge of the 
Singaporean legal system.' Most of these respondents probably would, for example, be 
amazed to learn that such a simple economic right as inalienable tenure of land does 
not exist in Singapore. It is the bifurcation of the court's integrity in dealing with 
political and non -political issues which is problematical and which is directly avoided 
in this survey. In 1997, Singapore's legal system was rated best in the world by the 
World Competitive Yearbook produced by the International Institute for Management 
Development (IIMD) based on its contribution to economic competitiveness. In the 
same year, the rival World Competitiveness Report produced by the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) rated Singapore's legal system fourth, but still ahead of Britain, Australia 
and the United States. However, in its ranking of nations on the impartiality of 
arbitration, the WEF report rated Singapore as 22nd with Malaysia and below Hong 
Kong and India while the AHD's report ranked Singapore l4d' in terms of respondents 
"confidence in the fair administration of justice in society" .8 
The size, structure and nature of the Singaporean judiciary, 1975 -1998, is detailed in 
Table 5.1. 
What we find in examining the Singaporean judiciary and its development From 1975 
to 1998 is that Singapore does not have a professional judiciary in the same way that 
other English law jurisdictions have. While it is not unusual in Britain, Australia, and 
Canada for senior members of the bar to be elevated to the highest court from private 
practice, it is common for the district courts, and the magistrates court in particular, to 
be dominated by professional magistrates and judges who serve a substantial part of 
their careers on the bench in a service separate from the administrative functions of the 
Attorney -General's department.9 This is also the case in most of East Asia where there 
See: World Economic Forum, World Competitiveness Report 1993, Davos, World Economic Forum, 1993; "S'pore's 
legal system rated best in world ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 2 October 1993, p. 3 
' Francis Seow's comments as a former Solicitor -General of Singapore, on the invalidity of this survey are worth 
noting. See: Francis T. Seow, The politics of judicial institutions in Singapore. Available at 
http: / /www.gn.apc.orgisfd/L inks %20pages /L...)Foldersl The %20Law /judicialinstims.html 
"Is Singapore's legal system getting a bad name ? ", Straits Times, 25 October, 1997, p. 1 
' See: Rodney N. Purvis, "Judiciary and Accountability: The Appointment of Judges ", The Australian 
Journal of Forensic Sciences, 26, 2, 1994, pp. 56-67; Carl Baar, "Court Organization, Judicial Selection, and Judicial 
independence in Canada ", The Judges Journal, 37, 2, 1998, pp. 44-53. For an interesting comparative jurisdictional 
case study see: Jonathan P. Nase, "Pennsylvania's Appellate Judges, 1969 -1994 ", Duquesne Law Review, 33, 3, 
1995, pp. 377 -389 
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TABLE 5.1: Size and Structure of the Judiciary 1975 and 1985 -98 
Year Supreme 
Court 
District 
Court 
Magistrates 
Court 
Total % Total 
Change 
1998 
1998: No 
1998: % change from 1995 
1998: % total judiciary 
% continuing from 1995 
% continuing from 1990 
% continuing from 1985 
Lower court recruits since 1995 
(No.) women 
22 
+29% 
25% 
73% (16) 
18% (4) 
9% (2) 
0 
9% (2)16 
53 
+112% 
61% 
43% (23)11 
17% (9)72 
8% (4)11 
13% (7)34 
38% (20) 
1210 
-37% 
14% 
8% (1) 
0 
0 
NA' 
67% (8) 
87 
43% 
100% 
46% 
15% 
7% 
8% 
35% 
+43% 
1995 
1995: No. 
1995: % change from 1990 
1995 :% total judiciary 
Continuing from 1990 
% Continuing from 1985 
Lower court recruits since 1990 
% (No.) women 
17 
+70% 
28% 
18% (3) 
12% (2) 
0 
12% (2)19 
25 
+19% 
41% 
17% (9)1' 
16% (4)18 
0 
20% 5 
19 
27% 
31% 
0 
0 
NA 
37% (7) 
61 
33% 
100% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
23% 
+33% 
1990 
1990: No. 
1990: % change from 1985 
1990: % total judiciary 
% Continuing from 1985 
Lower court recruits since 1985 
10 
+25% 
22% 
70% (7) 
128 
21 
+33% 
46% 
43% (9) 
24% (5)10 
15 
-6% 
33% 
7% (1) 
NA 
46 
33% 
100% 
37% 
13% 
+18% 
i0 There were actually 16 appointed magistrates in 1998, but 4 were absent on overseas study leave and so 
were not counted. These four were; Tham Chee Ho. Ms Lim Gek Choo, Steven Lo Pang Foo and Ms Gail 
Ong Sze Shuen. 
Of this group, 11 were Chinese, 5 Malay, 3 Indian or Sikh (1 Indian and 2 Sikhs) and 4 were Eurasian 
or another ethnic group. 
12 Of this group, 4 were Chinese, 4 Malay and I Eurasian. Of the four Malay judges, 3 have served since 
at least 1985 (Syed Alwee bin Ahmad Alsree, Abdul Rahim Bin A Jalil and Zainol Abeedin bin Hussin) 
and the other, Hamzah Moosa has had a long association as a court officer and State Counsel. 
13 Of these 4 judges, three are Malay (Syed Alwee bin Ahmad Alsree, Abdul Rahim Bin A Jalil and 
Zainol Abeedin bin Hussin) and the other is Francis G- Remedios. However, there was also a small group 
of other judges who have had continuous court careers. These include those promoted from a magistrates 
position to a district judge (Liew Thiam Leng, Daniel Koh Poh Leong) and one person who held an 
administrative position as Deputy Registrar in the Supreme Court in 1985 and was subsequently 
promoted to being a district judge; Khoo Oon Soo. Thus the number of district judges who remained 
continuously in a judicial position was extremely small; 13% between 1985 -1998, and of these three, 
approximately half, were Malays because of the necessity to have some Malay judges to oversee trials of 
Malay citizens to maintain a degree of racial equity in the courts. 
14 See Kee Oon, Daphne Hong Fan Sin, David Chew Siong Tai, Lim Kwee Huat, Christopher Goh Eng 
Chiang, Foo Shu Ching and Lo Wai Ping. 
'5 Not Applicable. There is no court lower than the magistrates court. 
16 In 1998, Justices Lai Siu Chiu and Judith Prakash were the only women Supreme Court judges. Both 
had initially been appointed as judicial commissioners, Lai on 2 May 1991 and Prakash on 1 April 1992. 
In 1998 there were no women judicial commissioners. 
" Of this group continuing from 1990, 10 were Chinese, 5 were Malay, 4 were Indian or Sikh and 3 were 
Eurasian or another ethnic group. 
10 Of this group continuing from 1985, 3 are Malay (Syed Alwee bin Ahmad Alsree, Abdul Rahim Bin A 
Jalil and Zainol Abeedin bin Russin) and the other is Francis G. Remedios. This is the core group of long 
term district court judges. 
19 In 1995, one woman was a Supreme Court judge (Lai Siu Chiu) and one a judicial commissioner 
(Judith Prakash). Lai had been elevated to the Supreme Court bench on 2 may 1994 and Prakash was 
subsequently elevated on 1 April 1995. 
20 Justice T. S. Sinnathuray, appointed in 1987, has been the only Supreme Court judge elevated from the 
Subordinate Courts since 1985. 
203 Chapter Five 
% (No.) women 0 0 0 0% 
1985 
1985: No. 8 15 16 39 +70% 
1985: % change from 1980 + 13% +67% +33% +39% 
1985: % change from 1975 +33% +114% +60% +70% 
1985 : % total judiciary 21% 38% 41% 100% 
% Continuing from 1980 50% (4) 47% (7) 25% (4) 38% 
Lower court recruits since 1980 0 1' NA 
% (No.) women 0 0 0 0% 
1980 
1980: No. 7 9 12 28 22% 
1980: % change from 1975 +17% +29% +20% 22% 
1980: % of total judiciary 25% 32% 43% 100% 
continuing from 1975 67% (4) 14% (3) 0 25% 
Lower court recruits since 1975 14% (1)23 22% (2) NA 11% 
% (No.) women 0 0 0 0% 
1975 
1975: No. 6 7 10 23 - 
1975: % change - - - - 
1975 : % total judiciary 26% 30% 44% 
(No.) women 0 14% (1) 10% (1) 9% 
is an even more entrenched and distinct a career judiciary based on either the French or 
German models.24 
The Singapore case is the opposite; sitting as a district judge or magistrate is simply 
one of a number of postings for officers within the Legal Service, especially those 
working within the Attorney -General's Chambers, usually a promotional posting. This 
is, once again, an unreflective continuation of the British colonial model as we have 
noted before. With the exception of ethnic minority district court judges, of whom 
there must be some, particularly Malays, there is no attempt in Singapore to appoint 
judges for long periods at the subordinate or superior courts level, and no attempt to 
develop a professional judiciary. Of the 162 people holding judicial office from 1975- 
1998, only 26 (16.1 per cent) were in court associated office' for more than three of the 
five year periods used in this analysis. Of this group, six (3.7 per cent) were supreme 
court judges and 20 (12.3 per cent) were subordinate court appointees. If we omit those 
newly appointed in 1998 and those already holding office in 1975 and not continuing to 
2' Liew Thiam Leng, Alfonso Ang Cheng Ann, Sarjit Singh, Yap Chee Leong, Daniel Koh Poh Leong 
22 Abdul Rahim bin Abdul Jalil, a Malay magistrate was elevated to the district court. 
z Justice T. S. Sinnathuray was elevated from being Senior District Court Judge. 
2° As is the case in Indonesia, Thailand, China, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. I do not suggest, however, that this 
makes such careers judiciaries totally independent of the political executive. For analyses of judicial systems in 
contemporary Asia see: Kanishka Jayasuriya, ed., Law Capitalism and Power in Asia, London, Routledge, 1999; 
Douglas M. Johnson and Gerry Ferguson, eds., Asia -Pacific Legal Development, Vancouver, University of British 
Columbia Press, 1998; Yong mang, ed., Comparative Studies on the Judicial Review System in East and Southeast 
Asia, The Hague, Kluwer Law international, 1997; Andrew Huxley, ed., Thai Law. Buddhist Law: Essays on the 
Legal History of Thailand, Laos and Burma, Bangkok, White Orchid Press, 1996; Kitamura Ichiro, "The Judiciary in 
Contemporary Society: Japan", Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 25, 2, 1993, pp. 263 -274; Yang 
Chang Soo, "The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Korea ", Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 
25,2, 1993, pp. 303 -317 
25 In this analysis I have included contiguous periods of being a registrar or assistant registrar with a judicial 
appointment as a court associated office. Registrars and assistant registrars conduct preliminary hearings in both the 
supreme and subordinate courts. 
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hold office (i.e. restricting the analysis to the period 1995 -1980) we find that of the 111 
judicial officers 18 (16.2 per cent) had continuous appointments over three periods or 
more. This is not characteristic of a professional judiciary. 
As shown in the above table, over the past 23 years, there has been no body of long 
term career magistrates or judges with the exception of a small number of Supreme 
Court judges. In that period, only one judge was recruited from the district court to the 
supreme court, Justice T. S. Sinnathuray. Of those supreme court judges sitting in 1998, 
only two were on the bench in 1985 . and only four had been appointed between 1985 
and 1990, 18 per cent of these judges. This is partially a generational issue, but not 
totally, as the Chief Justice and the two permanent Judges of Appeal are in their 70s, 
five of the other judges are in their early 60s 26 and of the remaining judges and judicial 
commissioners, four are in their mid to late 50s27, six are in their early 50s2ß while only 
two are younger; Lee Seiu Kin and Choo Han Teck in their early 40s. The continuing 
challenge to the political executive is to find within a largely passively hostile legal 
profession a small core of appointees who will manage political cases as required and 
to fill other positions with technical appointees who can maintain the superior court's 
credibility. The core appointees need to consist of the Chief Justice, at least two Judges 
of Appeal and at least one other supreme court judge, this being sufficient to ensure 
control of political cases. 
In the district court, of the 1998 appointees, the level of retention of judges from 1985 
(eight per cent) and 1990 (17 per cent) was almost identical to that of the supreme court 
for the same periods, nine per cent and 18 per cent respectively. Among the 
magistrates, it was worse; of the 1998 cohort of magistrates there were no continuations 
from either 1985 or 1990 and only one from 1995 and for the 1995 cohort there was 
similarly no continuations from 1990 or 1985. The one magistrate who did continue 
from 1995 -1998 was Chinese, so at the magistrates courts level the maintenance of a 
minimal Malay or Indian presence to hear at least some minority community cases is 
obviously not important. Of the 1990 cohort of magistrates, only one continued from 
1985, Rajaram Ramiah an Indian. This practice of actively ensuring that there is no 
professional judiciary within the subordinate courts, subjugates these courts directly to 
executive power; they are not part of an independent judiciary but an arm of executive 
government, part of the Singapore T.egal Service, which has two branches; a Judicial 
Branch which staffs the courts and a Legal Branch which provides legal services to the 
state 29 Although this analysis used five year periods as the basis of analysis, 
respondents in the legal profession commented that being appointed as a magistrate or 
26 Justices Lai Kew Chai, Goh Joon Seng, Chao Hick Tin, S. Rajendran and Warren Khoo 
" Justices M. P. H. Rubin, Kan Ting Chiu, Amarjeet Singh and Lim Teong Qwee 
" Justices G. P Selvam, Lai Siu Chiu, Judith Prakash, Tan Lee Meng, Chan Seng Oon and Tay Yong Kwang 
25 Structure of the Singapore Legal Service. Available at: http :www.gov.sg /pmo /lsc /struc.html, 26 July 1999 
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district court judge was a two -three year promotional rotation that was expected of 
most Legal Service officers in the Attorney- General's Chambers. It was also seen, 
particularly a district court appointment, as good preparation for leaving the public 
sector and going into private practice, although an analysis of movement from public 
to private sector practice shows that this rarely occurs. The reality is that Legal Service 
officers form the bulk of the judiciary and they carry into that role the norms 
characteristic of the civil service including implicit support for the political executive 
and its power arrangements. 
It is obvious, however, that while political control of the judiciary has not lapsed over 
the past 23 years, the size, structure and nature of the judiciary has changed. The 
judiciary had shown substantial growth: 70 per cent from 1975 -1985 and then slower 
growth, although it grew 43 per cent between 1995 -1998 principally though a 112 per 
cent increase in district court appointments and a 22 per cent increase in supreme court 
judges. Between 1975 -1998, supreme court appointments almost quadrupled and 
district court appointments increased almost eight fold. The magistrates court has seen 
far less growth, having 10 magistrates in 1975 and 12 active magistrates in 199830, 
although there was a steady increase to almost double the 1975 number by 1995 (19 
magistrates) this was not sustained. 
This concentration of growth in the district courts is a result of two major policy 
drivers. The first is a substantial legislative revision process undertaken since the late 
1980s and accelerated under the Goh Chok Tong governments, which has made the 
district courts the relevant jurisdiction for almost all Iegal action, thus reducing the 
range of matters dealt with by the magistrate's and supreme courts; 95 per cent of all 
cases are now dealt with by the subordinate courts' The second is a determination by 
the executive to increase its control over the courts while actually appearing to do the 
opposite by refocussing the control strategy, through a series of administrative reform 
3016 magistrates were actually appointed in 1998, but four were absent on overseas study leave. 
31 See: Yong Pung Howe, Justice 21 @ Subordinate Courts: Administering Justice in a Knowledge Society, 10 April 
1999, p. 1. This is a program of law revision rather than law reform in comparison to other English law jurisdictions. 
It is overseen by the Law Revision Commission (LRC) which is assisted by the Legislation Division of the Ministry 
of Law which undertakes most of the work arising from the various committees of the LRC. The LRC is an executive 
construct and does not operate under its own legislation and is essentially under the control of the Minister for Law. It 
is also assisted by the Law Reform. Committee of the Academy of Law which is also dominated by executive 
appointees with Justice L. P. Thean as chair. This program of law revision has been substantial and has been 
responsible for the district court becoming the major arena of most legal activity. It has also led to a substantial 
publishing program, especially by Butterworths, to bring legal texts up to date. The extent of the changes cannot be 
dealt with here, but are reflected in such publications as: Nigel M. Robinson et al (eds.), Construction Law in 
Singapore and Malaysia, Singapore, Butterworths Asia, 1996; Saheran Suendran bin Abdullahm, Lim Tian Huat and 
Edwin Chew, Corporate Receivership: the law and practice in Malaysia and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 
Butterworths Asia, 1997; Tan Sook Yee, Principles of Singapore Land Law, Singapore, Butterworths Asia, 1994; 
Tan Lee Meng, The Law in Singapore on Carriage of Goods by Sea, Singapore, Butterworths, 1994; Walter Woon, 
Basic Business Law in Singapore, Singapore, Prentice hall, 1995; Tan Cheng Han, Matrimonial Law in Singapore 
and Malaysia, Singapore, Butterworths Asia, 1994; Mahinder Singh Sidhu, The law of wills, probate, 
administration, and succession in Malaysia and Singapore: with cases and commentaries, Kuala Lumpur, 
International Law Book Services, 1998. 
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initiatives, on the subordinate courts and allowing the supreme court apparently 
greater autonomy. As all subordinate court judges are civil servants and, as 
demonstrated, almost all are short-term appointees, the executive's control over the 
lower courts is absolute if it so wishes. The judiciary has effectively been suborned as 
part of the civil service; officers of the Singapore Legal Service in 1998 formed 75 per 
cent of the judiciary. This increase in the size and responsibility of the middle layer of 
the court system as part of broader judicial administrative reforms is not unusual; the 
Pennsylvania judicial system was similarly reformed in 1980.32 However, the 
independence of the judiciary has stronger constitutional and cultural guarantees in 
this jurisdiction than in Singapore. 
The supreme court's greater autonomy was to be demonstrated by the appointment of 
some judges who have no obvious government connections and by allowing the court 
to find against the government on some matters such as the finding on the Official 
Secrets Act case. Unfortunately for the political executive, the Tang Liang Hong case, 
which could not be heard in the district court, spoilt this strategy by exposing the 
court's continuing political role. More recently, the role of the Chief Justice in reducing 
fines imposed on opposition figure Chee Soon Juan to a level where he could continue 
to contest elections, as desired by the government, is a clear indication of the political 
linkages existing between the political executive and that part of the judicial branch 
which is politically oriented.' 
Women in the Judiciary 
The gender composition of the courts has also changed, but only recently. There were 
no women on the supreme court until 1991 and since April 1992 there have been two, 
both now judges, comprising 9 per cent of appointees. While there was one woman 
district court judge in 1975, there were none in 1985 or 1990 and only 5 (20 per cent) 
had been appointed by 1995. However by 1998, 20 of the 53 district court judges were 
women, comprising 38 per cent. Representation of women in the magistrates courts 
was almost identical to the district court until 1995 when women comprised 37 per cent 
of appointments. However, by 1998 the majority of active appointees were women; 67 
per cent. This increase in the representation of women, now representing 35 per cent of 
judicial appointments, is not the result of a formal gender equity policy as the political 
executive remains opposed to such. Although respondents who were women lawyers 
uniformly commented that the cabinet, particularly Goh Chok Tong, had been keen to 
appoint women to the supreme court bench, it was on the basis of professional 
competence, not gender equity. The increase of women legal officers serving in the 
32 A Brief History of Pennsylvania's Cnvrtr, p_ p_8_ Available of mmwm 'w`-'24mwisr n_'m 
33 See: Agence -France -Presse, "Singapore bars outspoken opposition leader Chee from holding rallies ", 5 August 
1999. Available at: http: / /www. Singapore- window.org/sw99 /9080Safphtm, 12 August 1999 
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subordinate courts, as in South Korea but unlike most other East Asian nations, is a 
consequence of the increasing number of women lawyers, professional women's delay 
in marrying and having children and the meritocratic and other structural factors in 
the civil service system which do not actively discriminate against women.' If 
compared to the United Kingdom, where 43 per cent of lawyers are women ,35 
Singapore's benchmark jurisdiction, the representation of women in judicial ranks in 
Singapore is impressive as illustrated in Table 5.2 below. 
Table 5.2: Representation of Women in Judicial ranks in 
Singapore and the United Kingdom, 1998 
Jurisdiction Highest Courts36 Middle Level Magistrates Totals 
Courts" Courts38 
Singapore" 9% 38% 67% 34.5% 
United Kingdom40 6% 11% 17% 11.4% 
Private -Public Sector Transfers 
Further analysis of those appointed to judicial positions reveals that very few of them 
cross from the civil service into private practice; the legal profession in Singapore is 
very clearly bifurcated between private and public practice except for the recruitment 
of judges to the supreme court from a very small number of private firms. This division 
has become more pronounced over the past 20 years as demonstrated in Table 5.3 
below. 
Supreme Court judges are usually elderly at retirement and reportedly few, if any, join 
firms as consultants after retirement 41 From 1987 -1998, no Supreme Court judges were 
appointed directly from the private sector except for Yong Pung How; all others were 
first appointed from the position of judicial commissioner. Of the 23 judicial 
commissioners appointed in this period, 16 (70 %) came directly from private firms. Of 
these 16, six (26 %) had substantial public sector backgrounds. Over this period, 
3° For an analysis of similar rise of women judicial officers in South Korea see: Linda S. Lewis, "Female 
Employment and Elite Occupations in Korea: The Case of "Her Honour" the Judge ", Korean Studies, 21, 1997, pp. 
54-71 
The law Society of England and Wales, Fact sheet D: Employed Solicitors. Available at http: // 
www.lawsoc.org.uk/dcsi, 11 November 1998 
6 In Singapore this includes all judges of the Supreme Court including Judges of Appeal. In the United Kingdom it 
includes: Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, Heads of Divisions, Lords Justices of Appeal and High Court judges. 
" In Singapore this includes all district court judges. In the United Kingdom it includes: circuit judges, recorders, 
assistant recorders, assistant recorders in training, district judges and deputy district judges. 
'g In Singapore this includes all magistrates. In the United Kingdom it includes: metropolitan stipendiary magistrates, 
provincial stipendiary magistrates and acting stipendiary magistrates. 
39 "Judiciary", Singapore Government Directory, January 1998, pp. 91 -97 
as Women in the Judiciary. Available at http:www. open. gov.uk/lcd /judicial/womanapp.html. This is 1999 data. 
a1 It was reported by respondents that Justice A. V. Winslow and Punch Coomaraswamy were consultants for a short 
period after retirement (Winslow, who retired early, now teaches in the NUS Law School) and two recent retirees 
from the supreme court joined private firms; Goh Phai Cheng went to Harry Elias and Farmers and K. Saunthararajah 
went to B. Rao and K. S. Rajah in 1995 and 1992 respectively. Goh Phai Cheng, T. S. Sinnathuray and Tan Teow 
Yeow are all on the local panel of accredited arbitrators of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre. 
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recruitment to the superior bench is drawn almost equally from practitioners with 
substantial or wholly public sector backgrounds (56 per cent) and those with wholly 
private sector backgrounds (44 per cent). 
In the lower courts the traffic is almost all one -way; all recruitment is from the 
Singapore Legal Service. Of those appointed to the district court from 1975 -1995, only 
four out of 44 ( nine per cent) left for private practice and remained there " Of those 
appointed as magistrates during this period only six out of 57 (11 per cent) left for 
private practice and remained there' Clearly, for most appointees, a position in the 
Singapore Legal Service is a position for life. This is a vindication of substantial efforts 
by the executive to attract and retain legal officers in the face of a profession which is 
generally hostile to it. However it also seems to indicate that state service does not 
predispose lawyers to seek positions in private firms or firms to seek applicants from 
the public sector or, in a worse case scenario, for the public sector to attract the best 
legal talent as, if it did, there would be a greater flow between each sector at other than 
supreme court level." If we examine those officers of the Singapore Legal Service most 
eligible for jobs in the private sector, State Counsels and above in the Attorney - 
General's Chambers, the number of those who left for the private sector and remained 
there until 1999 declined severely from 1975 -1995 as shown in Table 5.3 below. The 
efforts of the Singapore Legal Service to increase remuneration, widen its services to 
provide greater career opportunities and provide postgraduate training opportunities 
has obviously worked. This has also provided the political executive with a solution to 
the problem of ensuring adequate numbers of controllable, loyal, qualified people to 
staff the courts. 
42 This analysis is based on their being still in private practice in 1999. This is a reasonable assumption as appointees 
to the subordinate courts are usually in their late 20s to early 30s on appointment, so those in these positions in 1975 
should still be active in the profession. These were: Tan Seck Sam now with Quahe Tan and Partners; Sarjit Singh, 
now with Sarjit Singh and Partners; Tan Lian Ker, now with in a one person practice; and Peter Lim Seng Lak now 
with Wee Swee Teow and Company. 
43 These were: Lee Teck Leng now with Michael Khoo and Partners; Rajaram Ramiah now with Wee, Ramaya and 
Partners; Mok Wing Chee, now with Chung and Fong; Chiah Kok Khun, now with Wee, Swee, Teow and Company; 
and Ch'ng Lye Beng and Lim Choo Eng, both with Tan Jinhwee Eunice and Lim Chooeng. 
m The general hostility of the legal profession towards the government and the judiciary in general, or some members 
of it at least, has not diminished in recent years. There continues to he widespread hostility, in particular, to the Chief 
Justice. This is such that it is often commented upon by the judges themselves. One of the most recent occasions was 
when, at the admission ceremony of new advocates and solicitors in May 1999, the Chief Justice was forced to 
comment: "... I shall have to ... address what many judges and I feel is a growing and worrying problem facing the 
legal fraternity - the deterioration in the standard of professional and ethical conduct of many a lawyer today. ...it has 
also come to our attention that a fair number of the younger lawyers fail to conduct themselves appropriately when 
they come before judicial officers... I cannot begin to stress this enough - this is that the courts have never and will 
not condone or tolerate such ill manners and shoddy conduct. All lawyers must accord due respect and deference 
when they are before a court of law...this sort of behaviour ... borders on contempt of court. Lawyers act in a most 
unprofessional and unethical manner when they display such arrogance and disrespect toward judges and other 
judicial officers." When the Chief Justice has to threaten charges of contempt of court against lawyers who are 
disrespectful of judges, the relationship between the judiciary and the legal profession are obviously low. See: Yong 
Pung Howe, Admission of Advocates and Solicitors: Chief Justices Address, 31 May 1999, pp. 8 -10 
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Despite the implied existence of Westminster conventions, and in imitation of the 
unreformed Westminster practice of British governments , the structure and nature of 
the Singaporean judiciary is such that it is clearly under what is effectively a sovereign 
executive which, exercising power through the Attorney -General, the Legal Services 
Commission,' the legislature, the presidency or the Chief Justice, can control 
appointments to and dismissals from the courts. An analysis of appointments to the 
Supreme Court since 1987 reveals the frequent use of temporary appointments, the 
appointment of career civil servants with strong allegiance to the government and the 
appointment of PAP cadre members or close affiliates of the party. 
For example, the present Chief Justice, formerly CEO of the Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation and personal friend of Lee Kuan Yew, in 1984, seven years 
prior to his appointment as chief justice, made this self- assessment of his suitability for 
a legal position: 
Far from being distinguished in the law, I can only describe myself now as a working member 
of the business community, who had merely the good fortune to have a background in legal 
training, and some practical experience in this honourable profession before descending into the 
depths of the business world. ... My acquaintance with the law ceased as long ago as 1970, and 
before then had been confined almost entirely to Malaysia.... I never actually practiced in 
Singapore ... My final departure then from the profession in 1970 must be sufficient to allow 
judicial notice to be taken that I had neither the ability nor the inclination to continue to 
persevere in the law. 
Even allowing for modesty, this is not an appeal for consideration for appointment to 
the office of chief justice and head of the judicial branch of government! That said, 
Yong has made an exemplary contribution to the judiciary, not by way of legal 
expertise or by developing it as a bulwark against executive excess, but as chief 
executive officer of the courts through modernisation and impressive gains in 
efficiency 
as Until very recently, arguably, the practice of British governments was to carefully choose High court judges who 
would be politically accommodating. In 1985, Stevens commented that it was "... the unwritten law of our party 
system; and there is no clearer statute in that unwritten law than the rule that party claims should always weigh very 
heavily in the disposal of the highest legal appointments. In dealing with them you cannot ignore the party system as 
you do in the choice of a general or an archbishop. It would be a breach of the tacit convention on which politicians 
and lawyers have worked the British constitution for the last 200 years." See: Robert Stevens, Law and politics: The 
House of Lords as a Judicial Body 1800 -1976, London, Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1985, p. 85. While Shetreet and 
Waltman agree with Stevens, others, such as Lord McCluskey do not However, there appears to be a general 
agreement that while party political affiliation may not in recent years be paramount, the political temper of judges is 
crucial to their appointment and in earlier times, party affiliation was important See: Lord McCluskey, Law, Justice 
and Democracy, London, BBC Books, 1987, p. 54; Shimon Shetreet, Judges on Trial, Amsterdam, North Holland 
Publishing Co., 1976, pp. 67 -72; Jerold L. Waltman, "The Courts in England ", in, Jerold L. Waltman and Kenneth M. 
Holland, eds., The Political Role of Law Courts in Modern Democracies, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1988, p. 21 and 
pp. I 17-118. 
"6 The Legal Services Commission, a public service commission for the legal service, controls appointments to the 
subordinate courts. It is chaired by the Chief Justice and appointments to it are completely controlled by the 
executive. It is as independent of the executive as the Public Service Commission; i.e. not at all. 
67 Yong Pung How, `Braddell Memorial Lecture 1984: Common Sense in the Law and Business ", The Malayan Law 
Journal, January 1985, pp. xiv- xviii, p. xiv 
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Table 5.3: Singapore Legal Service Lawyers In Private Practice In 1999 From 
1975, 1990 And 1995 Attorney 
-General's Chambers Cohort 
Cohort Details 1975 1990 1995 
Cohort size' 22 41 84 
% (no.) cohort still in public service in 1999 " 36% 68% 75% 
(8) (28) (63) 
% (no.) in private practice in 1999 32% 15%5° 8% 
(7) (6) (7)51 
% (no.) known to be debarred , dead or emigrated 4% 0 0 
(1 ) 4 
% (no.) retired from public services 5% (1) 2% 1% 
or or 
% occupation unknown in 1999' 23% 15% 15% 
(5) (6)57 (13)5' 
TOTALS 100% 100% 100% 
in support of range of policies for developing Singapore's services sector, 
unfortunately, sometimes at the price of an erosion of citizen's legal rights. In 
providing, what one would hope was an unthoughtful summary of his first round of 
reforms at the beginning of the 1995 legal year, Yong described them to his 
professional colleagues as resulting in the development not of an improved justice 
system, but as an efficient state killing machine: 
e This analysis is restricted to all staff in the Attorney- General's Chambers classified from Senior State Counsel to 
State Counsel. A large number of Legal Service officers are also located in the Ministry of Law. However attempts to 
match SLS occupied positions across the 15 year analysis period has proven impossible and so these officers have 
been excluded. Some of whom also serve in the Ministry of Law, Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and other ministries. MINDEF does not list its legal officers or the majority of its ministerial structure in the 
Singapore Government Directory, as does the Internal Security Department, so Legal Service officers in these 
locations cannot be identified. 
d9 Includes three judges of the Supreme Court: S. Rajendran, Warren Khoo and Chao Hick Tin. Of these three. 
Rajarendran and Khoo had left the Legal Service for the private sector and subsequently re- entered the public sector 
as supreme court appointees. If we include these two as private sector lawyers, 41% of this cohort left the legal 
service for private practice. Others include: Gob Phai Cheng, Lawrence Ang Boon Kong, Adab Singh, Jeffrey Chan 
Wah Teck, 
50 These included: Ang Sin Teck (Rajah Loo and Chandra), Yang Ing Loong (Lee And Lee), Huang Yen San (Drew 
and Napier), Sheik Mustafa bin Abu Hassan (Sheik Mustafa and Co.), Ismail bin Hamid (Edmond Pereira and 
Partners), Ng Yuen (Shook, Lin and Bok) and Palaniappan Sundararaj (Derrick Ravi and partners). 
" This includes: Tan Wah Nam (Lee and Lee), Joanna Foong Chi Yuen (Rodyk and Davison), Phua Aik Siew (Wong 
partnership), Lionel Tan I Kwok (Rajah and Tann), Chua Eu Jin (Rajah and Tarn) and Rajiv Nair (Shook, Lin and 
Bok). 
'z Glenn J. Knight was debarred as a result of being found guilty of corruption while Director of the Commercial 
Affairs Department. 
sr This includes Lee Show Sian 
" Mrs. E. A. Chan 
ss Frrol Carl Foenander. Goh Phai Cheng who was Parliamentary Counsel in 1995 was not counted as this office is 
not included in the analysis. 
36 This includes officers not listed in the 1999 Singapore Government Directory. These officers could be employed in 
security, intelligence or other positions not listed in the directory. They may also be dead, retired, have emigrated or 
be in security classified positions. These include: Low Lin Kok, R. Pala Krishnan, Miss Anisnah bte Abdul Gani, 
Susan Wong Liang Him, Mohamed Harith bin Mohamed Kassim. 
s' This includes: Loke Yoon Kee, Lee Show Sian, Chua Eng Hui, Tan Chee Meng, Miss Joyce Huen Suling and Lim 
Yew Jin. 
si This includes: Samtani Anilkumar K, Ms Kwan Chiu Wan, Ng Der Lim, Lee How Chih, Ch'ng Lye Beng, Lim 
Yew Jin, Miss P. Aml Selvamalar, Miss Shoha Gopalakrishnan, Andy Wong Yin Soon, Lim Keng Yeow, Lim Tse 
Haw, Kessler Soh Boon Leng, Eugene Lee Yee Leng. Three are women officers and are assumed to have resigned or 
be on maternity leave. The others are not employed in private sector law firms and so are assumed to be placed in 
MINDEF, ISD or a GLC. 
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We have now reached the stage when criminal cases can be disposed by the high court in about 
six months. Criminal appeals are disposed of by the court of appeal in about six months. And 
condemned prisoners can be disposed of by the prison authorities in about six months. 
In response, the audience hissed him. Little wonder that the legal profession 
demonstrates little support for the government beyond those co -opted to manage the 
profession on behalf of the PAP and to assist in managing the state. Efficiency has 
replaced Justice as the god of the courts. 
As can be seen, almost half of appointees to the Supreme Court are drawn from the 
Attorney -General's Chambers or were formerly senior officers of this department 
before going into private practice and then into the judiciary. If we continue to accept 
that it is irrelevant for senior civil servants to be PAP members or cadres as argued 
earlier, those appointed with formal or informal affiliation to the PAP form 85 per cent 
of Supreme Court appointees. Those not obviously linked to the PAP comprise 15 per 
cent. When we further analyse appointments as in the second table above, those being 
appointed directly from the Attorney -General's Chambers comprises 32 per cent with 
the others with a background in that office coming directly from private sector firms. 
Most of the private practitioners appointed are from firms with a long record of 
affiliation with the PAP; Allen and Gledhill`° and Drew and Napier in particular, 
although not all appointees from these firm, such as Justice Judith Prakash from Drew 
and Napier, are PAP cadres or close PAP affiliates; many of these, like Prakash are 
"technical" appointees who can expect not to preside over political cases 61 The 
background of some judges is varied and mask their PAP affiliations. For example, 
Mohideen MP Haja Rubin was an executive in the Straits Times Group from 1967 -73, a 
legal adviser to Wee Kim Wee, chief executive of that company, PAP cadre and later 
president, before he joined David Marshall and Company as a partner. Others have a 
simpler career such as S. Rajendran who was a former Senior State Counsel before 
joining Khattar, Wong and Partners, another large law firm closely associated with the 
government and from there being appointed to the bench 62 
Cited in: Maggie O'Kane, "Eye of a Tiger", The Guardian Weekly, 20 May 1995, p. 4 
60 Chen Choon Joong, Managing Partner at Allen and Gledhill is on the boards of several government companies 
including Singapore power and TDB Holdings, the holding company for the Trade Development Board. In 1997 -98 
he was also the chairman of Power Supply Limited. 
sr Prakash has sat on a defamation suit brought by PAP MPs against 12 Workers Party members, in September 1997. 
However, this case was rather straightforward as the defendants reached an agreement with the claimants in which 
they admitted partial liability. The court hearing lasted 30 minutes. All the participants in the case were from the 
Indian community, as is Prakash. It is generally thought among those interviewed that Prakash is not a PAP cadre and 
is reluctant to accept political cases. See: "WP and a MP: 12 members to pay $200,000 for defaming MPs ", Straits 
Times, 9 September 1997 
In 1997 -98, Khattar Sal Pat, Managing Partner of Khattar Wong and Partners was a director of Sembawang 
Corporation and has been a member of the Public Service Commission (1990 -1998) and the Presidential Council for 
Minority Rights (1993- 1998), and in 1998 was also a member of the Police and Civil Defence Service Commission 
and the Singapore Labour Foundation affiliated with the NTUC. 
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However, few non -PAP affiliated appointments are made to the bench and 
those that are made are usually recruited as technical experts, essential to 
support the policies underlying the current policy priorities of development of 
the service sector and knowledge economy policies in which legal services play 
a crucial role. The bench thus maintains its technical abilities, appears 
increasingly non -political and stays firmly under executive control. 
Para -Judicial Structures 
The separation of the political and technical legal responsibilities of the courts has been 
augmented, particularly since 1995e by an increased emphasis on alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) mechanisms, particularly for commercial disputes, a policy strongly 
supported by both the political executive and the Chief Justice.`a While the standard 
arguments for ADR mechanisms hold true for Singapore as elsewhere' and they are 
now a standard part of business practice, they also offer a partial and convenient 
solution to the problem of the political role of courts being perceived as interfering 
with their responsibilities in commercial law in legal systems characterised by 
executive dominance of the judiciary as in Singapore, or by inefficiency or corruption. 
In Singapore two bodies have been established with a view to servicing foreign 
companies and domestic companies dealing with foreign companies: the Singapore 
Mediation Centre (SMC) established under the Singapore Academy of Law' and 
funded by the Ministry of Law and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre 
(SIAC), incorporated as a private company but subject to the provisions of the 
International Arbitration Act 1994. The SMC deals principally with disputes between 
be brought to bear. "67 The abolition of appeals to a non -Singaporean tribunal is, in 
63 The International Arbitration Act was passed in 1994, and came into effect on 27 January 1995. It effectively 
brought the Singapore International Arbitration Centre which had been established in 1991, under government 
control and made it subject to the provisions of the act which implemented the UNITRAL model law on international 
arbitration in Singapore. It also provided, under s.32(1) for the making of the International Arbitration (New York 
Convention Countries) Order 1995 which implemented Singapore's accession to the United nations Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958. The Attorney- General is chairman of the SIAC 
board. 
" The Chief Justice has made numerous statements and speeches on the development of ADR mechanisms since 
1994. See: Chief Justices Address at the Official Opening of the Singapore Mediation Centre, 16 August 1997; Chief 
Justice's Keynote Address International Mediation Conference, 18 August 1997; Admission of Advocates and 
Solicitors Chiefjustices Address, 31 May 1999 
6' The conventional wisdom on the establishment of ADR mechanisms is that it reduces cost and time in comparison 
to litigation through the courts, reduces court workloads and is more productive in maintaining commercial 
relationships following the settlement of the dispute. For a contemporary analysis of ADR in the some Asian nations, 
including Singapore, see; "Alternative Dispute Resolution in India, Indonesia, Japan and Singapore ", Asia Business 
Law Review, 19, 1998, pp. 36-41 
66 The chairman of the SMC board is a supreme court judge; Justice Goh Joon Seng in 1999. The SMC Advisory 
Committee is dominated by public sector appointees; three of the five members are judges or senior civil servants. 
See, http:// www .mediation.com.sg/smc_idx.html 
6' Cited in: Francis T. Seow, The Politics of Judicial Institutions in Singapore, 1997, p. 1. Available at 
http:// singapore- window.org/1028judi.htm, 1 March 1999, p. 2 
Table 5.4: Type of Appointees to the Supreme Court 1987 -1997` 
Type of 
Appointee 
Civil servant or ex- 
senior civil servant' 
PAP affiliate or 
cadre practitioner 
Non -PAP 
affiliated 
practitioner 
Person 
qualified but 
not practicing'° 
TOTAL 
Number 11 11 5 1 28 
% 48% 33% 15% 4% 100% 
Person Chao Hick Tin 
Tan Teow Yeow 
Goh Phai Cheng 
K. Saunthararajah 
Kan Ting Chiu 
Chan Seng Onn 
Lee Seiu Kin 
T.S. Sinnathuray 
S. Rajendran 
Warren Khoo 
Tay Yong Kwang 
J. Grimberg 
M. Karthigesu 
Goh Joon Seng 
M.P. Rubin 
M. Hwang 
Tan Lee Meng 
Choo H. T. 
P. Coomaraswamy 
Lai Kew Chai" 
G. P. Selvam 
Thean L. P. 
Lai Siu Chiu 
J. Prakash 
A. Singh 
Lim T. Q. 
Lau Lok Sam 
Yong P. H. 
ee Appointees holding office in 1987 are included. It is difficult to categorise appointments as any categorical system will inevitably have overlapping categories. This categorisation has been selected as 
it allows the clearest delineation, albeit, a still murky one. Many of the appointees fit into more than one category. For example, Yong Pung How is not thought to be a PAP cadre, yet he is PAP 
affiliated through Lee Kuan Yew, has been a former executive in a GLC (Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, MRT Corporation and Singapore Broadcasting Corporation), was a former 
practicing lawyer but not in Singapore and was appointed to the Supreme Court from the private sector. Biographical details of appointees after 1991 are not available from Singapore or Malaysian law 
journals. Data also included from interviews of legal professionals. 
69 This category includes appointments from the higher education sector, statutory boards and GLCs. 
'0 This is the appointment of Yong Pung How, the present Chief Justice. 
" Justice Lai was formerly a partner in Lee and Lee, the law firm started by Lee Kuan Yew and his brother and in which Lee's wife, Kwa Geok Choo is a consultant. 
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Table 5.5: Source of Appointees to the Supreme Court 19874997 
Source Attorney -General's 
Chambers 'Z 
Allen and Gledhill Drew and Napier Lee and Lee Other Private 
Practice 
NUS Law 
Faculty 
Other TOTAL 
No. 9 4 3 1 9 1 1 28 
32% 14% 11% 4% 32% 4% 4% 100 %" 
Names Chao Hick Tin 
Tan Teow Yeow 
Goh P. C. 
K Saunthararajah 
Chan S. O. 
Lee S. K. 
Tay Y. K. 
P. Coomaraswamy 
T.S. Sinnathuray 
M. Karthigesu 
M. Hwang 
Lai Siu Chiu 
Lau L. S. 
J. Grimberg 
J. Prakash 
G. P. Selvam 
Lai K. C. Thean L. P. 
Goh J. S. 
M.P. Rubin 
Kan T. C. 
A. Singh 
Lim T. Q. 
Choo H. T. 
S. Rajendran 
Khoo L. H. 
Tan L. M. Yong 
P. H. 
"This includes appointees drawn from the subordinate courts which are under the control of the Attorney -General. 
"The total is actually 101% with 1% due to rounding error. 
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two or more Singaporean parties and the SIAC deals with disputes involving one or 
more non -Singaporean parties, although the SMC may deal with any dispute referred 
to it. In relation to MNCs and other foreign companies operating in Singapore, it is 
these mechanisms in association with the case management strategies of the Economic 
Development Board and Trade Development Board which ensure that foreign 
companies investing and operating in Singapore do not have to fear the courts; their 
political role is kept strictly separate from their economic role. In particular, it is a lack 
of understanding of the crucial role of the EDB and TDB by foreign legal critics, such 
as the Bar Association of the City of New York, which has Ied in the past to erroneous 
conclusions about the reliability of Singaporean courts in relation to economic issues.74 
These two statutory authorities, particularly the EDB, act as a buffer and mediator 
between foreign companies and all other state agencies so as to ensure that as much as 
practical, no dispute arises between the state and these companies that could give rise 
to litigation with the state or with domestic companies.'s 
In addition to these mechanisms, a comprehensive ADR infrastructure has been 
developed both within the subordinate courts and across a number of policy domains 
which have been identified as major sources of litigation.7ó Within the subordinate 
courts, a Primary Dispute Resolution Centre has been established, the Juvenile Court 
has implemented a number of mediation strategies and established a mediation /social 
intervention based Family Justice Centre." The subordinate courts have also joined the 
Court Dispute Resolution International (CDRI) regime which involves "cross- border 
real time co- mediation with judges from other jurisdictions ", including Australia and 
the United Kingdom with plans to extend this mechanism to include European and 
North American jurisdictions The Ministry of Law has also established Community 
Mediation Centres to augment the subordinate courts mediation mechanisms. 
The last vestige of complete independence in the judicial system, appeal to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, was abolished in February 1994, despite Lee Kuan 
Yew previously insisting that Singapore should "allow a review of the judicial process 
that takes place here in some other tribunal where obviously undue influence cannot 
" The Bar Association's report of the decline of the rule of law in Singapore warned foreign companies that the 
political role of the courts, seen to be a corrupting influence, would lead to the courts being unreliable in commercial 
matters. This has not happened. The Singaporean judiciary very clearly differentiates between its political and 
economic responsibilities. 
'6 This may, on occasion, involve EDB intervention between GLCs and foreign companies as well as ministries and 
statutory boards. The EDB is represented on all GLC holding company boards. 
16 See Yong Pung Howe, Justice 21@ Subordinate Courts: Administering Justice in a Knowledge Society, 10 April 
1999, pp. 3 -5 
n This involves the use of peer mediation, family conferencing, family care conferencing and youth care programs in 
association with the Ministry of Commtmity Development's social work services. See: tbid, p. 4 
" See: Yong Pung Howe, Justice 21 @ Subordinate Courts: Administering Justice in a Knowledge Society, 10 April 
1999, p. 3 
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itself, no cause for concern; New Zealand acted in 1996 to do likewise,' as has 
Australia. The principal concern is that the indigenous judicial system be sufficiently 
mature to defend the rule of law, maintain the independence of the judiciary and, at 
the most basic level, be able to provide balance in the exercise of state power over 
citizens. Given that the Privy Council80 and several international judicial 
organisations81 had castigated the Singaporean judiciary for failing to uphold such 
standards, it is difficult not to conclude that the executive replaced the Privy Council 
with a domestic Court of Appeal as a means of maintaining executive control of the 
judiciary and minimising international criticism of the judicial- executive nexus and the 
executive's occasional overt ahuses of power. That criticism and executive action 
against it, has increased, is an indication of executive distain for international judicial 
standards, the degree of its infatuation with total control of domestic institutions and 
its inability to permit more than a modicum of open debate of its power arrangements. 
The behaviour of the executive in prosecuting any negative domestic, or domestically 
published criticism of executive dominance of the courts while failing to sue similar or 
identical commentary in Hong Kong,S2 Australia" or the United States' establishes that 
the executive is only too aware of the truthfulness of the assertions and will not risk 
attacking its critics in jurisdictions where courts are less attuned to its goals. 
Developing a Singaporean Canon and System 
This willingness of the executive to use the courts to its own ends has also been 
accompanied by a sophisticated strategy, overseen by the Chief Justice and the 
Minister for Law, S. Jayakumar, to increase the involvement of the Singaporean 
judiciary in international judicial conferences and associations by emphasising the 
technical, structural and management reforms implemented since 1991 and avoiding 
79 "Legislation abolishes appeals to the Privy Council ", New Zealand Executive Government News Release Archive, 
18 June 1996. Available at http: / /www.executive.govt.nz/minister /graham/ dgn180696_1.htm, 1 March 1999 
8° In respect of B. J. Jeyaratnam's appeal to overturn his disbarment as a legal practitioner in Singapore by the 
Supreme Court, the Privy Council commented that he (and his co-appellant Wong) "...have been fined, imprisoned 
and publicly disgraced for offences of which they were not guilty ... but, because of the course taken by the criminal 
proceedings, their Lordships have no power to right the other wrongs which the appellant and Wong have suffered." 
See: Privy Council Appeal No. 10 of 1988, p. 22 
"' Singapore's judicial and legal systems have been criticised by the United States government, Amnesty 
International, the International Commission of Jurists, the New York Bar Association, Asia Watch 
"2 For example, Hong Kong's Financial Secretary, Donald Tsang, has commented "In Hong Kong the government 
does not stand above the law. You can take the government to court - try doing that in Singapore... ". The Singapore 
government took no action against Tsang or the Asia Times newspaper in response to this front page insult. See: 
"Feisty Tang challenges Singapore ", Asia Times, 9 October 1996, p. 1 
The Australian Law Society criticised the decline of the mle of law in Singapore in its journal in 1988. See: 
"Australian lawyers and the mle of law in our region ", "Controls on lawyers tightened" and "Singapore explains why 
the law is not enough to keep security", Australian Law News, August 1988, pp.4, 17, 17 -18 
84 Critical commentary on Singapore's courts have been published in The Times (London) in Bernard Levy's 
columns, by William Safire in the New York Times, Hamish McDonald in The Sydney Morning Herald, by Amnesty 
International in several jurisdictions, by Asia Watch in the United States and others. See: "The misrule of law: 
Singapore's legal racket", The New York Times, 1 June 1997; "Singapore dissidents get a chance to speak freely ", 
"Singapore dissidents get a chance to speak freely", Sydney Morning Herald, 29 November 1997; "Model of our 
own: letter by Robyn Kilpatrick ", South China Morning Post, 30 March 1997; Francis T. Seow, The politics of 
judicial institutions in Singapore, 1997, p. 1. Available at: http: // singapore- window.org/1028judi.htm, 1 March 1999, 
pp.4 -5 
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discussion of more substantive issues. It has also provided the judiciary with a 
rationale for moving away from what Phang termed its "carbon copy"' of the English 
legal tradition to develop law, as with the constitution, suited to local conditions. This 
was reflected in changes to the way in which common law is applied in Singapore 
through the Application of English Law Act 1993. However, the desire to establish 
local precedents for political cases was probably already part of judicial thinking as 
reflected in the judgement on one case against the Jehovah's Witness sect in which 
Chief Justice Yong Pung How stated : 
I am not influenced by the various views as enunciated in the American cases cited to me but 
instead must restrict my analysis of the issues here with reference to the local context.' 
Legislation establishes the courts as courts of limited jurisdiction,' thus restricting 
their ability to interpret law by the imposition of compulsory legislated sentencing 
requirements which limit the powers of inquiry and sentencing discretion of the courts. 
In particular, there has been a trend since the mid -1970s of revising the civil and 
criminal law so as to remove judicial sentencing discretion from most legislation and to 
limit the scope for judicial review. By this mechanism, the executive shares the judicial 
function; the role of the courts is to decide on the broad merits of a case; the executive 
does the sentencing via legislation. Much legislation, particularly that concerned with 
social and political control, contains mandated sentencing provisions for offences. This 
includes the Criminal Code, Misuse of Drugs Act, Immigration Act, Vandnlicm Act, 
Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act, Undesirable Publications 
Act, Internal Security Act, the Banishment Act, the Maintenance of Religious Harmony 
Act, The Undesirable Publications Act, The Environmental Public Health Act, The 
Singapore Broadcasting Authority Act and the Telecommunications Authority of 
Singapore Act. 
Most of these acts' also specifically exclude judicial review of administrative action, or 
limit the courts ability to restrain executive action as do such legislation as the Societies 
Act, the Trade Unions Act, the Industrial Relations Act,' the Employment Act,' the 
xs Andrew B. L. Phang, "Convergence and Divergence -A Preliminary Comparative Analysis of the Singapore and 
Hong Kong Legal Systems ", Hong Kong Law Journal, 23, I, 1993, pp.1 -30, p.4. Phang argued that by maintaining a 
legal system that was almost identical to the United Kingdom was a functional possibility in Singapore. 
Singapore Law Reports, Chan HiangLeng Colin v Public Prosecutor, 1994, 3, p. 681 
" British, New Zealand, Canadian and Australian courts can also be described as courts of limited jurisdiction, as 
legislation defines what the courts can and cannot do in many cases. However, in the case of Singapore, the limits on 
court discretion in deciding cases and sentencing fax exceed the case of courts in other common law nations. 
For example, the following acts exclude judicial review; Internal Security Act, the Banishment Act, the Trade 
Unions Act and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 
59 This act prohibits the Industrial Relations Court from adjudicating on almost all personnel related matters and 
prohibits them from being the basis of an industrial dispute; e.g. promotions, transfers, recruitment, redundancy 
terminations, misconduct terminations or the allocation of duties to employees. In these cases dispute resolution 
procedures managed by the Ministry of Manpower, not the courts, are established by s.35(2 -9) of the Industrial 
Relations Act and s.I4(2 -8) of the Employment Act An office called the "Labour Court" is located within the Labour 
Relations and Welfare Division of the Ministry of Manpower, but it is not part of the judicial system but rather a 
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Government Proceedings Act," the Passports Act,' the Income Tax Act,' and the 
Education Act 94 If one takes the Trade Unions Act as an example, it can be 
demonstrated that sensitive social and political domains are subject to autonomous 
executive control. For example, s.18(2) of this act provides that the decision of the 
Minister for Manpower is final on any decision of the Registrar of Trade Unions and 
not subject to review by the courts. Given that the registrar has powers to register or 
deregister unions at his own discretion, this provides the Ministry of Manpower, with 
the approval of its minister, with unfettered control over unions 95 This is the basis of 
what Chan termed the "administrative state ", allowing as it does, in association with a 
depoliticised or hegemonised populace, almost unfettered executive and bureaucratic 
autonomy in the governing of the nation.% 
Other controls also exist. For example, the Judges Remuneration Act 1994, provides for 
the salaries of judges of the Supreme Court to be paid at the discretion of the Minister 
of Finance, not by the parliament nor an independent tribunal. There is no avenue for 
appeal against a determination by the minister, although the constitution protects 
remuneration insofar as, a judge's conditions of service cannot be changed to his 
detriment following appointment 9' There is also no requirement that salaries or other 
conciliation office for minor industrial disputes. However , disputes relating to collective bargaining are referred to 
the Industrial Arbitration Court under ss.42-43, but the decisions of this court cannot be appealed to a higher court. 
99 Under s.14(8) of this act, the decision of the Minister for Manpower in respect to an alleged wrongful dismissal is 
final and cannot be challenged in the courts. 
9' For example, s.27 of the Government Proceedings Act, prohibits a court from granting an injunction against the 
government. For an example of the use of this provision, see: Bocotra Construction Pte Ltd and Others y The 
Attorney -General- High Court, Goh J, 14 August 1994 in which the Attorney- General successfully argued that the 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre and the courts, could not place an injunction on the Public Works 
Department to restrain it from access to a contract bond. See: "Case Briefs ", Singapore Arbitrator, January 1995, pp. 
8 -11 
92 Under s.3(1)(g) of the Passports Act (and by Passports Regulation 15(1Xa) the Controller of Immigration can 
cancel and impound a passport at his discretion. Appeals against such an action only lie to the Minister for Home 
Affairs whose decision is not reviewable by a court. 
99 Under the Income Tax Act, appeals against taxation assessments lie with the Income Tax Board of Review, not a 
court This tribunal is usually chaired by a subordinate court judge. The Comptroller of Income Tax has, however, 
other unreviewable powers under this act. For example, under s.87 the Comptroller of Income Tax can direct police 
and immigration officials to stop a person leaving the country if that person has unpaid taxes or is, in the opinion of 
the Comptroller, liable to make payment. Appeals to this power lie to the Minister of Finance and may not be 
reviewed by a court. 
94 e.g. s.60(3) 
99 There are multiple and overlapping provisions for the registrar to register or deregister unions. The most generic 
provision for deregistration is found in c_15(5) by which the registrar may withdraw or cancel the registration of any 
union "... which has failed to show cause _ or which, having shown cause, has failed to satisfy him." Registration 
provisions are found in ss. 10 and 14, but even if applicant unions meet the few criteria for registration, the registrar 
is not compelled to register them. Similarly, under 5_15, although a trade union may breech the act and be liable for 
deregistration, the registrar is not obliged to deregister the union. 
96 Chan Heng Chee, "Politics in an Administrative State: Where Has the Politics Gone ? ", in, Seah Chee Meow, ed., 
Trends in Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 1975, pp. 51 -68. In a later article, Chan attempts, unsuccessfully I think, to 
differentiate between her concept of an `administrative state' and Riggs' `bureaucratic polity'. See: Chan Heng Chee, 
"The PAP and the Structuring of the Political System ", in, Kemial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., 
Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore. Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 70-89, p. 78 
Of course, any constitutional provision can be easily changed by the parliament in the form and composition it has 
had since 1963, so such guarantees are qualified. 
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components of a remuneration package be uniform." In 1997 it was reported that the 
remuneration of judges comprised salary, provision of a prestigious motor vehicle,' 
government accommodation (or the payment of a housing allowance in lieu of) and 
other benefits which would include a 13th month additional salary payment and 
performance bonuses of a minimum of three months salary and a maximum of nine 
month's.100 A summary of estimated benefits is provided in Table 5.6. The amounts 
calculated in this table are in marked contrast to the annual pensionable salaries of 
judges which were set in 1995 at $347,400 for the Chief Justice, $253,200 for the Judges 
of Appeal and $234,600 for other judges and judicial commissioners.ror This level of 
remuneration is a strong incentive for judges to both resist monetary corruption and to 
conform to the executive will, but is equally a necessary strategy for recruiting talented 
lawyers to the bench. It would be unfair, however, to view this level of remuneration 
as excessive in the context of the income of senior practitioners in Singapore's Iegal 
profession. It is probable that partners in the larger law firms such as Drew and Napier 
and Allen and Gledhill as well as partners in medium size firms such as Harry Elias 
and Partners and David Lim and Partnerslo2 achieve, in most years, income well in 
excess of $1 million, with senior partners and Senior Counsel probably double this 
amount. Given that a comfortable, not extravagant, family home in a good 
neighbourhood would cost approximately $5 million in 1997, judicial salaries are 
undoubtably good, but not grossly excessive in comparison to the private sector. 
Neither could one say that they are excessive in respect of remuneration for senior 
lawyers in Australia,103 the United Kingdom and the United States, although they are 
vastly superior to judges salaries in these jurisdictions. To address this issue equitably, 
55 This includes entitlements such as travel, supply of a motor vehicle, medical insurance payments, supplementary 
income such as bonuses and variable allowances, pension entitlements, access to government holiday houses, among 
others. See: Sunday Times, 21 July 1996 
99 Judges receive a government provided Mercedes Benz or similar luxury vehicle. On visits to the courts and clubs 
frequented by judges, the author sought out these vehicles all of which have a special number -plate beginning with 
the letter 3 and a number (the Chief Justice's is JI) and was able to verify the provision of these vehicles. Government 
officials refused to provide information on salaries and remuneration components and the Prime Minister's office will 
admit to only having a fleet of six state vehicles, despite many senior public servants being provided with 
government vehicles fitted with the special Q series number plates. Q stands four `quartermaster', yet another 
colonial hang -over. 
1a Francis T. Seow, The politics of judicial institutions in Singapore, 1997, p. I. Available at http' /singapore- 
wíndow.org/1028judí.htm, I March 1999, pp.4 -5 
1p' The pensionable salary is that portion of the total remuneration package which is guaranteed and cannot change. It 
forms the basis upon which the judges' public service pensions are calculated. See: Judges Remuneration (Annual 
Pensionable Salary) Order 5331/94 
102 In March 1999, Drew and Napier and Allen and Gledhill were Singapore's two largest law firms. Drew and Napier 
employed 170 layers and had 47 partners. Allen and Gledhill had 149 lawyers and 48 partners. Harry Elias and 
Partners had 36 lawyers and 16 partners and David Lim and Partners had 17 lawyers and 8 partners. See: The largest 
firms. Available at http:// www. worldlegalfonan .co.uk/Asia&Africa/Singapore/ Surveys 
03 For Australia see: Andrew Burrell, "Lawyers notch up record year for income increases ", The Australian 
Financial Review, 28 July 1999, p. 3. This reported total remuneration for senior lawyers as ranging from $A!.2 
million to $550,000. For the United Kingdom see: "One in 4 QCs earn over £1/4 million ", The Guardian, 5 July 
1999. This report, which did not include the top 25 per cent of earners, revealed that one -quarter of Queen's Counsels 
had gross incomes in excess of £346,000. For the United States see: Margaret Cronin Fisk, "Most lawyers benefit 
from boom ", The National Law Journal, 1999. Available at ht tp : / /www.nlj.com/I999 /get_paid 0614 /index.html. In 
this report, the remuneration of general counsel of large corporations ranged from $US297,000 to $US3,110,000 with 
an average income from selected companies of $US1,038,516. 
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one must ask whether Singaporean judges are paid too much or those in other 
jurisdictions too little and, in association with this, whether there should he a 
connection between judicial salaries and the salaries of senior lawyers in the private 
sectors. These are issues which cannot be addressed here, but it is fair to observe that 
Singapore has aligned salaries in all branches of government with the private sector in 
a way that is far more equitable than other comparable jurisdictions. The important 
question from a public policy and public management perspective is whether this 
strategy provides better government and better public administration? In addition to 
remuneration, the working conditions of judges has also been greatly improved 
providing a lifestyle that may be more attractive than private practice for some senior 
lawyers. For example, due to the automation of all court business procedures supreme 
court judges rarely have to take work home and the work day usually finishes at 6 
pm.1' This is in marked contrast to the private sector. 
Table 5.6: Estimated Remuneration of Singaporean Judges 1997 
Rank Base Base Annual Potential Potential Additional Minimum Maximum 
of 
Judge 
Monthly 
Salary 
Salaryl" Perform, 
Bonus1" 
Employer 
CPF'°' 
Benefits "' Potential 
Salary' 
Potential 
Salary 
Judge $68, 340 $630, 000 $615, 060 $249, 000 $96, 000 $934, 008 $1, 590,060 
Chief 
Justice $105, 000 $1, 260, 000 $945, 000 $441, 000 $96, 000 $1, 734, 000 $2, 742, 000 
The most basic level of control over the courts is, however, the executive's ability to 
control the points of entry of cases to the judicial system through the police and the 
public prosecutors. If a public prosecutor or a police officer of inspector level and 
above chooses not to refer a case for prosecution, then it remains out of the jurisdiction 
of the courts and under executive discretion. There have been several recent cases 
where this has happened involving political issues, one of which is examined below. 
During the 1997 elections, the prime minister and the two deputy prime ministers, Lee 
Hsien Loong and Tony Tan, entered polling booths in the Cheng San, Bukit Gombak 
and McPherson constituencies, where none were candidates, without the prior 
permission of the electoral officers in charge of the booths. This was clearly in 
contravention of section 39(4) of the Parliamentary Elections Act and a complaint was 
106 As reported in an interview with Java Prakash, husband of Justice Judith Prakash. See: 
'°' Includes 13" month payment as for the civil service. 
106 Minimum performance bonus is three months salary; the maximum is assumed to be nine months as this is 
equivalent to the upper echelons of the Administrative Service. 
10' Normal CPF contribution is 20% of salary plus bonuses. 
108 Based on the conservative pricing of housing at $3,000 per month and vehicle rental of an E class Mercedes Benz 
saloon at $5,000 per month; a total of $96,000 per year. This does not include the cost of providing the Chief Justice 
with a chauffeur, entertainment expenses or a residence or housing allowance greater than that provided to other 
judges of the Supreme Court. 
109 This includes: base annual salary + one month's performance bonus + 20% employer CPF payment based on 13 
month's salary + the additional benefits listed in the table. This is the absolute minimum that could be paid, except in 
those cases where the government reduces all CPF contributions nationally. 
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subsequently lodged with the police by the opposition Workers Party r'o Rather than 
initiate an investigation of the prime minister and deputy prime ministers, the police 
requested a clarification of the provisions of the Parliamentary Elections Act. 
The advice provided by the Attorney -General, himself a member of the executive, was 
an exercise in both intellectual arrogance and incredulity. In essence the government's 
chief legal adviser used geometrical principles to argue that; (1) the act prohibits 
unauthorised persons from being within 200 metres of a polling station; (2) the centre 
of the 200 metres circular prohibited area is the polling station itself; (3) therefore the 
area of the polling station cannot be considered as part of the 200 metre circular 
prohibited area; (4) because the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers were 
inside the polling stations themselves, i.e. the neutral centre of the prohibited area, they 
could not be in contravention of the act as they were not within 200 metres of the 
polling station but in the station itself. This explanation was even accompanied by 
appropriate geometric diagrams. Apparently the alleged miscreants used top secret 
MINDEF technology and beamed into the polling stations Star Trek style, thus not 
crossing the 200 metre perimeter! 
The Attorney -General then chose to cite the Elias Report ' on which the relevant 
legislation was based, but in doing so chose to ignore the report's intentions in respect 
of these provisions (removing "undue influence or harassment" in the vacinity of 
polling stations) and instead focussed on the report's technical examples of how such 
intentions might be avoided; not allowing the establishment of any "desk or table near 
the entrance to any polling station ".12 This interpretation was provided, even though 
the police had been directed on polling day to question Chee Soon Juan, Secretary - 
General of the opposition SDP, as to whether he had contravened the same legislation 
by canvassing for votes at a polling booth, while casting his vote in the constituency in 
which he was standing.13 The Attorney -General's explanation was rejected by both the 
Worker's Party and the Singapore Democratic Party 114 One of the interesting 
associated outcomes of this conflict was a statement by Associate Professor Ho Peng 
Kee during parliamentary debate, rejecting the Attorney -General as being a member of 
the executive, and asserting that this office provides independent advice to the 
executive, despite the office being created in Chapter Two of the constitution which 
1DiPlease explain': Worker's Party call to public prosecutor ", Straits Times, 15 July 1997 
'' Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Corrupt, Illegal or Undesirable Practices at Elections, Singapore 
Parliament, Cmd 7 of 1968 
uz Letter from the Attorney- General to Professor S. Jayakumar, Minister for Law, dated 21 July 1997. Available at 
http: / /www. Singapore- window.org/ag0721.htm 2 January 1999 
13 "Unauthorised persons inside polling stations: SDP's response ", letter from Chee Soon Juan, Secretary- General, 
Singapore Democratic Party to the Attorney- General, 12 August 1997. Available: http://www.singapore - 
window.org/sdp0812.htm, 14 March 1998 
O4 "Unauthorised persons inside polling stations: SDP's response ", letter from Chee Soon Juan, Secretary- General, 
Singapore Democratic Party to the Attorney- General, 12 August 1997. Available: http://www.síngapore- 
window.org/sdp0812.htm, 14 March 1998 
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establishes the executive.115 There is not necessarily a conflict in these roles as long as 
the independence of the judiciary is genuinely guaranteed and respected, as it is in 
Britain, although this is done more by convention and political culture than by stronger 
constitutional guarantees. In this jurisdiction, the Lord Chancellor is not only the head 
of the judicial branch of government, he is a member of the cabinet and can sit on cases 
as a Lord of Appeal as president of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords.16 
Additionally, the highest court of appeal, the Privy Council, forms part of the 
legislature. In these ways, the doctrine of the separation of powers is compromised in 
the United Kingdom, but it is a compromise guarded by powerful conventions, the 
breaking of which would force major changes in the political system. 
Although the political executive has consistently denied that it interferes in the 
operations of the judiciary,1" and recently even a judge has been forced to deny it 118 it 
cannot hide the judgements of its judges from public scrutiny. The issue is not whether, 
over dinner in the restaurant at the Academy of Law, ministers and civil servants may 
attempt to steer judges towards a particular outcome in a particular case. No 
knowledgeable analyst believes, as Justice Rajarendran states in his refutation of 
executive interference in the courts, that "private directives to the judge from the 
executive" are provided to Singaporean judges; this assumes a gullible naivete on both 
the part of the PAP and critics of the Singapore justice system.19 Judges are appointed 
in Singapore on the same basis that they are in all jurisdictions; because the political 
executive is certain that, in having appointed them, they will maintain and preserve 
the existing system. If any judge lacks the intelligence and perception to understand 
this and thus requires direct instruction of how to behave in political trials, it is 
obviously a poor appointment and would be quickly overturned; the Singaporean 
political executive makes few mistakes of this kind. Such appointments are not made to 
the Supreme Court bench and, given the scope of executive power, are easily remedied 
by the removal of the offending judge. 
110 Singapore Parliamentary Reports, 68 14 January 1998, co1.86 
116 Lord Irvine of Lairg The Lord Chancellor, Speech to the Third Worldwide Common law Judiciary Conference, 5 
July 1999. Available at http: / /www. open. gov. uk /Icd/speeches/1999 /5- 7- 99.html. See also: Marcel Berlins, "Writ 
Large ", The Guardian, 6 July 1999, in which Berlins raises the issues of conflict of interest in the Lord Chancellor 
sitting on appeals as a Law Lord. 
11] For recent examples see: "Libel laws here 'cannot ape others', Straits Times, 27 November 1998; "Singapore 
regrets US human rights report ", Reuters, 20 April 1998; "Amnesty engaging in 'propaganda campaign' ", Straits 
Times. 14 October 1997 
118 Justice Rajendran was forced to release a statement to the press following the Tang Liang Hong and Jeyaratnam 
trials in 1997. This in itself is unusual and demonstrates the pressure being bought to bear on the Supreme Court by 
it's failure to separate political action by the PAP from the national interest. See: "S'pore judiciary is open: Justice 
Rajendran", Straits Times. 30 September 1997 
' A political role is played within the Supreme Court and the Subordinate Courts by their respective registrars. 
Those appointed to these positions are responsible for assigning judges to each case and therefore require a particular 
sensitivity to the political implications, if any, of cases. The Registrars are aware ( as is most of the Singaporean 
middle class and all of the legal profession) which judges are most sympathetic to the PAP, thus making choices 
rather obvious. The Chief Justice and the Senior District Judge respectively approve the roster of cases proposed by 
the registrars in the Supreme Court and Subordinate Courts respectively and so also play a political role in the 
allocation of cases to what are called 'reliable' judges. 
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The Achilles heal of the Singaporean judiciary in political cases is not executive 
instructions piped by email from the lofty heights of the Alpha domain' of GEMS 
(the civil service electronic messaging system); it is the judgements of the learned 
judges themselves. While pristine in their commercial judgements, in political cases 
they condemn themselves out of their own mouths and through their court 
procedures. It is this which provides clear evidence of the intellectual games which 
some judges are forced to play in order to meet the political outcomes required of the 
executive; not according to instruction, but according to convention and political 
culture. If judgements claimed by critics to be politically motivated are assessed 
according to criteria used by judges in other common law jurisdictions; that is by the 
same standards which Singaporean judges claim they are applying, they consistently 
fail the test. 
The basis of the extensive criticism of the Singaporean judiciary by judicial bodies, 
which has grown in magnitude over the past 20 years, has not (at least originally) been 
based on any particular antipathy towards the PAP. It has been based on disbelief that 
a judicial system can perform so consistently within the principles of English law on 
most matters, and then betray these principles without protest in political cases, as 
evidenced in recorded judgements." The Singapore government focuses its 
misinformation campaign in defence of the judiciary at international human rights 
organisations such as Amnesty International and Asia Watch, or asserts that the most 
damning criticisms, those by other judicial institutions which have based their attacks 
principally on the actual performance of judges and the management of cases, are 
based on wrong legal interpretation.' The Bar Association of the City of New York, 
the International Commission of Jurists in Canada, Australia and its international 
office in Geneva, the Privy Council and eminent internationally renown senior counsel 
such as John Platts -Mill QC, Frank Galbally QC,m Anthony Lester QC,u4 Geoffrey 
20 The Alpha domain is the restricted area within the Government Information Infrastructure within which the 
Administrative Service, ministers and senior armed forces and security officers communicate and share documents 
and discussion groups. Within this domain all participants have a secret email identification that is not published 
except within the domain, thus restricting access and allowing identification of domain originated messages. The 
existence of the domain itself is also supposed to be restricted 
12' For example, in Justice Rajendran's judgement in the case of Goh Chok Tong vs J. B. Jeyaratnam heard from 8 -12 
August 1997, the ICJ observer, Canadian Judge Paul Bentley commented on the logic of the judgement: " "The logic 
escapes me! Rajarendran indicated that he was adopting the reasoning of the English House of Lords in Rubber 
Improvements Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd ... as the correct interpretation of the law of defamation ... On this 
reasoning, Jeyaratnam's words to the crowd could not be defamatory. Yet the conclusion of Judge Rajendran runs in 
clear opposition to the ration in the "Lewis" case." 
to The Singapore government did publicly respond to the report to the International Commission of Jurists by Stuart 
Littlemore on Justice Rajendran's trial of J. B. Jeyaratnam in 1997. See: "Jurists' body claims S'pore court compliant ", 
Straits Times, 3 October 1997. Arguments by the Ministry of Law that only its lawyers have the capacity to properly 
interpret Singaporean law is typical of the intellectual arrogance and lack of genuine international experience of most 
of Singapore's governing elite. 
2 Galbally, observing the trial of student activist Tan Wah Now in the court of Justice T. S. Sinnathuray, 
commented that: "In Australia, the case would be laughed out of court ... the evidence and procedure ... would, in 
my opinion, have aborted any trial in Australia ... In my opinion, it is just a political trial." See: Francis Seow, The 
politics ofjudicial institutions in Singapore, p. 5-6 Available at: http:// www. singapore- window.org/1028judi.html 
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Robertson QC,175 George Carmen QC, Judge Paul Bentley,' and Stuart Littlemore 
QC127 have all criticised judgements in political cases in Singapore, not on the basis of 
political belief, but according to the established legal principles of common law 
nations, the same standards Singapore professes to follow. It is equally telling that, 
although Lee Kuan Yew and other PAP leaders have retained British QCs for their 
cases, none of these has gone to print to defend the Singaporean judiciary in these 
controversial cases. In particular, the use of the law of defamation to silence critics by 
bankrupting them, or in the case of the opposition Workers' Party to wind it up,° also 
indicates collusion between banks in Singapore, the executive and certain judicial 
officers. The political leadership has demonstrated its ability to obtain financial 
information on whomsoever it pleases, from all local trading banks, either under the 
ISA, the Securities Industry Act, the Banking Act or the Companies Act.129 The 
government has been less successful in obtaining information on the assets of those 
accused in political cases, except for Malaysia and Hong Kong 130 The unusual nature 
of this use of defamation law to suppress political opposition was even acknowledged 
by the Attorney -General of Singapore as justification for defamation action being taken 
against academic Christopher Lingle in 1994.131 Thus we are also presented with 
12a Lester represented Teo Soh Lung, one of the accused in the Marxist conspiracy case and was banned from 
continuing his representation and from ever practising in Singapore during the course of the case. Lester was 
obviously too formidable an opponent for those hearing these cases. Lester commented that his debarment in 
Singapore was due to "a combination of half -truth, breach of confidence and pure fiction." On the part of the 
government. See: Bernard Levin, "An all- consuming spite ", The Times, 10 April 1989 
1ss See: Geoffrey Robertson, The Justice Game, London, Chatto and Windus,1998, pp. 229 -240 
126 Judge Bentley is a judge of the Intro Provincial Court in Canada See: Judge Paul Bentley, "The Politics of 
Defamation in Singapore, The Provincial Judges Journal, Autumn, 1997. Available: http://www.singapore - 
window.org/80217can.htm 
Stuart Littlemore, Report to the International Commission of Jurists Geneva, Switzerland, on a Defamation Trial 
in the High Court of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong vs J B. Jeyaratnam August 18 -22. Available at: 
http:www. singapore- window.org/icjbrep.htm, 12 December 1998 
2a In a case decided in May 1999, the Appeals Court upheld a defamation action against the Workers' Party which 
will lead to it being wound -up as the party has insufficient funds to pay the damages awarded. If the party ceases to 
exist, its parliamentary members will also loose their seats, thus leaving only one opposition MP in the parliament. 
See: Agence France -Presse, "Workers' party faces closure after losing damages appeal ". Available at: 
http:// wwwsingapore- window.org/sw99 /90520afp.html 
For example, the pressure applied by the government on Francis Scow's bankers to withdraw his business line of 
credit and foreclose on loans. See: Francis T. Seow, To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison, New 
Haven, Yale Southeast Asian Studies, 1994, pp. 59 -60. Such financial information can be obtained by either the ISD 
or the CAD, or, as in Seow's case by a direct request from the prime minister. 
"° While Francis Seow's Malaysian and Hong Kong bank details were provided to the government, Tang Liang 
Hong refused to divulge his offshore assets and no nation has so far volunteered to assist the Singapore government 
find them, despite the Singapore courts issuing a Mareva injunction against Tang to freeze all his assets which should 
be honoured in all countries. Details of Tang's Malaysian holdings were readily provided to the Singaporean 
authorities. One can only assume that some reciprocal arrangement exists between the two government in respect of 
the assets of opposition political figures, abetted by the fact that Malaysian banks value their Singaporean business 
too much to have a dispute with the Singaporean government. See: Santha Poorjitham, "The Ruling Party vs Tang ", 
Asiaweek 2R February 1997 
13' Lingle had, in a op ed piece for the International Herald Tribune, commented that one of the methods for 
suppressing dissent in Singapore included " relying upon a compliant judiciary to bankrupt opposition politicians." 
Although Lingle did not mention Singapore by name, Chan Sek Keong, the Attorney- General, in justifying libel 
charges against Lingle, pointed out that from 1971 -1993, 11 opposition politicians had been bankrupted through 
actions brought against them by PAP politicians and that this had only happened in Singapore. Therefore, Lingle 
must have meant Singapore. The Attorney- General was forced to demonstrate that only in Singapore could a 
"compliant judiciary" possibly exist in order to press charges against Lingle. See' Warren Fernandez, "Judge: Enough 
Evidence for a Case Against Lingle, Four Others. ", Straits Times, 26 December 1994, p. 2 
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another irrefutable record of the courts inconsistencies in defamation cases, the 
quantum of damages as shown in Table 5.7 below. 
Table 5.7: Comparison of Damages Awarded in Political and Non -Political 
Defamation Cases in Singapore 1959 -19972 
Year Actions by PAP Damages II Year 
Politicians Awarded II 
1999 R Ravindram MP $265,000 
1997 S. Jayakumar, S. 
Vasoo, K. 
Shanmugam and R. 
Sinnakaruppan and 
Chandra Das vs. 
The Worker's Party 
and 12 of its leaders. 
$200,000 and 
rights to 
greater 
damages 
waived by 
claimants!' 
1997 Various PAP 
Cabinet ministers vs. 
$5.825 
million 
19% 
Tang Liang Hong 
1996 Lee Kuan Yew Sr Lee $1.05 million 1995 
Hsien Loong vs. 
Tang Liang Hong 
1994 Lee Kuan Yew vs. $400,000 1994 
International Herald 
Tribune 
1990 Lee Kuan Yew, Lee $650,000 1992 
Hsien Loong and 
Goh Chok Tong vs. 
International Herald 
Tribune 
1989 Lee Kuan Yew vs. $230,000 1992 
J. B. Jeyaratnam 
1988 Lee Kuan Yew vs. $250,000 1981 
Seow Khee Leng 
1979 Lee Kuan Yew vs. $130,000 1969 
J. B. Jeyaratnam 
Actions by Non 
Politicians 
Company - 
imputation of 
incompetence 
Importer - 
imputation of 
bogus goods 
Bank - imputation 
of negligence 
Architect - 
imputation of 
unethical conduct 
Architect - 
imputation of 
fraud 
Lawyer - 
imputation of 
dishonesty 
Lawyer - 
imputation of 
insolvency 
Damages 
Awarded 
$20,000 
$100,000 
$50,000 
$45,000 
$60,000 
$25,000 
$7,350 
The acts of intellectual desperation which must be resorted to by some judicial officers 
only serves to demonstrate that the political executive has chosen to jettison key 
aspects of the Westminster conventions and selectively disregard the rule of law for 
political gain. Such behaviour points to both the extraordinary degree of autonomy 
enjoyed by the political and civil service executives and the high degree of instability 
inherent in the PAP's structuring of power relations in Singaporean society. A highly 
stable political system does not require the institutionalisation of political and judicial 
3z Except for that separately noted, data was provided by the registrar of the Supreme Court to Stuart Littlemore in 
1997 and included in: Stuart Littlemore, Report to the International Commission of Jurists Geneva, Switzerland, on a 
Defamation Trial in the High Court of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong vs J B- Jeyaratnam August 18 -22. Available at: 
http:www.singapore -window.org/icjbrep.htm, 12 December 1998. All figures are in Singapore dollars. 1999 data 
added by the author from: Agence France -Press, "Workers' Party faces closure after losing damages appeal ". 
Available at: http: / /www. singapore- window.org/sw99 /90520afp.html 
13 "WP and a MP: l2members to pay $200,000 for defaming MPs ", Straits Times, 9 September, 1997. In this case, a 
bargain was struck in which the defendants admitted liability and agreed to publish apologies in the press and the 
claimants agreed to forego a more substantial damages claim. 
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deceit. The signing of declarations, such as the Beijing Statement of Principles of the 
Independence of the Judiciary, does nothing to remedy the lack of judicial independence 
in Singapore. As the statement was signed by the Chief Justice, not a minister and is 
not supported by Singapore legislation, it has no power.' More importantly, however, 
it simply conflicts with Singaporean power arrangements as evidenced by Winslow's 
comment that within the Singaporean legal environment' "Judges and the legal 
profession think in terms more of concepts like the Rule of Law than of constitutional 
supremacy, independence of the judiciary, and of rules of natural justice rather than 
judicial review. "° 
In assessing the role of the judicial branch in maintaining unfettered executive power 
in Singapore, care must be taken to ensure that the institutional arrangements and the 
political role of certain judicial officers do not indict all the judiciary and that the 
power of the court is not equated with unidirectional power arrangements which 
favour the executive. The political executive needs, in particular, a supreme court 
which is seen as, and is capable of, maintaining the confidence of the international 
business community in commercial litigation. This provides the bench with some 
power vis a vis the political executive, but it is a power that must be carefully 
exercised. For example, even under Lee Kuan Yew's administration, the Chief Justice's 
opinion on the recruitment of judges and how they were appointed placed at least 
some constraints on the prime minister.137 The present chief justice is an even more 
formidable character than the first and his control of the judiciary and power vis a vis 
the political executive seems to be uniformly accepted as is his support of that 
executive's political and policy strategies. Indeed, this alignment of judicial and 
political interests was explicitly endorsed by the courts in 1989 in the judgement of the 
Court of Appeal in the case of Dow Jones (Asia) Inc. v The Attorney -General: 
The Court rejected the trial judge's definition that engaging in domestic politics is a matter for 
the Minister and not the courts to decide. However, it also rejected the argument that the 
meaning should be restricted to involvement in electoral processes and espousal or editorial 
support for a political party 138 
1° See: "Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the Lawasia Region ", CIJL 
Yearbook, March 1998, pp. 110 -121. The International Commission of Jurist's Centre for the Independence of Judges 
and lawyers, criticised many of the provisions in the agreement. See: "CIJL Observations on the 1995 Beijing 
Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary", CIJL Yearbook, March 1998, pp. 123 -128 
135 Valentine S. Winslow, "The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore ", in Lawrence W. Beer, ed. Constitutional 
Systems in Late Twentieth Century Asia, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1992, pp. 627 -655. Winslow is an 
Associate Professor of Law at the NUS Faculty of Law and a former judge of the supreme court. 
°6 Valentine S. Winslow, "The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore ", in Lawrence W. Beer, ed. Constitutional 
Systems in Late Twentieth Century Asia, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1992, pp. 627 -655, p. 649. 
13' In an interview which included his recruitment to the Supreme Court, Justice Karthigesu noted that although he 
told the prime minister (Lee Kuan Yew) that he would prefer an initial appointment as a judge of the supreme court, 
Lee commented that the then Chief Justice would not accept that and he could only offer him a judicial 
commissioner's appointment until a new Chief Justice was appointed. See: "In Conversation: An Interview with the 
Honourable Justice of Appeal M Karthigesu", Singapore Low Review, 16, 1995, pp. 1 -13, p. 10 
1 s Malayan Law Journal, 1989, 2, p. 396 
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Some informants were of the opinion that several of the recent appointees to the 
supreme court bench only accepted appointment on condition that they were not to be 
involved in political trials. There exists within the Supreme Court judiciary since 1991, 
a group of judicial commissioners and judges who do not participate in political trials. 
This is the group appointed as 'technical judges'; a group absolutely necessary to 
maintaining Singapore's reputation for a quality legal system in commercial and 
business related Iaw. The superior judiciary can therefore be divided into those 
"dependable" judges allocated political cases and those who are not. In the past, the 
superior judiciary could be counted on almost to a man's to support the executive; 
Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin, Justices Choor Singh, Tan Ah Tah, T. Kulasekaram, A. 
Wahab Ghows, T. S. Sinnathuray, Lai Kew Chai, L. P. Thean,10 F. A. Chua, Chan Sek 
Keong, A. P. Rajah and Punch Coomaraswamy, many of whom were elevated from the 
civil service ' and some from the parliament and were PAP cadres before elevation to 
the bench. Although some of this older group, such as A. V. Winslow were not thought 
of as entirely dependable by Lee Kuan Yew,'' there were no obvious opponents of the 
executive among this group. Of them, only Lai and Thean remain on the bench and 
both are in their seventies. The 'political' judges most clearly now include; Chief Justice 
Yong,' the two permanent Judges of Appeal,' and Justices Lai Kew Chai, Goh Joon 
Seng, S. Rajendran, Chao Hick Tin and G. P. Selvam.'4' Of these judges, Yong, 
Kathigesu,' Lai and Thean, all in their mid -70's belong to the PAP Old Guard 
generation with Yong a personal friend of Lee Kuan Yew's,' Lai being a former senior 
partner in Lee and Lee's and a personal friend of Lee Kuan Yew and his wife Kwa 
Geok Choo, Chao,19 and Rajendran150 were loyal recruits from the Attorney -General's 
19 This should be taken literally; there were no women judges prior to 1991. 
140 Justice Thean was at one time in the same firm as Chief Justice Yong; Shook, Lin and Bok. 
161 Such as A. Wahab Ghows, former Solicitor -General, Punch Coomaraswamy, former Deputy Speaker of 
Parliament and Sinnathuray who's career was entirely within the Attorney- General's Chambers and as a District 
Court Judge prior to his elevation to the Supreme Court. 
`°z A. V. Winslow was eventually moved to the Law Faculty at NUS and given an academic position, although he had 
made no judgements that obviously opposed the government. 
43 Although the Chief Justice has a clear responsibility for supporting the PAP regime, he does not directly become 
involved in political cases, but works with the registrar of the Supreme Court to ensure their effective management by 
judges willing to accept political cases. 
14d Justice Mootatamby Kathigesu and Justice L. P. Thean. The third judge required to comprise the court of appeal, 
which may make majority decisions, is selected from among the other Supreme Court judges. 
05 All of these, except the Chief Justice, have been over trials involving J. B. Jeyaratnam and Tang Liang Hong and 
other Workers Party members in recent years. 
149 Kathigesu was a colonial district judge, a partner in two large Singaporean law firms; Allen and Gledhill and 
Rodyk and Davidson, and for a long period an arbitrator in Regional Centre for Arbitration in Kuala Lumpur. He has 
had several affiliations with the PAP government; member of the Income Tax Board of Review, Judge -Advocate of 
the Military Court of Appeal, chairman of the Hindu Advisory Board and a member of the Senate of the Academy of 
Law. 
0' They studied together in Cambridge and maintained contact after Yong returned to Kuala Lumpur where he 
practised for many years before moving to Singapore. 
1d8 The law firm founded by Lee Kuan Yew and his brother and in which his wife Kwa Geok Choo also worked. Kwa 
was retained as a consultant to the firm until recently. Goh Chok Tong's wife is also a partner in Lee and Lee. 
ßa9 Chao Hick Tin, a graduate of the University of London, prior to his judicial appointment was Head, Civil Section, 
Attomey- general's Chambers, State Counsel and Deputy Senior State Counsel. He has also held positions as director 
of the Post Office Savings Bank, Sembawang Group and the Export Credit Insurance Corporation. He was awarded 
the Public Service Medal in 1976 and the Public Service Star in 1984. It is assumed that he is a PAP cadre. 
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Chambers and Selvam was a senior partner in Drew and Napier,'s' a strong pro -PAP 
firm which often acts for the Lees and Goh Chok Tong, and believed to be a PAP cadre. 
While this is a useful and necessary distinct-ion between the judges of the supreme 
court, it should also be noted that most of the judges recently appointed because of 
their assured political support are also perceived as experts in particular areas; for 
example, Selvam is an acknowledged expert in maritime law.152 These are not just 
political appointees, but proficient senior lawyers. 
The Executive and the Legal Profession 
Within the Westminster conception of the judiciary as the third branch of government, 
the legal profession plays a special role as all solicitors and barristers are deemed to be 
officers of the Supreme Court or the equivalent court of registration for lawyers. The 
legal profession therefore has a privileged relationship with the judiciary and through 
this, a relationship with the legislature that is unimpeded by the formal restrictions 
placed on the judiciary, principally by convention. The legal profession therefore 
frequently comments of legislation, advises on its drafting, can act as a sounding board 
for executive policy proposals and may act to defend or protect the judiciary from 
what is seen to be unfair criticism in general or assault from either of the other two 
branches of government. In Singapore, this role has been gradually diminished as the 
profession has become more and more regulated. Two statutory bodies, the Singapore 
Academy of Law and the Board of Legal Education as well as the Law Society of 
Singapore which is subject to political participation controls under the Legal Profession 
Act, similar to those imposed by the Societies Act on all other social organisations in 
Singapore, are the profession's regulatory bodies. 
The Law Society has responsibility for partially regulating the legal profession and 
represents practising lawyers, but not the judiciary and legal academics. From at least 
1977 until 1987 there had been tension between the government and the Law Society 
based on a perception by the government that the society was too critical of the legal 
infrastructure developed to support the government's social and political control 
objectives: a conflict between a rule of law perspective by the society and the rule by 
law practices of the government. This tension had been exacerbated over this period 
by the society, or influential members of it, criticising the government in relation to 
u° Rajendran was a former State Counsel and Senior State Counsel in the Attorney- General's Chambers before 
leaving for the private sector and becoming a senior partner in Khattar, Wong and Partners from where he was called 
to the bench. 
51 See: "SUP chief issues public apology", Straits Times. 22 December 1094, p. 18 
12 This was one of Selvam's major areas in private practice. He has also published in this area, although not in recent 
years. See: G. P. Selvam, "Singapore: Some Recent Developments in Maritime and Admiralty Law ", Lloyd's 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, may 1985, pp. 209 -216 
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foreign law firms153 amendments to the penal code', executive interference in the 
administration of the courts', changes to the legislation regulating the legal 
profession156 and culminated in the participation of the president of the Law Society in 
opposition politics.157 On its part, the government has attacked the society for 
participating in politics, although its legislation until 1986 required it to comment on 
legislation, and of not defending the nation's legal system against foreign criticism.' 
During the hearings of the Select Committee on the Legal Profession Amendment) Bill 
in 1986, Lee Kuan Yew threatened the Law Society council members subpoenaed to 
appear, in stating: 
It is my job as prime minister in charge of the government to put a stop to politicking in 
professional bodies. If you want to politick, come out ... You want to politick, you form your 
own party or join Mr. Jeyaratnam ... You think you can be smarter than the government and 
outsmart it, well, if ou win, you form the government. If I win, we have a new Law Society. It 
is as simple as that' 
'55 The government permitted foreign law firms to establish themselves in Singapore from 1980 and allowed 
domestic banks to employ foreign lawyers from 1981, against the objections of local law firms. See: Law Society of 
Singapore, 25Years: A Brief Retrospective, Singapore, Law Society, 1995, sections D, E, and F. Available: 
http://www.lawsoc.org.sg/about/history.html 
1s Objections by a large number of Law Society members to changes in the Penal Code in 1984 that would impose 
mandatory jail sentences for certain offences upset the government See: Law Society of Singapore, 25Years: A Brief 
Retrospective, Singapore, Law Society, 1995, sections D, E, and F. Available: 
ht tp:// www .lawsoc.orgsg/about/history.html 
Iss Allegations in 1986 by a Society member that the government had interfered in the Subordinate Courts judiciary 
resulting in a Commission of Inquiry by the government which was shadowed by a Society sub -committee. This was 
a particularly sensitive issue as the accusation was made in association with charges brought against opposition 
member J. B. Jeyaratnam. Senior District Judge Khoo, who had acquitted Jeyaratnam of fraud charges on appeal, had 
been transferred by the government from his judicial position to the Attorney- General's Chambers in August 1984, 
demonstrating the executive's absolute control over the judiciary. In early 1986, during parliamentary debate on 
amendments to the Subordinate Courts Act, to limit further the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts, Jeyaratnam 
raised the issue of whether Judge Kohl's transfer had been politically motivated. This issue was taken up by a young 
woman lawyer on the Council of the Law Society, Teo Soh Lung, who in 1988 was arrested under the ISA as one of 
a group of "Marxist conspirators" attempting to overthrow the state. In any matter involving J. B. Jeyaratnam, the 
long term personal enmity between he and Lee Kuan Yew should never be forgotten as a factor in the government's 
reaction. 
56 Disagreements with the government over changes to the Legal Profession Act in late 1986 to strengthen 
disciplinary proceedings undertaken by the Society resulting in a parliamentary select committee being established to 
examine the amendments and the subsequent establishment by the government, with minimal prior consultation with 
the Society, of the Singapore Academy of Law in 1988. This legislation provided for compulsory membership and 
financial contributions for all legal practitioners, removed the legal education responsibilities from the Law Society, 
gave non -lawyers eligibility for membership, and established an administrative structure for the Academy that gave 
the government substantial indirect control of it. This effectively made the Academy the Republic's major legal 
professional body. "The Singapore Law Academy: Will it hurt the legal fraternity? ", Straits Times, 4 February 1996 
15' In 1986 when Francis Seow, President of the Society, publicly criticised through letters to the Straits Times, 
amendments to the Newspaper and Printing Act that would restrict the circulation of foreign publications, relations 
between the society and the government became very tense. This resulted in a continuing conflict that year between 
the society and the government as the government accused the society of involving itself in politics, despite the then 
provisions of the Society's legislation which required it to "... assist the Government and the Courts in all matters 
affecting legislation and the administration and practice of the laws of Singapore. "15' This was compounded by 
Seow's subsequently entering parliament as an opposition member and his eventual arrest by the government in May 
1988 under the Internal Security Act and his subsequently seeking political asylum in the United States. See: Francis 
Seow, To catch a Tartar, ; and, Law Society of Singapore, 25Years: A Brief Retrospective, Singapore, Law 
Society, 1995, sections D, E, and F. Available: http: / /www.lawsoc.org.sg/about/ history.html 
rsa The Attorney- General, Chan Sek Keong in November 1995, criticised the Law Society for not defending the 
Singaporean legal system against foreign criticism, although if it had done so, the society would have breached 
government warnings for it not to involve itself in politics. See: "The Singapore Law Academy: Will it hurt the legal 
fraternity? ", Straits Times, 4 February 1996 
Iss Cited in: Daniel Bell, "Dissent Reassuring ", Sunday Morning Post, 11 July, 1999, p. 4 
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The Singapore Academy of Law, of which Lee Kuan Yew and his wife are members, a 
statutory body to control the entire legal profession, was subsequently set up in 1988 
under the Singapore Academy of Law Act 16° Members of the Academy comprise 
lawyers, judges, academics and persons interested in the law and the legal system in 
general, thus allowing membership by non -lawyers such as parliamentarians and 
businessmen. The statutory functions of the Academy include legal research, law 
reform and development, continuing legal education and examination of persons 
intending to practise law. 161 In November 1995, the Singapore Academy of Law Act 
was amended to empower the Academy to undertake additional statutory functions162 
which removed from the province of the Law Society any possibility of its being 
involved in political issues or advising in any substantive way on the development of 
the law. The province of the Law Society is the general administration of the practising 
legal profession, although even in this its powers are limited.163 The Singapore 
Academy of Law Act effectively places the legal community's advising to government 
function under the control of government proxies. An examination of the membership 
of the Senate and major committees of the academy clearly demonstrates the degree of 
government control of the academy, exercised in this case through the judiciary and 
senior members of the PAP legal cadre cohort. 
Table 5.8: Analysis of Membership of the Senate of the 
Singapore Academy of Law 199816' 
Member Curren Curren Forme Academic The Law Practition 
Category t t r s Attorney - Society ers165 
judges JCs* judges 
or JCs 
General TOTA 
L 
Number 14 6 2 2 1 2 5 32'bb 
[44%] [19%] (6%] [6%] [3°I4 [6%] [16%] [100°!0] 
Cumulati 63°% 
ve 
69% 75% 78% 84% 100% 
Judiàai Commissioner 
16° Singapore Academy of Law Act, Chapter 294A, Revised Edition 1989 
161 The original statutory functions of the Academy of law were: to promote the advancement and dissemination of 
knowledge of the laws and the legal system; to promote legal research and scholarship and the reform and 
development of the law; to provide continuing legal education for its members; to provide for the training, education 
and examination by the Academy or by any other body, of persons intending to practise the profession of law; to 
provide the facilities for the social interaction of its members; to promote good relations and social interaction 
amongst members and between members and law students and persons concerned in the administration of law and 
justice in Singapore. 
1fi2 These additional functions were; to appoint persons as notaries public or commissioners for oaths and to 
authenticate their signatures; to undertake activities and projects relating to the study, development and operation of 
laws and legal systems and the facilities, information technology and infrastructure in support thereof. 
to provide consultancy and other services relating to the study, development and operation of laws and legal systems 
and the facilities, information technology and infrastructure in support thereof. 
163 For example, the Law Society's inquiry and disciplinary committees are not established by the Society itself, but 
rather by the Chief Justice. 
164 Available: htt p: / /www.sal.orgsg/a_salorg.html, 16 March 1999 
165 Two of the practitioner members are Senior Counsel ((tiam Chin Toon SC and V. K. Rajah SC) 
166 Not including the secretary to the senate. 
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The chief justice is the president of the academy and chairman of the executive 
committee. The Attorney -General is a vice -president (of which there are five) and also 
sits on the executive committee. The other vice- presidents are the senior judge of the 
Court of Appeal, the dean of the Faculty of Law at NUS, the president of the Law 
Society and a former judicial commissioner and Senior Counsel, Joseph Grimberg who 
is seen as a reliable supporter of the PAP, if not a cadre. The executive committee of the 
Academy comprises the president, all five vice -presidents, the vice -president of the 
Law Society and two judges. 
Currently, foreign law firms are prohibited from practising in Singapore even with a 
Singaporean partner, but may only establish themselves to advise clients on foreign or 
international law," resulting in a local monopoly on legal advising on Singaporean 
law and representation in Singaporean courts. At the discretion of the courts, foreign 
lawyers can apply for temporary admission to represent clients as has occurred in 
several prominent defamation cases involving political figures.168 In September 1997, 
the Minister for Law established a Legal Services Review Committee to advise of 
strategies for ensuring that the legal services sector could adequately support the 
policy push towards a services oriented economy. The committee's report was 
delivered in June 1999 and recommended two mechanisms for closer relationships 
between foreign and domestic law firms; joint ventures and formal alliances with an 
initial cap on five joint ventures.169 
This strategy was augmented by amendments to the Legal Profession Act in early 1993 
which restricted the registration of lawyers in Singapore to graduates of certain 
designated universities. This was supposedly to maintain the quality of lawyers 
practising in Singapore, but appears to have been principally aimed at reducing the 
number of foreign trained lawyers entering the profession, as these, like Francis Seow, 
Chiam See Tong and others, had a propensity for non -conformity. There was also 
apparently a particular concern that those educated in Indian law schools were being 
corrupted by an Asian Westminster system that was a workable, if tarnished, 
democracy. The new rules restricted legal registration from 1 May 1993 to those 
enrolled at 15 English universities, 17° and after 1 January 1994, also those at nine 
selected universities in Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, New Zealand and Canada.' 
16' Barbara Leitch LePoer, Singapore: Background and U.S. Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service, 
Washington DC, 1995, p. 1 
'68 For example, in the Barings fraud case, Nick Leeson was represented by British lawyer Stephen Pollard. See: 
"Nick Leeson ". Available: http: / /www. star. net / people /- cousy /poo198 /dm/leeson.htm, 4 November 1998. In the Tang 
Liang Hong defamation case, Mr. Tang has been represented by British Queen's Counsel Charles Gray. Available: 
http:// www. ozemail .com.au/-- tanktalk/judgm.htm, 4 November 1998. Similarly, veteran opposition figure J. B. 
Jeyaramam has also been represented by British lawyers in the past. 
1A9 "Singapore swing suits lawyers ", Law Society Gazette, 26 June 1999, p. 52 
'0 All Scottish, Irish and Welsh universities were excluded, whereas previously all British law degrees had been 
recognised. 
"' Legal Profession (Qualified Persons) Rules 1994 
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Students trained at these institutions also had to complete a Diploma in Singapore law 
at NUS after returning to Singapore so as to acclimatise them to the domestic legal 
environment. These rules restricted entry to the profession in two ways; by rejecting 
graduates of universities not included in the rules and by relying on the foreign 
universities to restrict the number of Singaporean students enrolled in their courses 
because of limited course places. 
The political executive will also use more direct means to control lawyers when 
necessary, by directly damaging their income, assets or professional reputation by 
using administrative instruments. In 1976 a lawyer was imprisoned under the Criminal 
Law (Temporary Provisions) Act for seeking a judicial review of the conviction of his 
client who was also being held under that act'n It was also reported in one interview, 
that between 1995 -97 following the International Herald Tribune (IHT) defamation 
case, local counsel for the IHT, Howard Cashin,'m had all his property holdings except 
his family home forcibly acquired by the government under the Land Acquisition Act 
leading him to lose many hundreds of thousands of dollars in assets. ' Cashin had 
previously been the target of executive wrath when he had acted as junior counsel for 
Geoffrey Robertson QC in a libel suit brought by Lee Kuan Yew against the Far East 
Economic Review. On the day the case commenced, Robertson reports that a loyal PAP 
member sued for divorce on the grounds that Cashin had committed adultery with his 
wife, with Lee Kuan Yew's press secretary handing out press releases on the 
allegations in the Supreme Court chambers.' It does not pay to carry out one's oath as 
a solicitor and barrister with too much vigour or inclusiveness in Singapore. 
The development of legislation controlling the legal profession over the past 20 years 
has now provided the government with almost total control of the profession and has 
depoliticised it. The profession has no watchdog brief for monitoring the government's 
legislative program, although the Academy of Law provides advice to the government 
on request. However, as demonstrated above, it is firmly under the control of the 
executive through a proxy judiciary and members of the PAP legal cadre cohort. As 
was predicted in 1987, Singaporean lawyers have been "... reduced to the role of 
technicians who facilitate commercial transactions. "16 
t" See: Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, London, Macmillan, 1994, p. 
204 
Cashin is a senior partner in Lim Hua Yong and Co, a small law firm. 
1d Cashin's own house was reportedly also acquired but Cashin and his family have been allowed to remain in the 
house on a monthly rental basis. The obvious implication is that if Cashin crosses the political executive again, he 
will be forced to leave his family home. 
°' Geoffrey Robertson, The Justice Game, London, Chatto and Windus, 1998, p. 236. The person making the 
allegations is reported to have been William Cheng, a long time colleague of Lee Kuan Yew's. Cheng was a senior 
officer in Special Branch, the precursor to the Internal Security Department, before joining the mainstream civil 
service_ He was Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education, 1963 -1972, then executive chairman of the Central 
Provident Fund board 1973 -1978. See: Lee Kuan Yew, "Mass Politics and Parliamentary Politics ", Petir, 1, July 
1978, pp. 2 -21, p.4 
"6 Nancy Batterrnan and Eric Schwartz, Silencing All Critics: Human Rights Violations in Singapore, New York, 
Asia Watch, 1989, p. 2 
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This has not, however, produced a fully compliant legal profession, as signified 
by the incident at the ceremonial opening of the 1995 legal year where large 
numbers of lawyers hissed the Chief Justice as he extolled the virtues of his 
administrative reforms which had led to doubling the disposal of capital cases 
by removing virtually all protections for the accused.' Similarly, at a Law 
Academy function in 1998, large numbers of people talked and joked while the 
Attorney- general and the Chief Justice were giving speeches. The technicians 
have not completely forgotten the purposes of their profession. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The New York Bar Association has criticised what it sees as the decline of the rule of 
law in Singapore, including in its assessment not only social and political law, but also 
commercial law and stringent criticism of the Singaporean legal profession's capacity 
to adequately represent foreign companies in any dispute with the Government.' 
There is a perception, even amongst government officials in other Asian nations, such 
as Hong Kong, that in Singapore the government is above the law." In terms of 
commercial law there is little, if anything, to fear however about litigating against the 
Singapore government. The New York Bar Association's report is severely deficient in 
understanding the way in which the Singapore government works with foreign firms, 
especially through its four principal industry boards; the EDB, TDB, PSA and the 
NSTB. The same control philosophy that works on the basis of "leave nothing to 
chance" that has produced severe distortions in the social and political aspects of the 
constitutional and legal framework, have led to very sophisticated business 
relationship practices between government agencies and foreign firms, and 
increasingly, domestic companies. These practices ensure that little substantial 
litigation takes place between the government and foreign firms because of the 
government's determination to provide a legal, economic and social environment 
conducive to business. By using its "cluster strategy ", the EDB and associated 
government agencies such as the TDB, holistically case manage their MNC and 
indigenous clients in such a comprehensive way that resort to legal means to settle a 
"' Recounted by lawyers interviewed. 
"8 Beatrice S. Frank et al, The Decline of the Rule of Law in Singapore and Malaysia: A Report of the Committee on 
International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, New York, The Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York, 1991, p. 98 
19 For example, Hong Kong's Financial Secretary, Donald Tsang, has commented "In Hong Kong the government 
does not stand above the law. You can take the government to court - try doing that in Singapore... ". The Singapore 
government took no action against Tsang or the Asia Times newspaper in response to this front page insult. See: 
"Feisty Tang challenges Singapore ", Asia Times, 9 October 1996, p. 1 
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dispute arises in only the most difficult of cases; the level of support from these 
agencies is such that legal action would completely undermine the business 
relationship. Many foreign commentators are either unaware of this practice or choose 
to ignore it and therefore wrongly conclude that legal action against the Singapore 
government is difficult rather than unnecessary. 
The other side of this picture is the design of the legal system to ensure that it is 
conducive to continued PAP political control through perpetuation of its hegemonic 
program. The notions of judicial independence and autonomy have no institutional 
basis in Singapore. Jayasuriya comments: 
While executive dominance and structural incentives have shaped judicial independence and 
autonomy, in recent years corporatist ideology has played a decisive role in shaping judicial 
attitudes and behaviour. The dominance of this ideology has enabled the judiciary to have 
autonomy, but it is an autonomy that lies within the bounds of state ideology. Hence, it could 
be argued that it is an autonomy within the executive rather than outside as one finds with 
customary notions of the 'separation of powers'...It is clear that this notion of deference to 
executive competence amounts to the argument that judicial action needs to be congruent with 
the interests of the executive.' 
Despite the pragmatic public management systems that complement and soften the 
legal regime in the commercial sphere, the legal system remains one of the principal 
means by which the PAP core executive rules the nation. It is not by 'terror' as 
Tremewan would have us believe,181 but by a cold, technical, legalistic implementation 
of a system of law in which social and political controls are traded off for an economic 
pact with the simple majority of voters that the PAP executive rules, combined with a 
passionate belief in their 'manifest destiny' buttressed by a selective insularity 
reinforced by a skilfully managed media system that reinforces the legal instruments of 
coercion. 
As with all other institutions, executive control of the judiciary is exercised through it 
being subject to executive discretion in the exercise of detention without trial laws and 
indirect constitutional executive authority over the judiciary. In specific reference to 
the judiciary, control is also exercised by the removal of any external source of review 
of Singapore's courts, by legislation to curtail the sentencing prerogatives of the 
judiciary and the terms and conditions of appointments, such as annual re- 
appointments of judges older than the retirement age and the payment of salaries 
which are under the direct authority of the executive through the Minister for Finance. 
180 Kanishka Jayasuriya, "Corporatism and judicial independence within statist institutions in East Asia ", in, Kanishka 
Jayasuriya, ed., Law, Capitalism and Power in Asia: The rule of law and legal institutions, London, Routledge, 1999, 
pp. 173 -204, p. 186 
1$1 Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, London, Macmillan, 1994, p. 199 
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We can conclude that the Chief Justice and the Attorney -General are members of the 
core executive in Singapore and that other members of the Supreme Court judiciary 
and the Senior District Judge form part of the outer core, particularly the judges of the 
Court of Appeal. The remainder of the judiciary are part of the administrative 
machinery of state and have no status within the core executive, or at best may be 
located in proximity to the core executive in relation to certain, usually political, cases. 
As we found in the previous examination of the relationship between the legislature 
and the core executive, in Singapore, the Westminster conventions do not exist; the 
doctrine of the separation of powers is observed in word only; the legislature and the 
judiciary are disenfranchised by the executive and the legal profession has almost no 
independence from executive government. 
The judicial system has been hegemonised and interprets its role in terms of the overall 
goals of the political executive, thus allowing it to operate a bifurcated legal system 
which differentiates strongly between economic rights on the one hand, which are 
highly protected, and legal and social rights on the other, which are not. However, 
even economic rights are subjugated to the political program as the use of land 
acquisition and taxation legislation has demonstrated. The judiciary are, however, not 
as compliant as some would have us believe. The contemporary judiciary, because of 
the demonstrated inability of the political executive to recruit sufficient judges of 
genuine ability in the 1980s, and the continued passive hostility towards it by much of 
the Iegal profession, has had to accept that some of its judges will not act on its behalf 
in all circumstances, and some, perhaps, not at all. The contemporary judiciary is the 
result of a compromise, the exact nature of which we are uncertain, which balances the 
need for a reputable, talented judiciary with the requirement by the political executive 
for the judicial system to assist with the control of political opposition. This negotiated 
balance is qualitatively different from the relationship that characterised that between 
the Lee governments and their Supreme Court. 
6. THE CIVIL SERVICE AND 
CORE EXECUTIVE 
DYNAMICS 
This chapter examines the relationship between the political executive and the civil 
service executive. It attempts to clarify the structure and dynamics which provide the 
framework for interaction among ministers, public service institutions and the quasi - 
institutional structures that facilitate management of the state by the core executive. It 
thereby assesses whether a case can be made for the inclusion of the public sector 
executive within the core executive and, if so, how it operates in managing the state in 
concert with the other components of the core executive, particularly the political 
executive. It is important to note that, as with preceding chapters, an attempt is made 
to examine the character of the relationship between the Goh Chock Tong governments 
and the civil service. 
THE SINGAPORE PUBLIC SECTOR: STILL AN IRON CAGE? 
It should be no surprise that control of the public service by the political executive in a 
Westminster -style state is absolute. In Britain and other Westminster style jurisdictions, 
convention, not law, is the protector of what public sector autonomy exists. In 
Singapore, no such convention exists and what little did exist during the colonial 
period was purposely and effectively jettisoned by the PAP as discussed previously. 
The Singapore constitution is peculiar, in respect of other Westminster style 
constitutions, in that it contains many provisions for the administration of the public 
service and all major regulatory changes to the service require constitutional 
amendments. This would seem to be a particularly clumsy administrative mechanism, 
but it has one strength; it forces all significant public service changes to go through the 
legislature, thus requiring a two -thirds majority vote. In the event of a non -PAP 
government being in office without such a majority, it means that a PAP opposition 
can act as a protector of "its" public service, inherited by a non -PAP government. If a 
non -PAP government does not have this majority, no major changes can be made to 
the public service; it is yet another reserve safety control device in accord with the 
'leave nothing to chance' maxim which drives institutional design in Singapore. 
A specific provision is made in the constitution for the control of the promotion of the 
most senior Administrative Service officers above a particular level (called "the 
significant grade ") whereby such appointments may only be made by the President on 
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the advice of the prime minister.' Article 154 also guarantees that all government 
employees "... whatever race in the same grade of the service of the Government shall, 
subject to the terms and conditions of their employment, be treated impartially." The 
Constitution also established the basis of promotion as being on "... the basis of official 
qualifications, experience and merit"' 
Public service schemes of service, regulations for recruitment, service, promotion, 
conduct and discipline and allowance for the Public Service Commission to operate in 
accordance with its constitutional functions is provided for in Article 116. The Public 
Service Commission and the Legal Service Commission are established by Articles 105 
and 111 respectively. Public service pension matters are provided for in Articles 112- 
115. 
The public sector environment is highly constrained in Singapore, due to the culture of 
secrecy and the continuation of a command and control management approach from 
the colonial era. Underlying this culture is a raft of legislation and public sector 
management guidelines that reinforce these cultural traditions. In addition to the 
provisions for the public service within the constitution as detailed above, several 
pieces of legislation supported by subsidiary legislation provide the operational 
framework for the public service. It is these acts which enforce a rigid secrecy and 
insularity upon the public service and the civil service in particular. The most 
important legislation is detailed below. 
The Official Secrets Act 1970. Based on eponymous British legislation, this Act 
prohibits any act which is defined as "prejudicial to the safety or interests of 
Singapore" and the communication of any information or document by any person 
holding any government office to another person not specifically authorised to receive 
it. The Act also makes it an offence to encourage another person to supply such a 
document or information and, rather harshly, defines all partners, directors or officers 
of a firm or corporation in which a person is found guilty of an offence under this Act 
as equally guilty unless such persons can prove "... that the act or omission constituting 
the offence took place without his knowledge or consent. "3 A person suspected of 
committing an offence under this act may be arrested without warrant. The Act also 
allows the president to confer the powers of a police officer on any person for the 
purposes of the Act, including a civil servant. If found guilty under this Act, the 
maximum penalty is a $20,000 fine and a prison term of 14 years. 
Article 111(a) 
z Article 110 (2) of the Constitution 
3 Article 16(3) of the Constitution 
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The influence of this act on the maintenance of a culture of secrecy which defines 
accountability only as being to the executive cannot be underestimated. In my 
interviews of public service officers, the inability or unwillingness of an officer to 
answer even the most simple of questions was based on reference to this act. This may 
have been a convenient excuse for some, but it was obviously a deep concern for 
others, particularly officers outside the Administrative Service. One indication of the 
paranoia associated with the act can be gauged from a complaint from one civil servant 
that his ministry's filing system had so many "secret" categories, that it even had a 
category "secret -miscellaneous" in which everything that wasn't otherwise secret could 
be filed!' In effect, in order to protect themselves, public servants classified almost 
everything as secret. The effect of this act has been somewhat softened, at least in law, 
by the finding by the High Court in March 1998, that regardless of the classification of 
documents by the public service, it is the responsibility of the courts to determine what 
is and is not a state secrets This case is examined later in this chapter. 
The Prevention of Corruption Act. This Act provides extensive powers of 
investigation and severe deterrents for corrupt behaviour. These include: 
1. The power to investigate not just a suspect person, but also that person's wife, 
children or agents including their financial and other records if required; 
2. The power to require the attendance of witnesses at a place designated by the 
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and interview them; 
3. A provision that even if a bribe was not accepted, a person is guilty of an offence if 
he intended to commit an offence; and 
4. The estate of a person found to be corrupt within six years of death could be 
penalised under the act 6 
Until recently, the act also stipulated that an offence outside Singapore could be treated 
as if it occurred inside Singapore. However, in 1998, the High Court ruled this 
provision invalid. 
Internal Security Act 1989. Although this Act has no specific provisions relating to the 
public service, its discretion is so broad and it is so completely an instrument of the 
executive, that it cannot be ignored as a general instrument of political and social 
control which also has an impact on the public service and the behaviour of public 
officers. This Act allows for what is effectively unlimited detention without trial on the 
' "Miscellaneous secrets? ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 13 July 1991, p. 14 
5 "Who should have the final say - the state or the courts ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 14 March 1995, p. 14 
s Hilton L. Root, Small Countries, Big Lessons: Governance and the Rise of East Asia, Hong Kong, Oxford 
University Press, 1996, p. 46 
' Although Article 151(1)(b) of the Constitution forbids preventative detention of a citizen for more than three 
months, this is conditional upon the report of an advisory board which considers representations by the detainee and 
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certification of a cabinet minister$, the Secretary to Cabinet or an authorised minister 
for any reason, forbids judicial review of such orders except to review that the 
procedures specified in the Act were carried out,' places release from detention in the 
hands of the executive not the courts and provides for only the internal review of 
detainees' situations and eligibility for release. It also provides for detention without 
trial, special powers relating to subversive publications, the prohibition of 
organizations and associations of a political or quasi -military character, the control of 
entertainment and exhibitions, restrictions on the freedom of speech, assembly, 
association and movement, and the powers of curfew, search and seizure.1° This Act 
executes Article 149 of the constitution which, among other things, gives the state 
power to act against those whose actions: 
1. 'excite disaffection against the President or the Government; or 
2. promote ill -will among different races or classes likely to cause violence; or are 
prejudicial to the security of Singapore. 
The Penal Code. The Penal Code contains special provisions in relation to public 
officers charged with or found guilty of an offence against the code and many other 
acts and provides penalties in excess of those applied to non -public servants under the 
code. 
The Evidence Act 1990. This Act contains a provision which forbids the production of 
any unpublished government records 'relating to affairs of State' as evidence in a court 
except with the permission of the permanent secretary subject to the control of the 
president.' Additionally, public officials cannot be compelled to answers questions in 
court, either related to his official duties', or which are questions that it would 
ordinarily be improper for any person to ask13, or if they would "... disclose 
communications made to him in official confidence (either oral or written) when he 
considers that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure."' The Act also 
prohibits a court from inspecting a document if it relates to "affairs of state ".15 This Act 
advises the President on any extension or termination of the detention. This provision is weakened, however, by 
Article 151(4), which provides for the authority ordering the detention to reject the recommendations of the advisory 
board and seek Presidential approval for continued detention. 
s As provided for in Article 150 of the constitution 
' Full judicial review if orders made under this Act was revoked by the Internal Security Act (Amendment) Act 1989, 
following judicial orders to release some of those arrested as part of the 1988 "Marxist conspiracy" case, thus placing 
control of ISA orders wholly in the hands of the executive. 
10 Cited in: Jon S. T. Quali, "Meeting the Twin Threats of Communism and Communalism: the Singapore Response ", 
in Chandran Jeshurun, ed., Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia, Singapore, institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1985, pp. 186 -217, pp. 207 -208 
" Evidence Act 1990, s.123 
Evidence Act ss.123 -133 
" Evidence Act 1990 ss.150 -151 
" Evidence Act I990 s.126 
" Evidence Act 1990 s.162(2) states: "The court, if it sees fit, may inspect the document unless it refers to affairs of 
State or taker other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility." 
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therefore provides for the total control of the release of information by public officials 
which might be detrimental to the government and also provides substantial 
protection for both the government and its officials from investigation by the courts 
through an extremely broad claim of executive privilege.16 
The Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1985, grants the parliament 
and its committees the power to command the attendance of any person and the 
supply of any document required by the parliament or committee as it sees fit to 
demand.' However, the Act protects public officers from this provision and 
specifically excludes them from it if the president certifies that "... the evidence relates 
to affairs of State and that the public interest would suffer by the production thereof.i16 
This Act also defines a number of offences against the parliament which are punishable 
by the parliament, especially the publication of anything which 'reflects on the 
character' of the Speaker or members of the parliament itself.19 This effectively 
prohibits criticism of the parliament or the government by public servants and others 
whether in an official or private capacity. 
Statutory Boards and Government Companies (Protection of Secrecy) Act 1995. This 
Act extends provisions similar to the Official Secrets Act to statutory boards and 
government companies. The major difference is that the sanctions are significantly less, 
being a fine not exceeding $2000 and /or imprisonment not exceeding one year. It is 
interesting that this act, while applying to all 21 major statutory boards and the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, does not apply to the government's 
major holding company Temasek Holdings but rather to only some of its subsidiaries 20 
Why this is the case is unknown, as Temasek is a private company wholly owned by 
the government. 
This body of public sector legislation is reinforced by subsidiary legislation in the form 
of public service regulations. These are principally contained in the Instruction 
Manuals21, the Delegations of Powers (Ministry of Finance) Notifications,' Public 
16 For a more complete discussion of the implications of the Evidence Act 1990 for public officials see: Jeffrey 
Pinsler, Evidence. Advocacy and the Litigation Process, Butterworths, Singapore, 1992; Rafiah Salim, Evidence in 
Malaysia and Singapore: Cases, materials and commentary, Butterworths, Singapore, 1989; M. P. Jain, 
Administrative Law of Malaysia and Singapore. 2nd ed., Malayan Law Journal, Singapore, 1989 
"parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1985 ss.12 -15 
'" parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1985 s.16(1) 
' parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1985 s.31((g) -(k) 
20 See: Schedule 1, Statutory Bodies and Government Companies (Protection of Secrecy) Act 1995 
Z' Instruction Manuals (IMs) which are the public management guidelines for the civil service within which most 
regulations are incorporated. Permanent Secretaries may, under the authority vested in them by Article 34(3) of the 
constitution, issue management directives for their own ministries, but these must be consistent with the Instruction 
Manuals and other laws and subsidiary legislation made under other constitutional provisions and may be overridden 
by ministers exercising their authority under Article 30. 
'z These notifications, made under s.19 of the Financial Procedure Act, provide financial delegations to ministers and 
public officials including in respect of financial losses, (including those in which fraud or negligence may be 
involved). See: Delegation of Powers (Ministry of Finance) Notification 1998, Republic of Singapore Government 
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Service (Special and Senior Personnel Boards) Orders, and the Public Service 
Commission (Personnel Boards) Orders.' There is also specific subsidiary legislation to 
maintain public service discipline, principally the Public Service (Disciplinary 
Proceedings) Regulations, the Public Service Commission (Delegation of Disciplinary 
Functions) Directions 199726, and the Public Service (Personnel Boards and Appeals 
Board) Regulations 27 It is of interest to note that officers in the Administrative Service 
are excluded from disciplinary action under these regulations. 
The daily operations of the Singapore civil service in particular are regulated by this 
subsidiary legislation. As statutory boards are not part of the civil service, they operate 
according to guidelines approved by the relevant board, but broadly in conformity 
with civil service guidelines. In regulating themselves, statutory boards must act in 
conformity with the accountability and financial provisions specified in Articles 22(a), 
(b)and (f) of the constitution. Government companies must take account of similar 
requirements specified in Articles 22(c), (d) and (f). Subsidiary legislation relevant to 
the Singapore Armed Forces will not be considered in this study. 
While it has no direct relevance to the public sector, the frequent use of the Defamation 
Act 1957 by the government to silence and attack its critics implies that any criticism of 
the government must be carefully chosen in terms of wording and location so as to 
avoid prosecution under this legislation. This would include criticism of the public 
service, boards and GLCs. It must be said, though, that the Defamation Act is not 
widely used by the government except in the context of political campaigns,2° although 
recently at least one business commentator has refused to publish his thoughts on 
Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement, 8, 1998, 20 February 1998, pp.217 -234 re delegations to write off 
financial losses, public stores, debts, overpayments and irrecoverable revenue. They also relate to monies associated 
with GLCs. See: Delegation of Powers (Ministry of Finance) (No. 2) Notification 1998, Republic of Singapore 
Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement, 28, 1998, 22 May 1998, pp.975 -976, re EDB Investments 
Pty Ltd. 
Under these Orders, the permanent secretary to the Prime Minister's Office appoints members of the Personnel 
Boards. For example: Public Service (Special and Senior Personnel Boards) (Amendment No. 2) Order 1998, 
Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement, 20 February 1998, p.849 
2' These orders depend upon the authority of Article 110(d)(1), (2) and (4) of the Constitution to establish regulations 
for the establishment and operation of Personnel Boards in ministries and departments of the civil service. For 
example: Public Service (Personnel Boards) Order 1994, Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Subsidiary 
Legislation Supplement, 27 June 1997, p.3639 
ss These provide the framework for the laying, hearing and execution of disciplinary charges against public officials, 
including prescribed punishments for offences. For example: Public Service (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations 
1994, Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement, 26 September 1997, p.6853 
u These regulations provide delegations to Permanent Secretaries to investigate alleged breaches of discipline and to 
take action against offices guilty of an offence. See: Public Service Commission (Delegation of Disciplinary 
Functions) (Amendment) Directions 1998, Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation 
Supplement, 24, 1998, 24 April 1998, p. 877. Disciplinary regulations are also provided for specialist services as well 
as the general civil service, e.g. the Public Service Commission (Prison Officers) (Disciplinary Proceedings - 
Delegation of Functions) Directions 1997. 
These regulations provide the framework for public service appeals against disciplinary charges and promotional 
outcomes. For example: Public Service (Personnel Boards and Appeals Board) (Amendment) Regulation 1998, 
Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement, 9 April 1998, p.847 
28 An excellent legal analysis, with cases, of the Defamation Act 1957 is provided in: Keith R. Evans, The Law of 
Defamation in Singapore and Malaysia, 2nd ed., Singapore, Butterworths, 1993 
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Singapore's financial system from fear of defamation action by Singaporean banks, 
including government owned banks.' Thus the government's use of this legislation to 
suppress political freedom threatens to tarnish its reputation for supporting economic 
freedom. Foreigners are not accustomed to working in a legal system bifurcated by 
political control prerogatives. 
The public service is also controlled through the industrial relations system. There is 
no specific public sector employment legislation in Singapore. The public sector makes 
use of the same law that applies to all workers, with some exception. For example, all 
officers of the Administrative Service and certain other categories of senior officers are 
forbidden to join a trade union or a political party, although all Division 1 officers may. 
These senior officers, who are the category of officer that works most closely with 
ministers and politicians, are organised not into industrial relations organisations, but 
into professional social clubs, in the case of the Administrative Service, the Alpha 
Society.30 
Industrial relations legislation consists of the: 
1 . Employment Act which regulates the terms and conditions of service of 
employees; 
2. Industrial Relations Act which regulates the relationship between employers and 
unions; 
3. Trade Unions Act which regulates the establishment and management of unions; 
4. Trade Disputes Act regulates industrial action; 
5. Workman's Compensation Act provides rules for the compensation of workers 
injured or killed at work; 
6. Retirement Age Act provides for the minimum retirement age of workers; 
7. Factories Act establishes an occupational health and safety regime for factories; 
and the 
S. Employment of Foreign Workers Act regulates the recruitment and employment 
of foreign workers. 
All of this legislation applies to the public sector, except for the Singapore Armed 
Forces, the Factories Act and the Employment of Foreign Workers Act which do not 
apply to the public service, but do to GLCs. 
2-9 In his recent book, Phillipe Delhaise, an experienced senior Asia based financial sector analyst, refused to discuss 
Singapore banks because of fears of defamation action being taken against him by those banks under Singapore law. 
See: Phillipe F. Delhaise, Asia in Crisis: The Implosion of the Banking and Financial Systems, Singapore, John Wiley 
and Sons (Asia), 1998, p. 180 and p. 193 
30 In typical Singapore fashion, hierarchy is very important, thus the officers of the Administrative Service are the 
premier service, the first, hence alpha 
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This legislation has developed an industrial relations environment characterised by ;31 
1. The exclusion of certain categories of senior public officials from union 
representation; 
2. The application of generic industrial relations laws to those public officials not 
excluded from union membership; 
3. Government dominance of the industrial relations system in all aspects through a 
policy of industrial tripartism among government, unions and employers, 
especially through the National Wages Council; 
4. A strong, centralised union movement under government control; 
5. A concern with economic growth, political stability and industrial harmony over 
traditional workers rights; 
6. No tolerance of substantial industrial conflict, although small company specific 
industrial action is tolerated; 
7. The imposition of a non -adversarial approach to industrial conflict resolution 
through labour- management committees and at a higher level, a corporatist 
mediation structure involving the NTUC, the Ministry of Manpower, the Singapore 
National Employers Federation (SNEF) and the Industrial Arbitration Court. This 
non -adversarial approach is specified in the Trade Union Act;32 
8. The extensive use of house unions on the Japanese model in association with 
collective bargaining, including in the public sector; 
9. Control of wages through a Tripartite National Wages Council although 
Administrative Service salaries, allowances and bonuses are under the discretion of 
the political executive; 
10. The integration of social and industrial policy instruments within the collective 
bargaining process e.g. education and training provisions subsidised by the 
government; contributions to the Central Provident Fund; the use of productivity 
measures (e.g. Quality Control Circles, or, in the public sector Work Improvement 
Teams (WITs) and suggestion schemes); productivity -linked performance related 
payments in addition to base salary; medical benefits; and 
11. The development by unions of large commercial and co- operative business 
enterprises and investment funds under the provisions of s.48(g) of the Trade 
Unions Act to encourage union membership. 
The other major mechanism for control of the public service is through pay and 
conditions, as also noted by Paul 33 Singapore has what is arguably, the best paid and 
For detailed analyses of the Singapore industrial relations system see: Venkatraman Anantaaman, Singapore 
Industrial Relations System, Singapore, McGraw -Hill, 1990; Tan Chwee Huat, Labour Managernent Relations in 
Singapore, Singapore, Prentice Hall, 1995; Evelyn Wong, "Labour policies and industrial relations', in Linda Low 
and Toh Mun Heng, Public Policies in Singapore: Changes in the 1980s and Future Signposts, Singapore, Times 
Academic Press, 1992, pp. 144 -169. For a more critical view see: Frederic C. Deyo, Beneath the Miracle: labour 
Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989 
" The Trade Union Act was amended in 1982 to remove adversarial representation as a function of registered unions. 
33 Erik C. Paul, "Obstacles to Democratization in Singapore ", Centre for Southeast Asian Studies Working paper, 
Monash University, 78, 1992, p. 12 
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best housed public service in the world.' The upper grades of the Administrative 
Service and the senior ranks of all services (e.g. the Accounting Service, the Education 
Service, the Engineering Service) are superscale grades, the remuneration levels of 
which are determined through reference to the formula used for pegging these salaries 
to private sector salaries for ministers and senior officials." Other benefits to these 
officers are determined by cabinet on the advice of the Permanent Secretary, Public 
Service Division, PMO, through the relevant minister. Administrative Service officers 
receive an allowance additional to their salaries. 
All salaried public servants also receive additional benefits including subsidised rental 
of holiday homes, low- interest loans for housing, motor vehicle and other purchases 
(e.g. computers and home renovations), low -cost membership of the subsidised Civil 
Service Club with sport and recreation facilities, generous subsidised health 
benefits,37group insurance cover,' interest free study loans' and generous leave 
entitlements.' An indication of the salary levels paid to senior public servants is 
provided in Table 6.1 below.41 These salaries are not restricted to a very small group of 
senior officers, but to the overwhelming majority of Division 1 officers (approximately 
28% of the civil service) and to some Division 2 officers who comprise approximately 
30% of the civil service. These salaries are the base salaries for these officers. All 
officers also receive what is called a "variable component" usually equivalent to one 
month's salary and a performance bonus which may be between two and nine months 
Since the early 1990s, the public sector building program has provided almost all ministries and boards with 
accommodation of the highest quality, often incorporating fitness, creche, recreation and dining facilities of a high 
standard. Among the new buildings provided have been those for the Internal Revenue Service, the Ministry of 
Education, the Central Manpower Base, the Civil Service College, the Ministry of Finance, the Prime Minister's 
Office, the Parliament, Trade Development Board, ISEAS and a major higher education building program. 
33 Singapore Prime minister's Office, Competitive Salaries for Competent and Honest Government: Benchmarks for 
Ministers and Senior Public Officers, Singapore, Prime Minister's Office, 1994 
36 All officers can apply for use of holiday chalets at Loyang and Changi areas in Singapore and at the resort areas of 
Fraser's Hill and Cameron Highlands in West Malaysia. 
" Medical costs in Singapore are relatively high as the country has a medical system equivalent to advanced 
industrialised nations. The government subsidies to public servants are very generous, amounting to a subsidy rate of 
85% for an officer and 60% for each officer's dependents for costs incurred at Government Outpatient Dispensaries, 
Specialist Outpatient Clinics and Accident and Emergency Departments at government and restructured hospitals (ie 
the majority of hospitals) and the National University Hospital. If the officer attends other clinics the subsidy is $10 
per visit. However, the subsidy is limited to $350 per year The government also pays a I % contribution to each 
officer's Medisave health cover account to a maximum of $840 per year Dental costs are subsidised at a maximum 
rate of $70 per year. These benefits are heavily used; although only 4.4 per cent of Singaporeans hold the Civil 
Service Card which entitles them to medical subsidies, they accounted for 20 per cent of class A medical services and 
10 per cent of Class BI medical services. See: Chay Wai Chuen, "Beyond the Free Market ", Petir, May /June 1994, 
pp. 55 -61, p. 57 
" This group insurance cover is usually provided through the NTUC's insurance company, thus providing a large 
guaranteed market for this quasi -state organisation. 
39 The study loans are to a maximum of $4, 500 for a course in Singapore and $9, 000 for an overseas course and are 
interest free. Officers are bonded to the respective agency following the completion of the course. 
°0 Normal leave entitlements are 21 days recreation leave per year, 30 days sick leave (extended to 60 days if 
hospitalised), paid maternity leave of 56 days per child and special leave of 5 days per child under 6 years of age. 
This is far more generous than public sector leave in Australia 
" These salaries are 1995 figures. In August 1998 a request for the current salary levels was refused by the Public 
Service Division, Prime Minister's Office, without any explanation. Data from: Singapore Public Service 
Commission, Scholarships Bursaries Study Loans 1995, Singapore, Public Service Commission, 1995 
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additional salary per year.` Officers at and above division head level also receive 
additional payment for sitting on the boards of statutory agencies and GLCs. The 
quantum of this additional income could not be ascertained as requests for this 
information from the Public Service Division of the Prime Minister's Office and the 
Public Service Commission were uniformly refused. This information is also not 
provided to the parliament through any regular reporting mechanism. As these 
salaries are based on monitored market rates, they both rise and fall in response to 
market conditions. 
As can be seen from the components of the public sector operational framework, a 
distinction is made between the public service as a whole and the Administrative 
Service, the civil service elite corps that controls ministries and statutory boards. This 
distinction is mirrored in the SAF through the Wrangler Project" and its successors, in 
that officers assessed as capable of joining the general staff were provided with 
additional training, rapid promotion and challenging assignments to test and develop 
management and policy abilities. In this study, the SAF officer corps will not be 
explicitly examined. However, it is important to note that these complementary 
Table 6.1: Singapore Public Service Executive Remuneration 1998 
Indicative Rank Scale Monthly Employer Potential Potential 
Salary Paid CPF Bonus° Annual 
Permanent Secretary/ Staff Grade V 
Deputy Prime Minister 
Permanent Secretary/ Staff Grade IV 
Deputy Prime Minister 
Permanent Secretary! Staff Grade III 
Cabinet Minister 
Permanent Secretary/ Staff Grade II 
Senior Minister of State 
Permanent Secretary/ Staff Grade I 
Minister of State 
Permanent Secretary Superscale A 
r earn" Sala 46 
$48, 400 $116160 
$41, 500 $99, 600 
$34, 600 $83, 040 
$30, 000 $72, 000 
$25, 400 $60, 960 
$21, 700 $52, 080 
$435, 600 $1, 182, 220 
$373, 500 $1, 013, 860 
$311, 400 $845,500 
$270, 000 $733, 260 
$228,600 $621, 020 
$195, 300 $530, 740 
Permanent Secretary Superscale B $18,300 $43,920 $164, 700 $447, 780 
Permanent Secretary, Senior Superscale C $15, 200 $36, 480 $136, 800 $372, 140 
Education Officer, Legal Officer 
Permanent Secretary, Senior Superscale D1 $12, 900 $30, 960 $116, 100 $316, 020 
Education Officer, Legal Officer 
Permanent Secretary, Senior Superscale D $11, 700 528, 080 5105,300 $286, 740 
For example, in the Legal Service, those officers classified from Legal Officers Grade 1 (Staff Grade 3 rank) to 
Superscale El receive up to 9 months performance bonus as a variable component; those from superscale E to the 
upper timescale band receive up to three months bonus and those at the entry level which is only one grade receive up 
to two months bonus. See: The Legal Service: Salary and Progression, available at 
http : / /www.gov.sg/pmo/Iscisal.html, 10 June 1998 
a This was a management development project for the group of SAF officers assessed as having the potential to join 
the general staff, approximately by age 32. Lee Hsien Loong, Lee Hsien Yang and George Yeo were members of this 
group. 
60 Prior to 1 January 1999, this employer payment was 20% of base salary. From 1 January 1999 until further notice, 
this payment was reduced to 10% as a budgetary measure resulting from a recessionary economy. It is expected that 
the original standard 20% rate will be re- introduced when the economy recovers. 
a This is dependent upon (a) the personal performance of the officers and (b) national economic performance. 
a6 Includes one month variable allowance or Non -Pensionable Annual Allowance and the total for all health subsidies 
of $1,260 per year. 
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Education Officer, Legal Officer 
Permanent Secretary, Senior Superscale El $10, 850 $26, 040 $97, 650 $266, 000 
Education Officer, Legal Officer 
Permanent Secretary, Senior Superscale E $10, 000 $24, 000 $30, 000 $185, 260 
Education Officer, Legal Officer 
Permanent Secretary, Senior Superscale F $9, 200 $22, 080 $27, 600 $170, 540 
Education Officer, Legal Officer 
Deputy Secretary, Executive Superscale G $8, 400 $20, 160 $25, 200 $155, 820 
Officers, Legal Officer, Senior 
Education Officer Colonel SAF & 
CDF 
Senior Education Officer, Lt. Superscale H $7, 600 $18, 240 $22,800 $141,100 
Colonel SAF Zr CDF, Legal 
Officer, Chief Nursing Officer, 
Police Su ' tendent 
programs do interact as some senior field rank staff" and members of the general staff 
are inducted into the Administrative Service or the Corps of Senior Administrators 
following their retirement from active duty in the regular SAF. 
Ministers and the Administrative Service 
The political executive's relationship with the public service is not one of simple 
unidirectional control. As discussed in Chapter Three, the interaction between the 
political and public service executive (essentially the Administrative Service) goes 
beyond that of minister- bureaucrat to incorporate both within a partnership in 
managing the state. Ministers have an executive function in Singapore; they are 
actively involved in running their ministries and they work in the ministry buildings 
side by side with Ministry staff, usually with their offices on the same floor adjacent to 
the Permanent Secretary and deputy secretaries. However, the relationship with the 
civil service, or with boards is not a simple one of command and control. In particular, 
the relationship of ministers with the Administrative Service is complex and based on 
an historical pact, made shortly after the assumption of power by the PAP in 1959, by 
which the governance of the nation is shared by both the political and public service 
wings of a technocratic oligarchy, based on perpetuating a slightly modified model of 
British colonial control. 
The only recent study in which a consideration of intra- executive dynamics has been 
considered is that by Ho in 1995.' Through the examination of three case studies, Ho 
demonstrates the strong cohesion, though somewhat reduced autonomy of the core 
executive but notes its lack of consistent internal cohesion on specific policy issues, as 
demonstrated in internal conflicts between bureaucrats and politicians and 
consultations on the imposition of the initially unpopular policy of limiting motor 
vehicle numbers through a quota system. It is notable that in this case, the role played 
" Those officers with the rank of major and above. 
°ft Ho Khai Leong, "The Politics of Problem Definition and Agenda Setting in Singapore ", Asian Journal of Political 
Science, 3, 2, December 1995, pp. 66 -89 
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by MPs and specifically the chairman of the GPC49 on Communications and 
Information, Hong Hai, were significant, as was the parliamentary select committee 
established to assist in developing this policy 5° In this case, the select committee and 
the GPC were used to assess community response to the policy, a strategy that has 
become increasingly common under Goh Chok Tong governments. As Ho concludes; 
... it is reasonable to suggest that the VQS' is a case of inside initiative coupled with 
consultation by elites with the general public .._ However, policy outcomes suggest that 
countervailing pressures outside the governmental circle were restricted and that the various 
inputs from the public on policy formulation were very much limited to fine- tuning and 
incremental modifications on details rather than on broad principles. In other words, the 
politics of accommodation and exchange, as it exists, is very much an exercise in unequal 
bargains, and the subsequent results reflect that particular process.52 
Ho's conclusions are evidence of a continued intimate partnership between ministers 
and the higher Administrative Service officers. It also indicates their ability to 
dominate other actors in the policy process but also their willingness to listen to public 
opinion, particularly when nit is obvious that a policy or proposed policy might meet 
substantial middle class resistance. 
This partnership is evidenced by the pattern of recruitment to the political executive. 
Speaking in the parliamentary debate over the major changes to ministerial salaries in 
November 1994, Lee Kuan Yew noted that between 1980 -1994, only two ministers had 
been recruited from the private sector with no previous experience in the higher civil 
service; Tony Tan and Yeo Ning Hong.53 That debate was not only over ministers' 
salaries, but higher public service salaries, as ministers and the most senior public 
servants share the same salary scale. This scale is used to determine which public 
servants are senior to which ministers.54 All of the cabinet in 1998, except two 
members, came from the Administrative Service, the SAF general staff or the public 
sector; 20 per cent of MPs elected in 1997 came from the civil service or statutory 
boards,75 and as we saw in Chapter Three, ministers saw the relationship as a close 
partnership. It is, however, a partnership substantially hidden from the public gaze 
and not characterised by uniformity. Koh's study of the Administrative Service has 
shown that, at least at the most senior levels of the Administrative Service, (permanent 
secretary and deputy secretary) bureaucrats are principally concerned with strategy 
49 Government Parliamentary Committee. These committees are PAP party committees - they have no 
constitutional status. 
so ibid., pp. 71 -72 
" Vehicle Quota Scheme 
52 Ho, op. cit., p. 75 
53 Lee Kuan Yew, "How much is a good minister worth ? ", in, Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez and Sumiko Tan, 
eds., Lee Kuan Yew: The Man and His Ideas, Singapore, Times Editions, 1998, pp. 331 -342, p. 334 
$° In interviews with public servants and others, comments on the seniority of certain public servants vis a vis 
ministers was invariably based on their classification, as ministers and public servants share the same classification 
scale as shown in Table 6.1. The entry grade for ministers is Staff Grade 1 on this scale. 
ss See Chapter 4, Table 4.2 
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formulation, policy making and consultations with ministers, politicians and other 
senior bureaucrats in relationships that are described as collaborative ' However, 
Koh's study also identified different and contradictory perceptions of the relationships 
between ministers and Administrative Officers, with some officers reporting that there 
needs to be greater differentiation between the roles and others that there should be a 
greater 'fusioñ 57 
As Koh's study indicates, in the absence of any severe threat to the nation building 
hegemonic program that has emerged from the PAP's long period of control, tension 
has been evident in this power sharing relationship for some time. In 1991, Goh Chok 
Tong criticised his former Administrative Service colleagues for lacking political 
sensitivity.' Ong Teng Cheong, then PAP Chairman and First Deputy Prime Minister 
told PAP MPs and ministers that they had to differentiate themselves from 
bureaucrats$9 and to be more flexible in responding to unanticipated policy impacts.6° 
Koh reports that in choosing between competing policies or implementation methods, 
there is "... sometimes a battle with the political leadership in this areaió1 as there is in 
all political systems. The balance of power also seems to have shifted towards the 
political executive with some of Koh's respondents noting that too many of the new 
generation of permanent secretary do not have the courage to directly challenge 
ministers bz However, respondents in both my 1995 and 1998 interviews indicated that 
while this was only true of a minority of permanent secretaries and deputy secretaries, 
the issue was one more of style than substance. The current generation of senior 
Administrative Officers had matured in a more stable political and policy environment 
than the 'Old Guard' permanent secretaries, were dealing with ministers very similar 
to themselves in educational and socio- economic terms and preferred a less 
confrontationist approach to resolving conflict. It was also important to note that most 
of the current members of the cabinet also preferred this approach unlike Lee Kuan 
Yew, Goh Keng Swee, Toh Chin Chye and other Old Guard ministers who were 
renowned for their domineering and authoritarian style as well as for their robust 
debate of policy and administrative issues. 
However, Lee Kuan Yew has noted this sameness of the political and public sector 
executives is in itself, a problem; they do no challenge one another and are guilty of 
"intellectual in- breeding. "' Administrative Service officers interviewed in 1998 were 
" Gillian Brigette Koh Lim Choo, A Sociological Analysis of the Singapore Administrative Elite. The Bureaucracy in 
an Evolving Developmentalist State, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sheffield, June 1995, pp. 201 -207 
"ibid., pp. 308 -313 
58 "Core team to take on core govt jobs ", The Straits Times, 6 July 1991 
ss Sumiko Tan, "Help the common man achieve his goal ", The Straits Times, 17 November 1991 
6° 
"Perception gap dividing people and govt, says Teng Cheong ", The Straits Times, 12 August 1992 
fil Koh, op. cit., p 138 
6' ibid. 
61 Straits Times, 12 November 1994, p. 16 
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aware of this criticism and commented that it had a considerable influence on 
interaction within the core executive, as concerns over this issue had led to particular 
strategies for policy development and review being adopted to overcome it. These 
included on -line discussion groups in the alpha domain, electronic noticeboards, 
involving selected "outsiders" in brainstorming, using consultants and using a variety 
of planning strategies. 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE, POLITICAL PARTNERING AND POWER 
SHARING 
The relationship between ministers and the bureaucratic executive is not determined 
by these structural factors alone; a major determinant is dynamics within the political 
executive itself, as these intrude into the relationship between the two executives and 
help define and shape it. 
In the this section we examine some aspects of the dynamics of the relationship 
between the political executive and the public sector executive and assess the impact of 
this on the way in which the two executives work together within the contemporary 
core executive. 
Relations between the bureaucratic and political executives are neither as constantly 
comfortable as Ho suggests, nor as uniform and consensual as Lee Kuan Yew suggests. 
Tensions do exist within the core executive and particularly in the relationships among 
ministers and between ministers and the most senior ranks of the Administrative 
Service; permanent secretaries and deputy secretary level officers in ministries and 
boards. Only this most senior level of bureaucrat will be considered in this study. 
These tensions have arisen from natural and generally predictable causes; 
1. The generational transfer of power to the contemporary political executive; 
2. The continued desire for power and influence by Lee Kuan Yew and his family and 
the lack of widespread support for this within the core executive; 
3. The changing nature of Singaporean society driven by the PAP's economic success, 
particular increased affluence, higher educational Ievels and a burgeoning middle 
class which has grown increasingly immune to the PAP's political control 
strategies; 
4. The inability of the middle class to achieve genuine political participation except 
through PAP co- option; 
5. The complexity of the post cold war policy environment in an international 
economy which is becoming more globalised interdependent; 
fio Garry Rodan, "The Growth of Singapore's Middle Class and its Political Significance ", in Garry Rodan, ed., 
Singapore Changes Guard: Social. Political and economic Directions in the 1990s, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 
1993, pp. 52 -71 
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6. The isolation of Singapore as a soft authoritarian state as Indonesia, Thailand, 
Cambodia, South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines continue democratising and 
discarding the "Asian democracy" approach of the 1970s and 1980s; 
7. The maturing of the electrical manufacturing, petrochemical, transport and tourism 
sectors of the economy and the need to supplement these with alternative activity 
that has potential for high growth; 
8. The high risk strategies which have characterised much of the government led 
development of the external economy; and 
9. The globalisation of communications and media through satellite transmission and 
the internet to compete with domestic media and erode government control of the 
media.' 
The key factor underlying the major fault lines within the core executive is the 
generational transfer of power and leadership succession following Goh Chok Tong's 
retirement from the prime ministership. This power game is based on an inherent 
contradiction in Lee Kuan Yew's approach to his succession which has been worsened 
by events beyond his control, including Lee Hsien Loong's cancer in 1994, Lee Hsien 
Yang's continued refusal to enter politics, Goh Chok Tong's slowly increasing power 
and autonomy within the cabinet and the development by Goh Chok Tong of two key 
support bases as the foundation of his power base; within the party, particularly the 
parliamentary party and within MINDEF and the SAF. 
While Lee planned and designed his succession with as much control as possible as 
depicted in Chapter One, the final decision to appoint Goh Chok Tong as his successor 
was accompanied by a number of contingency strategies. These included his possible 
assumption to the elected presidency, the medium term removal of Goh (also possibly 
to the presidency, a major GLC or the GIC) and his replacement by Lee Hsien Loong, 
and a worse case scenario of splitting the PAP with the major remnant under Lee 
Hsien Loong and a more moderate faction under Tony Tan, presumably assuming the 
assumption to power of Lee Hsien Loong.`6 Huxley hints that Lee may have been able 
to use the SAF to support a quasi -martial law regime." 
None of these options was realised. It soon became obvious that, while the party and 
the nation were generally grateful to Lee for his achievements, Goh was a welcome 
ss See: Garry Rodan, "The Internet and Political Control in Singapore ", Political Science Quarterly, 113, 1, 1998, pp. 
63 -84 
" 
"Finally Being His Own Man. Finally, Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia and Himself; Asiaweek. 25 November 
1999. Available at: http: / /cnn.com/ASIANOW /asiaweek /interview /goh.chok.tong. Goh comments that this 
proposition was seriously considered twice; first in 1984 and then again in approximately 1994 when Tony Tan and 
Lee Hsien Loong were both deputy prime ministers. In 1992, Shee commented at an Institute of Policy Studies 
conference, that a two-party system could only emerge in Singapore through a split in the PAP. See: Shee Poon Kim, 
"Domestic Politics ", in, Arun Mahizhnan, ed., Singapore: The Year in Review 1992. Singapore, IFS, 1993, pp. 26- 
41, p. 36 
60 Tim Huxley, "The Political Role of the Singapore Armed Forces Officer Corps: Towards a Military- Administrative 
State ? ", SDSC Working papers, 279, 1993, p. 17 
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change. His modesty, consultative instinct, even his initial interpersonal and political 
ineptness, although tinged with what was seen as arrogance, was soon appreciated as 
having a more common touch. Lee had also trawled through all possible candidates for 
elected office, been rejected by many, tried out the remainder and discarded them, 
often brutally. This had alienated a very large sector of the nation's intellectual and 
business elite - they wouldn't provide themselves as political fodder again, so the 
source of alternative leaders was becoming resistant to recruitment.` Age had also 
started to erode Lee's support base among older members of the former core executive 
who had moved to the outer orbit of the second generation core, had retired or died. 
Options were further eroded when Ong Teng Cheong and Lee Hsien Loong both 
contracted cancer. It was at this point that the elder Lee began to at last hand over the 
final institutional levers to Goh; principally the Secretary -Generalship of the PAP, 
although he insisted on retaining control or at least significant influence over four 
areas essential to his personal need for control: the Gurkha Contingent,` the 
chairmanship of the Defence Council, the chairmanship of the GIC and membership 
and control over the membership of the Council of Presidential Advisers. All other 
policy and administrative areas which impacted on these had to be negotiated with Lee 
and those allied to him until 1997 when Goh's substantial election victory finally 
cemented his credentials with Lee as a tough uncompromising leader.' 
This management of the transition from Lee Kuan Yew was a very challenging task for 
Goh, particularly as he had a narrow personal support base and, at least initially, 
seemed to be too dependent on Lee. Goh had stated on many occasions that he was 
not, could not and would not be Lee Kuan Yew n What he was also saying more 
quietly, and more frequently after 1991 as his tenure extended, was that Singapore did 
not need another Lee; times had changed and so must the leadership, a stance 
eventually conceded by Lee himself.' This perception that the core executive needed to 
move beyond the Lee family has been reinforced by the lack of consistently strong 
support for Lee Hsien Loong's ascent to the prime ministership among the political 
executive in particular. In fact, from December 1993 until November 1999, Goh Chok 
69 For example, Lee Hsien Loong admitted in 1994 that the PAP cannot attract number of people it requires for 
planning its leadership succession. See: "S'pore may be in for succession problem ", Straits Times, 25 July 1994, p. 1. 
This was again conceded in 1999 by Goh Chok Tong. See: Goh, 1999, op. cit. 
69 The Gurkha Contingent theoretically is a neutral riot control force and has responsibility for guarding key national 
institutions such as the Monetary Authority of Singapore. There are no Gurkha guards at such installations. Rather 
the Gurkha Contingent has three responsibilities; guarding Lee Kuan Yew's private residence, guarding the Istana 
offices of the prime minister and senior minister and guarding ISD detention centres. It is undoubtedly capable of 
riot control, but there have been no riots in Singapore for over 30 years. Lee's personal bodyguards, as for all 
ministers, are ISD officers specially trained at the FBI Academy. 
"Finally, Being His Own man: Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia - and himself ", Asiaweek 25 November 1999. 
Available at: http:i /cnn.com/ ASIANOW / asiaweek / interview /goh.chok.tong/index.html 
Goh emphasised this in his maiden speech to parliament as prime minister. See: Alan Chong, Singapore's New 
Premier Goh Chok Tong, Petaling Jaya, Pelanduk, 1991, p. 26 
72 See Lee's comments in: "Lee Kuan Yew on Asean, the economy and S'pore ", Asiaweek, 21 may 1999. Available 
at: : http : / /cnn.com/ASIANOW /asiaweek/99 /0521 /nat1 :html 
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Tong avoided giving explicit public support to Lee Hsien Loong as his successor.73 In 
interviews with members of the core executive in 1995, 1997 and 1998, the 
overwhelming majority indicated that Lee Hsien Loong was less popular than Goh 
Chok Tong within the party and cabinet and that it should not be assumed that Lee 
will be the next prime minister. The consensus seemed was that this decision would 
not be one imposed by either Lee Kuan Yew or Goh Chok Tong; it would be done on 
the same basis as Goh's succession - by the cabinet in consultation with the inner core 
executive74 - but without Lee Kuan Yew's overwhelming influence. Goh could 
nominate a candidate, but equally, others could be nominated and the outcome has to 
be a negotiated settlement within the core executive.' One indicator of Goh Chok 
Tong's control of the party is the fate of the cohort of MPs recruited in 1988 under Lee 
Hsien Loong's patronage. Of this group, only three became ministers - Mah Bow Tan, 
George Yeo and Peter Sung. Of these, Mah and Yeo are more oriented towards Goh 
and Sung left parliament in 1997. Of the 1991 cohort, chosen by Goh, Ker Sin Tze and 
Lim Hng Kiang entered cabinet and in 1992, followed by Teo Chee Hean from 
MINDEF in the 1992 by- election. Lim and Teo are now senior cabinet ministers, 
nominated by Goh as part of the inner group of very talented ministers which also 
includes Lee Hsien Loong and George Yeo.76 
There has been speculation that the political executive is split between a Lee faction 
and a Goh faction or, if not a faction, an informal grouping around these two n This 
has been denied and the political executive is keen to project an image of party and 
cabinet solidarity, although even Goh admits that the solidarity extends mainly to the 
membership sharing "the same philosophy and the same vision on how Singapore 
should be governed. "' While it is certain that there are no formal factions in the PAP 
and cabinet, the core executive like all human groups, is undoubtable split along lines 
of personal affiliation, style and the means of governance.' What my interviews 
indicated was that there have been and are splits within the cabinet and the core 
executive, that these generally revolve around issues of general long -term strategy 
(which must be eventually resolved) and particular policies (which may remain 
n Goh commented in April 1993, following Lee's return to duties after treatment for his cancer, that he was his 
choice as successor_ However, a search of the Singapore Press Holdings Newslink database failed to find any public 
statement to this effect after that date. In his interview with Asiaweek in November 1999, Gob commented regarding 
Lee's elevation to the prime ministership: "Tt seems to be a given that he will succeed sometime after 2002." This is 
still not a strong endorsement. See: Anna Teo, "PM Goh says BG Tee remains his choice of successor ", Business 
Times, 1'2 April 1993, p. 1; and, Goh, 199, op. cit 
" 4 Lee Kuan Yew commented that choosing a successor prime minister was not the incumbent prime minister's 
decision but rather that "it is the members of the party core -group, not the Prime Minister, who decide on who should 
inherit power." See: Chong, op. cit, p. 67 
" For Goh's comments on his own elevation see: Chong, op. cit, pp. 8 -9 
'E "Finally His Own Man: Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia - and himself', Asiaweek, 25 November 
1999. Available at: httpJ /cnn.com/ASIANMOW /asiaweek/ interview /goh.chok.tong/index.htm 
" Chong, op. cit, pp. 58 -72 
rbid,p.8 
" Shee, 1993, op. cit, p. 36 
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unresolved), but that an enduring problem within the core has been the degree of 
Goh's genuine independence from Lee Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong and the 
question of the latter's possible succession to Goh Chok Tong. Some have indicated 
that the loss of five cabinet ministers and a minister of state from the political executive 
between 1992 -1994 is an indication of considerable disenchantment with the continuing 
influence of the Lees and Goh's inability to displace them or limit their influence.80 
These issues inevitably intrude into the relationship between the most senior 
bureaucrats and the political executive because of their essential inter -dependency. It is 
these two larger issues which we will study further in an attempt to make more explicit 
the dynamics within the core executive and the nature of the relationships between the 
political and public sector executives. 
A major issue that has shaped bureaucratic /ministerial relationships for much of the 
past 10 years is the place and power of Lee Hsien Loong within the ministry and his 
possible future. While Lee has many supporters, he has also alienated many because of 
what is seen as his arrogance and the autonomy he demonstrates in his relationships 
with other cabinet ministers; characteristics which, seven years after he joined the 
cabinet under Goh's sponsorship, he had not curbed. In 1990, an incident occurred in a 
pre -cabinet meeting which was the beginning of entrenching further among many in 
the core executive, resistance to Lee Hsien Loong's long term ambitions for the prime 
ministership.81 Prior to this meeting Lee Hsien Loong had gone to the office of Richard 
Hu, the Minister for Finance, and removed a number of files without Hu's permission. 
At that time Lee's office was on the 48`h floor of what is now Temasek Tower and Hu's 
was on the 50' floor. At the pre -cabinet meeting Hu took Lee to task for doing this and 
was supported by Tony Tan. Lee's response was aggressive and insulting, he directly 
insulting Tan and Hu, a man of his father's age. This was a double insult to Hu, who 
was Lee's superior in cabinet and a person of an age which should of itself deserve 
respect in Chinese society. Suppiah Dhanabalan intervened and chastised Lee for his 
behaviour, demanding that he apologise to Hu, withdraw his remarks and not 
interfere in other minister's portfolios. A heated exchange occurred into which a 
number of other issues intruded and eventually Lee lost his temper, reached across the 
table and slapped Dhanabalan across the face. This caused an uproar in the cabinet and 
Lee was severely chastised by Goh Chok Tong. Dhanabalan stormed out of the room 
and did not return for some time. Lee, in response to a demand from Goh, 
subsequently apologised to Dhanabalan, Hu and Tan. Hu, Dhanabalan and Tan all 
initially stated that they would leave the cabinet as a result of this incident. Goh later 
80 Although he does not state this view, Cherian George raises these departures from cabinet as a major problem. See: 
Cherian George, "Domestic Politics ", in, Yap Mui Teng, ed., Singapore: The Year in Review 1994, Singapore, IPS, 
1995, pp. 52 -60, p. 52 
n This information was reported tome by three informants, one of whom had access to a member of the political 
executive (but not of cabinet level) who had a first hand account of this incident. 
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took up the matter with Lee Kuan Yew who reportedly verbally thrashed his son over 
the matter. This was apparently followed by a more sober, educational but equally 
critical assessment from Lee Hsien Loong's mother, a talented through background 
political adviser. Lee Kuan Yew met later that day with Hu, Tan and Dhanabalan 
apologised for his son's behaviour and requested that they not resign, supported by a 
similar request from Goh Chok Tong. All held out for some time, but eventually Hu 
agreed to stay, but Dhanabalan and Tan both resolved to leave. This they did 
following the August 1991 elections, all without a public a word against Lee Hsien 
Loong, continuing to subscribe to the tenet of all secrets staying within the PAP 
family.' While this is reportedly Lee Hsien Loong's worse outburst in cabinet and he 
has obviously learnt from the experience by moderating his behaviour among the 
political leadership, he has reportedly not done as much in his dealings with the civil 
service. Every senior public sector official with whom I discussed the succession issue, 
off the record, rated Goh above Lee in terms of being of prime ministerial calibre and 
rated Goh as having far more support in the civil service, party, the GROs and the 
cabinet than Lee, although Lee has probably been more successful at developing 
support within the civil service than elsewhere. On the question of Lee's succession to 
the prime ministership, considerable doubt was expressed as to its inevitability, many 
pointing out that the cabinet was very talented and that there were a number of 
potential ministers recruited in the 1997 elections. However, this tension regarding Lee 
Hsien Loong and Lee Kuan Yew's eventual retirement continues to dog the political 
executive and to strongly influence its interaction with the senior bureaucracy. Both 
Lees have their own power hases; the father's built on his historical contributions, but 
now declining rapidly in terms of personal power and the son's within part of the 
Administrative Service, the business community and less so within the party and 
parliament. 
Goh has had to work around these Lee fiefdoms to develop his own power base. This 
he has done by concentrating on two areas; control of the party machine and the 
parliamentary party since 199183 and establishing clear control of and support from 
within the Ministry of Defence and the SAF.te A third area over which he seems to 
82 For the official story on why Dhanabalan and Tan resigned see: "Dr. Tan: I'll return to public office if my services 
are needed ", and "Decision to step down not a hasty one, says Dhana ", Straits Times Overseas Edition, 14 September 
1991, p. 3 
83 In 1988 Lee Hsien Loong had played a major role in preselecting candidates. This changed somewhat after 1991, 
but after 1994 Goh assumed almost complete control of party preselection, no personally, but by working thorough 
the party's selection committee process. 
u Goh was Second Minister for Defence from June 1981 and Defence Minister from January 1984-1991. Under the 
Armed Forces Act, the Minister has virtually autonomous control of the SAF including selection, promotion and 
allocation of all officers. In respect of his powers as Defence Minister Goh has commented: "I can tell you that I am 
most uncomfortable at the authority which I have as Minister for Defence. ... I can appoint the Chief of Staff, Chief 
of General Staff, Air Force Commander, Navy Commander, Army Commander. I can promote, I can transfer, I can 
demote without legally having to consult the Prime Minister ... I don't feel comfortable heranse the potential for 
abuse is that it is very easy for a potential mischief maker, who is a Defence Minister, to build up the military behind 
him..." See: Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, 20 August 1988, p. 5 
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have control is also the Information and Arts portfolio and through it media policy, 
although I was not able to satisfactorily verify this in interviews. The dominant view 
was that George Yeo, the Minister for Information and the Arts, was a strong 
supported of Goh and worked closely with him in reworking the media and cultural 
boundaries imposed by the government. His weakness in this area has been a lack of 
control over Singapore Press Holdings, still overseen by Lee Kuan Yew's old 
ministerial associate Lim Kim San, although in 1998, with Lim being 84 years of age 
and reportedly ill, this must soon pass. The party base allows Goh control of 
parliamentary candidates and therefore control of the parliament and the development 
of support networks throughout the housing estates and the PAP community sector. 
He has also appointed several hundred new cadres and retired many in the older 
generation, thus rebuilding the party's constituency infrastructure. It is Goh's power 
base within MIINTDEF that is of interest to this study, as it illustrates some aspects of the 
dynamics that characterise the relationship between the political and bureaucratic 
executives. 
The MINDEF power base has allowed Goh the opportunity to slowly increase his 
control in areas previously seen to be under Lee family domination. Selected retiring 
officers from the SAF officer corps have been moved into the Administrative Service; 
the Security and Intelligence Division of MINDEF has been developed as an alternative 
source of advice to the ISD on security matters; the defence related GLCs are populated 
with retiring SAF officers at board and executive level, providing influence over 
Singapore Technologies despite the presence of Lee Hsien Loong's wife as President 
and CEO of this conglomerate. Some observers, such as Huxley, have contended that 
Lee's base in MINDEF and the SAF is substantial, but there seems to be little evidence 
of this.' His rise to be Chief of the General Staff by the age of 32 did little to endear 
him to the regular SAF officer corps. George Yeo, not Lee, heads the SAF Reservists 
Association and Yeo had substantial support earlier in his career from the then Defence 
Minister Dr. Yeo Ning Hong and Goh Keng Swee.57 The latter, in particular, at that 
time still had considerable influence in the SAF and reportedly was not a supporter of 
Lee Hsien Loong. In more recent times, it was Goh who recruited Teo Chee Hean from 
the SAF for the 1992 by- election, not Lee, although Lee, through his oversight of the 
Administrative Service vets the transfer of senior SAF officers to the civil service. This 
also, however, is vetted by Goh's office and, at the most senior levels, by the cabinet. In 
establishing his power base in MINDEF, Goh had to first build close relationships with 
ss Remembering that officers from Lt Colonel rank and above will retire between 35 -40 if they are appointed to 
another position in the public sector, including in a GLC. 
ec Huxley, op. cit., p. 9. Huxley has excellent information sources in the SAF, but I think his sources provided 
information in the context of the mid 1980's, before Goh had become Defence Minister. 
a' Huxley supports the view that Yeo was a protégé of Dr. Yeo Ning Hong's. They are not related. See; Huxley, op. 
cit., p.16 
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several key MINDEF bureaucrats and develop these into a loose coalition of interests 
which would allow him to develop autonomy within the ministry independent of the 
constitutional authority of his office. This he did by aligning himself with a group led 
by Lim Siong Guan, formerly Lee Kuan Yew's Principal Private Secretary, 1978 -1981, 
and permanent secretary in MINDEF from 1982 -1994. Lim, a tough, conservative, 
highly intellectual administrator with a technocratic passion for efficiency, also has a 
fine political sense. His conservatism matched Goh's, while his political sense 
sharpened Goh's initially less developed political abilities. Goh's demonstrated 
administrative ability and desire for a change of style in government was also matched 
by Lim's entrepreneurial instincts and ability to innovate in public sector management 
while maintaining strong central control of the public sector, as demonstrated in his 
husbanding of the PS21 reforms outlined in Chapter Two and his substantial role in 
redesigning the government's coercive instruments as detailed in Chapter Eight. It is 
on this foundation, with the cooperation of most of his ministerial colleagues including 
Lee lisien Loong, that Goh has built his premiership. This type of partnering between 
the political executive and the bureaucratic executive is common in Singapore. 
Although ministers are rarely allowed by the prime minister to work for long periods 
with the same Administrative Officers, the number of people managing the state at the 
highest levels is small and natural networks and alliances develop and are an integral 
part of the core executive structure and dynamics. 
Bureaucrats and Ministers: Policy Community Cowboys or Rustlers? 
One other characteristic of the dynamic between the two executives, is the way in 
which they cooperate to develop and manage policy communities and networks. In 
questioning Administrative Officers and MPs on this issue in 1998, it was unanimously 
agreed that in Singapore policy networks are mediated through the political and 
bureaucratic executives with respondents generally describing this arrangement as 
corporatist. Business, industry and other civil society groups were seen as having no 
autonomy to initiate policy except in rare cases of broad public rejection of a 
government program or proposal. in fact, in discussions with several officers, it was 
indicated that the term 'policy community' was often used in certain ministries and 
that senior officers had a clear understanding of themselves as shaping and managing 
such communities as part of their portfolio management responsibilities. The 
examination of such communities is a very important aspect of the dynamics of the 
core executive, but can only be examined in passing in this study.` An example of 
these policy networks, the economic policy network, is provided in Diagram 6.1. 
This thesis had initially been a study to examine the policy communities and networks underlying the interaction of 
science and technology, education and labour market policies, but it was unable to proceed because network 
participants would not agree to being involved in the study. 
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Diagram 6.1: Singapore Economic Policy Network 1998 
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As we can see from the above, the dynamics of the leadership transition from Lee Kuan 
Yew to Goh Chok Tong are characterised by the development by Goh of a personal 
power base within the bureaucracy and his allying himself with particular bureaucratic 
and political groupings. This reflects the inherent nature of the relationship between 
the higher civil service and the political executive; one in which oligarchic control is 
principally shared between the two. We can conclude therefore that the relationship 
between ministers and the senior Administrative Officers is close, collaborative, but 
not uniformly so, as it is characterised by divisions based on personal allegiance and 
different views of long -term political orientation - Some aspects of how this relationship 
functions is examined in the case study below. 
THE DYNAMICS OF THE BUREAUCRATIC /POLITICAL PARTNERSHIP 
One illustration of the complexity of the relationship between the higher public service 
and the political executive is the events leading to the Supreme Court judgement on 
the interpretation of what constitutes a secret under the Official Secrets Act (OSA) 
1998. This was a major issue in executive control over the public service, as the OSA, in 
association with the Corrupt Practices Act (CPA) has been the lynchpin of executive 
public sector sanctions since before independence. This decision on the OSA, handed 
down by Chief Justice Yong Pung How, placed the courts as arbiter of what should be 
defined as a state secret, rather than the executive, thus removing the executive from 
direct control over public servants through the OSA. Although I was not able to 
interview the participants in this and related cases on this issue, I was able to discuss 
the matter with a number of civil servants and others with knowledge of it as well as 
review the literature. The details, as reported, and conclusions are as follows.' 
Secrecy, Paranoia and the Struggle for a New Paradigm 
In June 1992, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Administrative Service officer and director 
of the Monetary Authority of Singapore's (MAS) Economics Department, met with 
Manu Bhaskaran, economics research director of Crosby Securities, in his office at the 
MAS building in a routine meeting between a financial sector executive and the 
sector's regulatory authority. Chan Chia Lin, another MAS economist also attended the 
meeting. During the meeting, Shanmugaratnam referred to a document on which the 
n This case study draws upon confidential interviews, news reports and parliamentary debates. See: "Five fined 
between $1,500 and $6,000 each" and "Prosecution is not out to exact retribution, says A-G ", Straits Times Weekly 
Edition, 2 April 1994, p. 4; "OSA case: Govt out to plug leaks ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 9 April 1994, p. 14; 
"Minister says government might change laws ", Straits Times, 15 January 1998; "Who should have the final say - the 
state or the courts ? ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 14 March, 1998, p. 14. The official hardline on the case, which 
was actually harder in tone than the domestic news reports, can be found in: "Singapore Secrets ", The Economist, 23 
April 1994, p. 4. A sceptical view of the case highlighting some of its peculiarities was previously published in: 
"Singapore Keeping Secrets ", The Economist, 9 April 1994, p. 32 
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unreleased confidential flash estimate of economic growth for the second quarter on 
1992 was recorded9° The flash estimate is considered secret until officially released by 
MAS. In this particular case the overall flash estimate was 4.6% and was accompanied 
by an analysis of economic growth by economic sector, from which the overall flash 
estimate is calculated. 
During this meeting Bhaskaran, apparently without Shanmugaratnam's knowledge, 
somehow accidentally saw the flash estimate figure, recognised that it might be the 
unreleased flash estimate and noted it. After the meeting, Bhaskaran relayed the flash 
estimate to his colleague Raymond Foo Jong Chen and Kenneth James, technology 
editor for the Business Times newspaper for their personal and confidential use in the 
realisation that the estimate was still secret and he was not authorised to have 
knowledge of it. It seems that the single figure that Bhaskaran relayed to Foo and 
James may have been only one part of the leaking of the flash estimate, as it was also 
believed in some quarters of the Ministry of Finance, particularly by Government 
Statistician Paul Cheung, that the Business Times had details not only of the gross flash 
estimate (4.6 %) but also a breakdown of the estimate by economic sector. The flash 
estimate was subsequently published in the Business Times edition of 29 June 1992. In 
the subsequent court case, there was no clarification of how full details of the flash 
estimate may have become available to the Business Times. The two main competing 
theories were that Bhaskaran saw the entire flash estimate during the meeting with 
Shanmugaratnam, possibly when the MAS officers were called from the room, or that 
another source had provided them after the meeting with MAS. A third view was that 
Shanmugaratnam leaked the figures, supported by other senior civil service figures, as 
part of strategy to force greater openness in economic statistics and media reporting in 
Singapore because this is essential to the drive to build the infrastructure for a 
knowledge based economy; the new economic paradigm adopted for Singapore to 
complement the still successful manufacturing strategy. The veracity of this view is 
unknown. 
Foo, who is not an economist and who apparently did not understand exactly what the 
flash estimate was, discussed it over lunch with Kelvin Quek Eng Cheong and Choy 
Choon Ho, economists in the MTI's Research Division.91 Quek questioned Foo as to the 
source of his knowledge of the flash estimate as he knew that it had not then been 
officially released and so informed Foo. Foo subsequently met with another 
government economist, thought to be from the Department of Statistics within MTI 
90 In Singapore, flash estimates are the preliminary estimates of economic growth, calculated each quarter. Growth is 
estimated by economic sector and cumulated into a single overall growth figure. This single figure is what is usually 
referred to as the flash estimate. 
vi Quek and Choy were well thought of, having been assigned to the secretariat for the politically sensitive Cost 
Review Committee in 1992 -93. 
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and later sent two faxes to Crosby Securities offices overseas including details of the 
flash estimate, and circulated details of the flash estimate within his company. 
Following Kenneth James, the journalist, being provided with the overall flash estimate 
by Bhaskaran, he communicated it to Patrick Daniel, the editor of the Business Times, an 
economist, former Administrative Service officer in MTI, former Principal Private 
Secretary to Lee Hsien Loong and who had also been secretary to the ministerial level 
Economic Committee under Lee Hsien Loong in 1985 -86.'2 Danìel subsequently 
discussed the estimate with Dr. Paul Cheung, Chief Statistician and head of the 
Department of Statistics within MTI. Cheung seemed, at least initially, not to have been 
perturbed that the Business Times had either the flash estimate or such a good 
approximation of it as to be the same and suggested that the use of the 4.6% figure 
could be useful in dampening the current market bullishness, if published. Daniel 
authorised the publication of the figure, citing it as the official flash estimate, on 29 
June 1992 in the Business Times. 
The publication of the figure, before its official release, immediately raised questions in 
several agencies: MAS, the Ministry of Finance, the Economic Development Board and 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry at the officer level and among Permanent 
Secretaries and Ministers in their weekly meetings with ministry senior executives. The 
MAS and EDB boards also are reported to have discussed the issue. 
At this stage, it was not obvious to ministers and permanent secretaries as to where the 
Business Times had obtained the flash estimate. Officers in the Research Division of MTI 
and in the Department of Statistics had directly discussed with Daniel and Foo, their 
knowledge of the flash estimate. However, it seems that although both these MTI 
officers were aware that the flash estimate had not been officially released, MTI was 
unsure if MAS had decided to leak the estimate to help dampen market sentiment in a 
bull market. Whether MTI bothered to check this with MAS is unknown, but 
considered unlikely; rather, it is thought that MTI did nothing about it. If MAS did leak 
the estimate or inadvertently caused it to fall into the hands of the press, it was MAS' 
problem. It was apparent to all who were aware of the leak that it was an obvious 
breach of the Official Secrets Act (OSA). 
As breaches of the OSA are considered to be breaches of security, a referral was 
therefore made, not to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) within the 
Prime Minister's Office (PMO), but rather to the Internal Security Department (ISD) 
which has responsibility for policing the OSA. The ISD, while technically part of the 
" Daniel had also sat on various important government committees, such as the IT2000 Steering Committee charged 
with developing the National Information Technology Plan, 1991 -92. He obtained a BA (Hons) in engineering 
science and economics from Oxford University and a Master of Public Administration from the Kennedy School of 
Government at Harvard University. 
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Ministry of Home Affairs, is actually an independent department with ministry status 
which also reports directly to the prime minister's personal Istana office. In 1992, it was 
believed that the head of the LSD at that time, Tjong Yik Min, still reported to Lee Kuan 
Yew as well as Goh Chok Tong.93 However, at that time, Lee had his own man at ISD, 
Deputy Director Yap Kok Peng, one of the three deputy directors within the 
department.94 There could, therefore, have been conflicting demands made on the LSD 
by the political leadership in this case, although this cannot be verified. 
The LSD began its investigation on August 13 by interviewing Daniel, the editor of the 
Business Times, James and several other journalists. At a National Day dinner on 15 
August, Lee Kuan Yew criticised Goh Chok Tong by commenting that if he were still 
prime minister "... he doubted if Business Times would have used illegally obtained or 
leaked official figures. "95 Lee seemed to be of the opinion that Shanmugaratnam leaked 
the flash estimates. The LSD then followed the trail of information and documentation 
until it concluded that Shanmugaratnam was the originating source. A report was then 
made to the prime minister's personal office and subsequently referred to Dr. Andrew 
Chew, then Permanent Secretary (Special Duties) in the PMO. The report apparently 
included background details on all five people involved in the case and the two MTI 
officers who were aware of the leak, and concluded that this particular breach of the 
OSA was unusual in terms of the people involved, the fact that none involved had 
gained financially or in any other way, the economic nature of the breach itself and 
ISD's inability to understand whether the breach was actually of any significance. 
Chew was apparently concerned about the people involved and the necessity to take a 
more considered course of action than simply charging all concerned under the OSA. 
Chew was apparently not one of the group that could be considered involved if the 
flash estimate data was leaked. 
The report was then circulated to Lee Ek Tieng, Managing Director of MAS and the 
permanent secretaries in MTI (Lam Chuan Leong), MOF (under which MAS is 
placed), the Public Service Division of MOF and the Attorney- General's Chambers. 
MOF also referred the report to its Commercial Affairs Department which monitors the 
finance and securities industries. At this time, the two permanent secretaries in MOF 
were Ngíam Tong Dow and Dr. Andrew Chew, both of whom also held concomitant 
permanent secretary appointments in the PMO. Dr. Chew, as permanent secretary 
PSD, was also Head of the Civil Service. It is of note that the report was sent to 
ministers through their permanent secretaries; it was also discussed at a meeting of the 
Committee of Permanent Secretaries under Chew's chairmanship. This line of 
93 The alternative scenario supported by a minority of informants was that while Tjong reported to Goh, his deputy 
Benny Lim Siang Hoe, reported to Lee. 
4Q At this time Benny Lim was Deputy Director (Operations) and Yap was Deputy Director (Corporate). 
's 
"On Senior Minister: We understand each other's way of working ", The Straits Times, 5 December 1992, p. 3 
262 Ross Worthington 
communications is again critical to the way in which political executive-Administrative 
Service dynamics played out in this case. 
While full details of the report are not known, it apparently recommended prosecution 
of all involved in the case as well as civil service disciplinary action against 
Shanmugaratnam, Paul Cheung head of the Department of Statistics and Kelvin Quek 
Eng Cheong in MTI and possibly, Shanmugaratnam's dismissal. The report apparently 
took "the typical ISD hard line" as one respondent noted. Before discussing the reaction 
of permanent secretaries to the report, it is important to first understand why they 
acted to soften the ISD recommendations in order to protect Cheung, 
Shanmugaratnam, and to a lesser degree Daniel and Quek, and consequently press for 
changes in the OSA regime. 
Tharman Shanmugaratnam, a President's Scholar, graduated from the London School 
of Economics with a first class honours degree in economics, obtained a masters degree 
in economics from the University of Cambridge and later the Master of Public 
Administration degree from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University. He joined the Administrative Service and was subsequently posted to the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore. There he excelled in both technical and general 
policy analysis, becoming by the age of 33, director of the Economics Department of 
MAS, the most prestigious of its departments. Shanmugaratnam demonstrated 
considerable potential early in his career and was rapidly promoted. He was also 
considered a person of immense integrity and dedication with high moral values, a 
good intellect, a flexible thinker, an officer of Indian descent who mixed comfortably 
with people of all backgrounds, supportive of the government, modest and personable, 
if a little too overconfident on occasions. He was, in short, an Administrative Officer 
with high potential for a permanent secretary's position or even transfer to the political 
wing as a potential minister following the retirement of an Indian minister such as 
Jayakumar. 
MAS has always been a relatively small organisation, but as the central bank and a 
central economic policy agency, it has always had major political and civil service 
figures on its board and in senior management positions. By 1989, Shanmugaratnam 
had come to the notice of not only his managing director, J. Y. Pilláy, an almost 
mythical figure in the civil service and a permanent secretary of a level that outranked 
most cabinet ministers, but also of the very influential members of the MAS board. 
These included Dr. Richard Hu Tsu Tau, long -time Minister for Finance and former 
Managing Director of the GIC; Dr. Goh Keng Swee, retired Deputy Prime Minister, still 
At this time Shanmugaratnam was Assistant Director, External and Special Projects Division, Economics 
Department, MAS. He was head of this division. 
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a powerful political figure and immensely respected in the civil service and business; 
Lee Ek Tieng, then permanent secretary Finance and Revenue Divisions MOF; Lim 
Siong Guan, former Principal Private Secretary to Lee Kuan Yew and long- serving 
permanent secretary in MINDEF; and Chua Kim Yeow, managing director of the 
government owned POSBank.97 In late 1989, Pillay was replaced as managing director 
of MAS by Lee Ek Tieng who is close to Lee Kuan Yew and has worked with him, on 
and off, since the early 1970's 98 This was (and to a degree still is) one of the most 
powerful groups of people in Singapore, all of whom have close ties with Lee Kuan 
Yew and all of whom have his respect. 
Approximately 18 months after Lee Ek Tieng became managing director of MAS, 
Shanmugaratnam was promoted to Director, Economics Division under Dr. Teh Kok 
Peng, then, as now, one of the deputy managing directors. An indication of 
Shanmugaratnam's ability is that he is now also a deputy managing director, but 
actually ranks higher in policy terms because of his present responsibilities.' From this 
time onwards, he developed a close working relationship with Lee Ek Tieng and 
received even greater exposure to the MAS board. By the time the "flash estimate" 
incident occurred, there was widespread agreement among this group of senior 
Administrative Officers and board members, on Shanmugaratnam's high intellectual 
and ethical standards, work performance and potential. 
When the ISD report reached Lee Ek Tieng with recommendations which would ruin 
Shanmugaratnam's civil service career and imperil those of another senior 
Administrative Officer (Cheung), and a former Administrative Officer and political 
adviser (Daniel), Lee conferred with Shanmugaratnam and his deputies. After 
verifying the facts of the case and obviously making a decision to support 
Shanmugaratnam, it is reported that he quickly began to gather support among board 
members and other senior contacts, including Goh Keng Swee and Pillay, for finding a 
way by which the ISD recommendations, or the outcomes from them would not 
damage the Administrative Officers involved or the Administrative Service as it 
moved increasingly into a policy environment where greater risk taking was required. 
" Post Office Savings Bank of Singapore, a GLC. ' Lee Ek Tieng was one of a group of bright young men given senior appointments early in their careers and nurtured 
by Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee. Lee Ek Tieng worked in the Prime Minister's Office under Lee as head of the 
Anti- Pollution Unit, then an important policy body, from 1970 -1972. He was promoted to acting permanent 
secretary, later confirmed, in the Ministry of the Environment on its creation under Lee's close friend Lim Kim San in 
1972. 
" Shanmugaratnam's present position as Deputy Managing Director (Financial Supervision) actually places him as 
second -in- charge at MAS, as Dr. Teh Kok Peng's responsibilities have now been split between MAS, where he is 
responsible for international economic issues and GIC, where he concurrently holds the position of Deputy Managing 
Director, Special Investments and Real Estate Departments. This is a consequence of the restructure of MAS 
undertaken after Koh Beng Seng, Deputy Managing Director (Banking) resigned following a severe policy 
disagreement with Richard Hu and Lee Hsien Loong shortly after Lee was appointed as chairman of the MAS board 
and Koh Yong Guan, formerly god Permanent Secretary in MOF, was appointed as Managing Director of MAS. 
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Lee is also reported to have contacted Lim Kim San, chairman of Singapore Press 
Holdings and one of Lee Kuan Yew's closest friends, to seek his agreement to his 
strategy for dealing with the ISD report. Lim apparently agreed with reservations, to 
support Lee. 
Lee's strategy in this regard had apparently two foci; the ISD was intending to 
prosecute a senior officer on the basis of what amounted to "having an untidy deski100 
and another on the basis of giving sound financial market advice which would actually 
benefit government policy ;101 and the fact that the USA's definition of secret, was so old 
and broad as to be outdated and, indeed, damaging to many of the more recent policy 
goals of government, particularly those oriented to a service economy. It was 
considered to be colonial legislation inappropriate for modern Singapore and required 
revision, albeit, conservative revision. 
To counter the ISD report would take some time and so stalling tactics were 
implemented. These centred on one of MAS' central new policy tasks; the development 
of Singapore into a financial centre to challenge Hong Kong and Sydney and take 
second place after Tokyo as an East Asian financial centre. Central to this policy were 
the way in which government financial information was to be released, a print media 
with greater freedom to investigate and report on the financial sector with minimum 
supervision and the development of a perception in the foreign investment community 
that Singapore could be more open and the government less repressive than its general 
image overseas projected. This policy formed part of a general policy shift from a 
principal focus on manufacturing, petrol- chemicals and transport services to the 
greater development of the services sector and a knowledge economy; a principal 
component of which is less visible government control and oppression and a more 
open media environment. The strength of this strategy was that it was actually based 
on genuine policy concerns; none of the ministers involved are easily fooled, so any 
less rigorous a strategy could have had negative repercussions and have led to greater 
conflict. This strategy was supported by the MAS board and MOF, and subsequently 
accepted by the ministers involved, including Lee Hsien Loong in MTI and Richard Hu 
in MOF. Lee Hsien Loong was reportedly particularly concerned to protect Cheung 
and Daniel, as Daniel had previously been his Principal Private Secretary and Cheung 
was a close senior ally in the Administrative Service.102 
100 Reported to be Lee Ek Tieng's summation of the case against Shanmugaratnam. He apparently repeated this 
comment to Lee Ryan Yew and other ministers. 
101 Paul Cheung's comments about using the leaked flash estimates to dampen a bull market 
Cheung a demographer, had reportedly been recommended to Lee as a suitable appointee as Chief Statistician by 
Dr. S. Vasoo, a conservative PAP MP aligned to Lee Hsien Loong and head of the Department of Social Work and 
Psychology at NUS. Cheung, who received his Ph.D from the University of Michigan in 1983, was a Senior Lecturer 
in the Department of Social Work and Psychology before his appointment as Chief Statistician. The sensitivity of this 
position is that the Department of Statistics has to keep two different sets of statistics; one for public consumption 
and one for internal government consumption. 
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As this strategy of studying the policy implications of the ISD report unfolded, it is 
important to note that neither Shanmugaratnam nor any of the others involved in the 
case were stood down or acted against. At the same time, Lee Ek Tieng and others 
were beginning to work on a solution to soften the LSD recommendations and establish 
grounds for either a review of the OSA, possibly based on those done in Britain and 
Malaysia, or to find another way of circumventing such "accidental" charges being 
Iayed again. This was to take some time, as there was neither unanimous support 
among permanent secretaries nor ministers about either the desirability of this 
approach or about not acting on the ISD report, prosecuting quickly and moving on. It 
seems that this issue caused dissent even within the group which is usually supportive 
of the hard "control" line advanced by Lee Kuan Yew; Lee Hsien Loong, Wong Kan 
Seng and Jayakumar. This conflict centred on a desire by some to make sure that the 
OSA regime was not compromised, even by senior Administrative Officers, and a 
recognition that prosecuting those involved could have two significant detrimental 
outcomes; alienation of a large number of serving, particularly younger AOs, among 
whom rumours of the case had already spread, and imperilling the new liberalisation 
of financial services policy and the associated knowledge economy policy drive. This 
conflict was not to be settled easily or quickly. 
It appears that by mid -1993, Goh Chock Tong had become directly involved in this 
issue, as had the cabinet and the Council of Permanent Secretaries, and pressure 
mounted to find a solution that all could live with. All prosecutions under the OSA 
have to be approved by the Attorney- General,' so it was possible for the charges to be 
dropped by the Attorney -General withholding his consent. As it was widely known in 
the public service, academic and business communities that the publication of the flash 
estimates had been illegal, it was considered impossible to not prosecute; to do so 
would smack of special favours and hypocrisy. A compromise agreement was reach 
that all those directly involved in the case ( Shanmugaratnam, Daniel, Bhaskaran, Foo, 
James) would be prosecuted. The two MTI officers who were less directly involved, 
Cheung and Quek, would not be charged or prosecuted. Those prosecuted were to 
plead not guilty and dispute the prosecution on the facts of the case, accept the 
judgement and not proceed to appeal if found guilty. The government's case was to be 
prosecuted by the Attorney -General himself and was to include a recommendation 
that a non -custodial sentence only be considered; that is, each of the accused, if found 
guilty were to be fined. 
103 Official Secrets Act, s.14(I ). However, a person may be arrested and charged, or a warrant issued for his arrest 
without the approval of the Attorney- General, although no further proceedings may take place without that approval. 
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Twenty -two months after the publication of the flash estimates in the Business Times, 
the case was prosecuted before the head of the Subordinate Courts, Senior District 
Judge, Richard Magnus. Appearing before Magnus were the Attorney- General Chan 
Sek Keong for the prosecution, a rare event in itself as he is Magnus's official 
superior,1°' and some of Singapore's most eminent counsel, including Michael Khoo' 
and K. Shanmugam, both of whom are Senior Counsel.10G Shanmugam is also a PAP 
MP who has also appeared for Lee Kuan Yew, most recently against Tang Liang Hong 
of the Workers' Party. The trial lasted 43 days and the final judgement was that all five 
were guilty and were fined. It is notable that Shanmugaratnam was fined $1,500, an 
amount that would allow him to contest elections in future if required, almost certainly 
as a PAP candidate. 
All returned to their previous positions, notably Shanmugaratnam to MAS and Daniels 
to SPH, with no further disciplinary internal proceedings taking place against them. 
Shanmugaratnam was subsequently promoted to Deputy Secretary (Policy) in the 
Ministry of Education under Lim Siong Guan in March 1995 to 1998, whereafter he 
returned to MAS where Lee Ek Tieng is deputy chairman of the board and Lee Hsien 
Loong is chairman. He now works closely with Lee Hsien Loong as a major policy 
player in the liberalisation of the financial system. Cheung and Quek continued in their 
positions at MTI, with Quek being later promoted prior to leaving MTI for the private 
sector in early 1995.707 
Daniel continues to be a key figure within the media and economic policy community, 
maintaining his position as editor of the Business Times, member of the Financial 
Reporting Standards Consultative Committee's Advisory Committee, chairman of the 
Singapore Business Awards Organising Committee, member of the National Library 
Board, of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and the 
Trade Development Board.10B In 1998, he oversaw the redevelopment of the Straits 
Times Index, the daily trading indicator for the Singapore Stock Exchange.104 
Bhaskaran's career also continued unabated, resulting in his eventual appointment as 
Managing Director of SG Securities following the acquisition of Crosby Securities by 
Societe- Generale. 
106 The Attorney- general has control of all Subordinate Court appointments under the Subordinate Courts Act. 
105 Following a career in the Attorney- General's Chambers, Michael Khoo Kah Lip was appointed Deputy Registrar 
of the Supreme Court before becoming a District Judge and finally head of the Subordinate Judiciary as Senior 
District judge. He was transferred from this position to the Attorney- General's Chambers as a result of acquitting J. 
B. Jeyaratnam on all but one of a number of charges brought against him by the government in 1986, although the 
government denies this. He subsequently went into private practice. He is one of Singapore's most notable and 
respected lawyers. 
10S Singapore's equivalent of Queen's Counsel 
10' Quek was promoted to Senior Assistant Director in 1993 in the Research and Planning Division of MTI, the 
position he held on resigning from the civil service. 
108 "Appointment of New TDB Board ", TDB Press Release, 11 January 1999 
X09 "55 -stock Straits Times Index unveiled ", Business Times, 29 August 1998, p.l 
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The lack of impact of the court case on those involved has led some to conclude that 
the leaking of the flash estimate was deliberately undertaken in order to precipitate a 
conflict within the core executive and make starkly obvious the need to move beyond 
the command and control paradigm and to push for sweeping change in economic 
policy so that the services sector could be developed with a priority previously only 
accorded to the manufacturing and transport services sectors. Given the actors 
involved, this is certainly possible and if so, may indicate that the forces for change 
supporting the new paradigm are stronger within the civil service than the political 
executive and that the cohesiveness of the two groups has come under increasing 
strain as economic policy has been more critically debated and the full impact of the 
contemporary form of globalism becomes apparent. It also indicates that the political 
executive is in control of the bureaucratic executive, that this control is not absolute 
and must be negotiated and that the autonomy of both these components of the core 
executive is constrained by the other. 
This was not, however, the end of the story. The issue of what to do about preventing 
such an "accidental" prosecution from again happening, had not been agreed upon. A 
group of permanent secretaries, led by Lee Ek Tieng, were still determined that the 
OSA had to be modified to both fit the new policy environment and to protect the 
Administrative Service from a rule bound, control oriented, unaccountable ISD. This 
particular incident seems to have increased awareness among some ministers and 
senior AS officers that the autonomy granted to the LSD by Lee Kuan Yew's personal 
patronage, its minister's willingness to accede to this and it's virtual monopoly on 
internal security powers and resources was a two -edged sword. 
While providing a valuable surveillance, intelligence and suppressive capability to 
government, the ISD was also a potential threat to the liberalisation of policies and 
political climate if it was to continue to narrowly define and operationalise its 
activities. The national risk profile and the lynchpin assumptions on which the ISD 
operated were partially outdated and possibly dangerous if they remained unchanged. 
If the ISD could not be made more formally accountable and influenced to change in 
the short term, as this may lead to direct confrontation with Lee Kuan Yew, some of its 
teeth had to be gently pulled to ensure that it did not bite innocent bystanders as it 
defended the state against perceived threats; particularly if those bystanders are busily 
changing the system so that it was at least seen to be, if not actually being, more open. 
This was a conflict between those who recognised the broader social and political risks 
that were necessary in liberalising the financial, communications, media, academic, 
research and cultural sectors as the path to sustainably protecting Singapore's 
economic and political future, and those who wished to continue to separate social and 
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political control from economic policy as had been the case since 1963. With the move 
to a knowledge economy and service industry focus this partitioning of control policies 
could not work as the success of these economic sectors are assumed to be based on a 
more open education and social system within which risk taking and creativity could 
flourish. This is an extremely difficult cognitive shift for the risk averse inhabitants of 
the Singaporean core executive, particularly the more conservative who have been 
convinced of Lee Kuan Yew's vision of a "new society" based on his views on 
eugenics, race, culture and society -state dynamics. 
The boundaries in this debate over the "new" economy and its social and political 
impact were not neat and, in typical Singaporean fashion were full of contradictions, 
not least of all because of the constant conflict between the paranoia that the official 
ideology fosters among the core executive and social, economic and political realities 
with which parts of it necessarily clashes. Many of the permanent secretaries and 
ministers involved in pushing for change were traditionally oriented to the Lee 
command and control approach, but were forced to admit that the new economic 
policies had to be pursued, albeit at some risk. 
Those who were more oriented to greater openness and less (at least less obvious) 
control, were reluctant to greatly reduce the blatantly coercive power operationalised 
through the ISD and the OSA, but wanted greater control and accountability for the 
ISD, a distancing of the ISD from Lee Kuan Yew's personal influence and the 
development of a more contemporary and relevant risk profile based on contemporary 
security lynchpin assumptions. Changes to the OSA regime arising from the flash 
estimates case therefore became subsumed in a wider debate among the component 
groups in the core executive about the nature of social and political control, the loci of 
that control and the necessity to push ahead with financial sector and knowledge 
economy reforms. This debate was informed by the scenarios developed within 
MINDEF, information on social changes from the People's Association, the Feedback 
Unit, MPs, GROs and the Institute of Policy Studies and, at a more visceral level, by the 
presence of four opposition MPs in the parliament. 
This debate still continues, but as an indication of progress a resolution of the OSA 
problem was eventually reached in 1997 following the success of an appeal by lawyer 
Christopher Bridges against his conviction for alleged offences under the OSA1° The 
Court of Appeal in this case was presided over by the Chief Justice. Again, the 
Attorney -General was personally involved in this case, although he did not appear in 
court. Instead, he sought clarification from the Court of Appeal on eight questions 
10 This case will not be dealt with in detail here. See: "CJ rules on what information is not an official secret ", Straits 
Times Weekly Overseas Edition, 25 January 1997, p. 2 
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which would clarify the application of the OSA.' The Chief justice has, at December 
1998, not responded to the questions. The solution was to take the responsibility of 
deciding on what a state secret was out of the hands of the LSD, ministers and AOs and 
transfer the responsibility to the courts. While this still does not stop the political 
executive from discretionary use if the ISD to arrest, imprison and charge people under 
the provisions of the ISA with passing state secrets as a breach of national security, it 
goes some way towards redefining how the OSA and, to a lesser degree, the ISA 
regimes will operate. It was a small victory for the more moderate group within the 
core executive, but did not deprive the ISD of any power and can be seen as a small 
step by the more conservative group to acknowledging that control strategies must 
change to suit the times. The nature of these changes is examined, in part, in Chapter 
Eight. 
BEYOND THE PUBLIC SERVICE: QUASI -INSTITUTIONS AND THE CORE 
EXECUTIVE 
Beyond the formal, constitutionally defined boundaries of the public sector, lie a 
number of state bodies, which may be called quasi -institutions, that are also essential 
to the functioning of the Singaporean core executive. These institutions are also, on the 
whole, bodies which operate on the basis of close collaboration between the public 
sector executive and the ministry. It is within the quasi -institutional core that the core 
executive's operations are most hidden, although there appear to be no genuine 
reasons why this should be so, other than an obsession with state secrecy. The quasi - 
legal institutions of relevance to this study comprise: 
1. The Defence Council; 
2. The Coordinating Board; 
3. The Directorship and Consultancy Appointments Council; 
4. NTUC -PAP Liaison Committee; and the 
5. Committee of Permanent Secretaries. 
The organisational relationship of these components to the political executive is 
detailed in Diagram 6.1. 
The Defence Council 
The Defence Council may have been established by a cabinet decision in 1965, as 
reported by one respondent, but this cannot be confirmed. All civil service officers 
interviewed denied its existence, although it was known off the record. The council 
Lim. Li Hsien, "CS to review prosecutor's questions ", The Straits Times Weekly Edition, I March 1997, p. 3 
270 Ross Worthington 
reportedly meets quarterly principally for briefing on the state of external and internal 
security assessments. Meetings are reported as taking place in association with 
meetings of the Armed Forces Council. The council also meets when there is a 
perceived major threat to national security, either externally or domestically. It has no 
legislative basis and, like the British intelligence services until recently and the 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service, is a construct of executive decree, established by 
a cabinet decision. In developing such agencies the Singaporean core executive does 
not come into conflict with the Westminster constitutional tradition. Unlike other 
Westminster states however, its internal and external intelligence services have been 
created as ministries in their own right although they are placed organisationally to 
appear as departments of MHA and MINDEF respectively. The LSD was established 
through the renaming and restructuring of the Police Special Branch in 1966. However, 
it is understood that the creation of the SID in 1970 was the result of approval of a 
cabinet minute in February 1970 which outlined the scope of its operations, it's 
relationship to the SAF, MINDEF, the ISD and the SPF as well as its relationship with 
Malaysian, British, Australian and New Zealand external intelligence agencies which 
have a presence in Singapore.'" 
02 This seems to be confirmed by comments by Toohey and Pinwill. See: Brian Toohey and William Pinwill, Oyster: 
The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Melbourne, William Heinemann, 1959, p. 74 
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Diagram 6.2: Organisational Relationships of Quasi- Institutions to the Political Executive and Public Service:1999 
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In 1997, the Defence Council was reported to be chaired by Lee Kuan Yew, not Goh 
Chok Tong, although the deputy chairman was the Minister for Defence, Tony Tan. 
Following the success of the 1997 elections, Goh Chok Tong is reported to have 
assumed the chairmanship of the council. In 1998, the council included the Ministers 
for Defence (including the Second Minister for Defence), Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs 
and Information and the Arts, the permanent secretaries in all these departments, 
(including both MINDEF permanent secretaries), the Director SID, Chief of Defence 
Force, Director Joint Operations and Planning Directorate MINDEF and the Director 
ISD. Other members can he co -opted as required and it is reported that Dr. Goh Keng 
Swee and Dr. Yeo Hing Hong, both former Defence Ministers, have attended meetings 
in recent years. 
The Defence Council has one standing committee, the Security and Intelligence 
Committee (SIC). The SIC is reported to meet monthly and to have general day-to-day 
responsibility for oversight of SID and authorising those SID activities that its Director 
must seeks approval for under his operational directive. The SIC is chaired by the 
Minister for Defence and includes the Minister for Home Affairs, permanent 
secretaries from MINDEF and MHA, the Directors SID and ISD and the prime 
minister's principal private secretary. 
In the event of a national emergency, the council's decisions, are carried out by a sub- 
group of the council membership known as the Executive Group chaired by the 
Permanent Secretary MINDEF and reporting to the Minister for Defence. In 1991 we 
know that the Executive Group's core members comprised the permanent secretaries 
of MINDEF, MHA, MFA and MITA113 but it is most probable that the group also 
comprises both the Director SID and the Director ISD as well as the Commissioner of 
Police and the Commissioner for Civil Defence as required. The Executive Group 
operates under the general direction of the Minister for Defence or, if required, the 
prime minister. 
The Coordinating Board 
The Coordinating Board, like the Directorships and Consultancy Appointments 
Council (DCAC), was a secret body until its existence was revealed in 1985 in the 
Straits Times."' The exact composition and status of the Coordinating Board was not 
revealed at that time, but it seems that it was a cabinet committee or a cabinet 
committee that some senior bureaucrats also sat on. The function of the board was to 
coordinate major developments across the public sector. If Lee Kuan Yew, under 
13 "Teams that tackled crisis ", Straits Times Overseas Edition. 30 March 1991, p. 2 
"4 Leslie Fong, "Big 7 control 490 Government Companies", Straits Times, 6 April 1985, p. 11 
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whom the board was established, did not want to do this through the cabinet, it would 
be reasonable to assume that the board acted as some type of enlarged kitchen cabinet 
for Lee, operating under the general direction of a cabinet decision. In 1998, I was 
unable to ascertain if the board still existed, but from what indications were available, 
it seems that its functions have now been subsumed by cabinet and the prime 
minister's personal office. Vennewald still assumed it existed in 1994, but this 
assumption was also based in the 1985 information.115 The board may have been 
transformed into the standing ministerial committee, chaired by Lee Hsien Loong, 
which has oversight of very large government investments of S$500 million or more, 
revealed in January 1998 by Dr. Richard Hu.ue This committee, which remained 
unnamed, consisted of Lee Hsien Loong (chairman), Dr. Hu, Dr. Tony Tan, the 
Minister for Trade and Industry (Then Lee Yock Suan) and the Minister for 
Information and the Arts, George Yeo. 
The Directorship and Consultancy Appointments Council 
The Directorship and Consultancy Appointments Council (DCAC) is situated within 
the Temasek Holdings offices and is responsible for all appointments to the boards and 
senior executive positions of government companies, including the Government of 
Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) and subsidiary companies of all statutory 
boards. Appointments to DCAC are suggested by the council itself and approved by 
the cabinet. DCAC has no legislative basis and, indeed, was considered a government 
secret until April 1985, but it may have been operational since 1971.117 The council 
operates with the executive support of Temasek Management Services (TMS), also 
situated within the Temasek Holdings offices. TMS is primarily responsible for 
maintaining records on directors, potential directors and the most senior executives in 
GLCs, providing headhunting and recruitment services for DCAC and for producing 
and circulating that most secret of government documents, the Directory of Government 
Linked Companies.118 The directory does not include listings for the GIC group of 
companies which are listed in GIC's own, equally secret, directory, nor the MAS 
investment companies. CDAC has a three year appointment cycle and operates a roster 
so that the boards and senior management of each group of companies is reviewed 
every three years. At the end of the three year cycle the boards are usually reshuffled 
"s Vennewald, op. cit., p. 35 
"6 "Govt investments: Take the long -term view ", Straits Times, 16 January 1998, p. I 1 
"r Straits Times, 6 April 1981, p. 7 
18 When I approached TMS to purchase a copy of the Directory of Government Linked Companies, in 1995, the 
shocked receptionist could not deal with the inquiry and rushed out of the office for executive support. I was 
subsequently grilled by another officer as to how I had come to know about the publication. On being informed that it 
was mentioned in the academic literature, she was also shocked and informed me that it was a top secret government 
publication and under no circumstances could I obtain a copy. TMS has also instructed the NUS library, which holds 
some very old editions of the directory, that it is not to be lent, even to academic staff, as these directories are still 
secret. I subsequently obtained a copy of the 1991 directory from my own contacts. 
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although a group of senior core appointees remains in control of each group of holding 
companies, and a new Directory of Government Linked Companies is issued. The last full 
review cycle ended in December 1997 and the next will conclude in December 2000. 
In 1998, the membership of CDAC was reported to include:19 Suppiah Dhanabalan, 
Chairman, Quek Poh Huat, President Temasek Holdings, Er Kwong Wah, Chairman 
TMS120, Lee Hee Seng, Chairman Overseas Union Bankt2t, Dr. Andrew Chew, 
Chairman PSC,m Tay Siew Choon, President ST Industrial Corporation," Lee Ek 
Tieng, Managing Director of GTC,124 Ho Ching, President and CEO ST Group, Eddie 
Teo, Permanent Secretary MINDEF, Alan Chan Heng Loon, Deputy Secretary, MFA, 
Goh Wee Chee, Ngiam Tong Dow, Permanent Secretary Ministry of Finance, Michael 
Fam, executive chairman Fraser and Neave, Lim Siong Guan, Permanent Secretary 
PMO and MOE and director Temasek Holdings, Koh Boon Hwee, executive chairman 
of Wuthelam Holdings, chairman Singapore Power and director Temasek Holdings, 
Ng Kee Choe, President of DBS Bank and Lau Chan Sin, Deputy President and Chief 
Operating Officer of DBS Bank. Of these members, Dhanabalan, Quek, Koh, Lim and 
Ngiam were also members of the board of directors of Temasek Holdings. 
NTUC -PAP Liaison Committee 
As detailed in Chapter Three, the NTUC leadership and the cabinet agreed in June 
1980 to the establishment of an NTUC -PAP Liaison Committee and, as part of this 
arrangement, for the Secretary- General of the NTUC to be appointed as Minister 
Without Portfolio within the cabinet. The committee was chaired by the Secretary- 
General of the NTUC and included at that time, Goh Chok Tong, Ong Teng Cheong, S. 
Dhanabalan, and Ahmad Mattar, and four NTUC representatives headed by Devan 
Nair.im It was provided with administrative support by the Ministry of Labour. It is 
not known if the committee still exists as information on it could not be obtained from 
the NTUC or the PMO. However, it is likely, given the poor working relationship 
between firstly Lim Chee Onn and Lee Kuan Yew and then Goh Chok Tong and Ong 
Teng Cheong when they respectively headed the NTUC and the government, that the 
committee was allowed to lapse at some time after Goh became prime minister. If the 
1B Based on off the record interviews. There was some inconsistency among respondents on this issue, so only those 
names that were consistent across respondents are noted here. 
120 Er is a former permanent secretary in the civil service, his last position before retiring in 1994 being Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Education. 
11 Also confirmed in a newspaper report. See: Conrad Raj, "Dhanabalan to leave SIA to head DBS ", Business Times, 
7 April 1998, pp. 1 -2, p. 2 
'22 Among other appointments, Dr. Chew is also a former Head of the Civil Service, Permanent Secretary Health and 
PMO, chairman of the PSC and a director of Temasek Holdings. 
121 ST Industrial Corporation incorporates all the defence related GLCs except for ST Aerospace which provides 
aerospace services to both the military and civilian sectors. 
121 Lee Ek Tieng was also managing Director of MAS, Permanent Secretary (Special Duties), PMO and Head of the 
Civil Service. 
125 ibid., p. 167 
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committee has lapsed, its functions are probably now incorporated jointly with the 
cabinet and ministerial committees on policy issues, and within the relationship 
between the Ministry of Manpower and the NTUC Research and Administration Unit. 
Committee of Permanent Secretaries 
This committee is the coordinating committee for permanent secretaries including the 
CEOs of the major boards; the civil service equivalent of cabinet. It is more loosely 
structured than its political equivalent, is chaired by the Head of Civil Service and 
reportedly meets fortnightly the day after cabinet meetings, or after cabinet meetings 
when necessary. It receives secretarial support from within the portfolio in which the 
Head of Civil Service is located, not from the PMO. It appears that this committee, like 
its British counterpart, is an administrative, not a legal construct, and is not 
underwritten by a cabinet decision. If necessary, the chief executives of statutory 
boards who are below permanent secretary level may be invited to attend meeting. 
This body is also supposed to be secret, with some respondents denying its existence 
and others acknowledging it. Again, there appears to be no reasonable rationale for 
making a coordination body, the equivalent of which exists in virtually every civil 
service in the world, a secret, but it apparently is. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The relationship between the political and public sector executives is a close, 
collaborative partnership. The higher civil service bureaucrats undoubtably reside 
within the core executive and their power and responsibilities are negotiated rather 
than being the outcome of a uni- directional exercise of power from ministers to 
bureaucrats. While the political executive remains in control, it cannot do this at the 
expense of alienating the bureaucratic executive; each needs the other because of the 
lack of scope for replacements within each executive and the influence of scale; 
organisational, societal and geographical. The Administrative Service consisted of 247 
officers in 1998 and of these 70 were at permanent secretary and deputy secretary 
level,' of whom 24 were at permanent secretary level' It is these latter officers, who 
These officers were: Moses Lee Kim Poo, Lim Hsiu Mei, Lee Chiong Giam, Eddie Teo Chan Seng, Peter Ho Hak 
Ean, Chua Siew San, Tan Kee Tong, Lim Siong Guan, Chiang Chie Foo, Wee Heng Tin, Lam Joon Khoi, Lee Miew 
Boey, Tan Gee Paw, Wang Mong Lin, Ngiam Tong Dow, Koh Yong Guan, Jaspai Singh, Tan Yong Soon, Lee Ek 
Tieng, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Koh Beng Seng, Koh Cher Siang, Alan Ow Soon Sian, Tan Chin Tiong, Kishore 
Mahbubani, Koh Yong Guan, Tan Yoke Meng, Peter Chan Jer Hing, Tan Boon Huai, Benny Lim Siang Hoe, Lu 
Cheng -Yang, Niam Chiang Meng, Choo Watt Bin, Lim Siam Kim, Christopher Chia, Tan Chin Nam, Lim Han Soon, 
Goh Kim Leong, Lau Wah Ming, Lam Chuan Leong, Low Puk Yeong, Lam Siew Wah, Tan Guong Ching, Tan Kim 
Siew, Tan Wee Kiat, Khaw Boon Wan, Peter Ong Boon Kwee, Finian Tan, Philip Yeo Liat Kok, Ho Meng Kit, Gong 
Wee Lik, Daniel Selvaretnam, Lim Neo Chian, Stephen Yeo Siew Chye, Lee Suan Hiang, Ong Ho Sim, Chong Lit 
Cheong, Yeo Khee Leng, Barry Decker, Ridzwan Dzafir, Wong Chooi Sen, Tan Tee How, Lim Soo Hoon, and Pek 
Siok Ching and Lim Hock Chuan. See: Singapore Ministry of Information and the Arts, Singapore Government 
Directory January 1998, Singapore, MITA, 1998 
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comprise the Committee of Permanent Secretaries, that are permanent members of the 
Singaporean core executive because of their executive portfolio responsibilities, their 
management of policy communities and networks and the intimate nature of their 
relationship with the political executive. In managing the bureaucracy and 
coordinating the policy networks that underlie the formal institutional framework, 
they work closely with the 16 cabinet ministers, eight ministers of state and five 
parliamentary secretaries that comprise the ministry. 
As can be seen from the case study and the economic policy network outline, the 
dynamics of the relationship between the political and public sector executives is 
complex. It is, however, not characterised by bitter factionalisation or feuds. It is 
essentially a pragmatic, negotiated relationship which, regardless of splits within it, 
operates within a policy program to which all must adhere once changes to it are 
negotiated. Where conflict occurs it is usually over the direction of broad national 
strategy, personal style or policy means. The core executive culture is one wherein 
these conflicts are settled as quickly as possible, where entrenched schisms are strongly 
discouraged and members are expected to "get on with the job" because "we're all in 
the same boat" -a small boat. In the rare cases in which differences are irreconcilable, 
both ministers and senior public servants usually leave the public sector or move to 
another area, such as the GLC sector. 
Teo Ming Kian, Moses Lee Kim Poo, Eddie Teo Chan Seng, Peter Ho Hak Ean, Lim Siong Guan, Chiang Chie 
Foo, Tan Gee Paw, Ngiam Tong Dow, Koh Yong Guan, Lee Ek Tieng, Koh Cher Siang, Tan Chin Tiong, Kishore 
Mahbubani, Koh Yong Guan, Peter Chan Jer Hing, Niam Chiang Meng, Tan Chin Nam, Goh Kim Leong, Lam 
Chuan Leong, Khaw Boon Wan, Philip Yeo Liat Kok Ho Meng Kit, Barry Desker and Ridzwan Dzafir. 
7. THE CORE EXECUTIVE, STATUTORY BOARDS, AND 
GOVERNMENT LINKED CORPORATIONS 
This chapter is an analysis of who controls the statutory board and GLC sectors within 
the Singaporean public sector. As was illustrated in Chapter Three in the discussion of 
what and who might comprise the Singaporean core executive, several public sector 
analysts, including Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, raised the issue of these 
two sectors, but particularly the GLC sector, being unaccountable to any but the 
political executive. The hidden nature of the control of this "state directed capitalism" 
is a major feature of the Singaporean public sector. The secretiveness of the GLC sector 
is reinforced by most of its senior executives and board members being listed in a 
secret government publication, and with the sector being managed by two large state 
corporations chaired by PAP cadres, which issue no annual reports and are not 
publicly unaccountable, even to the parliament. This chapter also attempts to identify 
which board members from these two sectors are in the core executive and to examine 
the basis on which people are appointed to these boards as a means of understanding 
the way in which they relate to the core executive. 
STATUTORY BOARDS AS A COMPONENT OF THE CORE EXECUTIVE 
Statutory boards and GLCs are the executive arms of the public sector, conventionally 
viewed as being coordinated by the predominantly policy oriented civil service 
ministries. For this study an analysis of the directorships of 80 statutory boards and 
major standing committees from 1988 -1998 was undertaken to examine who comprises 
the core group of board appointees in 1998 and how this group has developed over the 
11 year period covered by the analysis. Data has been drawn principally from the 
January editions of the Singapore Government Directory and from newspapers, 
magazines and other sources where necessary, including searches of the Straits Times 
Newslink database. 
The standing committees were derived from the Singapore Government Directory for this 
period, and included the Community Improvements Project Committee and its 
predecessor the Projects Committee, the Feedback Unit Supervisory Panel, the 
Publications Appeal Committee, the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, the 
Presidential Council for Religious Harmony, the Singapore Council of Social Service 
and its successor, the National Council of Social Service, the Singapore Labour 
Foundation, the Singapore Medical Council, the governing bodies of all polytechnics 
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and universities and the Singapore Sports Council. A full list of the hoards and 
committees included in the analysis is provided in Appendix 3. Throughout this 
chapter the term 'boards' will be used to describe all the bodies included in this 
analysis. 
Two analyses will be undertaken of board representation; an initial brief analysis by 
business sector and a subsequent analysis of individual appointments. The first 
attempts to identify under what institutional arrangements, if any, appointments are 
made to boards, and the second to identify the group of people who have the greatest 
influence on statutory boards, particularly the core group of major boards broadly 
separated into those concerned with economic policy, social policy and political 
management. 
Organisational Representation on Statutory Boards: 1988 -1998 
In the period 1988 -1998, 5519 appointments of 1236 people, of whom 80 (6.4 per cent) 
were non -Singaporeans, to boards and major committees were identified. Of this group 
of appointees, their organisational affiliations were identified except for a group of 119 
people, 58 per cent of whom were members of ethnic community related boards and 
who could not be adequately traced because of my inability to access the media and 
literature in Tamil, Malay and Gujarati'. 
In Table 7.1, a sectoral breakdown of board representation is presented. It is notable 
that no genuine community sector could be identified in the pattern of representation.2 
As can be seen from Table 7.1, representation on statutory boards is dominated by 
public sector entities. The total public sector component of board representation for the 
sample period on an annual basis is provided in Table 7.2. As can be seen, the public 
sector has almost two -thirds of the representation on boards. This is disaggregated by 
public sector components in Table 7.3. 
As detailed in Table 7.3, statutory boards are dominated by boards themselves, 
represented either on other boards or with a board being highly represented on its own 
board. Ministries are also highly represented as one would expect; after all, the board 
are theoretically responsible to their ministry for the achievement of policy outcomes. 
This group of 69 people were members of the Sikh Advisory Board, the Hindu Advisory Board, the Hindu 
Endowments Board and MUIS. 
' In the 11 year period covered by the analysis, only the Singapore Indian Fine Arts Society, Jamiyah, the Orchid 
Society of Southeast Asia, the Shaw Foundation, the Singapore Action Group of Elders, The Substation, Yaya.san 
Mendaki and the YMCA were the only organisations represented on boards which could be broadly termed 
community groups; a total of 8 over 11 years. It is doubtful that a convincing argument could be made that even this 
representation is genuinely community representation. 
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Table 7.1: Sectoral Representation on Statutory Boards in Singapore 
1988 -1998 
Type of Organisation Number of Number of % of Average 
agencies/companies in Positions positions Number 
each type of boards 
on 
Statutory Boards 
Ministries 
Private sector Singaporean 
_ 
m > ith S 
_p..les wit  
positions 
GLCs 
Foreign companies 
Singaporean companies 
with <5 positions 
Members of Parliament 
and former members 
Unknown 
Ministers and former 
ministers 
NTUC 
Judiciary 
PAP cadres without 
discernable affiliations 
TOTALS 
34 
18 
7'4 
1322 23.95 6.9 
1065 19.3 12.17 
828 15.0 2.9 
16 495 8.97 7.8 
48 404 7.32 3.72 
158 4Ú'7 7.38 
42 308 5.58 1.9 
118 303 5.5 - 
30 216 3.91 1.7 
1 112 2.0 1.5 
I3 43 0.78 1.2 
3 16 029 2 
555 5519 99.98 1.6 
Table 7.2: Total Public Sector Board Representation 
1988 -98' 
Year Total Public Sector Public Sector 
Positions in Positions in Positions As % of 
Each Years Each Year Annual Total 
1988 353 231 65.43 
1989 334 219 65.57 
1990 331 217 65.56 
1991 362 240 66.3 
1992 395 254 64.3 
1993 413 262 63.44 
1994 709 415 58.53 
1995 731 417 57.05 
1996 485 325 67.01 
1997 538 348 64.68 
1998 868 520 59.9 
TOTALS 5519 3448 63.43 
Positions occupied by Singapore Press Holdings appointees are excluded from this count. 
f Position totals fluctuate among years due to the restructuring of the board sector and the creation of new boards. 
The difference in the totals for the percentage of positions between Table 7.2 and Table 7.3 is due to rounding error. 
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Table 7.3: Public Sector Representation on Statutory Boards in Singapore 
1988 -1998 by Sector Components 
Type of 
Organisation 
No. of 
Agencies, 
Persons 
Number of 
Positions 
% of 
Positions 
Average 
Number of 
Boards On 
Statutory Boards 34 1322 24.0 6.9 
Ministries 18 1064 19.32 12.17 
GLCs 165 495 8.85. 7.8 
Members of 42 308 5.58 1.9 
Parliament and 
tonner members 
Ministers and former 
ministers 
30 216 3.91 1.7 
Judiciary 13 43 0.78 1.2 
TOTALS 153 3448 62.48í 5.28 
The other major public sector bureaucracy, the GLCs have slightly less than half of the 
representation of the ministries. The combined weight of serving and former MPs and 
ministers provides greater representation for this group than the GLCs; 9.49 per cent of 
positions, with the average representation of MPs and ministers being 1.9 and 1.7 
respectively. The judicial arm of government is poorly represented, with 13 judges 
occupying 43 positions over the 11 year period on an average of 1.2 positions each. 
Private sector Singaporean and foreign companies have greater representation than all 
public sector groups except for statutory boards and ministries. Total private sector 
representation accounts for 29.55 per cent of positions, three times the representation of 
the GLC sector. The NTUC, which has its own company and investment sector to 
manage, only accounts for two per cent of positions. 
We can conclude from this data that the statutory boards were dominated by the 
public sector with minor private sector representation, accounting for 62.44 and 29.55 
per cent respectively; a total of 91.99 per cent for the two groups with virtually no 
representation from community and business organisations, no GRO representation 
and a very low level of union representation. Such an analysis would challenge the 
proposition that the Singaporean public sector is characterised by statist corporatist 
arrangements, as community and union representation is negligible. Rather, it would 
support the view that it is elitist or oligarchic. This data, however, only provides us 
with an indication of the breadth of representation. We also need to disaggregate this 
data to understand what the actual pattern of representation tells us about the broad 
sectors already identified. It is also important to ask whether the individuals on each 
board are actually representing their organisations or are appointed in an individual 
capacity and, if so, what is the basis of so doing. As much as is possible, we should also 
s GLCs are counted in holding companies and as conglomerates incorporating subsidiary companies. 
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seek to determine what the basis of representation is when a person has multiple 
representation possibilities. In the next two sections we will examine these two aspects 
of the data: disaggregation of the public sector and the private sector representational 
data. 
Personal Representation on Statutory Boards: 1988 -1998 
As already noted, 1246 people, of whom 80 (6.4 %) were non -Singaporeans, were 
identified as having been appointed to boards and major committees for the period of 
this analysis. When board secretary positions are removed, 1235 people remain. These 
were analysed in terms of the sector from which they originated and in terms of the 
number and nature of appointments. 
As can be seen from Table 7.4 the highest representation came for Singaporean private 
sector companies. However, if the public sector classifications are amalgamated, this 
sector is the source of most appointees; 55.1 per cent. 
The number of appointments held by individual board members varies greatly 
however as shown in Table 7.6 below. As can be seen, just over one quarter of 
appointments were for one year only for the sample period. However, 72 of these (5.8 
per cent) were made in 1998 thus indicating that this proportion of the total sample 
may be new appointees rather than just one -off appointments. However one -off 
appointments seem to be common but small in number; in 1997, 13 of these 
appointments were made, 10 in 1996, 17 in 1995, 19 in 1994, 4 in 1993, 6 in 1992, 8 in 
1991, 7 in 1990, 5 in 1989 and there were 30 people in 1988 who were either one -off 
appointments or who retired from a board by the following year. For example, by 1989, 
Anuar Hedwig had retired as director of the National Library, 
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Table 7.4: Sectoral Source of Individual Appointments to Statutory Boards in 
Singapore: 1988 -1998 
Sector No. ositions % of total 
Private Sector Singaporean Companies 248 20.1 
Civil Service 172 13.9 
Higher Education 130 10.5 
Foreign Companies 122 9.9 
Unknown 118 9.6 
Boards 118 9.6 
GLCs 106 8.6 
MPs 67 5.4 
MINDEF 42 3.4 
SAF 32 2.6 
NTUC 22 1.8 
Industry Associations 14 1.1 
Judiciary 12 1.0 
School Representation 11 0.9 
Cultural Organisations 09 0.7 
Community Representation 05 0.4 
Philanthropic Foundations 04 0.3 
Religious Organisations 02 0.2 
Town Council 01 0.1 
TOTALS 1235 100.1 
Table 7.5: Proportion of Public Sector Appointments to Statutory Boards in 
Singapore: 1988 -1998 
Sector No. Positions % of Total 
Civil Service 172 13.9 
Higher Education 130 10.5 
Boards 118 9.6 
GLCs 106 8.6 
MPs 67 5.4 
MINDEF 42 3.4 
SAF 32 2.6 
Judiciary 12 1.0 
Town Council 01 0.1 
TOTALS 680 55.1 
Chew Seong Yean from the HDB, the prime minister had agreed to Dr. Augustine 
Tan's and Ng Kah Ting's desire to retire from political life by the next election and BG 
George Yeo had resigned from the regular SAF and was preparing to contest a by- 
election for the PAP. If we wholly discount the 1988 single appointments, this leaves us 
with a total of 72 of these appointments; only 5.8 per cent of the total. Of this sample, 
88.2 per cent hold less than 10 board positions. As we are concerned with identifying 
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those at the core of the political system, in this analysis we will focus on the nature of 
those who have hold more than 10 board positions over the 11 year period of the 
sample. 
Table 7.6: Number of Appointments Held By Individual Members on 
Statutory Boards in Singapore: 1988 -1998 
No of 
Appointments 
No. of people in 
category 
% of total Cumulative % 
1 317 25.7 25.7 
2 261 21.1 46.8 
3 186 15.1 61.9 
4 104 8.4 70.3 
5 57 4.6 74.9 
6 51 4.1 79 
7 52 4.2 83.2 
8 41 3.3 86.5 
9 21 1.7 88.2 
10 30 2.4 90.6 
11 21 1.7 92.3 
12 16 1.3 93.6 
13 11 0.9 94.5 
14 8 0.6 95.1 
15 12 1.0 96.1 
16 4 0.3 96.4 
17 3 0.2 96.6 
18 5 0.4 97 
19 7 0.6 97.6 
20 6 0.5 98.1 
21- 44 22 1.8 99.9 
TOTALS 1235 99.9 99.9 
Analysis of Highly Represented Board Members 
Those board members holding 10 or more positions account for 11.8 per cent of the 
sample; a total of 145 people. A listing of these people is provided in Appendix 4. Of 
these, 59 (4.8 per cent) hold 15 positions or more. These people are listed in Table 7.7 
below. A further eight people held 14 positions. These were Er Kwong Wah,b Michael 
Fam Yue Onn,' Hiew Siew Nam,8 Professor Tommy Koh Thong Bee ,8 Leong Chart 
6 A Permanent Secretary in the Civil Service, last appointment being to the Ministry of Education. He is now retired. 
Chairman and Managing Director of Fraser and Neave, one of the largest food and beverage companies in 
Singapore. Fam is an Old Guard PAP cadre, close to Lee Kuan Yew and a long time member of the Council of 
Presidential Advisers of which he was still a member in 1998. He has been associated with the PAP since the late 
1960s. 
Hiew was formerly the Director of the Public Works Department in the Ministry of National Development. On 
retirement he received a position as Director, Project Completion, with SL Marina Centre Developments which he 
still holds. 
s Former Dean, Faculty of Law, NUS, then seconded to the Ministry of Foreign. Affairs. He was Ambassador to the 
United States for almost 20 years. On returning to Singapore, Koh was appointed inaugural Director of the Institute 
of Policy Studies, then an Ambassador -at -Large and eventually chairman of the National Arts Council. He 
relinquished the NAC chair in 1997. He is one of the most urbane and internationally experienced of PAP proto- 
cadres, making him a force for moderation and a strong supporter of the need to liberalise may aspects of the 
regime's social, economic and political structures. 
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Huen,1° Lew Syn Pau," Ridzwan Tuan Haji bin Haji Dzafir,'Z Patrick Yeoh Khwai 
Hoh.13 This provides us with both an historical perspective on those most influential on 
statutory boards as well as a contemporary view. 
However, our concern is with the contemporary core executive. If we therefore restrict 
the analysis to those holding board positions in 1998, we are left with a total sample of 
684 people holding 852 positions. Of these, only five have held nine positions or more 
over the 11 year sample period; Associate Professor Bernard Tan with 18 positions, 
Michael Fam Yue Onn with 14 positions, Dr Andrew Chew with 12 positions, Tan Kin 
Hian with 11 positions and BG (NS) Lam loon Khoi with nine positions. Only 25 
people have 3 positions or more, 20 have two positions and the remainder, 213, have 
only held one position. This would indicate that the 1998 appointments heralded the 
beginning of a substantial renewal in board memberships. This issue is pursued in the 
following analysis which examines the state of board membership in 1998 so that we 
can better identify the core people managing this part of the public sector. 
Leong is a senior partner of RDC Architects, one of the most highly represented private sector firms on boards. He 
is assumed to be a PAP cadre. He has only held appointments since 1990 on the HDB, SPBOG and the STITB. 
Il Lew is an MP and was variously, Secretary, Metal Industries Workers Union (1988 -93) and Assistant Director 
(Industrial Relations) in the NTUC Administration and Research Unit. He is now General Manager, Comfort Group, 
the privatised former NTUC Comfort Cooperative, still predominantly owned by NTUC interests. 
Ridzwan is a long time managing director of the TDB and a member of the Council of Presidential Advisers and 
the Presidential Council for Minority Rights. He also hold two non -residential ambassadorial appointments. He is an 
excellent example a public service proto- cadre. 
" Yeoh is a director on the DBS board and is president of DBS Bank. However, many of his former responsibilities 
have now been transferred to the American CEO appointed in 1997, John Olds and his board representation is 
declining. Olds is not represented on any board, but was appointed to the DBS board after the survey period. 
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Table 7.7: Board Members With 15 or More Positions on Statutory Boards in 
Singapore: 1988 -1998 
NAME No. 
Pos. 
ORGANISATION 
1 Tan Chin Nam 44 EDB, GM 
2 Cham Tao Soon, Dr 41 NTI, President 
3 Yu-Foo Yee Shoon 39 MP -NTUC, VP 
4 Cheong Siew Keong, Dr 34 MRTC 
5 Tan Swan Bang, Dr Prof. (Adj.) 32 MND, PWD, DG 
6 Lim Pin, Prof. 31 NUS, VC 
7 Liu Thai Ker 30 HDB, CEO, DS 
8 Othman bin Haron Eusofe 28 MP -NTUC, ASG 
9 Chen Seow Phun, Dr John 27 MP 
10 Lee Chang Leng, Brian, Prof. 26 NTI , Elec. & Electronic Engineering 
11 Lee Ek Tieng 26 MOF , PS (Revenue Div) 
12 Chong Yew Fook, Charles 24 MP 
13 Yeo Selig Teck 24 TDB, CEO 
14 Yip Soon Kwong, John 24 MOE, Director of Education 
15 Hu Tsu Tau, Dr Richard 23 Minister for Finance 
16 Tav AK, Keith 23 KPMG Peat Marwick 
17 Chandra Das, S 22 MP 
18 Goh Kim Leong 22 MOE, PS 
19 Lim Swee Say 22 NCB, GM 
20 Lee Hee Seng 21 PSC member & OUB, MD 
21 Pek Hock Thiam 21 STB, ED 
22 Zulkifli bin Mohammed 21 MP- Political Secretary, MCD 
23 Chew Chin Tiong, A/P Ernest. 20 NUS , Head, Department of History 
24 Goh Chee Wee 20 MP 
25 Koh Boon Hwee 20 HP Singapore 
26 Sim Kee Boon, DUBC, PIG 20 Keppel Corp & former Head of Civil Service 
27 Su Guaning, Dr 20 MI NDEF, DSO, Director 
28 Wong Lee Hoong 20 TH- Singapore Treasury Building 
29 Hong Hin Kay, Albert 19 RSP Arch, Planners, Engineers 
30 Lim Hock San 19 CAAS, DG. 
31 Lint Yong Wah 19 DBS Bank, Exec. VP 
32 Tan Eng Beng 19 MOL , Lab Welfare Div, Div. Dir. 
33 Tan Guong Ching 19 MCI, PS 
34 Tan Wee Hin, Leo, Prof. 19 NIE , Dir & Dean, Schl Science 
35 Wee Chow Hou, A/P 19 NUS, Dean , Bus Admin Faculty 
36 Khattar, Sat Pal 18 Khattar Wong & Part, Solicitors 
37 Law Song Sang, Dr 18 VTIB , Director 
38 Lee Kim Poo, Moses 18 SBA, GM, DS 
39 Othman Dunu bin Wok, Tuan Haji 18 Former minister & NTUC- Overseas Investment 
40 Tan, Bernard Ail' BBM, PPA(P), PBM 18 NUS, Dir Office Stud Affairs 
41 Goh Keng Swee, Dr 17 MP- former Deputy PM 
42 Koh Cher Siang 17 MCD, PS 
43 Lua Cheng Eng 17 NOL, CEO 
44 Lee Chiong Giam 16 PA, Chief ED 
45 Lee Keh Sai 16 K S Lee Sr Associates, Principal Consultant. 
46 Sinnakaruppan, Ramasamy 16 MP -NTIJC ,Research Unit, Deputy Director 
47 Teo Hwee Choo 16 MOE , Director, Admin. Div. 
48 Chan Sek Keong 15 Attorney-General 
49 Chen Min Liang, Peter 15 SHELL Eastern Petrol 
50 Ho Meng Kit, BG (NS) 15 EDB, MD 
51 Lim Soong Guan 15 MI 1DEF, PS 
52 Lim, Gloria, Prof. 15 NUS , Dept Botany 
53 Pek Beng Choon, CoL (NS) 15 NUH, CEO 
54 Tan Chee Chuan, Steven 15 SAMAS Management Consult, MD. 
55 Tan Chin Tiong BG (NS) 15 MHA, PS 
56 Tan Kim Siew, Dr Col. (NS) 15 MND , Director, Housing 
57 Tan Yam Pin 15 Asia Pacific Breweries, Group GM 
58 Tien Sing Cheong 15 ENTRACO, COO 
59 Wang Kai Yuen, Dr 15 Xerox Sing. Software Centre 
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STATUTORY BOARD MEMBERSHIP IN 1998 
As outlined in Table 7.8, in 1998 there were 868 positions on the sample boards, filled 
by 667 appointees. Of this group, the public sector accounted for 375 people filling 524 
positions, the private sector for 197 people filling 241 positions and there were 67 
people from unknown organisations filling 70 positions. The remainder came from the 
NTUC, schools, community and industry organisations. Thus the public sector 
accounted for 58.8 per cent of the total people and 59.9 per cent of board positions and 
the private sector accounted for 31.4 of the appointees and 48.7 per cent of the 
positions. Appointees of unknown origin accounted for 9.8 per cent of appointees and 
8.2 per cent of positions. Forty-three (64.2 per cent) of the unknown appointees were 
members of ethnic community advisory boards and not of major economic and social 
policy boards. A summary of board representation by sector is provided in Table 7.8. 
Table 7.8: Summary of Major Sectoral Representation on Statutory Boards 
in Singapore: 1998 
Sector No. people % of people No. positions % of positions 
Public Sector 375 56.1 524 60.42 
Private Sector 197 29.5 241 27.55 
NTUC 11 1.6 14 1.6 
Community Organisations 15 2.3 16 1.9 
Philanthropic Trusts 2 03 2 02 
Hong Kong govt. 1 0.15 1 0.12 
Unknown 66 9.9 70 8.1 
667 99.85 868 99.89 
With 59.9 per cent of board positions filled by public sector appointees in 1998, boards 
are now slightly less dominated by this sector when compared to the 11 year average 
of 63.43 per cent, indicating that the proportion of public service appointees has 
declined slightly. This may reflect the recent trend in public sector representation. Such 
representation was almost constant from 1988 -1993, fluctuating only 2 per cent in this 
period and then dropped by almost 5 per cent in 1994 and a further 1.5 per cent in 
1995. It then leapt by 10 per cent in 1996 to 67.01 per cent and then declining to its 1998 
level. This may indicate that there is emerging either a reluctance by non -public sector 
people to be involved in public sector management, a reluctance by government to 
involve people outside its sphere of control, or a congruence of both trends. The 1998 
data certainly provides no evidence of an emerging trend towards greater involvement 
by those outside the government's sphere of control. 
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Table 7.9: Singapore Statutory Board Membership By Sector in 1998 
Sector No. people % of people No. positions % of positions 
Higher Education 83 12.4 113 13 
GLCs 61 9.1 76 8.8 
Ministries 58 8.7 70 8.1 
Boards 56 8.4 87 10.0 
MPs & Ministers 42 63 63 7.3 
Property 24 3.6 27 3.1 
Finance 23 3.4 33 3.8 
Permanent Secretaries 22 3.3 48 5.5 
MINDEF 22 3.3 24 2.8 
Deputy Secretaries 20 3.0 28 3.2 
Architects 17 2.5 20 2.3 
Medical 17 2.5 19 22 
Lawyers 15 22 23 2.6 
Media 12 1.8 14 1.6 
NTUC 11 1.6 14 1.6 
1T 11 1.6 13 1.5 
Accountants 10 1.5 15 1.7 
Petrochemicals 9 1.4 10 1.2 
Electronics 9 1.4 11 1.3 
Industry associations 9 1.4 9 1.0 
Manufacturing 9 1.4 11 13 
Engineers 6 0.9 8 0.9 
Food & Beverage 7 1.0 9 1.0 
Judiciary 5 0.7 7 0.8 
Arts 6 0.9 6 0.7 
SAF 5 0.75 7 0.8 
Trading 5 0.75 5 0.6 
Community organisations 5 0.75 5 0.6 
Independent schools 3 0.5 4 0.5 
Dentists 3 0.5 3 0.35 
Tourism 2 03 2 0.2 
Philanthropic Trusts 2 0.3 2 0.2 
Retail 2 0.3 2 02 
Town Councils 1 0.15 1 0.12 
Bong Kong govt. 1 0.15 1 0.12 
Transport 1 0.15 1 0.1 
pharmaceuticals 1 0.15 1 0.1 
Jewellery 1 0.15 1 0.1 
Management consultants 1 0.15 1 0.1 
Shipping 1 0.15 1 0.1 
Social research 1 0.15 1 0.1 
Recreation 1 0.15 1 0.1 
Religious Organisations 1 0.15 1 0.1 
Unknown 66 9.9 70 8.1 
TOTALS 667 99.85 868 99.89 
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Public Sector Representation 
An analysis of public sector representation on boards is provided in Table 7.10. 
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Table 7.10: Public Sector Representation on Statutory Board 
in Singapore 1998 
Sector No. eo . le % of . eo . le No. ositions % of . ositions 
Higher Education 83 12.4 113 13 
Boards 56 8.4 87 10.0 
GLCs 61 9.1 76 8.8 
Ministries 58 8.7 70 8.1 
MPs & Ministers 42 6.3 63 73 
Permanent Secretaries 22 3.3 48 5.5 
Deputy Secretaries 20 3.0 28 3.2 
MINDEF 22 3.3 24 2.8 
Judiciary 5 0.7 7 0.8 
SAF 5 0.75 7 0.8 
Town Councils 1 0.15 1 0.12 
TOTALS 375 56.1 524 60.42 
As can be seen, the higher education sector, dominated by appointees from NUS, had 
more board directorships than any other part of the public sector, followed by board 
appointees, GLC, ministry and current and former MPs. It is notable that the level of 
representation from MPs is higher than that of permanent secretaries, although slightly 
less than permanent secretaries and deputy secretaries combined. Representation from 
the SAF is particularly low, although when combined with MINDEF, increased to 3.6 
per cent, the highest for any one ministry. 
Private Sector Representation 
An analysis of private sector representation on statutory boards is provided in Table 
7.11. 
Representation from this sector was dominated by the property and finance sectors. if 
the property, architects, engineering and tourism sectors are combined as property 
related industries, this combined sector would account for 6.3 per cent of private 
sector representation. If we also combined the finance and accountant categories into a 
combined finance sector category, this would represent 5.5 per cent of directors. 
Therefore, these combined property and finance categories would account for 12 per 
cent of the total directorships and 43.6 pre cent of the private sector directorships. 
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Table 7.11: Private Sector Representation on Statutory Board 
in Singapore 1998 
Sector No. People % of People No. Positions % of Positions 
Property 24 3.6 27 3.1 
Finance 23 3.4 33 3.8 
Architects 17 2.5 20 23 
Medical 17 2.5 19 2.2 
Lawyers 15 2.2 23 2.6 
Media 12 1.8 14 1.6 
TT 11 1.6 13 1.5 
Accountants 10 1.5 15 1.7 
Petrochemicals 9 1.4 10 1.2 
Electronics 9 1.4 11 1.3 
Industry associations 9 1.4 9 1.0 
Manufacturing 9 1.4 11 1.3 
Engineers 6 0.9 8 0.9 
Food ir Beverage 7 1.0 9 1.0 
Trading 5 0.75 5 0.6 
Dentists 3 0.5 3 0.35 
Tourism 2 0.3 2 02 
Retail 2 0.3 2 0.2 
Transport 1 0.15 1 0.1 
Pharmaceuticals 1 0.15 1 0.1 
Jewellery 1 0.15 1 0.1 
Management consultants 1 0.15 1 0.1 
Shipping 1 0.15 1 0.1 
Social research 1 0.15 1 0.1 
Recreation 1 0.15 1 0.1 
TOTALS 197 29.5 241 27.55 
Union Representation 
NTUC representation was by 11 people for 14 positions. However, this was 
supplemented by nine MPs with NTUC affiliation as employees or office holders and 
by Ng Ser Miang who is a director of several GLCs and of the NTUC Fairprice Co- 
operative. Thus NTUC interests are represented by 20 people in 36 positions, four per 
cent of the total. This is obviously not a significant level of representation, although the 
affiliation of several MPs with the NTUC compensates for this. There was no 
representation from individual unions; all representation was from the NTUC 
meritocratic elite. 
Community Sector Representation 
Representation from the community sector is shown in Table 7.12 below. 
The inclusion of independent community organisations on statutory boards is not 
typical of representation from this sector. Six directorships come from the arts 
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category; Robert Lau Kuo Kwong, Executive Chairman of the Singapore Arts Centre, T. 
Sasiatharan the Artistic Director of The Substation theatre, the Chinese language writer 
Table 7.12: Community Sector Representation on Statutory Board 
in Singapore 1998 
Sector No. people % of people No. positions % of positions 
Arts 6 0.9 6 0.7 
Community organisations 5 0.75 5 0.6 
Independent schools 3 0.5 4 0.5 
Religious Organisations 1 0.15 1 0.1 
TOTALS 15 2.3 16 1.9 
Goh Sin Tub, Dorai Natarajan, member of the executive committee of the Singapore 
Indian Fine Arts Society14 and the owners of two fashion firms; Sarkasi Said Tzee and 
Su Yeang. Of this group, the Singapore Arts Centre and The Substation are 
substantially government funded and Lau is a former civil servant, once chairman of 
the Singapore Theatre Trust and an employee of the Institute of System Science, so 
these organisations are at best quasi -government. The community organisations' 
directors comprise Kenneth Tan from the Singapore Film Society, Dr. Isa Hassan and 
Ali Sumardi of Yayasan Mendaki, Yusof Alsagoff of the Orchid Society of Southeast 
Asia and Ong Yong Wan of the Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service. Of these 
organisation, Mendaki and the Red Cross are government controlled and are not 
genuine community organisations. However, Kenneth Tan is a member of the Film 
Appeal Committee and Yusof Alsagoff is a member of the National Parks Board, and 
both come from organisations that are genuine community organisations without overt 
or covert government control.' The three directors from independent schools also 
cannot be deemed to be independent of government influence, as over 80 per cent of 
their funding comes from the Ministry of Education which also has final oversight and 
control of them. Members of the boards of independent schools must also be approved 
by the Minister for Education prior to appointment. These schools are also strongly 
affiliated with the governing elite. The one religious organisation identified, the Roman 
Catholic Church, is a target of covert government control. Other religious organisations 
from the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities do have representation on the 
Council for Religious Harmony and on minor boards, but they could not he identified 
in this survey. 
No GROs are represented on statutory boards. 
" Dorai Natarajan was previously president of the Indian Fine Arts Society, but continued his board membership 
after relinquishing this position. 
is It is taken for granted that, as with all civil society organisations, these societies are under the final control of the 
Registrar of Societies. 
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Organisations Most Represented on Boards 
The organisations with the highest level of representation on statutory boards in 1998 
are listed in Table 7.13 below. These organisations account for 409 directorships and 47 
per cent of the total board seats. As can be seen, the only private sector organisations 
among this elite group are RSP Architects, Planners and Engineers, Overseas Union 
Bank, Esso and Singapore Press Holdings (SPH). As the later is privately held but 
government controlled, it is treated in this study as a GLC. The only other technically, 
non -public sector organisation represented is the NTUC, but it is effectively a part of 
the government. The most highly represented source of directors is from NUS, 
followed by the defence organisations, MPs and the Ministry of Education. If former 
MPs are combined with sitting MPs, this group was the second highest source of board 
directors with 7.2 per cent of representation. 
Table 7.13: Organisations Most Represented on Statutory Board 
in Singapore 1998 
Organisation No. Boards 
Represented on 
No. positions 
held 
% of total 
positions 
National University of Singapore 34 66 7.6 
Ministry of Defence & Singapore Armed 31 37 4.3 
Forces 
Members of Parliament 24 43 5.0 
Ministry of Education 22 29 3.3 
Nanyang Technological University 17 22 2.5 
National Trades Union Congress 14 14 1.6 
Ministers and Former Ministers 12 19 22 
Ministry of Health 11 29 3.3 
Economic Development Board 9 15 1.7 
Ministry of Information and the Arts 9 9 1.0 
Singapore Press Holdings 8 9 1.0 
National University Hospital 8 8 0.9 
RSP Architects, Planners and Engineers 8 8 0.9 
Ministry of Home Affairs 7 9 1.0 
Ministry of Finance 7 9 1.0 
Attorney- General's Chambers 7 7 0.8 
Housing and Development Board 7 7 0.8 
Prime Minister's Office 7 7 0.8 
Health Corporation of Singapore 6 17 2.0 
Ministry of Community Development 6 7 0.8 
Public Works Department 6 6 0.7 
Overseas Union Bank 6 6 0.7 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 5 6 0.7 
Esso 5 5 0.6 
Singapore Polytechnic 4 5 0.6 
Ministry of Law 3 6 0.7 
National Archives Board 2 4 0.5 
409 47 °ío 
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Table 7.14: Highest Representation by Persons on 
Statutory Boards in Singapore: 1998 
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o Name Pos. Organisation Sector 
1988- 
1998 
No. 
Boards 
1 Tan Wee Hin, Leo, Prof. PPA(E), 
PBM 
19 NIE , Director Education 6 
2 Niam Chiang Meng PPA(P) 09 MITA, PS PS 6 
3 Cheong Slew Keong, Dr BEM, 
BBM(L) 
34 NUH , Chairman GLC 5 
4 Sinnakaruppan, Ramasamy 16 MP, Assist. Secretary- General, NTUC MP 5 
5 Tan Kim Siew, Dr. Col. (NS) 15 URA , CEO, Chief Planner Board, CEO 5 
6 Su Guaning, Dr. 20 MINDEF , DS (Technology) DS, MINDEF 4 
7 Khattar, Sat Pal PPA(P) 18 Khattar Wong & Partners Lawyers 4 
8 Chew G K, Andrew, Dr. 12 PS, PMO (Retired) PS 4 
9 Yeo Siew Chye, Stephen 11 NCB, CEO Board, CEO 4 
10 Lam Joon Khoi, BG (NS) 09 MOE, DS (Policy) DS 4 
11 Ng Chee Tat, Philip 09 Far East Organisation, CEO Property 4 
12 Wee Heng Tin PPA(P), PPA(G), 
PBS 
08 MOE, Director -General of Education PS 4 
13 Wong Nang fang 08 OCBC, Executive Vice President Finance 4 
14 Chiang Chie Foo 06 MOE, PS (2') PS 4 
15 Chain Tao Soon, Dr. 41 NTU , President Education 3 
16 Yu -Foo Yee Shoon 39 MP, Dep. Secretary- General, NTUC MP 3 
17 Lim Pin, Prof. 31 NUS, Vice Chancellor Education 3 
18 Liu Thai Ker, PJG PPA(E) 30 RSP Architects, Planners & Engineers Architects 3 
19 Chong Yew Fook, Charles 24 MP, Adviser, Pasir Ris CCC MP 3 
20 Lim Swee Say 22 MP, Dep. Secretary- General, NTUC MP 3 
21 Lee Hee Seng, PJG, DUBC 21 PSC Chairman & OUB Chairman Finance 3 
77 Chew Chin Tiong, Ernest, A/Prof. 20 NUS, Department of History Education 3 
23 Sim Kee Boon, DUBC, PJG 20 Executive Chairman. Keppel Corp & 
former PS, Head of Civil Service 
GLC 3 
24 Lim Hock San, PPA(E) 19 United Industrial Corp., President & Manufacturing 3 
CEO 
25 Tan Eng Heng BBM, BBM (L) 19 Asia Life Insurance Society, Chairman Finance 3 
26 Lee Kim Poo, Moses 18 MCD, PS PS 3 
27 Chan Sek Keong 15 Attorney General PS, AG 3 
28 Ho Meng Kit, BG (NS) 15 EDB, Managing Director Board 3 
29 Lim Choo San, Michael 13 Price Waterhouse, Managing Partner Accountants 3 
30 Fang Ai Lian 11 Ernst & Young, Managing Partner Accountants 3 
31 Selvaretnam, Daniel I 1 EDB, Assist MD (Internation. Policy) Board 3 
32 Tan Kin Lian PBM 11 NTUC Income NTUC 3 
33 Decker, Barry, PPA(E) 10 TDB , CEO board, CEO 3 
34 Koh Yong Guan PJG 10 MOH, PS & MD MAS PS 3 
35 Lee Suan Hiang, PPA(P) 10 SPSB, CEO Board, CEO 3 
36 Nee Yeh Ching, Andrew, Prof 10 NUS, Dean, Faculty of Engineering Education 3 
37 Tan Ee Ping 10 Tan Ee Ping & Partners, Principal Lawyers 3 
38 Arun Mahizhnan 07 Dep. Director, Inst. of Policy Studies Board 3 
39 Magad, Ahmad Mohamed 06 MP & H -IV Singapore, MD MP 3 
40 Chee Yarn Cheng, A/P PPA(P) 04 MOH, Dep. Dir, Medical Services Ministry 3 
41 Wang Gungwu, Prof. 04 NUS, Chair, Institute of East Asian Education 3 
Political Economy 
42 Cheong, Benedict 03 MHA, Director, (Operations), SPF Ministry 3 
43 Leong Keng Thai 03 TAS, Director -General (DS level) Board 3 
44 Seng Han Thong 03 MP, NTUC, Director (Organisational MP 3 
Management) & GM, Chinese, SPH 
654 153 
GLCs AS A COMPONENT OF THE CORE EXECUTIVE 
Two analyses of the leadership of GLCs were undertaken. One was based on the 1991 
Directory of Government Linked Companies (DGLC)and the other on annual reports for 
the financial years 1996 -97 and 1997 -98, whichever was most recently available for each 
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company at the time fieldwork research was undertaken. Attempts to obtain a copy of 
any post -1991 Directory of Government Linked Corporations16 met with no success. 
Vennewald has already conducted an analysis of GLCs based on the 1991 DGLC and 
this study did not wish to replicate it. However, an analysis was conducted to verify 
Vannewald's findings as he did not have access to the full 1991 DGLC as I have. 
Vannewald's focus was also on testing a particular theoretical construct; Evers and 
Schiels' neo- marxist, class formation oriented 'Strategic Group Concept'." The focus of 
the present study, while partially concerned with the same group analysed in 
Vannewald's work, is focussed on an empirical analysis of who governs Singapore and 
how they govern and has no concern for class formation theory. Rather, my concern is 
to not only identify the core executive, but to use this analysis of GLCs to identify 
particular strategies of governance used by the core executive in managing this 
component of the public sector and comparing them with those strategies identified in 
other analyses within the study. This analysis of the 1991 DGLC is therefore oriented to 
identifying the core executive, its governance strategies and its linkages throughout the 
hegemonic political and public management system. This analysis is augmented by a 
more contemporary analysis of those GLCs, the annual reports of which could be 
obtained in mid -1998. 
The GLC Leadership in 1991 
In the 1991 DGLC, 428 companies are listed, 343 of which are under GLC holding 
companies and 85 of which are under the control of statutory boards. The DGLC does 
not list companies associated with MAS, the GIC or Singapore Telecommunications, 
therefore the total GLC sector cannot be covered. Of those, companies listed, 33 are 
joint venture companies with foreign entities in which GLCs have a minority stake. 
These have been excluded from this study, leaving 395 companies of interest. The 
placement of these companies by their holding companies, boards and ministries is 
detailed in Table 7.15 below. 
Table 7.15: Numbers of GLCs by Holding Company, Ministry and Board 1991 
HOLDING COMPANY OR BOARD NO. COMPANIES % OF 
TOTAL 
Temasek Holdings (Private) Ltd 212 49.5 
Singapore Technologies Holdings 71 16.6 
MND Holdings (Private) Ltd 54 12.6 
Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd 6 1.4 
1, This is the new title for what was previously the Directory of Government Linked Companies. 
10 Werner Vennewald, "Technocrats in the State Enterprise System of Singapore ", Asia Research Centre Working 
Paper, 32, November 1994, p.4 
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Commercial and Industrial Security Corporation 
Economic Development Board 
Housing And Development Board 
Jurong Town Corporation 
National Computer Board 
National University of Singapore 
Port of Singapore Authority 
Post Office Savings Bank 
Public Utilities Board 
Singapore Broadcasting Corporation 
Sentosa Development Corporation 
Singapore Institute of Standards and Research 
Singapore Tourist Promotion Board 
Telecommunications Authority of Singapore 
Trade Development Board 
Urban Redevelopment Authority 
TOTAL 
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1 02 
3 0.7 
5 12 
9 2.1 
2 0.5 
1 0.2 
21 4.9 
6 1.4 
1 02 
2 0.5 
1 0.2 
4 0.9 
6 1.4 
11 2.6 
9 2.1 
3 0.7 
428 99.9 
The four major GLC holding companies in 1991 were Temasek Holdings (Private) Ltd, 
Singapore Technology Holdings, MND Holdings, Health Corporation of Singapore, all 
allocated to the MOF Revenue Division for oversight.18 In analysing these companies, 
they were each allocated a level of importance, to assist in identifying where the core 
GLC appointees were allocated. These levels ranged from 1 (the four major holding 
companies) to 6, the least important level comprised of small companies. The definition 
of each level is detailed in Appendix 5. The total number of GLCs by level is detailed in 
Table 7.16 below. These levels were used to calculate a rank based on the importance 
and spread of directorships held by each director using the formula: 
Director's Rank = Mean Rank of Companies 
Number of Companies 
Using this formula, the lower the director's score, the higher the rank. Therefore, the 
most important directors have scores between 0 -0.5 and the least important directors 
have a score of 6. 
Table 7.16: Number of GLCs by Level in Sample 1991 
Level 1 2 3 4 5 6 TOTAL 
No. Companies 4 10 38 156 147 40 395 
% 1% 2.5% 9.6% 39.5% 37.2% 10.2% 
The boards of the GLCs included in this sample, which provides the best sample 
currently available,19 provides 1199 directorships (including chairmanships) filled by 
1e The Directorship and Consultancy Appointments Council, Directory of Government Linked Companies 1991, 
Singapore, Temasek Management Services, 1991, pp. 293 -297 
19 Even if all publicly available records were purchased for all GLCs, this would only provide a partial sample as the 
majority are still not publicly listed and the MAS and GIC companies are all privately held, many of them outside 
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574 people of whom 263 were appointed as chairmen. Of these people, 48 come from 
the civil service, 41 from the military,20 99 come from statutory boards, 42 come from 
the private sector and the organisational affiliation of 97 is unknown. The breakdown 
of directors by sector is provided in Table 7.17 below. 
Table 7.17: 1991 GLCs: Representation by Sector 
CATEGORY NUMBER OF 
DIRECTORS 
% OF TOTAL 
DIRECTORS 
0 
NO. OF 
BOARD 
SEATS 
% OFTOTAL 
BOARD 
SEATS 
GLCs 209 36.4 ¡ 578 48.22 
Boards 99 17.2 0 269 22.5 
Unknown 97 16.9 0 118 9.84 
Civil Service 48 8.3 0 88 7.35 
Private Sector 42 7.3 54 4.47 
Military 41 7.1 0 44 3.67 
Foreign 29 5.1 ¡ 29 2.42 
MPs and Ministers 8 1.4 16 1.33 
Iudici 1 0.2 0 3 0.25 
TOTALS 574 99.9 1199 100.05 
As shown in Table 7.18 below, altogether, the public sector completely dominates GLC 
directorships with 70.7 per cent of directorships. 
Given that available public sector documentation was exhausted in identifying all 
directors, it is most probable that the majority of those classified as unknown are from 
the private sector, although some may be from the GIC and a few from publicly 
unlisted public sector positions. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the true 
private sector representation is close to 24.2 per cent. 
Table 7.18: Public and Private Sector Breakdown of GLC Directorships 1991 
SECTOR 
Public Sector 
Private Sector 
Unknown 
Foreign 
TOTALS 
NUMBER OF % OF TOTAL 
DIRECTORS DIRECTORS 
406 70.7 
42 7.3 
97 16.9 
29 5.1 
574 100 
Singapore. Therefore the 1991 DGLC, although still a secret document and now dated, provides the best sample 
currently available. 
20 The military group includes the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). 
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As can be seen from the above analyses, the GLC sector accounts for roughly one -third 
of the directors and statutory boards for one -sixth; the two sectors combined provide 
54.6 per cent of directorships 2' The representation of all directors by their 
organisational affiliation is provided in Table 7.19, GLC representation is shown in 
Table 7.20, and statutory board representation in Table 7.21 and ministry 
representation in Table 7.22. 
Singapore Technologies and the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) are the only 
organisations with dominant positions; 14.26 and 11.84 per cent of the total 
directorships held respectively - 26.1 per cent combined. These figures are 
approximately proportionate to the number of GLCs in each of these groups; 16.6 per 
cent in the Singapore Technologies Group and 12.6 per cent in the MND Holdings 
Group which consists only of DBS and its subsidiaries.' 
21 In this analysis, although the Post Office Savings Bank is technically a statutory board, it is treated as a GLC as it 
was amalgamated with the Development Bank of Singapore in 1998. 
22 The Directorships and Consultancy Appointments Council, Directory of Government Linked Companies 1991, 
Temasek Management Services, Singapore, 1991, pp. 239 -282 
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Table 7.19: 1991 GLCs: Representation by Organisation 
CATEGORY NUMBER OF 
DIRECTORS 
% OF TOTAL 
DIRECTORS 
NO. OF 
BOARDS 
% OF BOARD 
SEATS HELD 
Sing. Technologies 34 5.9 171 1426 
DBS 39 6.8 142 11.84 
Unknown 100 17.4 118 9.84 
Keppel Group 20 3.5 51 4.25 
SIA 26 4.5 50 4.17 
PSA 29 5.1 45 3.8 
Other Private Sector 34 5.9 46 3.8 
NOL 9 1.6 45 3.75 
M íNDEF 41 7.1 44 3.67 
Foreign 29 5.1 29 2.42 
Sembawang Group 8 1.4 28 2.34 
Temasek Holdings 10 1.7 28 2.34 
TAS 13 2.3 26 2.17 
JTC 7 1.2 25 2.1 
HOB 10 1.7 24 2.0 
EDB 
TDB 
7 
10 
1.2 
1.7 r 
23 
21 
1.9 
1.75 
URA 
POSB 
4 
5 
0.7 
0.9 
e 
19 
18 
1.58 
1.5 
INTRACO 6 1.0 17 1.42 
MPs & Ministers 8 1.4 16 1.33 
PMO 5 0.9 16 1.33 
SISIR 8 1.4 15 1.25 
RDC 6 1.0 14 1.17 
MOH 4 0.7 13 1.08 
MND 8 1.4 10 0.83 
MOE 2 0.3 0 10 0.83 
NUS 10 1.7 0 0 10 0.83 
HCS 5 0.9 8 0.67 
UOB 5 0.9 8 0.67 
MHA 6 1.0 7 0.6 
MTI 
NCB 
3 
3 
0.5 
0S é 
7 
7 
0.6 
0.6 
SNP 4 0.7 0 7 0.6 
STPB 5 0.9 7 0.6 
MCI 5 0.9 6 0.5 
NTU 
SDC 
3 
2 
05 
0.3 
0 
r 
6 
6 
0.5 
0.5 
PUB 5 0.9 i 5 0.42 
SBC 4 0.7 5 0.42 
ECICS 2 0.3 r 5 0.42 
CAAS 2 0.3 4 0.33 
MCD 3 05 i 4 0.33 
MFA 3 0.5 4 0.33 
MOF 4 0.7 4 0.33 
AGC 2 0.3 3 0.25 
Judiciary 1 02 ë 3 0.25 
NatSteel 2 0.3 0 3 0.25 
SMRT 2 0.3 3 0.25 
MAS 1 0.2 2 0.17 
MINLAW 2 03 2 0.17 
MOM 1 0.2 / 2 0.17 
Singapore Petroleum 2 0.3 i 2 0.17 
CISCO 1 0.2 1 0.08 
Construction 
Technology 
GIC 
02 
o 
1 
1 
0.08 
0.08 1 0.2 
NUH 1 02 i 1 0.08 
SingTel 1 0.2 1 0.08 
574 99.6 i 1199 100.05 
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Table 7.20: Representation by GLCs on GLC Boards 1991 
CATEGORY NO. OF 
SEATS 
% OF BOARD 
SEATS HELD 
Sing. Technologies 171 14.26 
DBS 142 11.84 
Keppel Group 51 4.25 
SIA 50 4.17 
NOL 45 3.75 
Sembawang Group 28 2.34 
Temasek Holdings 28 2.34 
POSB 18 1.5 
INTRACO 17 1.42 
HCS 8 0.67 
SNP 7 0.6 
ECICS 5 0.42 
NatSteel 3 0.25 
SMRT 3 0.25 
Singapore Petroleum 2 0.17 
CISCO 1 0.08 
Construction 1 0.08 
Technology 
GIC 1 0.08 
NUH 1 0.08 
Sin: Tel 1 0.08 
48.63 
Statutory board representation is dominated by those commercially oriented boards 
concerned with infrastructure development such as the Port of Singapore Authority 
(PSA), the Telecommunications Authority of Singapore, Jurong Town Corporation and 
the Housing and Development Board (HDB). All have relatively high levels of 
directorships; 3.8. 2.17, 2.1 and 2.0 per cent respectively. 
Table 7.21: Statutory Board Representation on GLC Boards 1991 
Cate_ o No. of Boards 
PSA 45 3.8 
TAS 26 2.17 
JTC 25 2.1 
HDB 24 2.0 
EDB 23 1.9 
TDB 21 1.75 
URA 19 1.58 
SISIR 15 1.25 
NUS 10 0.83 
NCB 7 0.6 
STPB 7 0.6 
NTL; 6 0.5 
SDC 6 0.5 
PUB 5 0.42 
SBC 5 0.42 
CAAS 4 0.33 
MAS 2 0.17 
250 20.92 
Ministry representation, other than by MINDEF, was relatively minor as shown in 
Table 7.22 below. 
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Table 7.22: Ministry Representation on GLC Boards: 1991 
Cate o No. of Boards 
PMO 16 1.33 
MOH 13 1.08 
MND 10 0.83 
MOE 10 0.83 
MHA 7 0.6 
NM 7 0.6 
MCI 6 0.5 
MCD 4 0.33 
MFA 4 0.33 
MOF 4 0.33 
AGC 3 0.25 
MINLAW 2 0.17 
MOM 2 0.17 
TOTALS 88 7.35 
The type of GLCs on which ministries were representation did not follow a consistent 
pattern. Some ministries, such as Health and MINDEF, are predominantly represented 
on GLCs integral to their policy community; the Health Corporation of Singapore and 
its Subsidiaries and Singapore Technologies respectively. Others have a more general 
representation. All ministries are represented at almost all levels of company from 2 -5, 
with most representation at levels 2-4, the major operating companies. 
As can be noted from Table 7.19, no organisation other than Singapore Technologies 
and the Development Bank of Singapore has more than five per cent of directorships. 
Only 12 organisations (22 per cent) had two per cent or more of the total directorships. 
These organisations combined account for 56.69 per cent of total directorships and are 
clearly the most dominant in the management of the GLC sector. This group is shown 
in Table 7.23. 
It is significant that the only ministry with a substantial spread and level of 
directorships is MINDEF, not the Prime Minister's Office nor the Ministry of Finance ' 
Six GLCs together account for almost 43 per cent of directorships; Singapore 
Technologies, DBS, the Keppel Group, Singapore International Airlines (SIA), 
Sembawang Group and Temasek Holdings. 
Of MINDEF's 44 directorships, 40 are within the Singapore Technologies Group, one in an NCB subsidiary and 
three in Temasek Holdings companies. Of the 44 Singapore Technologies directorships, 10 are in the armaments and 
military related Chartered Industries of Singapore Group. 
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Table 7.23 Organisations With the Highest Level of Directorships 
in GLCs: 1991 
No. O anisation 
1. Sing. Technologies 
2. DBS 
3. Keppel Group 
4. SIA 
5. PSA 
6. NOL 
7. MINDEF 
8. Sembawang Group 
9. Temasek Holdings 
10. TAS 
n. JTC 
12. HDB 
TOTAL 
% of Directorshi.s 
14.26 
11.84 
4.25 
4.17 
3.8 
3.75 
3.67 
2.34 
2.34 
2.17 
2.1 
2.0 
56.69 
Other GLCs, boards and ministries have relatively low levels of representation, 
although some have high Ievels in a limited type of GLC. For example, the Ministry of 
Health, principally through Dr. Kwa Soon Bee, has a high level of representation on 
HCS subsidiary boards 24 This practice of having representation on subsidiary and 
associated companies of a ministry, GLC or board is characteristic of the pattern of 
board representation and is to be expected. 
Analysis of GLC Board Directors 1991 
Using the formula previously used, each director was allocated a rank based on the 
number of companies of which he was a director and the level of those companies. The 
most important directors; those with scores between 0 -0.5, are listed in Table 7.24 
below; a total of 33 directors. 
This group accounts for 27.02% of total board seats. Eight of this group are either chief 
or senior executives of statutory boards, four are civil service permanent secretaries, 19 
are either chief or senior executives of GLCs, one is an MP and one other's institutional 
affiliation is unknown. 
The group of directors with ranks of 1 or less amount to 77 people, representing 43.6 
per cent of board seats. Those with a rank of 2 or less amount to 202 people and 
account for 61.8 per cent of board seats. Those with a rank of 3 or less amount to 311 
2° Kwa chaired all hospital and national specialist centre boards (eg. the Singapore National Eye Centre Pte Ltd) as 
well as being chairman of the HCS board and Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health. In fact, 11 of the 13 
directorships held by MOH officials are in HCS or health related companies. The other two boards on which he was 
represented were Singapore Zoological Gardens and lurong Rird Park. 
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Table 7.24: Most Represented People on GLC Boards 1991 
NO. NAME SUBSTANTIVE AFFILIATION SECTOR NO. RANK 
u COMP. 26 
1 Quek Poh Huai, Col President, Singapore Aerospace Limited G 20 0.2 
(NS) 
2 Lua Cheng Eng CEO, Neptune Orient Lines Limited G 17 0.23 
3 Lai Chun Loong President, Chartered Industries of Singapore G 15 0.24 
4 Wong Kok Siew President, ST Industrial Corporation G 16 0.24 
5 Ho Ching Executive VP, ST Ventures G 17 025 
6 Ngiam Tong Dow CEO, DBS & PS G 6 0.25 
7 Au Eng Kok MD, Pidemco Land Pte Ltd G 15 0,28 
8 Lim Ming Seong Group President, STH G 11 0.28 
9 Hwang, P. Y. Former chairman, EDB B 6 0.31 
10 Lum Choon Wah MD, Temasek Holdings G I1 0.31 
11 Ng Kee Choe Executive VP, DBS G 13 0.31 
12 Kwa Soon Bee, Dr. Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health C 10 0.32 
13 Hsu Tse -Kwang Executive Chairman, Sembawang Holdings G 11 0.32 
14 Tan Soo Nan Executive VP, DBS G 13 0.34 
15 Hsuan Owyang Chairman, HDB B 9 0.35 
16 Toh Ho Tav Director, Fleet Management Division, NOL G lt 0.36 
17 wee Soon Lock, 
Michael 
Executive VP, DBS G I 1 0.36 
18 Lam Chuan Leong Permanent Secretary, MTI C 4 0.38 
19 Han Cheng Fong, Dr. CEO & MD, DBS Land Ltd G 11 0.39 
20 Ng Kiat Chong Executive Director, PSA B 9 0.42 
21 ErKwong Wah Permanent Secretary, MOE C 9 0.42 
22 Yeoh Khwai Hoh, 
Patrick 
President, DBS Ltd G 7 0.43 
23 Yeo Liai Kok, Philip Chairman, EDB B 4 0.44 
24 Mak Kai Tye, Francis Executive Chairman, Jurong Environmental B 9 0.46 
Engineering 
25 Lee Chee Yeng Director, Information Systems Division, PSA B 0.47 
26 Yeo Seng Teck Chief Executive Director, TDB B 0.47 
27 Chew Guan Khuan, 
Andrew 
Permanent Secretary & Head of Civil Service C 6 0.47 
28 Das, S. Chandra MP & Executive Chair, NUR Investment and L 6 0.47 
Trari;no 
29 Lim Yong Wah (Mrs) Unknown U 6 0.47 
@ Lee, Dorcas 
30 Lee Ek Tieng MD, MAS and Chairman, PUB B 2 0.5 
31 Chong Kie Cheong Senior VP, DBS G 8 0.5 
32 Loh Chuk Yarn GM, Singapore Precision Industries G 8 0.5 
33 Teo Soon Hoe Exec. Director, Keppel Corporation Limited G 6 0.5 
TOTAL 324 
people who account for 80 per cent of board seats. Directors with a rank greater than 3 
are associated principally with boards of levels 3 -6 and will not be considered in this 
analysis. Those of interest who may be members of the core executive will be 
associated with level 1 and 2 companies and have a score of 0.05 or less. The 
distribution of directors by rank and institutional affiliation across companies by level 
is shown in Table 7.25 below. 
Coding: B= Statutory Board; C =Civil Service; G= -GLC; L= Legislature (MPs);U= Unknown 
25 Rank is calculated according to the following formula: Rank = Mean Rank of Companies 
Number of Companies 
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Table 7.25: Distribution Of Directors By Rank And Institutional Affiliation 
Across GLCs By Level 1991 
REPRESENTATIONAL LEVEL 
CHARACTERISTICS 0 -.5 .51 -1 1.1 -2 2.1 -3 3.1 -4 4 -6 
% of People 5.7 13.4 35.2 54.2 83.6 100 
No. of people 33 77 202 311 481 574 
% of seats 27.02 43.6 61.8 80 93.2 100 
% of level 1, 2 & 3 chairs 38 49 52 0 0 0 
W ,...,,,,..,,(73 %). i (94 %),.,(100) IX 
GLC 19 47 100 139 184 209 
Board 7 16 34 53 87 99 
Civil Service 5 8 21 28 44 48 
Military 0 3 14 27 38 41 
Private Sector 0 1 12 25 35 42 
Unknown 1 1 15 31 67 97 
MPs 1 1 4 4 6 8 
Foreign 0 0 1 4 19 29 
Judiciary 0 0 1 1 1 1 
There are only four level 1 companies! MND Holdings Private Ltd, Hospital 
Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd (HCS), Temasek Holdings and Singapore 
Technology Holdings Pte Ltd (STH). MND Holdings is comprised of only one group of 
companies; the DBS group. All of the Level 1 companies are chaired by permanent 
secretaries!' All of the Level 1 companies are dominated by civil servants or 
permanent secretaries but all have substantial representation from other parts of the 
public sector. As can be seen from Table 7.26, and from the previous analysis by 
organisation, GLC affiliated directors dominate the boards at all levels below level 1 or, 
at least have equal representation to other sectors. The members of each level one 
board are detailed in Appendix 6. It is clear that these directors are core actors in the 
management of the GT.0 sector. It is below this level that identifying the other core 
GLC actors becomes more problematical. 
As shown in Table 7.24, most of the highest ranking directors are drawn from the 
GLCs; 19 of the 33 listed, 58 per cent of the total. Another eight are drawn from 
statutory boards (24 per cent), 4 from the civil service (12 per cent), one is an MP and 
the affiliation of one is unknown. It is obvious from this analysis that below the level 1 
Dr. Andrew Chew Guan Khuan, (MND Holdings) Dr. Kwa Soon Bee (HCS), Lee Ek Tieng (Temasek Holdings) 
and Ngiam Tong Dow (STH). Chew was Head of the Civil Service, Kwa, Permanent Secretary, Health, Lee was 
Managing Director, MAS and Ngiam was Permanent Secretary, Budget and Revenue Divisions, MOF as well as 
CEO of the Development Bank of Singapore. Lee, had only two GLC board positions; chairman of Temasek 
Holdings and a director of MND Holdings. Ngiam -was chairman and CFO of the Development Bank of Singapore as 
well as STH and is on all level I boards except for MND Holdings. However he has no other directorships. Kwa was 
principally responsible for those GLCs associated with the Ministry of Health; the public hospital sector corporatised 
under the Health Corporation of Singapore of which he was chairman." His other directorships are minor. Chew had 
broader representation; in addition to being chairman, MND Holdings, he was also chairman of Singapore Biotech, 
Temasek Management Services and Singapore Treasury Building. He was also a director of Temasek Holdings and 
National University Hospital The only other permanent secretary with more than one level I directorship was Lam 
Chaun Leong who was on the HCS and STH boards. 
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holding companies, the GLC sector is principally self -managing and that the GLC 
senior executives are responsible for it. This is demonstrated in Table 7.27 which lists 
the chairmen of all companies from Levelsl -3. Of these 52 companies, six (12 per cent) 
are chaired by statutory board officers 28 16 (31 per cent) by permanent secretaries' (12 
if Level 1 companies are excluded) and 28 (54 per cent) by GLC senior executives?' 
One is chaired by an MP31 and one by Fock Siew Wah from the private sector.32 
Altogether, the top 52 companies are chaired by 30 people, the majority of whom are 
drawn from the GLCs themselves. Of these, an elite group is readily identifiable, being 
those with representation of a large number of high Ievel boards. These are listed in 
Table 7.26. 
These 14 are the top GLC executives with substantial responsibility for management of 
this sector. They are not employed in any other sector; the GLC sector is their base. 
However, as with other sectors, many of them have parallel appointments in the 
statutory board sector. These responsibilities are detailed in Table 7.28 below. 
As is evident from Table 7.28, the only director in this group with substantial 
responsibilities outside the GLC sector is Quek Poh Huat who is chairman of SISIR and 
a member of the Trade Development Board. This would indicate that this sector is very 
self- contained; its priority is the commercial and profitable operation of its businesses, 
not public sector management or national economic policy. In fact, of those directors 
from GLCs with ranks below 1, only five had substantial appointments to economic 
policy boards in 1991; Ng Pock Too' to the Economic Development Board where he 
once worked, Lim Chee Onn34 to the Urban Redevelopment Authority Board, Dr. 
Cheong Choon Kong' as chairman of the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation, Lock 
Sai Hung' to the POSB board and Tien Sing Cheong37 to the TDB board. One other 
GLC executive, Yap Neng Chew' was a member of the politically sensitive Appeals 
Board (Land Acquisition) and Valuation Review Board. At this time, Ng and Lim were 
MPs and so these appointments may have been more in this capacity than their GLC 
zs Of the statutory board executives, two are of permanent secretary rank; Philip Yeo Liat Kok from the EDB and Dr. 
Chain Tao Soon from NTU. 
25 Of the group of permanent secretaries, one officer Tan Boon Tiek, the Attorney- General, is equivalent to a 
permanent secretary. 
30 Of the GLC senior executives, two are former permanent secretaries; Herman Hochstadt, Sim Kee Boon. 
Pidemco Land was chaired by Dr. Hong Hai. Hsu Tse -Kwang, Executive Chairman of Sembawang Holdings was 
previously the Commissioner of Inland Revenue. 
32 Singapore mass Rapid Transit Corporation 
33 Ng was Group CEO, Sembawang Holdings, CEO, Sembawang Maritime Pte. Ltd. And Group Chief Executive, 
Sembawang Shipyard Ltd. 
u Lim was Senior Executive Director, Keppel Corporation Limited, MD, Straits Steamship Land and MD, Streamers 
Maritime Holdings. 
15 Cheong was MD, Singapore Airlines Limited. 
36 Lock was MD, The Insurance Corporation of Singapore. 
" Tian was CEO, Intraco. 
8 Yap was Executive Chairman, International Development and Consultancy Corporation (Pte) Ltd. 
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appointments. Ng's appointment to the EDB was cancelled following him losing his 
parliamentary seat in the 1991 election. Therefore, of the top 47 GLC executives 39 only 
Table 7.26: Principal Directors in GLCs 1991 
No. Name Substantive Affiliation No. Director 
-Ships 
Rank 
1. 
2. 
Quek Poh Huat, Col (NS) 
Lua Cheng Eng 
President, Singapore Aerospace Limited 
CEO, Neptune Orient Lines Limited 
20 
17 
0.2 
0.23 
Lai Chun Loong President, Chartered Industries of 15 0.24 
Singapore 
4. Wong Kok Siew President, ST Industrial Corporation 16 0.24 
5. Ho Ching Executive VP, ST Ventures 17 0.25 
6. Au Eng Kok MD, Pidemco Land Pte Ltd 15 0.28 
7. Lim Ming Seong Group President, STH 11 0.28 
8. Lues Choon Wah MD, Temasek Holdings 11 0.31 
9. Ng Kee Choe Executive VP, DBS 13 0.31 
10. Tan Soo Nan Executive VP, DBS 13 0.34 
11. Toh Ho Tay Director, Fleet Management Division, 
NOL 
11 0.36 
12. Wee Soon Lock, Michael Executive VP, DBS 11 0.36 
13. Han Cheng Fong, Dr. CEO & MD, DBS Land Ltd 11 0.39 
14. Yeoh Khwai Hoh, Patrick President, DBS Ltd 7 0.43 
192 
t9 Of the 77 directors with ranks of 1 or less, 47 were GLC executives. 
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Table 7.27: Chairmen of the Top GLCs 1991 
No Name Sector" Level" GLC GLC 
Group 
1 Au Eng Kok G 3 Resources Development Corp. TH 
2 Cham Tao Soon, Dr. B 3 Sing. Automotive Engin Priv (ST) ST 
3 Chew Guan 'Chuan, Andrew, Dr. C I MND Holdings Private Ltd MND 
3 Singapore Biotech Pte Ltd TH 
3 Temasek Management Services TH 
4 Er Kwong Wah C 3 Sembawang Engineering (SH) TH 
5 Fock Siew Wah U 2 Singapore MRT Limited TH 
6 Ho Ching G 3 Chartered Electronics Industries ST 
7 Hochstadt, Herman R. G 2 Neptune Orient Lines Limited TH 
3 Export Credit Insurance Corp. TH 
8 Hong Hai, Dr. L 3 Pidemco Land Pte Ltd URA 
9 Hsu Tse -Kwang G 2 Sembawang Holdings TH 
3 Sembawang Maritime Pte Ltd (SII) TH 
3 Sembawang Shipyard Ltd (SH) TH 
10 Hwang, P. Y. B 2 Intraco TH 
3 Petrochemical Corp. of Singapore TH 
11 Kwa Soon Bee, Dr. C 1 HCS Pte Ltd HCS 
3 Singapore General Hospital Pte HCS 
3 Kandang Kerbau Hospital Pte Ltd HCS 
3 Tan Tock Seng Hospital Pte Ltd HCS 
3 Tao Payoh Hospital Pte Ltd HCS 
12 Lai Chun Loong G 3 Chartered Metals Industries (ST) ST 
13 Lam Chuan Leong C 2 Singapore Aerospace Limited (ST) ST 
14 Lee Ek Tieng C 1 Temasek Holdings TH 
15 Lim Chee Onn G 3 Steamers Maritime Holdings TH 
16 Lim Ming Seong G 3 Singapore Shipbuilding & Engin. ST 
3 ST Ventures ST 
17 Loh Wing Siew G 3 Keppel Engineering Pte Ltd TH 
18 Lum Choong Wah G 3 Singapore National Printers Ltd TH 
19 Ng Kee Choe G 3 DBS Finance Ltd MND 
3 S. Polymer Corporation (DRS) MND 
20 Ngiam Tong Dow C I STH ST 
2 DBS Ltd MND 
21 Pillay, J. Y. C 2 Singapore Airlines Limited TH 
22 Quek Poh Huat G 3 Singapore Aerospace Engineering ST 
3 Singapore Computer Systems ST 
23 Sim Kee Boon G 2 Keppel Corporation Limited TH 
3 Far East Levmg.ston Shipbuilding TH 
3 Keppel Bank of Singapore TH 
3 Keppel Finance Limited TH 
3 Straits Steamship Land TH 
24 Tan Boon Teik C 3 S. Petroleum Company (DBS) MND 
3 The Insurance Corp. of Sing DBS TH 
25 Wong Kok Siew G 3 S. Electronic & Engineering ST 
3 S. Precision Industries ST 
26 Wong Lee Hoong G 3 Singapore Pools Private Limited TH 
27 Yap Neng Chew G 3 Internation. Dev and Consult Corp. TH 
28 Yeo Liat Kok, Philip B 2 Chartered Industries of Sing (ST) ST 
2 ST Industrial Corporation ST 
29 Yeo Seng Teck D 3 TDB Holdings Pte Ltd TDB 
30 Yeoh Khwai Hoh, Patrick G 3 DBS Land Ltd MND 
3 NDC Merchant Bank Ltd MND 
Table 7.28: Statutory Board Positions Held by Top GLC Directors 
40 Sector in which appointee is substantively employed. 
O Level of company. Level 1 companies are the major holding companies. 
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No. Name Statutory Board Positions 
1 Quek Poh Huat, Col (NS) Chairman, SISIR 
2 Lua Cheng Eng Member PSA board 
Member, National Maritime Board 
3 Lai Chun Loong Member, Singapore Polytechnic Board of Governors 
4 Wong Kok Siew No statutory board appointments 
5 Ho Ching Member, Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research 
6 Au Eng Kok No statutory board appointments 
7 Lim Ming Seong Member, Temasek Polytechnic Board of Governors 
8 Lum Choon Wah No statutory board appointments 
9 Ng Kee Choe Member, Ngee Ann Polytechnic Council 
10 Tan Soo Nan No statutory board appointments 
11 Toh Ho Tay Member, Singapore Polytechnic Board of Governors 
12 Wee Soon Lock, Michael No statutory board appointments 
13 Han Cheng Fong, Dr. No statutory board appointments 
14 Yeoh Khwai Hoh, Patrick Member, Temasek Polytechnic Board of Governors 
Member, Board of Commissioners of Currency Singapore 
six had any appointments of significance to statutory boards in 1991. This indicates 
that the GLC leadership, except that provided by sitting MPs, is highly autonomous, 
separate from the rest of the public sector and that most of its leaders might only 
participate peripherally in the core executive, if at all. 
THE GLC LEADERSHIP IN 1998 
The data used in this section was collated for the period 1996 -1998 and is based on 
annual company reports, searches of the company records of the Singapore Registrar 
of Companies and Businesses and where these were inadequate, newspaper and other 
published reports and news. The data is limited in that it does not cover all GLCs; it is 
the best that could be obtained during fieldwork in mid -1998. Searches were made of 
several libraries in Singapore to obtain the data; the National Reference Library, the 
Trade Development Board library, the Stock Exchange of Singapore library, the 
libraries of the National University of Singapore and the Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. It includes some GLCs not covered in the 1991 analyse above, but it should be 
noted that most GLCs, are privately held companies and do not submit publicly 
available annual reports to the Stock Exchange of Singapore or the Registrar of 
Companies and Businesses. Their details are only included in the Directory of 
Government Linked Corporations, of which I could not obtain a 1998 copy as it is still 
classified as a secret government document. 
Between 1991 and 1998, considerable restructuring and rationalisation was undertaken 
in the GLC sector, thus making a direct comparison between 1991 and 1998 GLC data 
somewhat difficult. Companies formed under statutory boards, except for MAS and 
EDB were transferred to the four major holding companies and a more rational group 
structure was developed for each of the holding companies with business units being 
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transferred, amalgamated or sold under the overall direction and coordination of 
Temasek Holdings. Each major holding company was re- organised around a small 
number of core businesses and the extensive diversification that had taken place 
among GLCs in the previous 20 years was curtailed. These significant changes to the 
GLC sector and their policy implications are deserving of a study of their own and will 
not be examined in detail here, although major initiatives need to be noted. STH was 
renamed, Singapore Technologies (Private) Limited (STPL) and reorganised. Singapore 
Technologies Industrial Corporation was amalgamated with the Sembawang 
Corporation in October 1998 to form SembCorp Industries.' Some public sector 
departments were corporatised, notably the Public Works Department as PWD 
Corporation (Private) Limited, and some were made into statutory authorities, notable 
the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.' Two other major changes were 
also made; the Port of Singapore Authority was corporatised as PSA Corporation and 
the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) was amalgamated with the Development Bank of 
Singapore (DBS). POSB had been formed as a statutory board because of political 
sensitivity due to it being the largest provider of housing loans to the HDB housing 
sector, although it operated as a fully commercial entity. In this analysis, POSB will be 
treated as a GLC rather than a statutory board. 
This re- organisation of the GLC sector was accelerated and given a policy and 
operational framework by the recommendations of the Report of the Committee on 
Singapore's Competitiveness (CSC), handed down in November 1998. Although it had 
been de facto policy for some time, the CSC's recommendations that the GLC sector be 
the incubator for the development of a group of strong internationally competitive 
Singaporean owned MNCs, provide the policy framework for the rationalisation of the 
sector.# The committee also recommended that the government continue to "play an 
active role to support and facilitate the private sector... "' As major GLC executives 
were well represented on the CSC committees, this rationalisation actually commenced 
prior to the CSC's report being handed to the government 43 By late 1998, the 
supervisory role of Temasek Holdings as the umbrella holding company was enhanced 
and it was re- organised with, among other changes, Temasek Management Services 
being bought under closer Temasek's control. In particular, MND Holdings was 
bought operationally into the Temasek fold" with Ng Kin Meng acting as secretary to 
d2 SembCorp Industries, Annual Report 1998, Singapore, SembCorp Industries, 1999, p. 1 
° It is worth noting that this organisation is no longer listed in the Singapore Government Directory. 
"Recommendations 40 and 41 of the CSC report. See: Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness, Report of the 
Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness, Singapore, SNP, November 1998, p. 10 
45 Recommendation 52 of the report . See: Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness, Report of the Committee on 
Singapore's Competitiveness, Singapore, SNP, November 1998, pp. 11 -12 
°6 Members of the main committee holding GLC directorships included( Peter Seah Lim Huat, Kwa Chong Seng and 
Lim Ho Kee. Seah was, and ìs, a member of the GIC board. 
" The two companies had been housed in what is now Temasek Towers for some years, but TMS had been more 
independent of Temasek Holdings in its day to day operations prior to 1997. 
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both companies in 1998 and the secretariat for both companies being located within 
Temasek's offices. The commercial companies under the TDB, NSTB and EDB were 
reorganised under holding companies with the EDB investments split between EDB 
Investments and EDB Ventures. Singapore Technologies Holdings was renamed 
Singapore Technologies Private Limited (STPL) and it appears to have become the pre- 
eminent holding company in some ways with considerable influence over Temasek 
Holdings. In 1998, the former president of STPL, Quek Poh Huat, was also President of 
Temasek Holdings, but Quek's base was in SPTL, not Temasek Holdings. 
Temasek Holdings adopted a number of supervisory strategies, eventually made 
public in 1999, which will impact on the composition of boards and the tenure of 
directors, at least at any one company. These strategies, which actually reflect standard 
Singapore Civil Service practice, include separating CEO and chairman appointments, 
more frequent rotation of directors and specifying corporate performance benchmarks 
for each major group of GLCs ' These policies will probably not expand the pool of 
directors, but will ensure their rotation through various GLCs over a six to nine year 
period. Additionally, civil service oversight of Temasek Holdings by the economic 
policy community was enhanced by upgrading the MTI seconded officer in Temasek's 
headquarters to Deputy Secretary level from Director level and increasing its Temasek 
rank from Senior Vice -President to Executive Vice -President. In 1998, this position was 
filled by Peter Ong Boon Kwee, Deputy Secretary in MTI. Ong's task was to report in 
general on the performance of the GLC sector, through MTI to the major economic 
policy bodies and to develop his own understanding of the GLC sector so as to better 
inform economic policy making. 
By 1998, the GLC sector had undergone substantial changes when compared to 1991, 
which is the last date at which we had an accurate and almost complete oversight of 
this sector, albeit without detailed information on GLCs associated with the GIC and 
MAS. 
Analysis of GLC Leadership in 1998 
Does the contemporary GLC leadership participate vin, or contribute to, the core 
executive? This section attempts to answer this question through an analysis of GLC 
leadership in 1998. 
TDB Holdings and NSTB Holdings. 
'Conrad Raj and Patrick Daniel, "Temasek fine -tunes stewardship of companies ", Business Times. 25 June 1999 
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More than 800 GLCs were identified and of these 657 were deemed to be significant 
enterprises. Many of those excluded were small property subsidiaries, inactive 
companies or small companies with niche services or markets, small overseas 
subsidiaries or companies in which a GLC had equity of less than 20 per cent. The 
details of directorships of many companies incorporated both in and outside Singapore 
could not be obtained because these private companies did not have to lodge annual 
reports and because of cost and time constraints.50 The full list of significant companies 
is provided in Appendix 7. 
In this analysis only companies at Levels 1 -3 for which directorship details could be 
obtained were included. Defining the company level below Level 3 in the absence of 
the relevant Directory of Government Linked Corporations and access to detailed corporate 
information, is difficult and probably inaccurate, so these companies were excluded. 
Even defining companies at Level 3 was problematical as details for companies such as 
EDB Investments and EDB Ventures, which probably are Level 3 companies, could not 
be obtained. Of those companies identified, 83 are level 1 -3 companies for which 
directorship information was available, using the criteria established for the analysis of 
the 1991 DGLC companies listings. The breakdown by level is shown in Table 7.29. The 
listing of these companies is at Appendix 8. 
Table 7.29 : List of Levell -3 GLCs in Singapore: 1998 
LEVEL Level Level 2 Level 3 TOTAL 
No. 5 18 60 83 
% of Total 6% 22% 72% 100% 
There are six level 1 companies included in the analysis: Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd., 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), MIND Holdings (Pte.) Ltd., 
Health Corporation of Singapore Pte. Ltd., Singapore Technologies Pte. Ltd., and 
Singapore Telecommunications Limited. This is the same number of holding 
companies as in 1991, but in that analysis, the GIC and Singapore Telecommunications 
were not included. In this analysis, only some details of GIC companies were obtained 
and are included. However, these companies provide us with little information of 
GIC's holdings and company structure which are worthy of a study of their own. 
so I estimate that, including GIC companies, there are probably in excess of 2000 GLCs. To fully study these, 
including the large number incorporated in Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, Panama, Ireland, Luxembourg and other 
countries, the cost would probably exceed $100, 000. Just to obtain the details of GLCs available from the Registrar 
of Companies and Businesses in Singapore would cost at least $4000 in initial search costs alone and a further cost of 
at least $3000 to identify major directors. 
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A total of 241 directors were identified for level 1 -3 companies, filling 446 
directorships. Directors are listed in Appendix 9. The sectoral affiliation of the directors 
is shown in Table 7.30 below. 
Table 7.30: Sector Representation on Level 1 -3 GLC Boards: 1998 
Sector No. % Of Total 
GLC 75 31.1 
Private Sector 51 21.2 
Civil Service 31 12.9 
Board 24 10 
MP 20 8.3 
Unknown 20 8.3 
Military 14 5.8 
Foreign 5 2.1 
NTUC 1 0.4 
TOTAL 241 100 
Of the 241 directors, 69 (28.6 per cent) had a ranking of 1 or below for the importance 
of their combined directorships. These directors are detailed in Appendix 10. Of this 
group, 38 (15.8 per cent) had a ranking of less than one and are included in Table 7.33. 
Of those 69 directors with a rank of one or less, the sectoral representation is as shown 
in Table 7.31 below. 
Table 7.31: Sectoral Representation Among Directors with a 
Rank <_ 1 in GLCs: 1998 
SECTOR GLC Civil MPs Military Board Private Unknown 
Service Sector 
TOTAL 
69 
100 
No. 19 13 11 5 3 16 
% of Total 28 19 16 23 
2 
As can be seen, the public sector accounted for 74 per cent of representation with the 
GT.0 sector itself taking almost one -third of positions approximately equal to its overall 
representation among Level 1 -3 companies. In this top group of directors, the civil 
service, MPs and the military increased their representation, although the latter, only 
marginally. Civil service representation was almost 50 per cent more than its general 
representation, MPs almost doubled their level of representation while that of the 
statutory boards was cut by two -thirds from 10 to three per cent indicating that board 
representation is predominantly on boards below Level 3. 
Public sector representation was almost exclusively by the most senior level of officials. 
Eight permanent secretaries are included from the ministries of Home Affairs, Law, 
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Trade and Industry, Community Development, Finance, the Prime Minister's Office, 
the Inland Revenue Authority and the Head of Civil Service, Lee Ek Tieng. One former 
permanent secretary, Er Kwong Wah, who retired during 1998 to an amakudari position 
within the Sembawang group, was counted as a civil service representative st Four 
deputy secretaries are also included from the ministries of Communications, Finance, 
Health and Home Affairs. The Ministry of Finance Deputy Secretary, Dileep Nair, was 
for part of 1998, CEO of POSBank. 
Statutory board representation was of equally a high calibre. Heading this group is 
Philip Yeo Liat Kok, executive chairman of the Economic Development Board and 
equal in rank to a cabinet minister' and to the other top ranking permanent secretary 
Lim Siong Guan who was promoted to Head of Civil Service in 1999 " The other two 
board representatives are Cham Tao Soon, President of Nanyang Technological 
University and Walter Woon, Associate Professor of Law at NUS and currently 
ambassador to Germany.' 
Representation from the military sector was not by active SAF officers, but from senior 
officers now occupying amakudari positions in the public sector. Winston Choo Wee 
Leong was formerly Chief of Defence Force and Han Eng Juan formerly Chief of Army. 
James Leo Chin Lian was a former Chief of Navy and the other two were senior 
general staff officers, Lee Hsien Yang and Lim Meng Kim. Lee, Lee Kuan Yew's 
younger son, was formerly Director, Joint Operations and Planning Directorate,' and 
Lim Meng Kim was formerly commander, Singapore Medical Corps. 
Of the 11 current and former MPs represented, five are current cabinet ministers, three 
are former cabinet ministers, two are former MPs and there was one serving MP, Yu- 
Foo Yee Shoon. The current cabinet ministers included both deputy prime ministers, 
Tony Tan Keng Yam and Lee Hsien Loong, the Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, the 
Minister for Finance, Richard Hu Tsu Tau and the Minister for National Development, 
" Er Kwong Wah's last appointment was as Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Community Development. He was 
replaced by Moses Lee Kim Poh. 
sz Both Philip Yeo and Lim Siong Guan were promoted to Staff Grade II in September 1996. Staff Grade I is the 
entry level for cabinet ministers, thus placing them above the rank of junior ministers. See: "EDB chief, PMO perm 
sec top Adntin Service promotions ", Business Times, 9 September 1996 
s' Yea, who is the most consistently dominant figure in the economic policy community over the past 10 years 
following the retirement of Goh Keng Swee, was Lim's major contender for the position of Head of Civil Service, 
but was reportedly passed over because of his public clash with parliamentarians in 1998 over how to deal with 
public employees breaking their scholarship bonds. Yeo directly criticised several MPs who strongly objected to the 
prime minister about a public servant publicly criticising them in the media. This lead to a perception that Yeo could 
not handle political issues well. He resigned from the Administrative Service on 31 March 1999 but retained his EDB 
position and received additional appointments as chairman of SembCorp Industries, deputy chairman of NSTB and 
chairman of Pidemco Land. See: At the Helm. Available at: ht tp:// www.sedb.comsg/helm/at_ch.html. Yeo was also 
reported to have clashed with the prime minister on some issues and also with Lee Hsien Loong over economic 
policy. 
s'. Woon was previously a Nominated Member of Parliament and a mild critic of the govemment in this capacity. 
ss Lee Hsien Yang's older brother, Lee Hsien Loong, now Deputy Prime Minister, also held this position prior to his 
entry to politics. 
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Lim Hng Kiang. Three former senior ministers, now occupying senior GLC amakudari 
positions were Dr. Yeo Ning Hong, former Minister of Defence, Suppiah Dhanabalan 
who had occupied multiple portfolios, principally in economic policy and foreign 
affairs and Lim Chee Onn who had headed the NTUC. The two former MPs were 
Bernard Chen Tien Lap ( also a former deputy secretary) and Dr. Hong Hai. As Hong 
was only a one term MP (1988 -1991) and had retained his position as chairman of 
Pidemco Land for the duration of his term, it is debatable whether he can be classified 
as an MP, but this demonstrates the fluidity of the core executive in Singapore; to some 
degree, formal institutional affiliation is irrelevant - it is the person who counts, not the 
institution. 
Private sector representation was also from executives of the highest level in major 
national firms. These include the chairman or chief executives of Wing Tai Holdings, 
Shell Group, Fraser and Neave, Hewlett- Packard, Esso, Union Bank of Switzerland 
Asia, Overseas Union Bank, Schroders International Merchant Bankers, Times 
Publishing, Inter- Roller Engineering' and United Overseas Bank. Additionally the 
senior partners of two of the nation's largest law firms held GLC directorships; Chen 
Choong Joong of Allen and Gledhill and Sat Pal Khattar from Khattar Wong and 
Partners. The managing partners from Price Waterhouse, Michael Lim Choo San, and 
Keith Tay Ah Kee from KPMG Peat Marwick, also held directorships. Of this group, 
three are presumed to be Old Guard PAP cadres; Michael Fam Yue Onn, Sat Pal 
Khattar and Lim Yong Wah. If we also include in this category directors who have 
been placed in another category (i.e. Dr. Hong Hai and Wong Hung Khim), we can 
also add the Haw Par Corporation and DelGro Corporation.' 
The directors from the GLC sector reflect those of the other sectors, in that they are 
generally of the most senior rank of executives. Included in this group are 16 directors 
who are either the chief executives or deputy chief of their companies; NatSteel, 
POSBank, Keppel FELS, ECICS, Singapore Power, Chartered Industries of Singapore, 
DBS Bank, Keppel Corporation, Neptune Orient Lines, Singapore Technologies, 
SembCorp Industries and Temasek Holdings. Of this group, DBS Bank has three 
directorships. If we also include in this category directors who hold senior GLC 
positions but have been placed in another category (eg. Lee Hsien Yang, Bernard Chen 
and Lim Chee Onn), the chief executives of Singapore Telecommunications, Singapore 
Post, Intraco, Keppel Land, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering and the Health 
Corporation of Singapore can be added. In the GLC sector, several of the GLC chairs 
are filled in an executive capacity as is the case with Keppel FELS (Choo Chiau Beng) 
Inter- Roller is not a major national firm, although it is a successful medium size Singaporean firm. It designs, 
manufactures, installs and maintains material handling, air handling and pollution control equipment. It exports much 
of its production and has plants in Singapore and Malaysia It had sales in 1998 of $32, 282, 437. See: Wright 
Investors Service. Available at: http: / /www.wisi.com. 
s' Hong has been chairman of haw Par since 1991 and DelGro purchased Singapore Bus Services in 1997. 
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and Singapore Power (Ho Kwong Ping). Only two directors, Quek Poh Huat and 
Quek Chee Hoon, came from Temasek Holdings.' 
Of this group of 69 top GLC directors, a smaller group of 38 directors had ranks of less 
than one. This is the most elite group of directors of GLC boards whose details are 
provided in Table 7.33 below. In this smaller group, if we classify only according to 
current employment, 24 of the 38 positions (63 per cent) are held by GLC executives, 
four (11 per cent) are held by permanent secretaries or deputy secretaries, eight (21 per 
cent) by senior private sector executives, one by an NTUC official59 and one by a 
statutory board chief executive. In this group therefore, the public sector provides 76 
per cent of directors. Of this public sector group, nine (24 per cent) are or have been 
either permanent secretaries or deputy secretaries (increasing to 13 and 34 per cent if 
we include ex -SAF general staff officers in this group),` six (16 per cent) are or have 
been either MPs or ministers' and only 12 (32 per cent) have had predominantly GLC 
careers ' The most dominant among this group is Quek Poh Huat, President of 
Temasek Holdings, as he was in the 1991 analysis. The importance of this group must 
also be examined in the context of those who chair the major GLCs. This group is listed 
in Table 732 below. 
58 At this time, Quek was an Executive Vice -President and Head, Direct Investments Group of Temasek Holdings. 
Quek Poh Huat was the President of Temasek Holdings. 
" Yu -Foo Yee Shoon who was also an MP and serves on NTUC companies and several statutory boards. 
" Including the ex -SAF officers, this group consists of: Khaw Boon Wan, Er Kwong Wah , BG (NS) Lee Hsien 
Yang, Lee Ek Tieng, BG (NS) Lim Chuan Poh, RAdm (ret.) James Leo Chin Lian, Moses Lee Kim Poo, Ngiam 
Tong Dow, Sim Kee Boon, Bernard Chen Tien Lap, Dileep Nair, BG (NS) Foo Kok Swee, Lim Chee Onn. 
" This group consists of: Lim Chee Onn, Suppiah Dhanabalan, Dr. Hong Hai, Dr. Yeo Níng Hong, Yu -Foo Yee 
Shoon and Bernard Chen Tien Lap. 
"This group consists of: Quek Poh Huat, Loh Wing Siew, Teo Soon Hoe, Lua Cheng Eng, Ang Kong Hua, Lai Chun 
Loong, Wong Hung Khim, Choo Chiau Beng, Ng Kee Choe, Oon Kum Loon, Lau Chan Sin and Quek Chee Hoon. 
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Table 7.32: Chairman of Level 1 and 2 GLCs 
and Selected Level 3 GLCs in Singapore 1998 
NO. NAME COMPANY LEVEL SECT 
Lee Kuan Yew GIC 1 
2. Yeo Ning Hong, Dr ST Group 1 I, 
PSA Corporation Limited 2 
3. Lee Kim Poo, Moses Health Corporation of Singapore 1 
4. Lee Ek Tieng MND Holdings Pte. Ltd. 1 
5. Lua Cheng Eng Neptune Orient Lines 
6. Yeo Liat Kok, Philip SembCorp 2 B 
7. Lee Kim Poo, Moses POSBank 2 C 
8. Ang Kong Hua Intraco 2 G 
9. Dhanabalan, Suppiah Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited L 
Singapore Airlines Ltd 2 
DBS Bank (+ POSBank) 2 
10. Koh Boon Hwee Singapore Telecom 2 P 
Singapore Post Group 2 
11. Wong Kok Siew ST Industrial Corporation (Transferred to 2 
Deputy Chair, SembCorp) 
12. Seah Lim Huat, Peter Chairman, Sembawang Corporation Ltd 2 P 
13. Cham Tao Soon NatSteel Ltd 2 B 
14. Farn Yue Onn, Michael Singapore Airlines 2 P 
15. Goh Kim Leong Singapore MRT Ltd 2 C 
16. Ngiam Tong Dow DBS Bank 2 C 
17. Lim Kim San Executive Singapore Press Holdings 2 L 
18. Sim Cheok Lim CISCO 3 P 
19. Hochstadt, Herman Ronald ECICS Holdings Ltd 3 C 
20. Er Kwong Wah Sembawang Maritime Ltd 3 C 
Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd 3 
21. Ho Kwon Ping Singapore Power 3 G 
22. Tan Guong Ching ST Shipbuilding and Engineering 3 C 
23. Cheong Quee Wah Executive Sembawang Resources Ltd 3 G 
24. Khaw Boon Wan Singapore Cable Vision Ltd 3 C 
25. Quek Poh Huat ST Aerospace Limited 3 G 
26. Chen Tien Lap, Bernard Teledata Singapore Ltd 3 L 
27. Goh Yong Hong Singapore Pools (Private) Limited 3 C 
28. Lua Cheng Eng Jurong Shipyard Ltd/Sembawang Shipyard Pte Ltd 3 G 
29. Teo Soon Hoe Keppel Finance 3 G 
30. Leo Chin Lian, James, RAdm ST Shipbuilding and Engineering 3 M 
(ret.) 
31. Loh Wing Siew Keppel Marine Industries 3 G 
Keppel Integrated Engineering 3 
32. Choo Chiau Beng Keppel FELS 3 G 
33. Lim Yong Wah Pidemco Land Pte Ltd 3 L 
34. Sim Kee Boon MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd 3 G 
35. Lum Choong Wah SNP Corporation 3 G 
36. Ho Ching ST Aerospace 3 G 
37. Lau Chan Sin DBS Land 3 G 
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Table 7.33: Most Represented People on GLC Boards 1998 
NO NAME POSITION & COMPANY NO. RANK SECT 
COMP 
1. Quek Poh Huai President, Temasek Holdings & Director & former 6 028 G 
President, Singapore Technologies Pte Ltd 
2. Khaw Boon Wan Permanent Secretary, MTI 9 0.3 C 
3. Cheng Wai Wing, 
Edmund 
Chair, MD, Wing -Tai Holdings Ltd 0.34 P 
4. Er Kwong Wah Executive Chair, Sembawang Marine & Logistics & 
former permanent secretary 
0.34 C 
5. Lim Chee Onn Deputy Chair & MD, Keppel Land. Former MP, 
minister and deputy secretary. 
7 0.37 L 
6. Dhanabalan, Suppiah Chair, Singapore Airlines Ltd (Until 30/5/98) & 4 0.38 L 
Executive Chair, DBS Bank (+ POSBank) (From 30 
/5/98) 
7. Seah Lim Huai, Peter President, CEO, Overseas Union Bank Ltd 5 0.4 P 
8. Loh Wing Siew MD, Keppel Corporation 7 0.41 G 
9. Teo Soon Hoe ED and Group Finance Director, Keppel Corporation 7 0.43 G 
10. Koh Boon Hwee MD, Hewlett- Packard Singapore 3 0.44 P 
11. Lua Cheng Eng CEO & Deputy Chair, Neptune Orient Lines Ltd 5 0.44 G 
12. Ang Kong Hua MD President, NatSteel Ltd. 5 0.48 G 
13. Lee Ek Tieng MD, GIC & Head of Civil Service 2 0.5 C 
14. Hong Hai, Dr, Former MP & CEO, Haw Par Corporation 3 0.56 L 
15. Lai Chun Loong President, Chartered Industries of Singapore 5 0.56 G 
16 . Lee Hsien Yang, BG President & CEO, Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. 3 0.56 M 
17. Lim Chuan Poly BG 
(NS) 
Deputy Secretary , Ministry of Communications & 
former Chief of Army , Singapore Armed Forces 
3 0.56 C 
18. Lim Yong Wah Chairman, Pidemco Land & Old Guard PAP cadre 3 0.56 G 
19. Wong Hung Khim Chair, CEO, DelGro & former President/CEO Singapore 3 0.56 G 
Telecom 
20. Yeo Ning Hong, Dr Former MP and cabinet minister. Executive Chairman, 
PSA Corporation 
3 0.56 L 
21. Choo Chiau Beng Chair & MD, Keppel FELS 5 0.6 G 
22. Leo Chin Lien, James, 
RAdm (ret.) 
Executive Chair, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering. 
Former Chief of Navy. 
4 0.63 M 
23. Ng Kee Choe President, DBS Bank 4 0.63 G 
24. Wee Ee Cheong Deputy President & Director, United Overseas Bank Ltd 4 0.63 P 
25. Cham Tao Soon President, Nanyang Technological University 3 0.67 B 
26. Thai Chee Ken Chair, Schroders International Merchant Bankers Ltd 4 0.69 P 
27. Foo Kok Swee, BG Director, MD63 & Deputy Chair, ECICS Holdings Ltd 4 0.75 G (NS) 
28. Lee Kim Poo, Moses Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Community 2 0.75 C 
Development 
29. Ngiam Tong Dow Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance 2 0.75 C 
30. Yu -Foo Yee Shoon MP, Deputy Secretary- General, NTUC 2 0.75 L 
31. Farn Yue Onn, Michael MD, Fraser and Neave & Old Guard PAP cadre 3 0.78 P 
32. Oon Kum Loon Executive Vice -President, DBS Bank 3 0.78 G 
33. Sim Kee Boon Executive Chair, Keppel Corporation and former 
permanent secretary 
3 0.78 G 
34. Chen Choong Joong Managing Partner, Allen and Gledhill, Solicitors 3 0.89 P 
35. Chen Tien Lap, 
Bernard 
Director, CEO, Intraco Ltd, former MP and Deputy 
Secretary 
3 0.89 L 
36. Lau Chan Sin Director, Deputy President and Deputy COO, DBS Bank 4 0.89 G 
37. Nair, Diileep Director & CEO, POSBank & Deputy Secretary, MOF 3 0.89 C 
38. Quek Chee Hoon Executive Vice President & Head, Direct Investments 3 0.89 G 
Group of Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd 
THE CORE MANAGEMENT OF BOARDS AND GLCS IN 1998 
Statutory Boards and Strategies of Governance 
From the analysis of the composition of statutory boards for the period 1988 -1998, it is 
possible to identify a number of major governance strategies for managing these two 
MD from at least 1988 -1991, then President & CEO 1992 -1995. 
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sectors. The full analysis of board directorships for this period is provided in Appendix 
11. A total of 13 strategies have been identified and are listed below. 
1. Total dominance of statutory boards by the public sector. Approximately two- thirds 
of directors come from this sector. Of board appointees, 93.6 per cent were 
Singaporean. On average, public sector appointees accounted for 63.4 per cent, 
Singaporean private sector appointees for 20.1% and foreign companies 9.9 per cent, 
the NTUC accounted for only 1.8 %, industry associations, 1.1 per cent and all 
community organisations combined (cultural, community, religious and 
philanthropic), only 1.6 per cent. Most public sector appointments were from the civil 
service (13.9 per cent and the higher education sector (10.5 per cent) the latter 
dominated by the NUS. 
2. Statutory are substantially self- managing and take responsibility for their own 
performance. The greatest source of statutory board directors is from statutory boards 
themselves, then ministries, private sector Singaporean companies and then from 
ministers and former ministers combined, followed by GLCs and foreign companies. 
3. Exclusion of NTUC representation and particularly, exclusion of rank and file union 
members and executives. Union representation on boards was negligible at an average 
of 2 per cent. NTUC directors were wholly from the NTUC meritocratic elite who 
derived from the public sector or the parliament, not from rank and file union 
members or even union secretaries. 
4. Exclusion of community sector representation. No genuine community 
representation could be identified, including representation from the government 
affiliated GROs, of which there was none_' 
5. The inclusion of minority private sector representation through the cultivation of a 
pool of private sector directors which has long term stability and comprises people 
who are of cadre or proto -cadre status; ie. They are supportive of the government and 
participate in board management in technical terms, not ideological or political terms. 
The individual counts more than the company or business sector, although in some 
minor boards, such as the Dental Board, the Board of Architects and other specialist 
6a In the 11 year period covered by the analysis, only the Singapore Indian Fine Arts Society, Jamiyah, the Orchid 
Society of Southeast Asia, the Shaw Foundation, the Singapore Action Group of Elders, The Substation, Yayasan 
Mendaki and the YMCA were the only organisations represented on boards which could be broadly termed 
community groups; a total of 8 over 11 years. In 1998, in the community sector, only two genuine community 
representatives were identified; Kenneth Tan from the Singapore Film Society on the Film Appeal Committee and 
Yusof Alsagoff from the Orchid Society of Southeast Asia on the National Parks Board. There is no representation 
from national women's organisations, welfare, educational, sports, cultural, clan associations or any of the other 
myriad community organisations that exist in Singapore. Also, no GROs are represented on statutory boards, so it is 
obvious that they are retained within the political and micro-administration domains' rather than at the policy 
making level. 
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professional boards, directors are almost wholly from the profession concerned or an 
associated profession. This is not to say that profession and business sector do not 
count; they do; Both Singaporean and foreign executives are requested by the 
government to "put something back into Singapore" by participation on boards to 
which they can contribute expertise. The pattern of participation most discernible is 
that almost no companies participate in boards wholly in their business sector. Once a 
particular director is found to be reliable, he will be asked to serve on a number of 
boards, most of which will not be connected with his occupation or business. The only 
major private sector companies represented on boards over the 11 year study period 
were RSP Architects, Planners and Engineers (RSP) and Overseas Union Bank (OUB), 
unless one counts Singapore Press Holdings which is privately held but government 
controlled. 
While some companies were allocated to directorships in boards related to their 
business sector, such as banks to the BCCS and MAS, the overwhelming majority of 
private sector appointments were not to boards related to their business sector. For 
example, while RSP was given directorships in sector -related boards such as BOA, 
S111B, ABLA, HDB, NHB and CIDB, it was also given directorships in non -sector 
related boards including SBC and SBA, NAC, STB and CPF. OUB had directorships in 
sector -related boards such as BCCS, EDB and PAB, but also in non -sector related 
boards such as SBC and SBA, NUS, PSC, NPBOG, CAAS, HDB, TAS and the FAC. 
As one examines appointments, it is obvious that what matters is the person more than 
the company affiliation. For example, in the cases of Michael Fam Yue Onn and Keith 
Tay Ah Kee, two of the most prominent private sector appointees, their directorships 
continued irregardless of their company affiliation over the period studied, and in 
Fam's case, over a 30 year period. An analysis of the match between company 
business sector and board appointments is shown in Table 7.3.4. 
Table 7.34: Matching of Statutory Board Directorships with the Business 
Sector of the Director's Employer in Singapore 1988 -1998 
Company Business Sector Board Appointments Match 
Esso Petrochemicals EDB, PSC, SPBOG, SSC, NUS, 
ITEBOG, LLB, SPSB, ITC, CAAS, 
BOA, NSTB 
Partial 
Fraser & Neave Food & Beverages NTU, ITEBOG, CPA, NUS, PSC No 
Descon Chartered Architects Architects People's Association No 
Price Waterhouse Accountants POSB, MRTC, FAC, LTA, ClUB, NTU, 
NPB, PAC 
Partial 
Khattar Wong & Partners Solicitors PSC, PCMR, SLF, PCDSC, SSC Ne 
Yeo Hiap Seng Limited Food & Beverages SCB, TPBOG, SSC, TDB Partial 
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Asia Life Insurance Society Insurance PSC, PCDSC, IRAS, LSC No 
Scotts Holdings Property TPBOG, NHB, NAC, STB Partial 
K S Lee & Associates Solicitors SPBOG, ITEBOG, NAPC, 511113 Partial 
Hong Leong Group Property & Finance SPSB, CAAS, SCSS Partial 
Asia Pacific Breweries Food Sr Beverages PSC, NUS No, 
Eve Centre & Surgery Ophthalmologist SCSS /NCSS No 
Lee & Lee Solicitors PUB, !SEAS, SAM Partial 
Kuok (Singapore) Commodity Traders TDB, NAC Partial 
Tan Ee Ping & Partners Consulting BOA, CIDB, SPSB Yes 
Engineers 
Baker Marine Energy Marine Engines CPF, JTC No 
Charles N Mendis & Partners Solicitors SCB No 
Far East Organisation Property CIDB, NAC, STB, STOTB Partial 
SAMAS Management Management ABLA, NAPC Partial 
Consultants Consultants 
Thorne Ship Management Shipping NMB Yes 
Yokogawa Electric Asia Electronics NSTB, ITEBOG, NAPC Yes 
Compaq /Digital Electronics SCB, LTA Partial 
DP Architects Architects BOA, ACM, HDB, NHB Yes 
Du Pont Chemicals JTC, TAS, NUS Partial 
Motorola Electronics EDB, NSTB, SPBOG, SPBS Yes 
Squire Mech Pte Ltd Electrical Engineers SPSB, SPBOG, LLB, BOA Partial 
Bankers Trust Banking PSA No 
Charles Toh Clinic Medical PSC No 
Singardo Trading Trading NAC No 
The Yeoh Clinic Medical SAM, NHB No 
Jardine Matheson Group Trading LIBOR, CPF, SOSS No 
6. Cliques of directors are not allowed to develop, a strategy perhaps implemented 
either as an anti- corruption method or as a method of dispersing power over boards so 
that no single group can develop a power base in a group of boards, or for both 
reasons. 
7. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have a right of representation. There is moderate 
SAF representation, little by the Singapore Police Force (SPF), and no representation 
over the 11 years from the Singapore Civil Defence Force. 
8. The intellectual resources of the nation must participate in public sector 
management. The NUS was the most highly represented body of all on statutory 
boards; more than any of the economic policy boards such as the EDB and the TDB, 
33 per cent more than the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), the most highly represented 
of the ministries` and more than twice as much as the next most represented ministry, 
the Ministry of Education (MOE).h' 
9. GLCs should not be highly involved in statutory board management, but should 
concentrate on their own sector. GLC appointees accounted for only 8.85 per cent of 
statutory hoard directorships. 
65 The NUS has a total of 357 places on 40 boards over the study period. 
MINDEF accounted for 4.9 per cent of positions and for 25 per cent of total ministry representation. 
67 The MOE had 2.95 per cent of positions and 15 per cent of total ministry representation. 
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10. Private sector directors should be highly educated and drawn principally from the 
elite professions. Singaporean companies with five or more board positions over the 
study period accounted for 14.85 per cent of total directorships. More than half of the 
representation from this group was provided by lawyers (15.1 per cent), property 
development and construction (including engineers), medical practitioners, architects, 
accountants and the finance sector. 
11. Industry associations are not relevant to the management of statutory boards. 
12. The expertise offered by foreign companies should be utilised by boards directly 
concerned with the business or industry specialty of these companies. Twenty-six 
foreign companies had significant representation on boards, the most highly 
represented group being the information technology and telecommunications group, 
comprising eight companies, all of whom were involved with boards in their industry 
sector. Of these companies it is of note that their executives sitting on boards were 
almost wholly Singaporean ° 
13. A small inner group of directors and chairman should have multiple long term 
representation on statutory boards to develop expertise in their management, 
encourage stability and to be responsible to the political executive for their 
management. Those board members holding 10 or more positions accounted for 11.8 
per cent of the directorships; a total of 145 people. Of these, 59 (4.8 per cent) held 15 
positions or more and formed the core of statutory board directors. A further eight 
people held 14 positions. These were Er Kwong Wah,' Michael Fam Yue Onn,' Hiew 
Siew Nam,' Professor Tommy Koh Thong Bee," Leong Chain Huen,74 Lew Syn Pau,' 
Ridzwan Tuan Haji bin Haji Dzafir,7ó Patrick Yeoh Khwai Hoh.n 
These companies were, in the following order; Hewlett Packard, Siemens Group, Xerox Singapore Software 
Centre, Compaq/Digital, Motorola, NEC, IBM Singapore Pte Ltd and Connor Peripherals. Some of these companies 
were highly ranked; Hewlett Packard at 43'", Siemens at 60' and Xerox Software at 75'. 
69 These directors were: Koh Boon Hwee, Alexander Chan Meng Wah, Cheah Kean Huat, Victor Ang, Sunny Chan 
Han Tiong and Frank Cloutier for Hewlett Packard; Dr. Wang Kai Yuen for the Xerox Singapore Software Centre; 
Lim Soon Hock and Darke M. Sani for the Compaq/Digital group, John Wong and Yang Boon Kiat from IBM, Noel 
Hon Chia Chun from NEC Singapore, Chan Hua Bee and Dr. Joe Chen Yuk Fu from Connor peripherals. 
° A Permanent Secretary in the Civil Service, last appointment being to the Ministry of Education. He is now retired. 
" Chairman and Managing Director of Fraser and Neave, one of the largest food and beverage companies in 
Singapore. Fam is an Old Guard PAP cadre, close to Lee Kuan Yew and a long time member of the Council of 
Presidential Advisers of which he was still a member in 1998. He has been associated with the PAP since the late 
1960s. 
Hiew was formerly the Director of the Public Works Department in the Ministry of National Development On 
retirement he received a position as Director, Project Completion, with SL Marina Centre Developments which he 
still holds. 
n Former Dean, Faculty of Law, NUS, then seconded to the Ministry of Foreign .Affairs. He was Ambassador to the 
United States for almost 20 years. On returning to Singapore, Koh was appointed inaugural Director of the Institute 
of Policy Studies, then an Ambassador -at -Large and eventually chairman of the National Arts Council. He 
relinquished the NAC chair in 1997. He is one of the most urbane and internationally experienced of PAP proto- 
cadres, making him a force for moderation and a strong supporter of the need to liberalise may aspects of the 
regime's social, economic and political structures. 
Leong is a senior partner of RDC Architects, one of the most highly represented private sector firms on boards. He 
is assumed to be a PAP cadre. He has only held appointments since 1990 on the HDB, SPBOG and the ST1TB. 
320 Ross Worthington 
GLCs and Strategies of Governance 
When we look at the data for GLCs for 1991 and 1998 what strategies of governance 
can we identify? The major characteristics of the pattern of governance of the GLC 
sector still discernible in 1998 were: 
1. Maintain control of GLCs by appointing an overwhelming number of public sector 
directors. In 1998, this level of representation was 74 per cent, 
2. Public sector appointees to GLC boards should come from the Administrative 
Service and be at the higher levels of the civil service and statutory boards. Public 
sector representation was almost exclusively by the most senior level of officials, 
including eight permanent secretaries, one former permanent secretary and four 
deputy secretari es. 
3. Private sector appointees to GLC boards should be from the highest level of the 
private sector; from large companies and include the most senior level of management 
in those companies. Private sector representation was also wholly from executives of 
the highest level in major national firms. These include the chairman or chief 
executives of Wing Tai Holdings, Shell Group, Fraser and Neave, Hewlett- Packard, 
Esso, Union Bank of Switzerland Asia, Overseas Union Bank, Schroders International 
Merchant Bankers, Times Publishing, Inter- Roller Engineering' and United Overseas 
Bank. Additionally the senior partners of two of the nation's largest law firms held 
GLC directorships; Chen Choong Joong of Allen and Gledhill and Sat Pal Khattar from 
Khattar Wong and Partners. The managing partners from Price Waterhouse, Michael 
Lim Choo San, and Keith Tay Ah Kee from KPMG Peat Marwick, also held 
directorships. 
'S Lewis an MP and was variously, Secretary, Metal Industries Workers Union (1988 -93) and Assistant Director 
(Industrial Relations) in the NTUC Administration and Research Unit. He is now General Manager, Comfort Group, 
the privatised former NTUC Comfort Cooperative, still predominantly owned by NTUC interests. 
'6 Ridzwan is a long time managing director of the TDB and a member of the Council of Presidential Advisers and 
the Presidential Council for Minority Rights. He also hold two non -residential ambassadorial appointments. He is an 
excellent example a public service proto-cadre. 
" Yeoh is a director on the DBS board and is president of DBS Bank. However, many of his former responsibilities 
have now been transferred to the American CEO appointed in 1997, John Olds and his board representation is 
declining. Olds is not represented on any board, but was appointed to the DBS board after the survey period. 
n Inter- Roller is not a major national firm, although it is a successful medium size Singaporean firm. It designs, 
manufactures, installs and maintains material handling, air handling and pollution control equipment. It exports much 
of its production and has plants in Singapore and Malaysia it had sales in 1998 of $32, 282, 437. See: Wright 
Investors Service. Available at: http://www_wisi.com 
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4. Holding companies should be controlled by key Administrative Service officers at 
permanent secretary level, former Administrative Service officers or former ministers 
who are, or have been, part of the core executive. 
5. GLCs should be substantially responsible for their own management and 
performance without drawing heavily on the civil service, statutory boards or the 
political executive for supervision. Most GLC directors came predominantly from the 
GLC sector itself, then from statutory boards and then from civil service ministries. 
6. The GLC sector's priority is to be profitable and commercially viable above all else. 
7. Appointments of directors should be made so that no cliques of directors with 
control over major groups of GLCs or groups of holding companies can develop. 
Multiple directorships should be made across various holding company groups. 
8. Community or consumer representation is not required on GLCs. 
8. The strategic framework of individual GLCs and, in particular, their holding 
companies, should be to plan over the medium to long term to develop commercially 
so as to achieve national economic policy goals, particularly the development of a 
number of globally competitive Singaporean owned MNCs. 
CONCLUSIONS: THE CORE EXECUTIVE IN THE BOARD AND GLC 
SECTORS IN 1998 
In 1998, the above analyses provide us with a core group of board and GLC actors 
which comprise 78 people as shown in Table 7.36. Of this group only four are highly 
represented on both statutory boards and GLC boards; Dr. Cham Tao Soon, Moses Lee 
Kim Poo, Yu -Foo Yee Shoon and Sim Kee Boon. However, among this group, 37 
people (47 per cent) have positions on both GLC boards and statutory boards, 16 (21 
per cent) hold GLC directorships only and 25 (32 per cent) hold statutory board 
directorships only. Sectoral representation within this group is as shown in Table 7.35 
below. 
Table 7.35: Sectoral Representation Among the Major Group of GLC and 
Statutory Board Directors in Singapore: 1998 
Sector Board Civil GLC MPs Private NTUC TOTALS 
Service Sector 
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No. l 14 16 19 10 18 1 78 
18 21 24 13 23 1 100% 
As can be seen from Table 7.36, 76 per cent of this top group of directors come from the 
public sector. However, as with all senior officers in the Singaporean public sector, the 
differentiation between officers based on their current public sector appointments is 
largely arbitrary as these officers move between the sectors during their career, 
although movement between boards and the civil service into GLCs is less common 
than between GLCs and the private sector. For example, of those directors from 
statutory boards, if we exclude the 6 directors who are from the higher education 
sector,' of the eight remaining directors five had served in the civil service; Stephen 
Yeo Siew Chye, Lee Suan Hiang, Leong Keng Thai, Barry Desker and Dr. Tan Kim 
Siew. Of those directors from the GLC sector, if we include the Ministry of Defence as 
part of the civil service, seven of the 19 have had civil service or board careers, 
including two former permanent secretaries, Sim Kee Boon and Er Kwong Wah, a 
former deputy secretary, Bernard Chen Tien Lap80 and a 
'9 To the best of my knowledge, none of these higher education appointees has had substantial careers in the civil 
service or non -education statutory boards. These directors are; Professor Leo Tan Wee Hin, Professor Andrew Nee 
Yeh Ching, Professor Wang Gungwu, Assoc. Professor Ernest Chew Chin Tiong, Professor Lim Pi and Dr. Cham 
Tao Soon. 
80 Chen is also a former MP and minister also. 
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Table 7.36: Core People on Statutory Boards and GLCs in Singapore:1998 
NO. 
1. 
I2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
NAME 
Mg Kong Hua 
Arun Mahizhnan 
Cham Tao Soon 
Chan Sek Keong 
Chee Yam Cheng, A/P PPA(P) 
Chen Choong Joong 
Chen Tien Lap, Bernard 
Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund 
Cheong Siew Keong, Dr BBM, 
BBM(L) 
Cheong, Benedict 
Chew Chin Tiong, Ernest, A/P 
PBM 
Chew G K, Andrew, Dr. 
Chiang Chie Foo 
Chong Yew Fook, Charles 
Choi, Chiau Beng 
Desker, Barry. PPA(E) 
POSITION & COMPANY 
MD President, NatSteel Ltd. 
Dep. Director, Inst. of Policy Studies 
President, Nanyang Technological University 
Attorney General 
MOH, Dep. Director, Medical Services 
Managing Partner, Allen and Gledhill. Solicitors 
Director, CEO, Intraco Ltd, former MP and Deputy 
Secretary 
Chair, MD. Wing -Tai Holdings Ltd 
NUH , Chairman 
MHA, Director, (Operations), SPF 
NUS, Department of History 
PS, PMO (Retired) 
MOE, PS (2°a) 
MP, Adviser, Pasir Ris CCC 
Chair & MD, Keppel FELS 
TDB , CEO 
17. Dhanabalan, Suppiah Chair, Singapore Airlines Ltd (Until 30/5/98) & Executive 
Chair, DBS Bank (+ POSBank) (From 30 /5/98) 
18. 
19. 
I 20. 
21. 
I 22. 
23. 
I 24. 
25. 
26. 
I 27. 
28. 
I 29. 
30. 
31. 
I 32. 
33. 
34. 
I 35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
139. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
Er Kwong Wah 
Fam Yue Onn, Michael 
Fang Ai Lian 
Foc Kok Swee, BG (NS) 
Ho Meng Kit, BG (NS) 
Hong Hai, Dr, 
}Chatter, Sat Pal PPA(P) 
Khaw Boon Wan 
Koh Boon Hwee 
Koh Yong Guan PJG 
Lai Chun Loong 
Lam Joon Khoi, BG (NS) 
Lau Chan Sin 
Lee Ek Tieng 
Lee Hee Seng, PJG, DUBC 
Lee Hsien Yang, BG 
Lee Kim Poo, Moses 
Lee Suan Hiang, PPA(P) 
Leo Chin Lian, James, RAdm 
(ret.) 
Leong Keng Thai 
Lim Chee Onn 
Lim Choi, San, Michael 
Lim Chuan Poh, BG (NS) 
Lim Hock San, PPA(E) 
Lim Pin. Prof. 
Lim Swee Say 
Lim Yong Wah 
Liu Thai Ker, PJG PPA(E) 
Loh Wing Siew 
Lua Cheng Eng 
81 
Executive Chair, Sembawang Marine & Logistics & former 
permanent secretary 
MD, Fraser and Neave & Old Guard PAP cadre 
Ernst & Young, Managing Partner 
Director, MDsr & Deputy Chair, ECICS Holdings Ltd 
EDB, Managing Director 
Former MP & CEO, Haw Par Corporation 
Khattar Wong & Partners 
Permanent Secretary, MTI 
MD, Hewlett- Packard Singapore 
MOH, PS & MD MAS 
President, Chartered Industries of Singapore 
MOE, DS (Policy) 
Director. Deputy President and Deputy COO, DBS Bank 
MD, GIC & Head of Civil Service 
PSC Chairman & OUB Chairman 
President & CEO, Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. 
Permanent Secretary. Ministry of Community Development 
SPSB, CEO 
Executive Chair, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering. Former 
Chief of Navy. 
TAS, Director -General (DS level) 
Deputy Chair & MD, Keppel Land. Former MP, minister 
and deputy secretary. 
Price Waterhouse, Managing Partner 
Deputy Secretary , Ministry of Communications & former 
Chief of Army , Singapore Armed Forces 
United Industrial Corp., President & CEO 
NUS, Vice Chancellor 
MP, Dep. Secretary- General, NTUC 
Chairman, Pidemco Land & Old Guard PAP cadre 
RSP Architects, Planners & Engineers 
MD. Keppel Corporation 
CEO & Deputy Chair, Neptune Orient Lines Ltd 
MD from at least 1988 -1991, then President & CEO 1992 -1995. 
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48. Magad, Ahmad Mohamed MP & II -IV Singapore, MD 
49. Nair, Dileep Director & CEO, POSBank & Deputy Secretary, MOF 
50. Nee Yeh Ching, Andrew, Prof NUS, Dean, Faculty of Engineering 
51. Ng Chee Tat, Philip Far East Organisation, CEO 
52. Ng Kee Choe President, DBS Bank 
53. Ngiam Tong Dow Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance 
I 54. Niam Chiang Meng PPA(P) MITA, PS 
55. Oon Kum Loon Executive Vice -President, DBS Bank 
56. Quek Chee Hoon Executive Vice President & Head, Direct Investments Group 
of Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd 
57. Quek Poh Huat President, Temasek Holdings & Director & former 
President, Singapore Technologies Pte Ltd 
58. Seah Lim Huat, Peter President, CEO, Overseas Union Bank Ltd 
59. Selvaretnam, Daniel EDB, Assist. MD (International Policy) 
60. Seng Han Thong MP, NTUC, Director (Organisational Management) & GM, 
Chinese newspapers, SPH 
61. Sim Kee Boon Executive Chair, Keppel Corporation and former permanent 
secretary 
62. Sinnakaruppan, Ramasamy MP, Assist. Secretary- General, NTUC 
63, Su Guaning, Dr. MINDEF , DS (Technology) 
64. Tan Ee Ping Tan Ee Ping & Partners, Principal 
65. Tan Eng Heng BBM, BBM (L) Asia Life Insurance Society, Chairman 
66. Tan Kim Siew, Dr. Col. (NS) URA , CEO, Chief Planner 
67. Tan Kin Lian PBM NTUC Income 
68. Tan Wee Hin, Leo, Prof. PPA(E), 
PBM 
NIE , Director 
69. Teo Soon Hoe ED and Group Finance Director, Keppel Corporation 
70. Thai Chee Ken Chair, Schroders International Merchant Bankers Ltd 
I 71. Wang Gungwu, Prof. NUS, Chair, Institute of East Asian Political Economy 
72. Wee Ee Cheong Deputy President & Director, United Overseas Bank Ltd 
73. Wee Heng Tin PPA(P), PPA(G), 
PBS 
MOE, Director -General of Education 
74. Wong Hung Khim Chair, CEO, DelGro & former President/CEO Singapore 
Telecom 
175. Wong Nang Jang OCBC, Executive Vice President 
76. Yeo Ning Hong, Dr Former MP and cabinet minister. Executive Chairman, PSA 
Corporation 
77. Yeo Siew Chye, Stephen NCB, CEO 
78. Yu -Foo Yee Shoon MP, De,u Secre . -General, NTUC 
former Chief of Navy, RAdm. James Leo Chin Lian. The other members of this group 
are; BG Foo Kok Swee, Quek Chee Hoon and Lim Hock San. Of the MPs who are 
directors, four have had civil service experience; Suppiah Dhanabalan, Lim Chee Onn, 
Ramasamy Sinnakaruppan and Lim Swee Say. Of those directors from the private 
sector, only Liu Thai Ker had previous experience in the civil service and statutory 
board sectors, his position with RSP Architects, Planners and Engineers being an 
amakudari position. Overall, of the 78 directors, 10 (13 per cent) had substantial careers 
in MINDEF or were regular SAF officers. Only one of the directors in this top group 
was from an NTUC affiliated organisation; Tan Lin Kian, CEO of NTUC Income 
Insurance Co- operative. 
There are several other characteristics of note for this group of top directors. Among 
them, many of the chief executives of the major boards are not represented except for 
Lee Suan Hiang of SPSB, Barry Desker of the TDB, Tan Kim Siew of the URA, Leong 
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Keng Thai of TAS and Koh Yong Guan of MAS. This would indicate that while these 
officers are major policy actors, their efforts are concentrated on management of their 
boards and immediate responsibilities. Those chief executives not part of the group of 
top directors includes Philip Yeo Liat Kok' of the EDB (although Ho Meng Kit, the 
Managing Director of EDB is represented), Ko Kheng Wah of JTC, Stephen Yeo Siew 
Chye of NCB, Ong Ho Sim of the PUB, Chong Lit Cheong of the NSTB, Yeo Kee Leng 
of the STB, Tan Guong Ching of the HDB, Lim Han Soon of the CPF, Koh Cher Siang of 
IRAS, Lim Hock Chuan of the SBA and Wong Woon Leong of CAAS. All of these 
officers sit on their own boards and all are major actors in their own policy 
communities; they could not be excluded from the core group of board and GLC 
directors. 
Another feature to note is the absence of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, Kwah Boon Wan, from all statutory boards within his portfolio, 
thus lowering his level of representation. During 1998, Kwah did not sit an any of his 
ministry's boards, thus indicating their relative autonomy from his oversight. This is 
not surprising, given that the chairman of the EDB, Philip Yeo is a higher classification 
that Kwah and Lee Suan Wang of SPSB and Barry Desker of the TDB are of a rank 
equivalent to Khaw's. In fact, the EDB is almost wholly autonomous from MTI. Its 
board comprises seven EDB senior executives, three non -executive directors, all of 
whom worked with Philip Yeo previously in MINDEF and five directors from the 
private sector, four of whom are foreigners. Thus, of the 12 Singaporean directors of 
the EDB, five worked with Philip Yeo in MINDEF; Ho Ching, Ho Meng Kit, Lim Swee 
Say, Peter Ho and MG (NS) Lim Neo Chian; five are career EDB officers; Gong Wee 
Lik, Daniel Selvaratnam, Shirley Chen, Teoh Song Sea and Liow Voon Kheong and the 
last is Philip Yeo himself. 
Also absent from the group of core statutory board and GLC directors are all of the 
heads of higher education statutory boards except for NUS, NTU and the NIE. No 
polytechnic principals are present. Of the 22 permanent secretaries,' eight are 
represented; Chan Sek Keong, Lee Ek Tieng, Niam Chiang Meng, Chiang Chie Foo, 
Koh Yong Guan, Moses Lee Kim Poo, Ngiam Tong Dow and Khaw Boon Wan. All the 
other civil service directors are at deputy secretary level, except for Dr. Andrew Chew 
Guan Khuan who was the immediate past Head of Civil Service who retired at the end 
of 1997. 
Philip Yeo Liat Kok's position at EDB is an executive chairman, so he effectively runs the organisation. In this 
particular case, he is assumed to take precedence over Ho Meng Kit, the EDB's Managing Director. The EDB is also 
represented by Daniel Selvaratnam, its Assistant Managing Director (International). 
s3 This number includes the Attorney- General, although constitutionally he is a member of the executive, he acts 
more as a permanent secretary and is not a member of the cabinet. 
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Representation from the major GLCs was provide by Ang Kong Hua of NatSteel, 
Bernard Chen Tien Lap of Intraco, Lai Chun Loong of Chartered Industries of 
Singapore, Lee Hsien Yang of SingTel and Singapore Post, Lim Yong Wah of Pidemco 
Land, Loh Wing Siew and Sim Kee Boon of Keppel Corporation, Lua Cheng Eng from 
NOL, Dileep Nair from POSBank, Ng Kee Choe from DBS Bank, Quek Poh Huat of 
Temasek Holdings and Seng Han Thong of Singapore Press Holdings. Overall, the DBS 
group had three directors in this top group, the Keppel group had five, Singapore 
Technologies and Temasek Holdings had two each while the other GLCs represented 
had one each. Of the 44 top GLCs, 28 are represented by their chairmen in this list of 
top directors. These include all the level 1 GLCs° except the GIC (although Lee Ek 
Tieng, the managing director of the GIC is in the list); 10 of the level 2 GLCs - Intraco, 
NatSteel, Singapore Airlines, DBS Bank, POSBank, Singapore Telecom, Singapore Post, 
SembCorp Industries, NOL and PSA Corporation - and 14 level 3 GLCs; Teledata, 
KeppelFELS, Sembawang Marine, Temasek Management Services, Singapore Cable 
Vision, DBS Land, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering, Pidemco Land, Keppel Maritime 
Industries, Keppel Integrated Engineering, Jurong Shipyard /Sembawang Shipyard, ST 
Aerospace, MobileOne and Keppel Finance. The majority of theses companies are older 
GLCs which can be expected to have the more experienced directors and executives. 
The private sector directors come overwhelmingly from either finance sector or 
property sector related firms; of the 18 directors from this sector, eight (44 per cent) 
come from the finance sector, five from the property sector (28 per cent), two from 
major national law firms, one from a transport company, one from the information 
technology sector and one from the food and beverage sector. The nature of these 
directorships is further discussed below in the context of the findings from all the 
analyses contained in this chapter. 
Analysis of this group of top directors in statutory boards and GLCs in 1998 indicates 
that responsibilities across the statutory board and GLC sectors are not concentrated in 
the hands of a few permanent secretaries or others, and that the tendency in the late 
1990's is to move away from the very small camarilla of permanent secretaries revealed 
in Vennewald's 1991 analysis to a more distributed leadership style. It also, indicates 
that the most influential people are bifurcated between the two sectors; there are 
people who manage statutory boards and people who manage GLCs and while a 
larger group is represented on both statutory boards and GLC boards, the most 
important people in each sector tend to concentrate their efforts on their particular 
sector. A group of dominant individuals does exist, it is a rather large group, it is 
u The level 1 GLCs represented include; Temasek Holdings (Suppiah Dhanabalan), MND Holdings (Lee Ek Tieng), 
the Health Corporation of Singapore (Moses Lee Kim Poo) and the ST Group (Dr. Yeo Ning Hong). 
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overwhelmingly from the public sector and does overlap the boundaries between 
boards, GLCs, the civil service and the military establishment. 
We can also conclude from this analysis that statist corporatist arrangements do not 
characterise state -society relations in Singapore. Rather, while some corporatist -like 
arrangements occur, the most consistent pattern of state -society relations is elitist and 
oligarchic., therefore supporting the notion of PAP hegemony as being oligarchic. The 
working class is wholly excluded from any direct representation on statutory boards 
and GLCs, while the inclusion of community organisations, trade unions and industry 
associations is at such a negligible levels as to be inconsequential. 
8. STRATEGIES OF GOVERNANCE: CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACHES TO COERCION AND 
CONSENT BUILDING 
This chapter examines selected key strategies in the governance repertoire of the Goh 
Chok Tong governments, in order to illustrate the approach taken by the contemporary 
core executive. In discussing the implications of these governance strategies, the 
linkage between the coercive functions of the state and its consent building functions is 
then examined. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how the contemporary core 
executive draws upon its historical political and public management roots and is 
developing new strategies to maintain the PAP's hegemonic program in the face of 
considerable social and economic change driven by Singapore's heavy dependency on 
the global trade regime and its increasing integration into the new international 
information and media regime. 
Central to the power dynamics of the core executive in Singapore are the use of the 
coercive and consent building instruments of the state. In this chapter we examine the 
nature of these instruments and their use as strategies of governance by the core 
executive. In particular, we focus on the coercive instruments available to the core 
executive and how these form part of their distinctive governance strategy. These 
complementary hegemonic strategies are based not only on legislation and public 
management mechanisms, which can be divided into those supporting the coercive 
framework and those which facilitate the development of consent, but also upon a 
technological capability to support these strategies being developed inside and outside 
the public sector, under the guidance and control of the political executive. Both the 
coercive and consent building frameworks have covert and overt components. Both 
sets of instruments and strategies of the core executive are derived from the Total 
Security framework adopted by the government. Within this framework, "Total 
Security is Total Defence plus active diplomacy plus internal security. "' In this context, 
internal security is broadly defined and includes social cohesion, toleration and 
national identity; there are definitely positive aspects to the concept of internal security 
shared by the core executive in Singapore, although its negative aspects are often the 
focus of analysis? 
"Defence `must not be left to the economic underclass ", Straits Times, 14 December, 1991, p. 2 
2 This view was expressed by all Administrative Service officers I have interviewed. While several acknowledged 
that many people thought of internal security in terms of coercive control, this was not what was generally meant 
Since 1997, Goh Chok Tong, through the development of CDCs and the Singapore 21 agenda, has been encouraging 
the use of more positive terms for social cohesion, such as `heartware' and `community bonding'. 
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In this study, the consent framework will not be examined in detail as its components 
have been the subject of considerable research over the past 30 years and much is 
already known of their nature, structure and functions. Rather, what I wish to do in 
this chapter is illustrate the ways in which the consent -building and coercive strategies 
interact and are mutually supportive in maintaining the balance essential to the 
durability of the hegemonic program. In some cases, what I term consent building 
mechanisms have been identified more as mechanisms of coercion by some, such as 
the media,' but many of these mechanisms fulfil both roles. An overview of these 
components and their relationship to the coercive framework is essential in 
understanding the way in which the contemporary core executive used these 
mechanisms as strategies of governance within the hegemonic framework. 
ASPECTS OF CONSENT BUILDING 
By its very nature, consent is a far more difficult strategy to identify and track; it is 
more often covert than overt and it places responsibility on both the consent -seeking 
party and the consent -giving party, thus blurring the boundaries between the two. The 
major strategy in the consent framework is the shaping of opinion and attitude; what 
was once called propaganda, but which is now termed "psychological" and "social" 
defence within the Singaporean executive's Total Defence framework. This strategy 
has a number of components, principal among which are: 
1. Control of the media; 
2. Control of the nation's communications infrastructure; 
3. Political socialisation through compulsory national service for all male citizens and 
the GRO network; and 
4. Community consultation in policy making. 
The consent framework is promoted through a legislative infrastructure which 
complements the coercion framework, the essential components of which are; the 
Peoples' Association Act, the Housing and Development Board Act, the Town 
Councils Act, the Societies Act, the Public Entertainment Act, the Environmental Public 
Health Act, Administration of Muslim Law Act, Legal Profession Act, the Newspapers 
and Printing Presses Act, Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, Singapore 
Broadcasting Act, the Telecommunications Authority of Singapore Act and the 
Enlistment Act. Some of the more consent oriented legislation also has coercive 
functions as well, but these are exercised usually within a consent facilitation 
3 For example, see: Lily Z. Rahim, "Singapore: Consent, coercion and constitutional engineering ", Current Affairs 
Bulletin, December 1993 /January1994, p. 2I 
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framework; such as justifying the control of the media and communications 
infrastructure on the grounds of social cohesion and the Maintenance of Religious 
Harmony legislation on the basis of curtailing inter -ethnic conflict by discouraging 
aggressive religious proselytization. It is in this balancing of coercive forces within 
consent building that ideology plays its most important role; ideology provides the 
justification for coercion to be exercised in order to promote consent. In Singapore, the 
control of the communications infrastructure and the media are the foundations on 
which consent building strategies are based and operate. 
Media and Communications Infrastructure: Strategies for Control 
The basis of the core executive's media based consent building strategies is based on 
public ownership or control, directly or indirectly, of the nation's communications 
infrastructure, or in the absence of such ownership, the ability to maintain surveillance 
of all media and media users as required by components of its coercive strategies. 
In 1998, the Singapore government, directly or indirectly owned almost all the nation's 
telecommunications infrastructure including: 
1. Singapore Telecommunications Limited' 
2. MobileOne (Asia) Pte. Ltd (M1).8 
3. SunPage' 
4. Television Corporation of Singapore 
5. Radio Corporation of Singapore 
6. Singapore International Media 
7. Media Corporation of Singapore 
8. Singapore Cable Vision (SCV) ;7 
9. 1 -Net Pte. Ltd.B; 
10. CyberWay ISP 9 
` in 1998, Singapore Telecommunications was 76 per cent government owned. 
5 Ml is a consortium comprising Keppel Corporation (35 %), Singapore Press Holdings (35 %) Cable and wireless 
(15 %) and Cable and Wireless HKT (15 %). Thus government affiliated interests control 70 % of the company. 
Keppel Corporation chairs the M1 board. 
s SunPage is a subsidiary of Singapore Technologies. 
SCV is an associated company of ST Telemedia. Its shareholders comprise: Media Corporation of Singapore (31 %), 
MediaDne international (25 %), Singapore Technologies Pte. Ltd. (24 %) and Singapore Press Holdings (20 %). The 
company is therefore 80 % owned by GLCs and 20 % by a government affiliate - SPH. Originally, the company was 
25 % owned by Continental CableVision of the United states which also had the original management contract for the 
company. However, disputes over management style and business strategy led the Americans to leave the consortium 
in late 1997. See: "Singapore CableVision to get new president from next Jan", Straits Times, 16 December 1997, pp. 
1 -2 
B This company is owned by a consortium comprising: SingCom Investments Pte. Ltd. (a wholly owned subsidiary of 
the Telecommunications Authority of Singapore), Singapore Telecommunications, Singapore Cable Vision, Pacific 
Internet and CyberWay. It is therefore almost wholly government owned. 
9 ISP= Internet Service Provider. In 1998, CyberWay was wholly acquired by the StarHub Consortium and is 
therefore predominantly government owned. 
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11. Pacific Internet ISP;10 
12. The StarHub Consortium for alternative fixed basic and cellular telephony,'' 
13. STAR (ST Advanced Radio); ° 
14. ST Mobile Data;13 and 
15. ST Teleport satellite earth station and transmission service. 
This infrastructure places the government in direct or indirect control of almost all 
domestic telecommunications facilities, all international telecommunications 
connections such as submarine cables and satellite earth stations, all television stations, 
almost all radio stations and 90 per cent of the radio audience," all interne' service 
providers, the only national digital trunk radio service, all fixed and cellular telephony 
services and all paging services. The control of telecommunications infrastructure 
extends to the banning of private ownership of satellite dishes, although they may be 
used by businesses under licence. To a large degree, the cable television services 
available through the SingaporeOne broadband service are being presented as making 
satellite reception irrelevant. This approach is reinforced by providing the first 
SingaporeOne cable point in I-iDB flats free of charge.15 However, this approach retains 
control over domestic content somewhat in the hands of the government, although 
international news networks such as CNN and BBC World News are available through 
SingaporeOne.16 As the telecommunications surveillance capability of the coercive 
framework has matured, particularly since 1995, it has become less important for the 
telecommunications infrastructure to be wholly government controlled. It is likely that 
the government will always retain direct or indirect control of the major 
telecommunications backbone services, such as SingTel and SingaporeOne, but it is 
possible that it will slowly relinquish ownership of other assets if this is commercially 
acceptable. 
Control of the national television and radio networks provides the government with 
° In October 1998, SembCorp ventures owned 74.99 % of Pacific Internet 
" The StarHub consortium is a joint venture between Singapore Technologies Telemedia, Singapore Power, Nippon 
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation and British Telecom. Its majority interests are government affiliated, See: 
Singapore Technologies Annual Report 1997, Singapore, Singapore Technologies, 1998, p. 26 
'' STAR is the nation's only digital public trunked radio operator. See: Singapore Technologies Annual Report 1997, 
Singapore, Singapore technologies, 1998, p. 26 
13 St Mobile data is the major operator of mobile data services using the RF spectrum. It is a joint venture of ST 
Telemedia, BellSouth Mobile data and the Comfort Group predominantly owned b NTUC. 
" The Radio Corporation of Singapore owns and operates 12 of the nation's 18 radio stations but has 90 per cent of 
the radio audience. All other radio stations are operated by government affiliates, NTUC, the Singapore Armed 
Forces Reservists Association (SAFRA) and the National Arts Council except the national cable radio Redifussion 
service. See: Speech by DPMLee Mien Loong at the launch of Radio Corporation of Singapore's Commercial 
digital Audio Broadcast Service. Singapore, RCS, 19 November 1999 
is "Cabling of landed properties delayed ", Straits Times, 16 December 1997, p. 3. This is in comparison to 
approximately $1,000 for a cable modem connection to a house. 
16 To what extent the Singapore government will attempt to censure these channels is unknown. It is conceivable that 
the government may use loss of access to the lucrative Singapore market to pressure these channels to avoid topics on 
Singapore which the government might object to. 
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the opportunity to shape news and current affairs as it wishes. As with other aspects of 
hegemonic control, there is little evidence that the government is proactive in doing 
this; within the hegemonic system, the media become self regulating and able to design 
such programs to fit the hegemonic parameters. Such control has recently extended to 
other aspects of television programming in particular. Since 1996, under funding 
provided through the EDB's Local Industry Upgrading Programme ((LIUP),17 the 
various television GLCs have been funded to develop increased local cultural and 
general programming content, including a greater amount of current affairs, as part of 
a strategy to develop a greater sense of national identity and community, and to 
exclude foreign content," a covert consent building strategy.19 This has resulted in 
television programs such as "Perspective ", a current events program2° a Chinese 
drama program commissioned by the Singapore Labour Foundation and the NTUC,21 
the launching of television programs to support the compulsory National Education 
curriculum in all schools,' increasing Hokkien, Cantonese and other dialect programs 
on SCV to enhance understanding of traditional Chinese culture," and a substantial 
increase in Malay language documentary and current affairs programs between 1995- 
1997.24 
In addition to the telecommunications infrastructure, the government, under the 
Newspapers and Printing Presses Act (NPPA), exerts complete control over the print 
media. This legislation gives the government right of approval over certain levels of 
share transactions in Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), the right to appoint certain 
directors to the board of Singapore Press Holdings as well as informal powers over this 
company. These informal powers extend to approving or nominating the appointment 
of the general manager of SPH. In the past, the former heads of the SID, S. R. Nathan 
and the ISD, Tjong Yik Min, have been appointed to this position on the nomination of 
the government. Tjong is the current president of SPH after having previously been 
appointed permanent secretary in the Ministry of Communications. He is widely seen 
as being groomed to succeed Lim Kim San, former minister and PAP cadre who in 
1998 was 84 and reportedly ill. Additionally, it has been reported that the government 
has frequently transferred former members of the ISD to SPH as managers or 
11 Ong Sor Fern, "New series and specials on Premiere 12 ", Straits Times, 26 June 1997, p. 16 
1e In 1997, a committee reviewed the programming of all TCS channels and criticised much of it for reflecting foreign 
values. The committee recommended increase production of Singapore made programs that `reflect local culture and 
values." See: "Not many lapses in standards" and "Children's Programmes ", Straits Times, 10 July 1997. 
'91 am grateful to Chua Beng Huat for his insightful comments on this aspect of the contemporary thinking of the 
political executive on this matter. He also deals with this shift towards a community orientation in state ideology in: 
Chua Beng Huat, Political Legitimacy and Housing: Stakeholding in Singapore. London, Routledge, 1997, especially 
Chapter 8 
20 "Perspective that jolts viewers on current affairs ", Straits Times, 23 June 1997, p. 4 
z' 
"Union's $1 m TV series a showcase for workers ", Straits Times, 17 April 1997, p. 3 
n 
"Schools rush to get antennas fixed ", Straits Times, 8 May 1997, p. 1 
n 
"Cable TV to screen more Chinese dialect shows ", Straits Times, 11 May 1997, p. 34 
za 
"STV12 aims to educate, reform ", Straits Times, 18 December 1997, p. 15 
333 Chapter Eight 
journalists u A number of former Administrative Service officers have also been 
'transferred' to SPH, such as political editor Han Fook Kwang. 
In addition to the control of newspapers and magazines, the NPPA gives the 
government to right to require approval of all printed material which is distributed to 
the public. Foreign magazines and publications are also licensed under s.16 of the 
NPPA and may be required to lodge a security deposit. In 1996 three foreign 
magazines were required to lodge a security deposit as part of their circulation permit; 
the Far East Economic Review, Asia Week and the Asian Wall Street Journal .26 Since 1986, 
the government has used the NPPA to restrict the circulation of five foreign 
publications; the three publications required to pay deposits above and Time magazine 
on the grounds that "all four publications had interfered in Singapore's domestic 
affairs. "' In 1997, the July issue of the British Vogue magazine was banned because of 
the inclusion of an "offensive" article on drug use u This reflect the external focus of 
the government's media based consent building orientation; while control of the 
domestic media is complete, all possible sanctions will be used to stop foreign media 
from criticism of issues with which the government has a particular sensitivity, 
whether they be political, social or cultural. 
The press in most countries, with the exception of the business press or specialist 
papers, provides news for a mass audience. The information provided carries a 
minimum of analysis, of forecasting or contextual information on stories; that which is 
provided will usually be provided by the agency or organisation from which the story 
is sourced. This is not the case in Singapore. There the media, in particular the print 
media, has a definite didactic orientation. Stories are placed in a context, analysis is 
routinely provided, technical terms are explained, particular columns to provide 
further analysis are not unusual. Singapore Press Holdings maintains a well staffed 
research group which supports this function, undertakes its own opinion polls and 
other surveys and feeds this information into its newspapers. In Singapore it is 
unquestionable that: 
The media has an important role in nation building because of its reach and its influence on the 
population. ... Newspapers play an important part in the transmission of cultural values. And 
values provide the tools for economic and social success, and for holding a nation together.' 
In 1980, Gaskil commented with regard to the use of the media by the PAP that: 
u Two of my informants commented that they had been interviewed off -the -record by Han Fook Kwang, 
political editor of the Straits Times and Warren Fernandez, assistant political editor on the same 
newspaper, in such as way as to indicate that the interview was not for the newspaper but for the ISD. 
None of these interviews appeared in the press. 
Based on correspondence from the Ministry of Information and the Arts. 
Singapore and the Foreign Press, Singapore, Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1988, p. 1 
as 
`British Vogue July issue barred for drugs article ", Straits Times, 18 July 1997, p. 1 
Goh Chok Tong, "The media's different worldviews ", Straits Times, 9 September 1998, p. 33 
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Reasonable grounds exist for believing that economic and other pressures against all opposition 
groups (exerted in part through control of the media) make elections very unfair. "30 
This was still the case in 1996 according to Rodari s assessment31 and is undoubtedly 
still true. However, this coercive function is very narrowly targetted. The most 
important function of government control of the media is consent building, or in the 
terminology of Total Defence, social and psychological defence. This aspect of control 
of the print media is evidenced by the considerable degree of editorial independence 
provided to the editors of the newspapers in each major language, a fact not usually 
acknowledged by non -Singaporean researchers. For example, in reporting religious or 
racial conflict outside Singapore, the different language newspapers take editorial 
stances which fit the hegemonic markers for their audiences; these markers do not 
mean uniformity in reporting, they seek, in this context, a reinforcement of racial and 
religious tolerance, a key consent building goal of the PAP.32 
National Education and Political Socialisation Strategies 
The use of compulsory national service in the armed forces, the police or the civil 
defence forces is a central part of the consent building regime, integral to the PAP's 
efforts to develop a distinct Singaporean citizenship 33 Only an indication of its role and 
influence can be provided in this thesis. Its goal is not simply to develop an effective 
citizen defence force, but also to provide a lengthy and well planned program of 
political socialisation as an integral step in enhancing social cohesion and internal 
security ' In 1973, Goh Keng Swee, founding father of the SAF, noted that: 
The defence build -up has to be supplemented by a parallel increase in the robustness of the 
civilian population, if we are not to throw away the enormous effort and money we have put 
into it. We must discard the migrant parvenu values ... we must sharpen our awareness of our 
collective or national interests. 35 
The importance of this program as a political socialisation strategy, involving all males 
from 18-40 of age and extended to 50 years of age for officers, was indicated by Lee 
Hsien Loong following the "Marxist conspiracy" case. Commenting on the fact that 
most of those arrested in this case were women, Lee stated: 
3o Raymond D. Gastíl, Freedom in the World Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1981, Oxford, Clio Press, 1981, p. 
396 
3' Garry Rodan, "Elections without representation: The Singapore experience under the PAP ", in R. FL Taylor, The 
politics of elections in Southeast Asia, Cambridge, Cambridge university Press, 1996, pp. 61 -89, p. 82 
32 Evelyn Yap, "BG Yeo: NS vital for racial peace ", Straits Times, 23 August, p. 12 
33 It is notable that the major contemporary work on citizenship in Singapore completely omits any mention of the 
function of national service. See: Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in 
Singapore, London, Routledge, 1995 
3° Evelyn Yap, `BG Yeo: NS vital for racial peace ", Straits Times, 23 August 1998 
35 Goh Keng Swee, The Practice of Economic Growth, Singapore, Federal Publications, 1995 p. 237 
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One of the reasons there were so many women among those arrested as subversives may be 
because they are exempt from national service and, therefore, failed to be properly inculcated 
with Singapore national ideology ' 
The importance of the program in underwriting the government's racial tolerance and 
ethnic harmony stances was emphasised by BG George Yeo in 1998: 
As long as we have a good government, and our own police and army, whatever racial or 
religious problems that may arise from time to time, can be contained or minimised. ... 
National Service is, therefore, a very important institution in Singapore against both internal 
aggression and internal threats 37 
This inculcation program is designed by the National Education Office within the 
Defence Policy Group in MINDEF and implemented by all training units. It includes 
an emphasis on the need for a strong government and incorporates a PAP oriented 
analysis of domestic politics. Since 1997, MINDEF's national education course has 
provided the framework for the new National Education curriculum being 
implemented in all schools by the Ministry of Education, initially under the direction 
of the former permanent secretary of MINDEF, Lim Siong Guan 3s In this way, all 
Singaporeans are now bought into MINDEF's political indoctrination program rather 
than just adult males. 
The MINDEF's National Education framework is also used within all uniformed youth 
services in Singapore as part of their training, particularly the National Cadet Corps. 
This involves approximately 50 per cent of the high school population, although it 
includes more male students than female students?' These organisations involve their 
members in Total Defence oriented training which, for example in the Boy Scouts, 
provides for the award of a series of Total Defence badges.4° 
GROs AND POLITICAL SOCIALISATION 
Although the role of the GROs in their relationship to the core executive has been 
excluded from this study, it is meaningful to briefly note the extent to which they 
penetrate society as agents of the core executive. The GROs are the basis for political 
action in the HDB heartlands; it is they which, under the overall direction of the 
People's Association (PA), act as the agents of the core executive in the housing estates 
where most people live. As Tan has noted; 
36 Far East Economic Review, 31 August 1988, p. 35 
i7 Evelyn Yap, op. cit. 
3a Based on an interview with the head of the MINDEF National Education Office, Major Gregory tan, in 1998. 
39 Based on an estimate by a Ministry of Education official. 
TD Focus: The Total Defence Electronic Newsletter, January/February 1996. Available at: 
http://www.mindefgov.sg/midpa/td2/badge.html 
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At the more structural level, the vigorous promotion of government -sponsored grassroots 
organisations could be seen as the attempt by the government to organize, communicate and 
control its citizens, especially the large proportion living in the newly created Housing and 
Development Board estates.41 
The political executive has never been coy about the critical role of the GROs as an 
instrument of the core executive, citing them as a key part of the political infrastructure 
since 1960 with the founding of the PA." In 1998, the PA's organisation of the GROs 
included responsibility for all GROs as detailed in Table 8.1 below. As can be seen from 
the table, GROs involve large numbers of people in their administration, all on a 
voluntary basis. In 1997, the GROs offered 74,340 courses and activities in which there 
were 8,563,500 participants.' It is obvious from this summary data, that the GROs are 
extensively involved in their communities. While most of this involvement is not 
overtly political, it takes place within a socio- political framework constructed by the 
PAP and intended to promote consent for its political program. 
Town Councils and Community Development Councils 
The dominance of the civil service in the management of the state was supposed to be 
partly diffused by the introduction of town councils in 1988, and further by 
Community Development Councils (CDCs) in 1997. These decentralisation strategies 
were accompanied by the PS21 program to reform the public sector by improving 
services to citizens, increasing efficiency and defusing the general perception of the 
bureaucracy as insular and arrogant. However, town councils are chaired by MPs and 
Table 8.1: People's Association Grassroots Organisations 
GRO No. Membershi 
Community Development Councils 9 230 
Citizen's Consultative Committees 83 2,780 
Community Centre/Club Management Committees 105 2,730 
Residents' Committees 486 11,260 
Neighbourhood Committees 14 220 
Civil defence Executive Committees 81 1,310 
Women's executive Committees 97 1,500 
Youth Executive Committees 93 1,540 
Senior Citizens' Executive Committees 271 3,920 
Area Sub -Committees 65 780 
Boys' Club Management Committee 13 200 
Sea Sports Club Management Committees 5 70 
61 Tan Liok Hee, "Voluntary Associations as a Model of Social Change ", Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 
2, 14, 1986, pp. 67 -79, p. 78 
' See: Lee Kuan Yew, Nation Building and the People's Association ", in, Jackie Sam, ed., The first Twenty Years of 
the people's Association, Singapore, The People's association, 1980, pp. 7 -17; and, Speech by Mr. Wong Kan Seng, 
Minister for Home Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the people's association at the people's association Long Service 
and Staff Commendation Awards Presentation Ceremony. Singapore, People's Association, 26 July 1997. 
al All data provided by the People's Association, September 1998. 
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TOTALS 1 1,322 26,540 
members appointed by the prime minister rather than elected, with members 
predominantly appointed from local GROs with clear government or PAP affiliations. 
Further, town council administrations were staffed by former public servants or public 
servants on secondment, at least in the PAP controlled councils which have been the 
overwhelming majority. In essence, the town councils are localised public housing 
estate management committees and partial substitutes for the HDB, as described by 
Low, but they are far from being self -determining and allowing "participation by the 
residents in truly local issues. "' 
The CDCs are similarly structured and controlled.' There has been no "evolution of 
'grassroots democracy' in these initiatives, especially as a major role for the CDCs is 
to "be an umbrella body, overseeing existing grassroots bodies such as the Citizens 
Consultative Committees, the Community Centre Management Committees, and the 
Residents` Committees."," and to administer a number of government welfare 
schemes including public assistance, the Rent and Utilities Assistance Scheme and the 
Medifund Scheme ' It should be noted that prior to the institution of the CDCs, Goh 
Chok Tong had described the Residents' Committees as "grassroots Parliaments "; he is 
obviously committed to the concept of consultation, but it is only consultation; it is not 
democratic dialogue " The CDCs, like the town councils are merely mechanisms for 
redistributing ministry and statutory board functions to highly controlled local 
government agencies with limited budgets, limited responsibilities and little political 
autonomy. There has been no rolling back of the state in these initiatives, although 
there has been a minor dispersal of limited power over a small policy domain in 
response to electoral dissatisfaction with the HDB's inability to become genuinely 
client- focussed and acknowledge the importance of the connection between 
citizenship, electoral satisfaction with government and the standard of its services. 
CDCs have been established because town councils have failed, in Low's terms, "to 
become centres for social and political communication and interaction.i50 Whether the 
CDCs are genuinely supposed to aspire to such an achievement is arguable and some 
more time will be necessary before their role and function can be fully analysed. 
16 Linda Low, Professionals at the Crossroads in Singapore, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1996, p.195 
as Nine CDCs had been established by 1998, all headed by PAP MPs with members appointed by the prime minister. 
See: Leong Ching Ching, "9 CDCs for Singapore ", Sunday Times, 3 August 1997, p. 1; and, Jason Leow, "National 
helpline reaches out to all in need ", Straits Times, 10 January 1998, p. 57 
46 Chua Lee Hoong, "Mayors and CDCs: election strategy or radical political change ? ", Straits Times, 24 August 
1996, p. 30 
" ibid. 
`t Pang Gek Choo and Leong Ching Ching, "CDCs to administer three government schemes ", Straits Times, 30 
March 1997, p. 29 
" Bertha Henson, "PM calls for grassroots Parliaments ", Straits Times, 8 June 1991, p. 1 
° Low, 1996, op. cit., p.195 
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What the establishment of town councils and CDCs has achieved, is the placement of 
the management of the main 'bread and butter' issues of HDB estate management and 
minor government program management close to citizens and the greater involvement 
of GROs in the most basic level of state management. This has probably helped defuse 
citizen dissatisfaction with the perceived poor level of service previously provided by 
the more centralised bureaucracies and possibly dissatisfaction with the government's 
acceptance of this. 
Community Consultation Strategies 
The Goh Chok Tong government was supposed to herald a new era in which 
government was to be "consultative and participative.i51 The development of 
genuinely consultative governments under Goh has taken some time, principally, it is 
asserted by many interviewed, because he had considerable resistance from the 
bureaucracy, Lee Kuan Yew and large numbers of parliamentary members who were 
not convinced that there was anything to gain by this approach. In fact, there was a 
fear that Goh's style would send signals that the government was weak and indecisive. 
However, Goh has slowly and persistently pushed this agenda, although not with 
outstanding success before 1995. The Catherine Lim episode in December 1994, 
galvanised the middle classes in particular to question the authenticity of Goh's 
consultation agenda. Dr. Lim wrote a letter to the Straits Times questioning whether the 
government had changed under Goh and asserting that it didn't seem to have done so; 
there was no evidence of a greater degree of consultation and participation in 
government according to Lim. The reaction from Goh's press secretary was a classical 
old -fashioned Singapore public service slap down, challenging Dr. Lim, a mild 
apolitical academic, to join a political party or not bother commenting on national 
politics. The public outcry about this approach resulted in a more conciliatory letter 
from Goh to the newspaper and his subsequently being questioned on the matter in the 
parliament 52 
From 1995 onwards, the governments efforts to be more participative and consultative 
became more apparent and received greater publicity. These efforts targetted the 
middle classes; working class participation was, at best, mediated through the GROS, 
Meet -the -People Sessions, ministerial walkabouts and the traditional political "show 
the face" strategies. The public sector meritocracy was only interested in consulting 
5' Alan Chong, Singapore's New Premier Goh Chok Tong, Petaling Jaya, Pelanduk Paperbacks, 1991, p. 41 
'2 See: Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Repon, 63, 11, 23 January 1995, pp. 1016 -1022 
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with their meritocratic equals, an attitude that was emphasised in interviews ' 
By 1998, the consultative mechanisms of government consisted of: 
1. An expanded Feedback Unit characterised by a greater number of community 
feedback sessions. By 1998, the Feedback Unit had increased its inputs to three 
times the 1995 level. In June 1998, the unit held the first of its national Feedback 
conference with 400 participants, pledged itself to continuation of the annual 
conference, to increase its feedback groups by six and to double participation in 
feedback sessions.' 
2. Government Parliamentary Committees have resource panels and undertake 
community visits and consultations with GROs, private sector companies and other 
organisations .5' 
3. Ministries have resource panels and various ad hoc advisory committees to assist 
with policy development 5 
4. The economic policy agencies have integrated industry consultation, including 
with SMEs, into their policy development processes.' 
5. Community and industry representation on major government committees such as 
the Singapore 21 Committee which also held public hearings, focus groups, 
community meetings and a public conference to obtain responses to its 
recommendations on a general public policy framework for the beginning of the 
next century.59 
While the amount of consultation has increased, perceptions of the government's 
willingness to consult and the breadth of consultation are still Iargely negative; 
principally because the increase started from a very low base and the resistance of a 
core executive still operating on an administrative model of government does not 
greatly value broader, more democratic forms of consultation. In a survey, reported in 
June 1998, the government scored consistently low on issues related to consultation 
and participation. Only 22 per cent of respondents agreed that government consults 
enough, 34 per cent agreed that the government is open and easy to talk to, 45 per cent 
agreed that there were enough feedback channels, 25 per cent agreed that there was 
freedom of speech, but 57 per cent agreed that the government was open to good 
suggestions 'o Although there are no comparable benchmark surveys available to 
compare this result, the fact that the survey was undertaken denotes the importance of 
the consultation strategy. Perhaps the best indication of the government's desire to 
engage more with civil society, following the major consultations that were integral to 
The usual response to the question on working class or general, participation in policy consultation was that only 
those who were thought to be able to offer something were consulted; ie. University graduates or successful 
businessmen at least 
54 Interview with Goh Chye Boon, Head, Feedback Unit, 1998. 
55 Alison De Souza, "More say in policies, please ", Straits Times, 20 June 1998, p. 2 
56 Interview with Dr. S. Vasoo, Chairman, GRC on Community development, 1998. 
Chua Mui Hoong, "Are people getting through to government ? ", Straits Times, 4 July 1998 
SB Interviews with NSTB, EDB, TAS and MTI officers in late 1995. 
ss "S'pore 21 panel to hold public conference ", Straits Times, 7 March 1998 
6° 
"Govt: How public sees it ", Straits Times, 20 June 1998 
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the Singapore 21 Committee, was the holding of a two day conference on civil society 
in May 1998, under the auspices of the Institute of Policy Studies. However, this 
conference also illustrated the tensions that still exist in state society relations; it was 
invitation only, closed door, the results were never published and no major initiatives 
seem to have emerged from it. 
As Raymond Lim, founder of the political discussion group The Roundtable 
commented in relation to this conference and state -society relations: 
In Singapore the state is extremely powerful. The Government calls the shots here. Civil 
organisations only test rather than determine the limits of growth of civil society.' 
Bilveer Singh sums up the dilemma of the Singaporean core executive in its inability to 
increase involvement in the political process and broaden its legitimacy beyond 
economic performance and its instinct to maintain total control, despite the greater use 
of consultative strategies: 
... especially since 1985, the country has become more pluralistic and open, with greater 
avenues for political participation and expression introduced. The problem, however, remains 
because all the aces are in the hands of the government and this is what has deterred many 
Singaporeans from involvement in national politics.2 
Conclusion: Strategies for Building Consent in Singapore 
The basic menu of consent building strategies in Singapore are: 
1. The existence of an elected parliament and regular elections, irregardless of the 
nature of the electoral system. 
2. The government's success in maintaining constant economic growth over almost its 
entire period of government. 
3. The success of the PAP governments' ability to provide high quality national 
housing for virtually the entire population.` 
4. Government ownership or control of the national telecommunications 
infrastructure and its content. 
5. Government control of the national print media and of the foreign print media 
circulated within the republic and its content. 
61 "What grows beneath the banyan tree?", Straits Times, 2 May 1998 
Bilveer Singh, The Vulnerability of Small States Revisited: A Study of Singapore's Post Cold -War 
Foreign Policy, Jogjakarta, Gadjah Mada University Press, 1999, p. 122 
s3 This as an essential strategy is assumed. The most cogent argument for it is provided by Chua Beng Huai_ See: 
Chua Beng Huat, Political legitimacy and Housing: Stakeholding in Singapore, London, Routledge, 1997 
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6. A political socialisation system that operates overtly and covertly through GROs, 
national youth organisations, the education system and the media. 
7. An approach by the core executive to policy issues and public management 
characterised by didactic and pedagogical strategies, supplemented by feedback 
and feedforward mechanisms operated through the civil service, the GROs and the 
media. 
COERCIVE STRATEGIES IN GOVERNANCE 
In this section, an overview of the structural characteristics of the coercive framework 
is provided and than a study of how the contemporary core executive has amended 
this framework in response to political, social and economic pressures since 1990 so as 
to make it more hidden, less socially intrusive, but without reducing its power. 
The Structural Framework of Coercion 
The coercive framework is principally based upon a select body of legislation, although 
it must be said that virtually all Singapore legislation is designed by the Parliamentary 
Counsel to maintain executive control, minimise judicial review, provide intrusive 
powers to the police and agencies which have dual public administration and political 
coercion roles often without warrant or independent review procedures. Principal 
among this body of legislation are: the Internal Security Act, the Prevention of 
Corruption Act, the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act, the Banishment Act, 
Enlistment Act, the Police Force Act, the Vigilante Corps Act,' the Singapore Armed 
Forces Act, the Trade Union Act, the Penal Code, the Undesirable Publications Act, the 
Film Act," the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act, the 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, the Public Entertainments Act, the Planning 
Act, the Land Acquisition Act, the Regulation of Imports and Exports Act, the Essential 
Information (Control of Publications and Safeguarding of Information) Act, the 
Singapore Broadcasting Authority Act, the Telecommunications Authority of 
Singapore Act, the Computer Misuse Act, the Banking Acte and the Environmental 
Public Health Act and the subsidiary legislation related to all this legislation. 
Both the Police Force Act and the Vigilante Corps Act are principally instruments for the administration and 
discipline of these two police forces, including the Special Volunteer Constabulary which is a third police force. 
There are also two other smaller police forces, both subject to the control of the Police Commissioner; the Port Police 
and the Airport Police. The powers of officers of these agencies is defined principally by other legislation. The 
Commercial and Industrial Security Corporation (CISCO) is also an auxiliary police force. 
ss Amendments to the Film Act in 1998 made it an offence to produce, distribute or publicly shown films or videos of 
a political nature. The penalty for a breach of this provision of the act is a fine of $62,000, 2 years imprisonment or 
both. This, of course, does not apply to the incumbent government's use of publicly owned media for its own 
political purposes. See: Andrea Hamilton, "Questions of Censorship: A ban on political film and video sparks 
debate ", Asiaweek. 27 March 1998 
s.47 of the Banking Act allows the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) to inquire into the credit provided by 
any bank to any customer under certain conditions. However, such information is allowed to be gathered as part of a 
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Many of the control provisions of these acts are not discernible from their titles. For 
example, the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act is the principal act preventing 
strikes and management lockouts in essential services industries such as water, gas and 
electricity supply industries. The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act has 
provisions for search, arrest and indefinite detention identical to the Internal Security 
Act in order to curb religious extremism. In relation to the Land Acquisition Act, its 
use for political or administrative purposes has been admitted. Richard Clutterbuck 
noted in 1984 that; 
"it was represented to the author that this (the power of compulsory acquisition of land for 
development under the Land Acquisition Act of 1966) enabled government officials to apply 
pressure on individuals to conform over some quite different matter by hinting that their 
property might be requisitioned under the Act at 1973 prices. "67 
It is also possible to include the Housing and Development Board Act in this category 
as the supply and control of public housing to 91 per cent of the population provides 
the government with a potent coercive instrument as was demonstrated by the use of 
public housing upgrading policy as an inducement to support the government in the 
1997 and earlier elections. In all opposition wards in the 1997 elections, the government 
directly threatened to withhold upgrading of HDB flats if opposition members were re- 
elected. Additionally, the national concrete spoiling repair program aimed at repairing 
older HDB blocks was withheld from the opposition electorates until 1999. The use of 
this policy has been explored elsewhere, especially by Chua and others, and its 
dimensions are so complex that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to However, it must 
be acknowledged as one of the most fundamental instruments used for coercion, 
although I would argue that its principal use is for building consent in support of the 
PAP regime. 
A number of professionals also commented during interviews that the various acts by 
which they are registered could also be considered as having a coercive function as 
general inspection of the bank under ss.44-45, although it must remain confidential to MAS. Tinder s.47(4xd) such 
information must be supplied under if permitted under any other law (such as the Internal Security Act) or in the 
investigation of a criminal offence, even though charges may not have been laid. A seminal issue in these provisions 
is whether the confidentiality of any information is limited to MAS or, as an executive agency of the government, 
that confidentiality extends beyond MAS. Given the political uses made of such information in the Francis Seow and 
Tang Hang Leong cases, the confidentiality of any customer information in a Singapore bank must be suspect. 
' Richard Clutterbuck, Conflict and Violence In Singapore and Malaysia 1945 -1983, Singapore, Graham Brash, 
1984, p. 343 
68 Several works examine the political function of housing policy in Singapore: Chua Beng -Huat, Political 
Legitimacy and Housing, London, Routledge, 1997; Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation 
Building and Citizenship in Singapore, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 113 -139; Linda Low, The Political Economy of 
a City- State: Government -made Singapore, Singapore, Oxford University Press,1998, pp. 179 -194; Phang Sock 
Yong, "Housing Policy Changes in Singapore ", in, Linda Low and Toh Mun Heng, Public Policies in Singapore: 
Changes in the 1980s and Future Signposts, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1992, pp. 114- 126;Tan Sook Yee, 
Private Ownership of Public Housing in Singapore, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1998; Cedric Pugh, "The 
Political Economy of Public Housing ", , in, Kendal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., Management of Success: 
The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 833 -859 
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registration boards incorporated under this body of legislation have considerable 
discretion in determining whether a person is of good character and morals as 
uniformly required by legislation.° Medical practitioners, dentists, nurses, contact lens 
practitioners, engineers, architects, bio- medical laboratory scientists, lawyers, land 
surveyors, pharmacists and accountants are all registered professions, although the 
social professions - teachers, social workers, psychologists - are not. For those 
professions, such as the medical profession, which have legislated peak bodies, voting 
for some of these is compulsory and failure to vote attracts fines and the possibility 
that professional registration will be withheld." There is therefore official compulsion 
for the more elite professions to be involved in their own co -option within the 
hegemonic system. 
The centrality of the coercive framework to the success of the hegemonic program is 
revealed in a comment by Goh Keng Swee in 1988 that the most important prerequisite 
for the PAP's success had been "an efficient secret police."' This secret police," 
operating principally as the ISD also incorporates the Police Security Branch (which 
includes the police Internal Security Unit), the Police Intelligence Division, the 
Criminal Investigation Department, the Prisons Department Intelligence Branch in 
association with the Customs and Excise Department, the CPIB and special postal and 
telecommunications surveillance units in Singapore Post and Singapore Telecom 
installations. Within the civil service, the ISD and the Security Intelligence Division 
(SID) attached to MINDEF and the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), are 
actually independent departments which for administrative reasons are placed within 
ministries.ß 
Despite the organisational autonomy of the ISD, SID and CPIB, the MI-IA Joint 
Operations Division (JOD) maintains closer operational linkages with these 
ev For example, under the Legal Profession Act, s.82A(3)(a), a solicitor, whether practising or not, may be subject to 
disciplinary proceedings if that person "has been guilty in Singapore or elsewhere of such misconduct =befitting a 
legal officer or an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession; ". What 
defines behaviour befitting an honourable profession is obviously open to wide interpretation. One example provided 
in interview was that any male homosexual solicitor in Singapore, where male homosexuality (but not female 
homosexuality) is illegal, could be easily struck off the role of solicitors, Needless to say, male homosexual who are 
solicitors or other registered professionals do not get involved in politics in Singapore, although there have been 
several prominent PAP affiliated figures who were homosexual, but not publicly so. 
° Voting for the membership of the Singapore Medical Council has been compulsory since 1998. Registered medical 
practitioners who fail to give a valid reason for not voting (e.g. absence overseas) are fined $500. Failure to pay the 
fine will result in registration being denied and the practitioner may be struck off the medical register and barred from 
practicing. See: "Penalties `not too harsh' for doctors who don't vote ", Straits Times, 26 November 1998 
" Cited in: Melanie Chew, "Human Rights in Singapore: Perceptions and Problems ", Asian Survey, 34, 11, 1995, pp. 
933 -945, p. 942 
Much of the information in this section comes from interviews with seven serving or former officials associated 
with internal security matters. 
r' The status of various departments and ministries and their relationship to the personnel board system introduced in 
1997, is outlined in "Ministries under Senior Personnel Board" on the web site of the Public Service Division. See: 
"Personnel management Authority - Ministries under Senior Personnel Board ". Available at: 
http:// www4 .gov.sg/pmo /pdb /psystem/pb.html 
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organisations, although the information and operational hierarchy is such that on 
national security, rather than criminal intelligence, matters, SID and ISD are at the top 
of the information and intelligence analysis hierarchy and on political security issues 
ISD takes fundamental responsibilities, but supposedly now with SID oversight " This 
infrastructure, has been coordinated, in large part, since February 1997 through the 
Joint Operations Division (JOD) of the Ministry of Home Affairs assisted by the 
Intelligence liaison Unit in the Police Intelligence Department, but despite this, there is 
still considerable compartmentalisation of operations and control of major intelligence 
resources, such as the national intelligence data warehouse and associated analytical 
functions remain under ISD and SID, rather than MHA, control? 
The ISD retains responsibility for most domestic political and social surveillance for 
which it can also call upon the services of the non -uniformed specialist police branches 
as required. Indeed, it is still common to rotate senior police officers through ISD as 
part of their career development and to retain strong operational links.7ó It continues to 
provides extensive physical and communications surveillance of citizens and now 
reports to both the Minister for Home Affairs and the Prime Minister's Istana office as a 
consequence of Goh Chok Tong's preference for a rationalisation of functions, for 
ministers to take responsibility for their portfolios and to have a greater supervisory 
role than to have many specific units reporting directly to his office? 
Prior to 1997, it was reported in interviews that internal security status reports went 
simultaneously to both Goh Chok Tong and Lee Kuan Yew. However, after the 1997 
election and the implementation of the "Home Team" concept, the prime minister 
changed the primary reporting line to Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs and 
one of Goh Chok Tong's kitchen cabinet, with the secondary reporting line being to the 
prime minister's Principal Private Secretary, Tan Tee How, who has a background in 
intelligence and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Lee Kuan Yew's direct involvement in 
internal security now seems to have passed, but as in all areas, he continues to make 
' Singapore's external intelligence activity will not be considered here, although it should be noted that the small 
external service is sometimes used to monitor banished citizens or PAP political enemies residing overseas. As in 
Britain until recently, the military and external intelligence organisations operate under cabinet directions not 
legislation. For a report on one alleged operation of the external intelligence wing see: "FBI investigates burglary 
with claimed links to Singapore secret police ", Sydney Morning Herald. 21 October 1997 
" Manpower limitations which have applied to other ministries have not been applied to either the ISD, SID, CPIB or 
the DSO in recent years, In fact, the recruitment of Division 1 officers (graduates) and the allocation of 
Administrative Service officers to ISD and SID has increased since approximately 1990, accompanied by a high level 
of recruitment and the advanced postgraduate training of staff in DSO. 
" For example, Sim Poh Heng and Tan Seck Kang, both who have served as Director, Central Narcotics Bureau 
(CNB), had substantial ISD careers after being transferred to the ISD from the SPF. See: "Ministry of Home Affairs 
Press Statement ", Ministry of Home Affairs, 19 March 1999. Available at: http : / /www.mhagov.sg/190399.htnl. The 
current Deputy Director of CNB, Tan Seek Kang has also served in ISD, current Director, ISD, Benny Lim came 
from the SPF and two of the current deputy directors in ISD, Ismail bin Ranting and Lim Poh Quee are also from the 
SPF. See: "Mandy Goh promoted to senior ASP ", Straits Times, 6 November 1984, p. 14 
" The reporting line to the Prime Minister's Office is reported to be through the Prime Minister's Principal Private 
Secretary, currently Tan Tee How who also liaises with Lee Kuan Yew's Principal Private Secretary (Heng Swee 
Keat) on important internal security matters. 
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his views known is he so wishes, although the degree of direct influence this has over 
the prime minister and cabinet has been questionable for some time. However the 
distinct impression now is that he is not involved directly in these matters as Goh 
Chok Tong insists on a more subtle approach to internal security in order to avoid a 
repetition of mistakes such as the perceived fiasco of the "Marxist conspiracy" which 
was under Lee's direct control. 
Lee Hsien Loong is reported by some informants to have no direct involvement with or 
control over the security agencies but is reputed to have secondary sources of 
information and probably some influence on them, at least within the ISD. How 
accurate such assessments are is unknown, but it is unlikely that Goh's position is so 
weak that he does not exercise considerable authority over this area. It is also obvious 
that, although Lee Hsien Loong has had considerable influence over the civil service 
since the Public Service Division began reporting to him in 1994, he has had no direct 
responsibility for internal security or defence issues since Goh Chok Tong has been 
prime minister, from late 1991, whereas Goh has retained considerable influence over 
MINDEF and the SAF and slowly taken control of internal security matters as he has 
consolidated his premiership. In 1998, some informants still supported the perception 
that the ISD had a reporting line to Lee Hsien Loong, based on Lee's supposed 
association with the former director of ISD, Tjong Yik Min who also attended Catholic 
High School and National Junior College one year behind Lee ' If such a relationship 
did exist, it is doubtful that it long survived Goh's ascension to the prime 
ministership.' 
Contemporary Approaches to Managing Coercive Strategies 
These coercive mechanisms and strategies are underwritten by a surveillance system 
which relies on four principal sources of information; telecommunications surveillance 
through dedicated interception facilities in all major SingTel switching nodes and 
surveillance of cellular voice and data systems through MIRA and SingTel's facilities 80 
18 This is also the view taken by an anonymous contributor to the Far East Economic Review in 1988. See: Singapore 
Inc.'s corporate security service ", far east Economic Review, 30 June 1988, pp. 21 -22 
'9 Given the seniority based nature of Singapore's high schools and junior colleges, the one year age difference 
between Tjong and Lee would be such that they would have had little opportunity to develop a friendship based on 
simply attending the same schools. Tjong attended university in Newcastle Australia and Lee went to Cambridge, so 
if any friendship between the two existed, it was formed on a basis other than attendance at the same schools. Both 
also had separate postgraduate education destinations, Tjong completed an MSc in the Department of Industrial and 
Systems Engineering at NUS in 1979, whereas Lee completed his MPA at Harvard in 1980. 
8° It was reported that there are definitely dedicated interception facilities built into the major switches at Comcentre, 
Telecentre, the Pickering Operations Complex, the Sentosa Earth Station and the major SingTel switching facilities to 
which the satellite downlinks from Tuas and Loyang are connected. The Pickering Operations Complex is the 
principal centre for telecommunications monitoring as it has high capacity digital networks which connect the Bukit 
Timah and Sentosa earth stations and the international submarine cables at Katong and Tuas to this complex. See: "A 
move to give users tip-top service ", Straits Times, 29 July 1988, p. 9 
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Police Security Branch, ISD and SPF field operatives, and an informer network that 
includes PAP cadres and others. These information collection mechanisms are now 
supported by a sophisticated intelligence analysis capability shared between the major 
security and police agencies which has been developed since approximately 1985. As 
George has commented this has been an extremely successful strategy: 
What consolidated the achievements of the police was the system of area control that Lee 
established through a network of civilian and paramilitary organizations. The backbone of these 
organizations was provided by the unseen but ubiquitous cadres of the PAP, perhaps 
numbering no more than 2,000. Recruited with great care, passed through several security 
sieves and forever sworn to keep their status secret, the PAP cadres have functioned in close 
coalition with the political leadership and the Special Branch. They have acted as the 
government's liaison men and community watchdogs, vigilantly keeping their eyes and ears 
open in every constituency of the republic, every trade union and student organisation, clan 
association and religious group.' 
However, contemporary surveillance and control strategies, while not excluding the 
traditional approaches, have progressed well beyond these proven methods. The 
traditional physical and postal surveillance strategies, based on ISD district officer 
networks (based principally on the old colonial districts - approximately 20), Leninist 
style informer cells, in -field undercover officers working in various high- contact 
professions, as well as networks of cadre and non -cadre paid and unpaid informers in 
unions, schools, religious organisations» the media, the public service, GLCs, large 
companies and the middle class professions on which these agencies relied» have 
been gradually supplemented by community policing strategies adopted from Japan 
and, more importantly, telecommunications based surveillance, for which capability 
planning commenced within SID and MINDEF from at least 1984 and probably earlier 
under the Systems and Computers Organisation first headed by Philip Yeo Liat Kok 
and established in 1979. While tapping of the domestic and international telephone 
systems had been common practice in colonial times and has continued, this has been 
supplemented by interception of electronic mail (email) and other data streams, 
including the development of a considerable capacity to infiltrate personal computers 
connected to the internet and private data systems. 
" T. J. S. George, Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore, Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 1984, p. 183 
u The surveillance of religious organisations, especially those with a record of inter- ethnic proselytising, has been a 
major concern of the political executive. In the White Paper on Maintenance of Religious Harmony, released in 
December 1990, a report by the ISD on "Religious Trends -A Security Perspective" was included to highlight the 
potential for religious based ethnic conflict 
" See: `Singapore Inc.'s corporate security service ", Far East Economic Review, 30 June 1988, pp. 21 -22 
Pu The Japanese koban system has been adapted by the SPF for local use. This provides a police presence in all 
neighbourhoods and a low level community surveillance capability as well as a heightened police response capability. 
See: W. T. Austin, "Crime and Control ", in K. S. Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., management of Success: The 
Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989 
85 "Defence men for security conference ", Straits Times, 21 December 1984, p. 18 
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COMMUNICATIONS BASED SURVEILLANCE 
This capability was already in place by 1987 with the first generation of email 
software,' but has been considerably enhanced since 1993 with the implementation of 
a number of special projects through the Ministry of Home Affairs' Computer Systems 
Division (CSD)87, in association with the NCB, MINDEF88 and specialist domestic and 
international security consultants 89 In 1998 within MHA, special support for 
surveillance operations is provided by two branches of CSD; the MIS /Surveillance 
Branch and the Investigation and Intelligence Project 90 In 1998, it was reported that 
voice intercepts were retained for two months by ISD and email intercepts for three 
months. Those intercepts of particular interest are, of course, retained on file. Email 
intercepts are easily stored as they are text files, and it was reported that the retained 
voice intercepts were then being retained using compression technology so that audio 
files can be attached to a surveillance subject's file. 
Surveillance of mobile voice and data was enhanced in 1995 with the installation for 
Singapore Telecommunications (SingTel), on behalf of the ISD, of a national system for 
intercepting cellular telephone signals, reportedly using Siemens technology, which 
'Francis T. Seow, To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison, New Haven, Yale Southeast Asia 
Studies, 1994, p.90 
s, Formerly the Computer Information Systems Department (CISD). 
B8 This has included MINDEF's Security Intelligence Division, its Signals Intelligence Group and the Information 
Technology Group within the Defence Science Organisation. 
89 MINDEF is the agency which sets computer and telecommunications intelligence security standards and 
procedures in consultation with the NCB. MINDEF bases its standards on those adopted by the United States 
Department of Defence, specifically the Defence Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment 
Standard overseen and maintained by the U.S. Defence Information Systems Agency (DISA). Most DISA standards 
are publicly available. Like the United States, Singapore's National Information Infrastructure (NH) has been 
designed with considerable input from the military and law enforcement agencies and incorporates the requirements 
for the national Defence Information Infrastructure (DII). MINDEF supposedly has an official liaison relationship 
with the US National Security Telecommunications and Information Security Systems Committee (NSTISSC), 
chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defence, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. In maintaining 
its technological capability in DII development, Singapore also maintains close working relationships with Israel's 
state security agencies and its associated state and private sector companies, the FBI and Australian military 
intelligence and signals intelligence agencies and also uses private sector American consultants as required. Although 
the only known foreign agencies which maintain a direct link with ISD are the Israeli agency Mossad, the FBI and 
the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation, others assist internal surveillance indirectly through their 
MINDEF link. The United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation which has a regional station in Singapore, provides 
some training to ISD, SID and MSD officers through these officers being seconded to the Singapore Police Force 
during FBI training placements. In 1998 32 Singaporeans were trained at the FBI Academy. In 1991 it was reported 
that approximately 40 SPF officers are sent for advanced overseas training to the FBI, Scotland Yard and the Japan 
National Police Academy. See: Mahesh Nalla, "Singapore ", in, Department of Justice, World Factbookof Criminal 
Justice Systems, Washington DC, Department of Justice, 1996. Available at: http: / /wwwojp.usdoj.gov/bjs /pub /ascii/ 
wfbcjsin.txt. For the Australian association see: Brian Toohey and William Pinwill, Oyster: The History of the 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Melbourne, William Heinemann, 1989, pp. 74 -75. For information on Mossad 
activity in Singapore see: Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: the Complete History of Israel's 
Intelligence Community, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1990, pp. 155 -156, and; Jeffrey Richelson, Foreign Intelligence 
Organisations, Cambridge (Mass.), Ballinger Publishing Company, p. 198. For an indication of the CIA and FBI 
presence in Singapore see: "Spy incident a sobering reminder for Singapore ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 30 
November, 1996, p. 12. For FBI training see: Ministry of Home Affairs Spokesman's Comments on Visit of FBI 
Director. Available at: http : / /www.mha.gov.sg/7nov99.htm1. Information on international participants in FBI training 
programs was available from the FBI Academy's website in 1998, but was removed during 1999. 
e See: Ministry of Information and the Arts, Singapore Government Directory, July 1998, Singapore, Ministry of 
Information and the Arts, 1998, p. 502 
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was enhanced in 1998 to also include the capability to intercept and decode CDMA 
signals 91 This system may have been linked to the trial of electronic tags for a category 
of released prisoner, called reformative trainees, in 1997.92 It may also have been as a 
consequence of this system that in 1995 all Administrative Service and other senior 
officers were issued official guidelines indicating the restrictions which should apply 
to conversations by cellular telephones. The existence of infrastructure to monitor the 
cellular telephone network was hinted at in parliament in 1997, but no details were 
revealed 93 This interception system is reportedly managed through SingTel's 
Information Security Department and includes staff seconded from ISD, SID and has 
liaison arrangements for access by the CPIB, CAD and MSD based on requests from 
these agencies. 
Paradoxically, this capability for surveillance has been developed in association with 
the MHA's responsibility for enforcing the Computer Misuse Act, for which it has 
established an Information Security Services team of IT security analysts 94 The 
Computer Misuse Act specifically empowers any police officer or a person Authorised 
in writing by the Commissioner of Police" to access and inspect any computer, search 
the computer, access any code, software or technology and to investigate those 
operating any computer, and to demand decryption information and access to any 
encrypted data95 if "there is reasonable cause to suspect (it) is or has been in use in 
connection with any offence under this Act...i9' The act also permits arrest without 
warrant.97 Some of these powers must be approved by the Public Prosecutor before 
being exercised." However, if the matter related to an internal security or political 
investigation, such authorisation would be automatic. 
These enhancements have included the acquisition and use of high performance 
computers, specialised software for communications traffic surveillance 99 the 
fl1 It was reported that this installation was undertaken by Siemens possibly jointly with Uraco Technologies Pte. Ltd., 
which is the Singaporean distributor of radiotelecommunications equipment manufactured by Siemens, Marconi, 
Hirschmann Rheinmetall Electronik of Germany and Harris Corporation of the United States. All manufacturers 
produce radio frequency equipment. The CDMA standard, derived from US military communications research, is 
used by MobileOne for its cellular telephone network. 
See: "Addenda to Presidential Address, Ministry of Home Affairs ", Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official 
Report, 26 May 1997, p. 38 
The Minister for Communications, Mali Bow Tan, indicated in the debate of the Committee of Supply, that 
telephone companies had taken measures to combat security breaches of the cellular telephone system , but did not 
give details. See: Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report, 29 July, 1997, p. 1198 
" 
"CSCP sites promote Computer Security", Use IT, 1, 1995, p.7 
"s.15 
" s.15(2) 
9' s.16, if "reasonably suspected of committing an offence" 
ss s.15(3) 
The capacity of the MHA to use specialised software to investigate an individual's person computer was revealed 
in April 1999, when a user complained that an MHA officer had scanned her computer without authorisation. It 
subsequently emerged that the MHA TT Security Unit had been asked to scan 200,000 on line PCs by SingTel 
supposedly to look for a trojan horse virus. Why an ISP would wish to scan its customers computers to look for virus 
against which its main systems should have defences is difficult to understand. See: Geoffrey Pereira, "Privacy of 
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implementation of a dedicated high security network within the civil service data and 
communications network and the development of software engineering and 
manufacturing capabilities for covert network surveillance. Surveillance data is 
processed using high performance database software with data mining and complex 
cross matching capabilities for file comparison and profile building. This has resulted 
in the development of a series of computer databases within a central data warehouse 
of people under surveillance which stores intercept data and also into which 
photographic and print information is optically scanned to provide a complete on -line 
file of large numbers of citizens and other residents. 
This data warehouse, supposedly located within the major government 
communications and data centre on Sentosa adjacent to the Sentosa earth station, is 
managed by ISD and is linked to the People Hub database in the National Registration 
Department. It is also being progressively linked to other hub databases including the 
database of registered societies and their officers maintained by the Registrar of 
Societies as these are developed as part of the TCP /IP based civil service integrated 
network which has replaced the first generation IDNet for public sector 
communications.100 For example, the information maintained on the database of the 
Registrar of Companies and Businesses and the Registrar of Vehicles can be accessed as 
required, apparently at no cost to MHA.101 
Since at Ieast 1996, the ISD and the Singapore Police Force have been interested in 
integrating relevant information from the Land Data Hub," the first stage of which 
was completed in December 1994 by the Ministry of Law and NCB into MHA and LSD 
databases. This seemingly innocuous connection, the second generation of which was 
implemented as the Integrated Land Information System (INLIS) on 24 October 1998 
and soon to include the Self- Service Map Production System (SMAP), provides various 
categories of digitised data to government agencies. This includes data on individual 
citizen's residential locations based on the new postcode system which identifies 
individual buildings and allows these to be categorised by street, building name, 
electoral division, census boundaries and the People's Association district boundaries 
which the ISD also uses to define its operational districts. This is now being 
supplemented by a complementary application, Address Point, which will allow the 
linking of postal codes to geographical coordinates. Although the Land Systems 
Support Unit in the Ministry of Law currently manually processes data requests from 
surfers safe, says SingNet ", Straits Times, I May 1999; Chong Chee Kin, "No Invasion of privacy: SingNet ", Straits 
Times, 1 May 1999 
100 "New Life for mNet ", Use IT, 2, 1995, p. 9 
iai This database is not publicly searchable, although citizens can purchase company and director searches from the 
Registrar of Companies and Businesses which then conducts the search and provides results. 
102 "Cross ministry project puts Singapore on world map ", Use IT, 2, I995, p. 12 
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MHA, it is planned to have direct connection with all INLIS subscribers through the 
public sector high bandwidth wide area network (WAN) in the near future.103 
One other area which supplies information to the ISD on demand is the enforcement 
and compliance divisions of the Internal Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS). The 
progressive implementation of database connections through this WAN, and the 
progressive implementation of high performance hardware and database software in 
key database hubs and agencies104 will soon allow all information on any citizen to be 
collated by security agencies through the use of crossmatching software on their 
supercomputer platform. Additionally, MHA is continuing to develop specific 
software products to assist in criminal and non -criminal surveillance,105 such as the 
Name Search System, implemented in April 1998. This system allows multiple agencies 
to collate information on individuals by a simple name search across multiple ministry 
databases.'Óú All of these initiatives conform to the civil service component of the 
National Information Infrastructure initiative which commenced in 1993 under the 
direction of NCB.107 
As almost every commercial and all government transactions in Singapore require the 
use of a person's NRIC national identity number,70R the extent of surveillance possible 
is considerable. All Singapore legal residents 12 years of age and over,109 whether 
citizens or not, must register and carry at all times, a national identity card. Those who 
register at 12 must re- register at 17 years of age as a check on all males who then 
become eligible for compulsory national service in either the military or civil defence 
forces.tto It is planned that these cards evolve into computer encoded smart cards with 
103 Singapore Ministry of Law, Integrated Land Information Services (INLIS) Fact Sheet, Singapore Ministry of Law, 
1999. Also available at: http: / /www.gov.sg.molaw/lssu/ projects /inlis/inlis_fact_sheet.html 
1' For example, the new SIR Building (Singapore Immigration and Registration Building) at Lavender contains a 
large data processing facility for all national registration and immigration records and provides these facilities, and 
special data analysis services for use by other agencies as required for other purposes. As with all the new buildings 
being constructed as part of the public service construction program, this building is wired with optical fibre cable 
and has high capacity ISDN connections to the civil service data communications network. 
ms The Singapore Police and judicial system is now highly computerised with systems integration between the two 
areas. For example, some of the older system now being upgraded to conform to the new broadband network include: 
Tickets and Summons System, Magistrates Appeal System, Crime Arrest System, Subpoena System, Police 
Summons System, and the Electronic Court Document handling System. 
106 The Name Search System (NSS) actually replaces an older system which was not as intelligent. In executing a 
search, the NSS accesses databases across the MHA and is currently used by MHA agencies (Singapore Police, 
Central Narcotics Bureau, ISD, Singapore Immigration and Registration) and the Ministry of Manpower. It will be 
made available to other ministries. See: "MHA commissions new Name Search System ", IT Impact, July 1998, p. 3 
10' Michael Yap, 'Paving the Information Highway ". Available at: 
http://www.ncb.gov.sgincb/speeches/96/niMsId001.1nni. At this time, Michael Yap Kiam Siew was Director 
Information Infrastructure and New Media/Intemet Cluster at the National Computer Board. In May 1998 he was 
appointed Deputy Chief Executive of NCB and from 1 March 1999, he has been Chief Executive. 
108 National Registration Identity Card number 
1'6 It is believed that this age was set by Lee Kuan Yew as it is the age at which, during the 1950s and 1960s, students 
enrolled in the first year of Chinese Middle Schools which were strongholds of the Barisan Socialis opposition. These 
schools no longer exist, but this is one indication of how a social model based on this period is still imposed on 
Singapore because of Lee's historical experience and personal paranoia 
110 Subsidiary legislation requires that if a card is lost or damaged or a card holder's address changes, this must be 
reported within 14 days to a police station or the National Registration Office. 
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a memory chip, which increases the ways in which they can be integrated into a 
national surveillance system, reflecting the format of the SAF Card introduced into the 
Singapore Armed Forces in 1995.111 A trial with this goal in mind was started in 1997 
and involved 50,000 people using a smart card with a high level of encryption.112 A 
similar smart card is already being used by Singapore Immigration for frequent 
visitors, particularly daily workers commuting from Malaysia.113 In 1996, a service 
wide smart identity card was introduced for all civil servants and is used for 
authorising and monitoring access to all "buildings, offices, carparks, data, computer 
networks, electronic mail and workflow applications. "114 The NRIC system has been 
supplemented by the introduction of the Student Identification Pass (SIP) in early 1997 
to replace students' TransitLink Concession Cards. The credit -card like SIP, valid for 
six years, contains pre -printed particulars of students with the holder's photo. From 
1998, the SIP will allow students to access the National Library and its branches and 
there are plans for introducing integrated chip (smart card) technology to the SIP. The 
NCB notes that with these developments, "The SIP could then be used as a tool for 
tracking class attendance, accessing school premises, computers and laboratories, and 
even as a Cashcard." 115 
All of these have now been supplemented by the Cashcard system which was initially 
introduced under pressure from MAS as an electronic funds system in an effort to 
reduce the costs associated with circulating currency. However, personalised 
Cashcards, which may have a value of up to $500, can also be used for a variety of 
identification purposes as well. Personalised Cashcards have been issued to more than 
500,000 trade unionists and linked to a customer rewards program to promote usage,'" 
and all students of NUS have also been issued with personalised Cashcards.117 In June 
1998, the Land Transport Authority (LTA) issued a contract for five million smart cards 
and associated readers to replace the existing integrated transport payment card 
(TransitLink card). These new cards, which are personalisable, will be trialled in early 
2000 and fully implemented by 2002.118 Travel data on these cards will be real time 
monitored through the Mass Rapid Transit system as fares are calculated on travel 
segments be completed in minimum times. Cashcards are also required to use those 
roads which are subject to Electronic Road Pricing (ERP). The ERP relies upon a 
"SCO success benefits others ", Computer Times, 1 September 1991, p. 12 
°2 "50,000 to take part in electronic ID trials ", Straits Times Weekly Edition, 30 November 1996, p. I 
The Immigration Autoclearance System allows a holder to pass through an automatic immigration checkpoint 
without being manually checked by an immigration officer. Each journey is logged into the Immigration Department 
database. 
14 "PS Card - Don't Leave Home Without It ", IT Impact, September 1996 
"Student Identification Pass - A Pass to The Future ", IT Impact, October 1997, p. 5 
"6 NTUC, STCS & NCB Joint Venture Signing Ceremony For NTUC Link Pte Ltd. Available at: 
hppt: / /www.stcom.sg/p0428.htm, l May 1998 
"' NUS Smart Card System. Available at: http : / /www.nus.sg/Major /smarthtml, 2 April 1999 
us Award of Contract for the Enhanced Integrated Fare System. Available at: http://www.ltagov.sg/new/PR%20- 
%20EIFS %205.html, 22 June 1998 and 3 April 1999 
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Cashcard inserted into an In- vehicle Identification Unit (IU); funds are automatically 
deducted from the card, and the number of the IU recorded as a vehicle drives under 
an electronic monitoring gantry above each monitored road. The N identification is 
linked to the vehicle and owner details in the database of the Registrar of Vehicles. This 
data is also included in the Land Transport Authority's strategic long term planning for 
an integrated intelligent transport system, implementation of which has already 
commenced. How this system will be able to track individual vehicles as the ERP is 
expanded is not publicly known, but the possibility should not be dismissed.119 
The importance of ITT12° based surveillance is reflected in the increased recruitment of 
information technology staff to all surveillance agencies and branches since 1993, and 
in particular by the appointment of Chew Hock Yong, a former Ministry of 
Communications official with a background in telecommunications policy, as Director 
of JOD in 1997. Complementary organisational reform was also undertaken within the 
CPIB with the formation of the Computer Information Systems Unit which has now 
substantially integrated its systems with the MHA. Although the reporting line for the 
CPIB remains to the PMO, and therefore to Lee Hsien Loong as the minister with direct 
responsibility, it is now operationally integrated with the MHA internal security 
structure, although it maintains its own IT systems. The CPIB also maintains close links 
with the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) within the Revenue Division of the 
MOF which is responsible for combating complex commercial frauds and white collar 
crime. The CAD is responsible for investigating and prosecuting offences under the 
Securities Industry Act, the Companies Act and the Drug Trafficking (Confiscation of 
Benefits) Act. It does this by tracking share and financial transactions and maintains a 
database on these and has powers to investigate all financial transactions of interest to 
it. This provides unlimited access to banking and financial information of individuals 
and companies, although ISD also has this access under the Internal Security Act.ut 
The CAD also refers other offences disclosed in the course of investigations to other 
enforcement and security agencies. CAD apparently has access to MHA and ISD 
surveillance databases as required and maintains its own surveillance databases on 
company directors, shareholders and executives which are made available as required 
to other surveillance agencies. 
19 Four components of the Integrated Transport Management System (ITMS) have currently been developed; the 
ERP, the GreenLink Determining System (GLIDE) which controls traffic lights and flow rates through major 
intersections, the Expressway Monitoring and Advisory System (EMAS) and TrafficScan which uses the satellite 
facilitated Global Position System installed in 7,500 taxis to assess traffic speeds and flow rates. ITMS is expected to 
be fully operational by 2002. See: Launch of TrafficScan. Available at: 
http:// www. lta.gov .sg/projects/trafficscan.html, 2 May 1999 
12° Information Technology and Telecommunications 
'2' See: Monetary Authority of Singapore, Directives to banks: Directive 12, 1 November 1985. This directive 
addresses the issue of banking secrecy and advises that the Internal Security Act and other legislation, allows access 
to individual bank records. 
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The growth of information technology (IT) usage in Singapore, strongly encouraged by 
the government, is not only a boon to efficiency and economic competitiveness, but a 
blessing for the domestic intelligence agencies as the main target for surveillance is the 
middle class which is a high user of email and on -line services in general. The 
surveillance of domestic email' and low level encrypted data is relatively simple and 
in Singapore is reported to be a major activity of the Police Security Branch's Loewen 
Road facility and the ISD's information systems team at its Phoenix Park headquarters 
and possibly its Aljunied facility.' The interception of international email and other 
data traffic is reportedly undertaken in association with the Information Security 
Department of Singapore Telecommunications (SingTel) by seconded ISD staff at all 
major exchanges as mentioned earlier. Additionally, similar but more targetted 
surveillance is undertaken by MINDEF's externally oriented Security and Intelligence 
Division and the defence community oriented Military Security Department, 
principally of the defence related government linked companies and their foreign 
partner companies, MINDEF itself and selected high security classified personnel. 
Surveillance of the civil service, statutory boards and non -defence related GLCs 
remains the principally the province of the ISD, CPIB and CAD agencies. 
While voice surveillance continues through the security sections in major telephone 
exchanges, this is targetted surveillance which has to account for the six major Chinese 
dialect s,124 six Indian languages,' English and Malay, at least,t2e and is time consuming 
and resource intensive. It is therefore used for the surveillance of the political 
opposition, selected non -governmental organisations, MPs and NMPs," religious 
organisations and those organisations and individuals thought to be pushing the PAP's 
so called 'boundary markers'. Ministers and their families are also placed under 
protective surveillance, although there is no demonstrable need for this in Singapore. 
Similarly, there appears to be no demonstrable need for the state to retain 1400 
Gurkhas to serve principally as an ISD guard force and a personal home and Istana 
guard for Lee Kuan Yew, but this is still done.' In addition to this type of surveillance, 
'u ISD retains this data for three months but adds data to and from its surveillance subjects to the database files 
maintained on these people. International email and data intercepts are treated in the same way. 
z The ISO maintains a facility in Aljunied, which is reportedly principally concerned with intelligence analysis and 
fieldwork coordination. The ISD is also reported as having 26 small district offices across the island which are used 
for fieldwork coordination. 
13' Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka, Hainanese and Foochow 
'u While Tamil is the major language among citizens descended from settlers from the Indian sub -continent, it is not 
overwhelmingly dominant among this population. Four other languages are spoken by significant Indian minorities; 
Telegu, Malayalam, Punjabi, Hindi and Bengali. 
czc The ISD appears to have a capacity to monitor all foreign language conversations by recording them and then 
arranging for translation. It has little in -house capacity to monitor Thai, Tagalog, Japanese, Burmese or regional 
dialects or minor languages. 
'2' The surveillance of MPs and NMPs is reportedly on a random basis, but maybe heightened in relation to 
particular issues. 
The Gurkha Contingent is supposed to guard key state installations and is nominally assigned as part of the 
Singapore Police Force. In reality they only guard four politically sensitive sites; the Whitely Road Detention Centre 
and the Moon Crescent Prison used by the ISD, Lee Kuan Yew's home and its immediate vicinity and the interior of 
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the ISD also collates on -line dossiers on a large number of individuals, both 
Singaporean and expatriate, from both its own resources as well as with assistance 
from other ministries, boards and to a lesser extent GLCs, seemingly on the basis of 
them being of "possible interest ". 
The Surveillance Bureaucracy 
The need to develop more sophisticated electronic surveillance systems which can 
automatically scan speech, rather than rely on manual surveillance, has been a priority 
for the Defence Science Organisation (DSO), now the Defence Science and Technology 
Agency (DSTA) since at least 1993. In 1996, after Apple Computer closed its very 
successful speech recognition research and development unit in Singapore,' it was 
reported in interview that the DSO had recruited several of the unit's staff to create a 
speech recognition unit to develop software comparable to that used by the United 
States' National Security Agency in its Echelon telecommunications surveillance 
system. The exact status of this project was not able to be determined in 1998, but given 
the resources that the DSTA and other government research groups have allocated to 
software engineering, it is probable that the project to develop multi- lingual speech 
recognition software has progressed considerably and may be operational. The 
principal organisation reported to be working with the DSTA on software engineering 
projects is the Command, Control, Communications, Computers and intelligence 
Organisation (C4I0) within MINDEF, which from April 2000 will be integrated into 
the DSTA.130 Between them, the two organisations employ at least 900 engineers 
including at least 500 software specialists.°' 
From approximately the late 1980s under Goh Chok Tong and Dr. Yeo Ning Hong, and 
particularly following the return of Tony Tan to the cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister for Defence in 1995, the Security Intelligence Division (SID) within 
MINDEF has been strengthened and better resourced. The reasons for this have been to 
reposition SID as the national intelligence organisation responsible for coordinating 
the Istana where the prime minister and the senior minister have their offices. For the status of the contingent in 1989 
see: House of Commons Defence Committee, First Report: The Future of the Brigade of Gurkhas, London, HMSO, 
1989 
This unit of Apple Computer Corporation developed the first commercially viable Chinese speech recognition 
software. Apple did not proceed with the product. 
"New It systems to support strategic uses ", Electronic Interface, June 1999. Available at httpJ/ 
apps.mindef.gov.sg/scointerface/Jun99/DSC Speech. htm 
In 1994, DSO as it then was, was reported to employ more than 300 engineers, but in 1998 I was told that there 
were approximately 500 engineers and scientists employed in DSTA, including approximately 100 software 
engineers. See: "Secrecy marks work of defence scientists ", Straits Times, 6 may 1994, p. 27. In 1997, the Command, 
Control, Computers and Systems Organisation (as it then was), was reported to employ 400 engineers, all of whom 
were software engineers. See: "Singapore puts force integration into place ", Janes Defence Weekly, 30 April 1997, 
pp. 25 -29, p. 26. In 1999, the C4I0 was reported to employ "about 500 IT professionals" and was looking to recruit 
another 100 per year. See: "Derring -do spirit will live on ", Computer Times, 1 September 1999, p. 13 
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domestic and external intelligence (and thus for moderating and counter -acting to 
some degree the autonomy of the ISD), enhancing the integration of signals 
intelligence analysis with other intelligence and enhancing the planning capability of 
MINDEF and the government in general. This enhanced role of SID has been 
associated with a more active Security and Intelligence Committee, the executive 
intelligence arm of the Defence Council. The development of a more integrated 
intelligence apparatus has been accompanied by the gradual promotion of Eddie Teo 
Chan Seng, long time deputy director and eventually director of the Security and 
Intelligence Division (SID) and his eventual appointment as Permanent Secretary, 
MINDEF in late 1994 and then Permanent Secretary, PMO in late 1998." Although 
MINDEF has no specific brief for such activity under the Singapore Armed Forces Act, 
it is not incompatible with the act and can easily be accommodated within the 
administrative arrangements covered in the General Orders of the Ministry of 
Defence." Also, within a Westminster -style political system, the cabinet can simply 
assign any responsibility it thinks fit to an executive agency of government, without 
legislation, as long as it is not in conflict with the constitution. 
This development of SID has included the recruitment of a large number of Division 1 
graduate officers and some Administrative Service recruits, with both the ISD and SID 
now having approximately 40 Administrative Service positions each in 1998, a 
considerable number in comparison to most ministries and boards.' Many of these 
recruits have technical backgrounds in communications and information technology, 
who have received specialist overseas training in a range of intelligence skills, 
including IT based surveillance and intelligence analysis." However, ISD and SII) 
recruitment has also included large numbers of social science and humanities 
graduates as intelligence analysts and planners to increase its capacity for political 
analysis both domestically and in its immediate strategic vacinity, as the analytical 
capabilities of ISD in particular were thought to have required considerable 
development. Within the ISD, the recruitment of large numbers of AOs and Division 1 
On promotion to Permanent Secretary, MINDEF, Teo was replaced as director of SID by Joseph Koh another 
Administrative Service officer and a Senior Deputy Director at SID. Koh had been the intelligence services officer at 
Singapore's embassy to the United States under S. R. Nathan immediately prior to his appointment as director, 
reputedly responsible for overhauling and renewing the SID's North American section, its largest outside Southeast 
Asia. Koh was appointed as Singapore's Trade Representative to Taipei from mid -1996 ( a position with reportedly 
military and intelligence liaison responsibilities) and was replaced by Col. Choi Shing Kwok, former Senior Deputy 
Director, SID who had a long SID career. Choi was promoted to Brigadier -General in 1997 and still heads SID. 
Teo's mentor in SID was S. R. Nathan who subsequently was ambassador to Malaysia and the United States and is 
now Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Nathan assumed the 
presidency of Singapore in August 1999. 
133 General Orders are the ministrys organisational arrangements which cover both the SAF and the civilian 
components of the ministry. They are made under s.199 of the Singapore Armed Forces Act and are not published in 
the Government Gazette or otherwise made public. 
13s This figure is calculated from discrepancies in the data provided by the PMO in 1998 on the allocation of 
Administrative Officers between ministries, boards and GLCs. 
It seems that SID has been recruiting scientific specialists (e.g. electronic and signals engineering) from NTU and 
more generalist graduates from NUS, but not exclusively. 
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officers with no police background is also being undertaken to push the organisation 
towards a more contemporary definition of its role' It is also an attempt by the 
political executive to address the disquiet felt by many ISD officers that they have in 
recent years become a political police more than a genuine security service. It is the 
hope of the political executive that the development of a considerable analytical 
capability that principally addresses socio- political issues, but remains capable of 
providing the party political analyses required by the political executive, will ally some 
of this disquiet. 
The re- development of SID has been pursued as a result of disquiet among the more 
moderate ministers and their AS supporters over the continued influence of Lee Kuan 
Yew over the ISD following his retirement from the prime ministership, its lack of 
accountability and its unwillingness to change its culture and style, which drew 
strongly on its policing and Special Branch background. The enhanced role for SID is 
supported by Goh Chok Tong, who as Minister for Defence and Second Minister for 
Defence from 1981 -1992, has developed strong links with the SAF and nurtured 
support among the SAF officer corps and MINDEF senior executive as a group of 
largely moderate officers who take a long term strategic view of Singapore's policy 
options. This is not surprising given Goh's reported animosity to the ISD following it's 
embarrassment of him and other ministers in April 1988 over his agreement to set up a 
judicial commission to inquire into complaints of mis- treatment by the ISD of former 
detainees. The ISD did not bother to brief Goh on the fact that the allegations were true 
and the decision was overturned by Lee Kuan Yew on his return from a short overseas 
trip. The development of the SID's capabilities and the expansion of its brief decreases 
somewhat the ISD's monopoly on internal security and provides the political executive 
with another, probably more moderate viewpoint. This can only be good for 
Singapore, but perhaps not for the ISD old school or the more hardline members of the 
political executive. 
Surveillance capability has been supported by technical training of staff overseas and 
more recently in Singapore by officers undertaking such courses as the Specialist 
Diploma in Information Systems Security offered by Temasek Polytechnic,137 and 
postgraduate programs at the Centre for Signals Processing at NTU, the Centre for 
Wireless Communications and the Centre for Security Systems at NUS and in the Kent 
Ridge Digital Labs.138 The two universities have over the past 10 years developed a 
156 This is hinted at by Home Affairs minister Wong Kan Seng in his address to ISD officers in August 1998. See: 
Speech by Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs at the ISD it 50' Anniversary Gala Dinner. Singapore, 
Ministry of Home Affairs, 22 August 1998 
13' This course commenced in June 1999. 
1" Formerly the Institute of Systems Science, but amalgamated in January 1998 with the Information Technology 
Institute. It is also located close to the Institute for Microelectronics which undertakes hardware and electronic design 
research. 
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formidable capability in almost all aspects of information technology and 
telecommunications, building impressive intellectual capital which can support 
advanced surveillance and security systems. This capability is located principally 
within the engineering faculties at NUS' and NTU140 and includes the development of 
satellites,141 and other technologies within a large number of specialist research centres. 
Research at NTU in these technologies has been so successful that two companies have 
been spun -off from the research teams to commercialise signal processing142 and secure 
communications technologies.' A significant industrial capability to support ITT 
surveillance has also been developed domestically, principally within the Singapore 
Technologies group of companies, especially Singapore Technologies Electronics and 
its subsidiaries such as CET Technologies. CET works with specialist research centres 
at NTU, NUS and the DSTA to develop Singaporean technologies for the information 
and communications security. It also distributes security products for a range of 
international manufacturers in this area.144 Consultancy services are also provided by 
other GLCs, such as the IT Security Centre within National Computer Services Pte. 
Ltd., and CISCO. Within the DSTA, software security applications are a major activity 
of the Computer Systems Group headed by Christopher Ting. Although this industry 
and intellectual infrastructure is primarily aimed at industrial development to meet the 
nation's ambitious knowledge economy goals, it nonetheless provides the government 
with considerable surveillance capability. 
The Legal Framework for Surveillance 
This surveillance activity is facilitated by a number of legislative provisions. For 
example, the use by citizens of cryptography software to reduce or repel government 
139 At NUS, these centres include the: Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and processing, Centre for Wireless 
Communication, Data Storage institute, Institute for High Performance Computing, Institute of Microelectronics, 
Centre for Heuristics in Information Mining and Extraction, Centre for Internet Research, Centre for Systems 
Security, Centre for Telemedia, Centre for Computational Mechanics, Centre for Intelligent Control, Centre for 
Microwave and RF, Centre for Optoelectronics and the Centre for Wavelets, Approximation and Information 
Processing. 
°0 At NTU, these centres include the: Centre for Advanced Information Systems, Centre for Advanced Media 
Technology, Centre for High Performance Imbedded Systems, Centre for Mechanics of Micro-Systems, Centre for 
Signal Processing, Information Communication Institute of Singapore, Information Management Research Centre, 
Microelectronics Centre, NTU- DIGITAL Network Technology Research Centre, NTU -SGI Centre for Graphics and 
Imaging Technology, satellite Engineering Centre, Global Positioning Systems Centre. 
For details of the Merlion satellite project see: Tai Wei Chua and others, " Merlion L & S band System ", in 
Proceedings of the 135 Annual AMA/USU Conference on Small Satellites, Utah State University, 23 -26 August 1999. 
This paper was developed by the Satellite Engineering programme researchers in the Division of Communication 
Engineering, School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, NTU. The military capability of this program, is hinted 
at in an assessment by Janes Defence Weekly. See: "Singapore edges closer to satellite reality", Janes Defence 
Weekly, 28 April 1999, p. 14 
Multitech Products Pte. Ltd. Was spun off in I995. 
Datmark Technologies Pte. Ltd. Was spun off in 1998 and had developed technologies associated with digital 
security, encryption technology, copyright protection of digital products, secure communications and e- commerce 
transactions. CET Technologies, a subsidiary of ST Electronics within the defence industry sector has a 10 per cent 
stake in Datamark with an option to increase this to 51 per cent 
u For a brief overview of CET's products and services see their intemet site at httpJ /www.cetstcom.sg 
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surveillance is prohibited in Singapore. Encryption software is a prohibited import 
controlled by the Trade Development Board, making Singapore, in 1996, one of only 
six nations that follow such a policy.' The use of communications interception 
technology by the police or any organisation or person which may broadcast a signal 
can be exempted from licensing or registration by the Singapore Broadcasting 
Authority under s.32 of the Singapore Broadcasting Authority Act (hereafter the SBA 
Act). This act also prohibits the import, manufacture, sale or hire of any "unauthorised 
decoder" under s.60,' allows the CEO of SBA to provide any officer of the authority 
the powers of arrest and entry and seizure without warrant under ss.64 -65, provides 
the Minister for Communications with the power to hear and decide on appeals 
without any further recourse to the courts (s.72(4)), allows the minister to exempt any 
person or class of persons from the provisions of the act (s.73) and allows the minister 
to change, at his absolute discretion, the definitions of what constitutes broadcasting 
apparatus and licensable broadcasting service (s.78). The SBA Act also allows the 
authority to make subsidiary legislation to control licensing of service and content 
providers and, under s.21 to impose licensing conditions. These conditions, as set out 
in the Singapore Broadcasting Authority (Class Licence) Notification 1996, require the 
licensee to fully comply with the laws of Singapore, to ensure that no service or content 
is against the public interest, public order or national harmony and requires that the 
Internet Service Provider "faithfully and truthfully furnish such information, and 
furnish such undertakings, as the Authority may require in connection with the 
provision of the Internet Service Provider's service ". This empowers the SBA to 
request lists of customers of each ISP, their registered lP address' and their registered 
on -line nickname' for internet chat and communications purposes. This provision, if 
combined with, or substituted by the provisions of the ISA, means that the Minister for 
Home Affairs could, either directly or indirectly require this information and at the 
1°5 Under the First Schedule of the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations of 1995, "The import of scrambler. 
or encryption hardware or software capable of re- arranging signs, signals, writing, sounds, or intelligence for the 
purpose of secrecy" is controlled. This means that the government can import such software and hardware but 
citizens cannot, although some commercial applications are allowed. All commercial applications must be justified to 
the TDB and registered with the Licensing Department of the Telecommunications Authority of Singapore. This 
provides TAS with details of the exact software used by each company, thus making it much easier for security 
agencies to decode data from these companies should they so wish. See: Wayne Madsen, Cryptography and Liberty: 
An International Survey of Encryption Policy, Global Internet Liberty Campaign. Available at: 
http:// www. gi lc.org/crypto /crypto-survey.html, p. 29 
1d6 The penalty is a $40,000 fine, three years imprisonment or both. While one reason for this provision is to protect 
coded pay -TV signals from piracy, it also protects the transmission of policy and security services coded radio 
signals. 
1°7 The Singapore Broadcasting Authority (Class Licence) Notification 1996. Available at: 
htt p:// wwwsba .gov.sg/work/sba/intemet/, 12 December 1998 
108 Internet Protocol address. This is the address of each computer linked to the intemet; it has an intemet node 
number which can be traced to a telephone number and through that to an address. 
lag It is common practice in Singapore for people engaged in Internet Relay Chat (IRC) to register their on -line 
nickname with the ISP and the chatroom moderator to prevent others from using their name and sending messages 
disguised as originating from another person. These nicknames are linked to the person's ISP account and real name. 
In reality, this provides no protection from government officers wishing to identify a person, regardless of the ISP 
privacy statements as these have no basis in law other than perhaps a tenuous existence as part of a contract which 
can be overridden by other laws as discussed in this section. 
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same time prohibit the ISP companies from making the supply of the information 
public. 
The Telecommunications Authority of Singapore Act (hereafter the TAS Act) provides 
most of the legislative basis for telecommunications and postal surveillance. It allows 
all foreign postal articles to be opened under s.59 and any article suspected of being in 
contravention of the act or its regulations top be opened under s. 69. Under this latter 
provision any offending article may be dealt with in any way the postal authority 
wishes.°0 All radio communications equipment must be licensed (s.70) and any police 
officer of sergeant rank and above, may size any communications equipment without 
warrant (s.74). This act also empowers the Minister for Communications or a court to 
allow the interception of any message under s.78(1)(b), and prohibits the sending by 
post of any material that is "indecent, obscene, seditious, scurrilous, threatening or 
grossly offensive character. "L51 The minister is also provided with discretionary powers, 
without recourse to judicial review, to issue any direction he thinks fit "in the interests 
of public security, national defence..." 152 and such directions may include, in the case of 
telecommunications, prohibition or regulation of telecommunications usage in specific 
or general cases, the seizure of telecommunications equipment or the "stopping, 
delaying and censoring of messages and the carrying out of any other purposes which 
the minister thinks necessary.. ",153 
In the case of postal articles, the minister has absolute discretion to direct the "... 
interception or detention of any postal article ", to direct that any such article be 
delivered to a nominated article and be dealt with in any manner the minister thinks 
fit.154 The minister can also direct that any official directed to undertake these actions 
"... not disclose any directions given to that person.." under the above provisions, "... if 
the Minister notifies that person that the Minister is of the opinion that the disclosure 
of the directions is against the public interest ".0 A certificate signed by the minister 
stating that a particular direction "... was in the public interest or in the interests of 
public security, national defence or relations with the government of another country" 
is sufficiently "conclusive evidence" that a "public emergency" exists that requires the 
exercise of these powers.156 These powers can obviously be used to authorised police, 
ISD and officers of other surveillance agencies to seize and examine all mail or 
telecommunications transmissions from all opposition political parties or other classes 
of citizens and for this to remain secret. As these directions can be made to any 
150 s.69(3) 
'S1 s.93(a). The penalty is a $10,00 fine or three years imprisonment or both. 
'52 
s.1 16(2)(b) 
153 s.1 16(3)(a) 
154 s.116(b)(i) and (ii) 
'55 s.116(6) 
'''s.116(10) 
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company or the employees of any company licensed to deliver telecommunications or 
postal services under the TAS Act, the government has a vested interest in maintaining 
control of the postal and telecommunications service providers so that its surveillance 
capacities are not weakened by organisations unwilling to conform to ministerial 
direction. 
Legislative provisions made under the TAS Act and the SBA Act, while facilitating 
surveillance, are mild compared to the provisions of the Internal Security Act (ISA) but 
are still considerable. This act allows for: 
1 The surveillance of any person considered to "be acting in any manner prejudicial 
to the security of Singapore or any part thereof or to the maintenance of public order or 
essential services" with regard to residence, employment, travel, meetings or 
membership or involvement in any organisationf 57 
2 The surveillance of all publications so as to ascertain whether they might incite 
violence, counsel disobedience of the law or any lawful order, lead to a breach of the 
peace, promote hostility between races or classes or be prejudicial to the national 
interest, public order or security of Singapore,' 
3 The surveillance of all printed material which either has been proscribed at the 
absolute discretion of the minister responsible or of any document "containing any 
incitement to violence, or counselling disobedience to the law or to any lawful order, or 
likely to lead to any breach of the peace",' or any document which "spreads false 
reports or makes false statements likely to cause public alarm",'6' or any "subversive" 
document' 
4 The surveillance of discussion or conversation so as to apprehend anyone who "by 
word of mouth ... spreads false reports or makes false statements likely to cause public 
alarm ;'63 
5 The statutory review by the minister of all appointments to all registered societies, 
community organisations, companies, and any other body legally constituted under 
any law and empowering the minister to veto any appointment which the minister 
considers at his absolute discretion to be "prejudicial to the interests of Singapore ",164 
and for any such order by the minister to remain secret except by government officials 
in the course of their work,' 
15' s.8 and 6.10 
158 s.20 
159 ss20 -24 
''6 s.25 
sl s.26 
l62 s.27. Subversive document is defined as any document which in part or whole has a tendency to excite organised 
violence, "support, propagate or advocate any act prejudicial to the security of Singapore or the maintenance or 
restoration of public order ... inciting violence ... or counselling disobedience to the law" (s27(3)(ó), or the invitation 
of support for such acts (s.27(3Xc). Under s.27(4), every document "purporting to be a subversive documents shall be 
presumed to be a subversive document until the contrary is proved ", thus placing the onus of proof on the accused 
and not the government. 
" s.26 
s.40 
iós s.40(3) 
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6 The surveillance and retention of personal records on all persons seeking 
admission to any institution of higher educations and forbidding the admission of 
students without a certificate of suitability;166 and 
7 The surveillance, control of movement and occupation, eviction and registration of 
any person within a declared security zone.167 
Within this legislative and policy regime, MNDEF, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MHA) and to a lesser degree, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the PMO have 
therefore developed a complete set of surveillance strategies, technologies and 
products which have now been integrated into a formidable instrument of covert 
government control. Most the coercive resources of government which can be used for 
domestic surveillance of citizens, except for the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, 
have now be centralised within MHA and MOF, although other agencies, such as the 
Internal Revenue Service, (actually a statutory board under MOF) can also be form part 
of the coercive repertoire when required.168 
While the government has stated that it will not use IU data, available from the RP 
system, to track citizens, it has not introduced any legislation to prevent this or other 
data being so used, nor established any procedures for independent verification of data 
usage. This is in line with its policy that all data collected by the government belongs to 
the government and may be used at the government's discretion. Although the NCB 
has endorsed the implementation of the TRUSTe privacy program in the public sector 
from early 1999, this privacy protection protocol and independent assurance system 
has no capacity to monitor or check the use of data by government agencies. Rather, 
this system is heavily dependent upon consumer complaints for assessing breaches of 
privacy on particular systems, and is specifically oriented to intemet servers and sites 
and does not cover government systems.169 When the issue of data privacy was 
discussed with officers of all government agencies interviewed, the general 
interpretation was that the government and the civil service viewed privacy protection 
as protection from illegal access from outside the public service or protection from the 
`a s.42. The government ceased requiring certificates of suitability in 1992, but has not amended the Internal Security 
Act to remove this provision. The change in policy has been administrative only, not substantive. This provision was 
administered by the Ministry of Education which relied on teachers to review each students official ministry file 
before issuing a certificate. This ministry therefore played a key role in the identification and classification of 
students thought to be undesirable on academic, political and other grounds. Hearsay evidence from discussions with 
teachers in government and independent secondary schools and junior colleges indicates that this provision was not 
treated very seriously by the vast majority of teachers from the mid -1970s onward and that it was generally 
ineffective with rare exceptions. It certainly failed to stop middle class children from receiving a tertiary education as 
they could enter foreign universities without the certificate. 
167 All of Part III of the act ss.48 -72. This part contains a large number of provisions which are outside the scope of 
this thesis. Among them are provisions for the seizure of buildings, lands, vehicles, aircraft, the requisition of 
accommodation and the killing of persons within designated danger areas by police and other authorised persons. 
168 For an example of how the Income Tax Act may be used for political purposes, see: Francis T. Seow, 
To Catch a tartar; A Dissident in Lee Kuan Pew's Prison, New Haven (Conn.), Yale University 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1994, pp. 24I -256 
69 Courtney Macavinta, "Short take: Singapore endorses TRUSTe privacy program ", CNET News.com, 8 December 
1998. Available at http: / /www. news. corn /News/ttem/0,29686,00.html, 5 January 1999. The TRUSTe system is an 
industry funded self -regulation system for privacy protection. See: http://www.truste.org 
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sale of confidential data by corrupt officers. Only two of the 12 officers with whom this 
issue was raised acknowledged that there could be inappropriate use of data on 
citizens by government; the others defended discretionary access by the public service 
on public interest and national security grounds - perennial bureaucratic reasoning in 
Singapore. The concept of citizens having a right to be protected from the state was 
simply not accepted; the state acted correctly; only corrupt officers would harm 
citizens and although it happened, there were safeguards to stop this. 
This coercive role of the SPF and its associated agencies has led it to having, not 
unexpectedly, a rather negative community image. Since 1997, the MHA has tried to 
counteract this with consent building strategies which focus community attention on 
the protective and safety aspects of these agencies. These strategies, building on the 
neighbourhood policing initiative have included introduction of the Community Safety 
and Security Programme which includes the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme and the 
cooperative develop of Community Focus Plans with GROs and CDCs,i7° a high profile 
recruitment and "Home Team" advertising campaign's and an outreach program for 
the ISD.tn The Community Focus Plans are a form of neighbourhood watch planning 
and strategy framework, jointly developed in association with Community 
Development Councils and grassroots leaders and so have probably had almost no 
impact on the general perception of the SPF. 
The ISD outreach program has involved ISD officers speaking to "more than 6000 
educationists, grassroots leaders, civil servants and even journalists. "tom With its focus 
on the historical role of the ISD during the 1950s and 1960s, a period that is almost 
totally foreign to Singaporeans under 30 years of age, is also doubtful that this 
campaign has persuaded many Singaporeans that the ISD has a role requiring its 
current powers in contemporary society. The topic of the desirability of Administrative 
Officers working in the ISO has also surfaced in the domestic press, in response to 
several AO who were posted to the ISD, buying themselves out of their bonds.' The 
only one of these campaigns which may have had any success is the Home Team 
advertising and recruitment campaign, although it is impossible to judge that at this 
time. 
O0 Speech by Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs at the Police Workplan Seminar, 9 march 1999. 
Available at: http : / /www.mha.gov.sg/090399.html 
Speech by Mr Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs, at the Home Team Senior Officers' Promotion 
Ceremony '99, 30 July 1999. Available at: ht tp: / /www.mhagov.sg/30ju199.html 
Speech by Mr Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs, at the /SD's 50°' Anniversary Gala Dinner, 22 August 
1998. Available at: : http : / /www.mhagov.sg/220898.html 
"3 ibid. 
"` "Safety keeps the icebergs silent ", Straits Times, 8 April 1998 
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CONCLUSIONS: 
The mix of coercive and consent building strategies used by the core executive in 
Singapore is a complex and, at times contradictory, mix which has to deal with policy 
application within a multi- ethnic population that, contrary to the opinion of some, is 
not passive in the face of government. 
The political thinking behind the development of this mix of consent building and 
coercive approaches in the Singapore was outlined by Goh Keng Swee, one of its 
principal architects: 
In inculcating group loyalties or group conciousness, we have avoided trying to stifle or inhibit 
the sturdy individualism which is so strong a part of the Singaporean's character. Instead of 
this, we have exploited this individualism by providing, as I said before, a judicious mix of 
incentives and deterrents when these are necessary. There is, of course, nothing normally 
wrong about this. It is a normal function of government. However, we found out that, whatever 
the rewards and deterrents, we have to take certain safeguards. First, we must secure the 
general acceptance of intended goals, an d this is best done only by open and clear explanation 
and by free debate. Next, the application of policy must be carried out with manifest justice 
and equity. Incentives should be open freely and fairly to whoever wishes to make the effort. 
As regards deterrents, adequate safeguards must be introduced against penalizing the innocent. 
Finally, the course of action to be pursued must be seen by the people to be sensible and 
practical. 
The core executive in 1998 seems to adhere to this framework. It has introduced a 
strategy of hiding the coercive instruments of the state as much as possible, developed 
greater subtlety in its management of these instruments and is busily attempting to 
meet the challenges of a highly educated population and a globalised economy in its 
redesign of its consent building instruments. However, the apparent openness of many 
of the new consent building strategies is now underwritten by a state surveillance 
system with greater capabilities than any of its predecessors; another application of the 
"leave nothing to chance" principle. It appears though, that the core executive while 
accepting that its desire to maintain an enormous level of control over society may be 
contradictory to the achievement of many of its economic and other goals, has adopted 
an approach of slow, controlled change, although a move towards any kind of political 
pluralism or even a basic two -party system seems beyond its present capabilities. The 
application of the coercive and consent building strategies detailed above are integral 
to the way in which the rate of change is being controlled by the core executive so as to 
meet its broader goals.176 
15 Goh Keng Swee, The Economics of Modernization and Other Essays, Singapore, Asia pacific Press, 1972, p. 283 
"6 For an acknowledgment of the core executive's awareness and scope of the need for change, see: Nigel Holloway 
and Lawrence Minnard, Singapore's Big Chance ", Forbes, 29 November 1999, pp. 42 -46, p. 46 
9. Conclusion: The Core Executive In Singapore: 
Structure, Dynamics and Prospects 
This study has attempted to provide an analysis of the contemporary Singaporean core 
executive in terms of its structure, dynamics and the strategies of governance that 
facilitates its operation. It has also sought to determine whether this executive has 
differentiated itself from the Lee Kuan Yew governments that preceded it. In this 
chapter, the conclusions of the study are presented and an assessment of the 
implications of the analysis for the future of the present core executive arrangements is 
presented. 
IDENTIFYING THE SINGAPOREAN CORE EXECUTIVE 
This study has demonstrated that the Singaporean core executive comprises the 
following thirteen components: 
1. The prime minister; 
2. The political executive including cabinet and non -cabinet ministers; 
3. The Speaker of the parliament; 
4. The Attorney -General; 
5. The Chief Justice, the judges of the Court of Appeal and the Senior District Judge 
6. Permanent Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries in the civil service and their 
equivalents in the statutory boards if not in the Administrative Service 
7. Administrative Service officers other than those in (6) above within the public 
sector executive in the civil service, statutory boards; 
8. 78 key members of statutory boards and GLC boards and the chief executives of the 
major government holding companies and GLCs; 
9. The General Staff of the SAF; 
10. Members of the CountiI of Presidential Advisers (CPA); 
11. The Chairman of the Public Service Commission 
12. The Auditor- General; and 
13. Other actors derived from the NTUC, the private sector and possibly the GROs, 
although the latter have not been included in the study in any substantive way. 
The 178 key members of the Singaporean core executive are listed in Tables 9.1 and 9.2. 
Table 9.1 includes ministers, statutory office holders, the most senior of the SAF 
general staff and key members of the CPA not covered by any other category. Table 9.2 
includes all others identified as being principal core executive actors through the 
analyses in the previous chapters. 
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The political executive consists of the cabinet and other ministers. There is no inner or 
outer cabinet and non -cabinet ministers are under the direction of ministers of cabinet 
rank. Ministers and the senior members of the Administrative Service have an 
integrated salary system which allows the relative influence and power of individuals 
within the two groups to be compared. This is just one aspect of the degree of 
integration between these two groups which comprise the inner core executive. 
Table 9.1. Members of the Singaporean Core Executive who are Ministers, Statutory 
Office Holders and SAF General Staff 
Cabinet 
1. Goh Chok Tong 
2. Lee Kuan Yes 
3. Tony Tan Keng yam 
4. Lee Hsien Loong 
5. S. Jayakumar 
6. Richard Hu Tsu Tau 
7. Lee Yock Suan 
8. Wong Kan Seng 
9. Yeo Cheow Tong 
10. George Yeo Yong -Boon 
11. Lee Boon Yang 
12. Mah Bow Tan 
13. Lim Boon Heng 
14. Lim Hng Kiang 
15. Abdullah Tarmugi 
16. Teo Chee Hean 
Other Ministers 
17. Aline K. Wong 
18. Sidek Bin Saniff 
19. Peter Chen 
20. Ow Chin Hock 
21. Othman Bin Hamra Eusofe 
22. Matthias Yao Chili 
23. Ho Peng Kee 
24. John Chen Seow Phun 
25. Eugene Yap Giau Cheng 
26. Yatiman Yusof 
27. Tang Guan Seng 
28. Mohamad Maidin BPM 
29. Koo Tsai Kee 
30. Chan Soo Sen 
Others 
31. Robin Chan - Elections Department 
32. Tjong Yik Min - SPH 
33. Lee Hee Sen -PSC 
Attorney -General 
34. Chan Sek Keong 
SAF 
35. Lt. -Gen Bey Soo "Chiang 
36. BG Ng Yat Chung 
37. BG Lee Fook Sun 
38. BG Lim Chuan Poh 
39. BG Raymond Ng Teck Heng 
40. RAdm Richard Lim Cherng Yih 
41. Prof Lui Pao Chues 
Security Services 
42. BG Choi Skiing Kwok - SID 
43. Lim Siang Hoe Benny - lSD 
44. Chua Cher Yak - CPIB 
Judiciary 
45. Chief Justice Yong Pung How 
46. Justice L. P. Them 
47. Justice Kathigesu Mootatamby 
48. Richard Magnus 
NTUC 
49. Seng Han Thong MP 
50. Lim Swee Say MP 
51. Hawazi Daipi MP 
52. R.Sinnakaruppan MP 
53. Ong Ah Enh MP 
Council of Presidential Advisers 
54. Lim Kim San 
55. Lee Seng Wee 
56. Michael Fam Yue Onn 
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Table 9.2 Members of the Singaporean Core Executive in 1998 in Addition to the 
Ministry, Statutory Office Holders and SAF General Staff 
1. Ang Kong Hua 
2. Arun Mahizhnan 
3. Cham Tao Soon 
4. Chan Jer Hing Peter 
5. Chee Yam Cheng 
6. Chen Choongboong 
7. Chen Tien Lap, Bernard 
8. Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund 
9. Cheong Siew Keong, Dr 
10. Cheong, Benedict 
11. Chew Chin Tiong, Ernest, 
12. Chew G K, Andrew, Dr. 
13. Chia, Christopher 
14. Chiang Chie Foo 
15. Chong Lit Cheong 
16. Chong Yew Fook, Charles 
17. Choo Chiau Beng 
18. Choo Watt Bin 
19. Chua Siew San 
20. Desker, Barry 
21. Dhanabaian, Suppiah 
22. Er Kwong Wah 
23. Fang Ai Lian 
24. Foo Kok Swee, BG (NS) 
25. Goh Kim Leong 
26. Gong Wee Lik 
27. Ho Hak Ean Peter 
28. Ho Meng Kit 
29. Hong Hai, Dr, 
30. Khattar, Sat Pal 
31. Khaw Boon Wan 
32. Koh Beng Seng 
33. Koh Boon Hwee 
34. Koh Cher Siang 
35. Koh Yong Guan 
36. Lai Chun Leong 
37. Lam Chuan Leong 
38. Lam Joon 'Choi 
39. Lam Siew Wah 
40. Lau Chan Sin 
41. Lau Wah Ming 
42. Lee Chiong Giam 
43. Lee Ek Tieng 
44. Lee Hsien Yang, BG 
45. Lee Kim Poo Moses 
46. Lee Miew Boey 
47. Lee Suan Wang 
48. Leo Chin Lien, James, RAdm 
(ref.) 
49. Leong Keng Thai 
50. Lim Chee Onn 
51. Lim Choo San, Michael 
52. Lim Han Soon 
53. Lim Hock Chuan 
5k Lim Hock San 
55. Lim Hsiu Mei 
56. Lim Neo Chian 
57. Lim Pin, Prof. 
58. Lim Siam Kim 
59. Lim Song Guan 
60. Lim Soo Hoon 
61. Lim Yong Wah 
62. Liu Thai Ker 
63. Loh Wing Siew 
64. Low Puk Yeon 
65. Lu Cheng -Yang 
66. Lua Cheng Eng 
67. Magad, Ahmed Mohamed 
68. Mahbubani, Kishore 
69. Nair, Dileep 
70. Nee Yeh Ching, Andrew 
71. Ng Chee Tat, Philip 
72. Ng Kee Choe 
73. Ngiam Tong Dow 
74. Niam Chiang Meng 
75. Ong Boon Kwee Peter 
76. Ong Ho Sim 
77. Oon Kum Loon 
78. Ow Soon Sian Alan 
79. Pek Siok Ching 
80. Quek Chee Hoon 
81. Quek Poh Huat 
82. Ridzwan Dzafir 
83. Seah Lim Huat, Peter 
84. Selvaretnam, Daniel 
85. Shanmugaratnam, Tharman 
86. Sim Kee Boon 
87. Singh, Jaspai 
88. Su Guaning, Dr. 
89. Tan Boon Huat 
90. Tan Chin Nam 
91. Tan Chin Tiong 
92. Tan Ee Ping 
93. Tan Eng Heng 
94. Tan Gee Paw 
95. Tan Guong Ching 
96. Tan Kee Tong 
97. Tan Kim Slew 
98. Tan Kin Lian PBM 
99. Tan Tee How 
100. Tan Wee Hin, Leo, Prof. 
101. Tan Wee Kiat 
102. Tan Yoke Meng 
103. Tan Yong Soon 
104. Tan, Finian 
105. Teo Chan Seng Eddie 
106. Teo Ming Klan 
107. Teo Soon Hoe 
108. Thai Chee Ken 
109. Wang Gungwu, Prof. 
110. Wang Mong Lin 
111. Wee Ee Cheong 
112. Wee Heng Tin 
113. Wee Heng Tin 
114. Wong Chooi Sen 
115. Wong Hung Khim 
116. Wong Nang Jang 
117. Yeo Khee Leng 
118. Yeo Liat Kok Philip 
119. Yeo Ning Hong, Dr 
120. Yeo Siew Chye Stephen 
121. Yong Pung How, Chief 
Justice 
122. Yu -Foo Yee Shoon 
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The judiciary is generally excluded from the core executive as only the Supreme Court 
has any degree of constitutional autonomy; the remainder of the judiciary is 
incorporated within the civil service. Five judicial officers can be counted within the 
core executive; the Chief Justice, the three judges of the Court of Appeal and the Senior 
District Judge who heads the lower courts. Of these officers, only the Chief Justice 
could be included as a permanent member of the inner core executive. 
The Administrative Service consisted of 247 officers in 1998 and of these 70 were at 
permanent secretary and deputy secretary level,' of whom 24 were at permanent 
secretary level 2 It is these latter officers, who comprise the Committee of Permanent 
Secretaries, that are permanent members of the Singaporean core executive because of 
their executive portfolio responsibilities, their management of policy communities and 
networks and the intimate nature of their relationship with the political executive. In 
managing the bureaucracy and coordinating the policy networks that underlie the 
formal institutional framework, they work closely with the 16 cabinet ministers, eight 
ministers of state and five parliamentary secretaries that comprise the ministry. This 
combined group of the most senior bureaucrats, the chief executives of the key boards 
and GLCs and ministers are at the heart of the Singaporean core executive. 
In the statutory boards and GLC sectors, 78 key members of the core executive were 
identified and are also included in Table 9.1. In addition to these, the senior managers 
of boards (most of whom are in the Administrative Service) and GLCs must be 
included. 
The role of the NTUC as a whole in the core executive appears, on close analysis, to be 
bifurcated if one makes a distinction between the NTUC headquarters and the body of 
trade unions. The principal offices of the NTUC have been incorporated into the 
political executive or the legislature and through these mechanisms, the NTUC has 
representation within the core executive, including the cabinet and the parliament. 
However, officer bearers from trade unions (e.g. secretaries) or rank and file union 
These officers were: Moses Lee Kim Poo, Lim Hsiu Mei, Lee Chiong Giam, Eddie Teo Chan Seng, Peter Ho Hak 
Ean, Chua Siew San, Tan Kee Tong, Lim Siong Guan, Chiang Chie Foo, Wee Heng Tin, Lam Joon Khoi, Lee Miew 
Boey, Tan Gee Paw, Wang Mong Lin, Ngiam Tong Dow, Koh Yong Guan, Jaspai Singh, Tan Yong Soon, Lee Ek 
Tieng, Thamian Shamnugaratnam, Koh Beng Seng, Koh Cher Siang, Alan Ow Soon Sian, Tan Chin Tiong, Kishore 
Mahbubani, Koh Yong Guan, Tan Yoke Meng, Peter Chan Jer Hing, Tan Boon Huat, Benny Lim Siang Hoe, Lu 
Cheng -Yang, Niam Chiang Meng, Choo Watt Bin, Lim Siam Kim, Christopher Chia, Tan Chin Nam, Lim Han Soon, 
Goh Kim Leong, Lau Wah Ming, Lam Chuan Leong, Low Puk Yeong, Lam Siew Wah, Tan Guong Ching, Tan Kim 
Siew, Tan Wee Kiat, Khaw Boon Wan, Peter Ong Boon Kwee, Finian Tan, Philip Yeo Liat Kok, Ho Meng Kit, Gong 
Wee Lik, Daniel Selvaretnam, Lim Neo Chian, Stephen Yeo Siew Chye, Lee Suan Hiang, Ong Ho Sim, Chong Lit 
Cheong, Yeo Khee Leng, Barry Desker, Ridzwan Dzafir, Wong Chooi Sen, Tan Tee How, Lim Soo Hoon, and Pek 
Sink Ching and Lim Hock Chuan. See: Singapore Ministry of Information and the Arts, Singapore Government 
Directory January 1998, Singapore, MITA, 1998 
Teo Ming Kian, Moses Lee Kim Poo, Eddie Teo Chan Seng, Peter Ho Hak Ean, Lim Siong Guan, Chiang Chie Feo, 
Tan Gee Paw, Ngiam Tong Dow, Koh Yong Guan, Lee Ek Tieng, Koh Cher Siang, Tan Chin Tiong, Kishore 
Mahbubani, Koh Yong Guan, Peter Chan Jer Hing, Niam Chiang Meng, Tan Chin Nam, Goh Kim Leong, Lam 
Chuan Leong, Khaw Boon Wan, Philip Yeo Liat Kok, Ho Meng Kit, Barry Desker and Ridzwan Dzafir. 
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members cannot be found within the core executive, as their influence is mediated 
through the NTUC's internal structures and then transferred to the core executive by 
the headquarters group. Those who represent the union movement are virtually 
indistinguishable from civil service bureaucrats, which many of them formerly were. 
There is no route to power for working class union office bearers in Singapore. The 
closest one comes to a professional unionist in the core executive is Yu -Foo Yee Shoon, 
who has worked as a union organiser for almost her whole career, but has never been a 
rank and file unionist. But despite her impressive credentials and enormous 
contributions, even she is undervalued within the core executive, probably because of 
what seems to be the inherently misogynistic character of the political executive' We 
can see from this that Rodan's contention that the working class is substantially 
excluded from political participation is undoubtedly correct for the period 1988 -1998.4 
GRO representation is totally absent from the core executive as are community and 
industry organisations. Industry organisations may be occasionally represented, but it 
would appear that their interests are predominantly represented at a lower level 
though particular policy networks which mediate their concerns to the core executive. 
Industry interest representation appears to be mediated through the 'business' MPs 
and the representation of individual business executives on statutory boards, GLC 
boards and government advisory committees. 
The party has no role within the core executive. My conclusions are that the party is 
largely irrelevant in terms of the core executive's management of the state except at 
election times because of the inherent nature of the party. I do not agree that the PAP is 
a cadre party, the view proposed by Pang and generally ascribed to since 1972. The 
party executive appoints the cadres, they are not elected' The executive can remove 
cadre membership and it can only be restored through an Ordinary Party Conference 
(OPC) held every two years.' Although cadres have a right to attend the OPC, the 
Yu -Foo Yee Shoon is a Chinese educated, English speaking graduate who is Assistant Secretary- General of the 
NTUC. Some of her responsibilities can be gleened from this study although the breadth of her responsibilities 
cannot be outlined in detail here. As an indication, she sits on GLC and statutory boards, has been a member of 
virtually every high profile policy committee and advisory body, is a MP, a senior NTUC officer and adviser to 
multiple organisations. She works very well at the community level, has good rapport with the Chinese dialect 
speaking HDB heartland and is widely respected. Her only flaw seems to be the lack of a postgraduate qualifications; 
hardly a rational reason for limiting a person of such potential from higher political office. 
° Gany Rodan, "Preserving the one -party state in contemporary Singapore ", in Kevin Hewitson, Richard Robinson 
and Garry Rodan, eds., Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, Sydney, Allen 
and Unwin, 1993, pp. 75 -108, p. 104 
'Central Executive Committee, PAP, Constitution of the People's Action Party, Singapore, PAP, 1984, Article 
'V(1)(1) 
'tbid., Article IV(4). This article is a very clever piece of wording. It means that the Central Executive Committee 
(CEC) can expel any number of members and they cannot appeal except to a special committee appointed by the 
CEC. Obviously, such a committee would carry out the instructions of the CEC. The expelled cadres can then appeal 
to the biennial Ordinary Patty Conference. If there was a considerable split in the party, the appointment of new 
cadres so as to control the Ordinary Party Conference could be easily arranged. Thus, the CEC is left in control and 
avenues of appeal against expulsion are effectively closed. An expelled member's willingness to fight against 
expulsion must also take account of whether the CEC, acting as the political executive, might also want to take 
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party executive is reported to invite selected cadres to the biennial conference, of which 
only 10 per cent need attend.' The party has no mechanisms by which the executive 
can be held accountable except the OPC which the CEC itself controls through its 
control of the cadre membership. Cadre membership does not guarantee a political 
appointment, so there is no established route from party membership to parliamentary 
membership, despite this happening occasionally. The executive itself is self - 
perpetuating; it controls the OPC which elects it and the CEC itself has the power to 
coopt up to six members to its own ranks.' The PAP is therefore a party of the 
executive which uses cadre and ordinary members as partners in its hegemonic 
program, but not as its masters. Almost certainly, the role of cadres in government is 
small. Their most important role is in social surveillance, political intelligence and 
working with the GROs. The minimum ten per cent of cadres required for an OPC can 
probably be met by PAP MPs and, if need be, their wives or other family members. 
This leaves the political executive firmly in control of the party and relegates the party 
to an election and political intelligence organisation with a greater role in pre -school 
education and political socialisation than it has in the central policy debates of 
government. Party branches are almost wholly focussed on the 'bread and butter' 
issues handled by town councils and CDCs; on implementation not policy 
development. 
The SAF General Staff also appear to have a bifurcated role, but obviously lie within 
the core executive. While enlisted in the regular SAF, they manage the defence and 
security policy domain through the SAF and MINDEF, by allocation to defence related 
GLC boards and, increasingly through secondment into the Administrative Service to 
civil service postings and ambassadorial appointments. Following their retirement 
from the SAF, members of the general staff enter the GLC senior executive, the 
Administrative Service or are given senior statutory board appointments.; some enter 
politics. There appears to be a trend of recruiting SAF General Staff and senior field 
staff officers into the Administrative Service to make up for a shortfall in recruitment to 
that service, indicating what may be an increasing dependence on the SAF officer corps 
for core executive members. 
The extent of private sector participation within the core executive as examined in this 
study supports Chalmers assertion that this has increased since the mid- 1980s. 
Whether this has changed the dynamics of policy making, is more questionable. It 
would appear that at least in the economic policy domain if in no other, private sector 
administrative action against the expelled cadre, such as a taxation audit, in order to deter such an appeal. Party 
members know that challenging the CEC is also challenging the government, so there is little likelihood of members 
acting in such a way as to require expulsion. If disagreements exist, it is much easier to resign from the party. 
' Ibid., Article 5 (7) 
ibid., Article 7(l)(A) 
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actors have been influential, particularly in the present drive to reform and liberalise 
the financial sector. However, in general, private sector actors within the core executive 
appear to be PAP cadres or proto- cadres selected on this basis rather than purely as 
industry representatives who can participate within the core executive under 
corporatist -type arrangements. It must be concluded that they have only a limited 
capacity to influence the policy system or the political executive that operationalises 
the core executive.' 
At the centre of the core executive in 1998 is a small group that, as one would expect, 
revolved around the prime minister. Lee Kuan Yew is not a member of this group, but 
he intrudes into it on issues on which he wishes his opinion to be heard; the behaviour, 
but not always the opinion, is accepted by Goh. This group included Goh's kitchen 
cabinet, the cabinet, and a few people from each of the major sectors; the civil service, 
the statutory boards, the GLCs and the military. Goh appears to not be personally close 
to any of the supreme court judges and they are not included in this circle. Goh's 
kitchen cabinet reportedly includes at least Tan Cheng Bok, Matthias Yao, Lim Siong 
Guan, Chiang Chie Foo, Tang Guan Seng, Tan Tee How and Lim Chee Onn. It 
probably includes others who could not be identified in this study. We do know that 
Goh is a very private person and that it is unlikely that he would have a large kitchen 
cabinet or circle of confidants.1° The most influential cabinet ministers appear to be Lee 
Hsien Loong, Tony Tan, Lim Hng 'Chiang, Teo Chee Heart, George Yeo and Wong Kan 
Seng. 
STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CORE EXECUTIVE 
The realpolitik of Singaporean institutional arrangements is this: the cabinet controls the 
government, the legislature, the party and approximately 60 per cent of the nation's 
GDP through the GLCs. There are no alternative sources of power; civil society 
remains shallow, the media and telecommunications systems are government 
controlled, almost all political discourse is mediated through government controlled or 
linked mechanisms and there are no independent means of accountability for the 
executive other than general elections within a gerrymandered electoral system. The 
power of the office of president is compromised in constitutional and power relations 
terms. The PAP almost wholly controls the parliament and can therefore, given that 
constitutional changes generally require the support of two- thirds of members, change 
the constitutional at will, with limited exceptions. The constitutional power exists for 
the government to override any fundamental liberty with the exception of freedom 
from slavery. These institutional arrangements allow the government to implement a 
° Ian Chalmers, "Loosening State Control in Singapore: The Emergence of Local Capital as a Political Force ", 
Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 20, 2, 1992, pp. 57 -84, p. 75 
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range of strongly coercive instruments of governance which it has done. These, 
however, are rarely used, are used almost wholly against the small political opposition 
and are offset by a panoply of consent building mechanisms based on control of the 
media, political socialisation mechanisms and the penetration of the social structure of 
HDB estates by social, cultural, sporting and community organisations under the 
direction of government and quasi -government agencies and overseen by a Leninist 
system of appointed advisors. 
These institutional arrangements, directed as they are from the centre and lacking the 
support of approximately 40 per cent of adult citizens ", are in themselves, rather 
fragile. The PAP has made it known in many ways that the democratic surface 
structure of the hegemonic framework through which it governs is not based on a 
stable state -society relationship and therefore is not characterised by representation or 
other rights. In this regard, a senior second generation PAP leader in the late 1980s, 
told Raj Vasil: 
We have achieved an economic miracle.... it is this that is sacrosanct to us. It can't be allowed to 
be jeopardized by anybody... We would have little hesitation in not allowing the electorate, if at 
a given moment it is hoodwinked or bribed, to elect people to Parliament who in our judgement 
would do harm to the national interest and the common good of the community.'Z 
The speaker obviously did not anticipate the PAP's descent into electoral bribery in the 
1997 elections or more probably holds that PAP bribery is qualitatively different from 
other bribery. Lee Kuan Yew has been even more forthright about the fragility of the 
constitutional facade behind which PAP hegemony has prospered. In responding to 
questions from William Safire at the World Economic Forum at Davos in 1999 on the 
degree of control he exercised in Singapore before the leadership transition, Lee 
remarked: 
You are wrong. No. We run a system right? I have seen what's happened in Indonesia, and I 
knew it was going to happen to Singapore if I did not prepare for succession. Because it was so 
easy just to carry on. I couldn't be removed. But if I had institutionalised it around me, it would 
have collapsed. So I institutionalised it around the office.13 
Although Lee was trying to demonstrate the strength and stability of the Singaporean 
political system, what he actually revealed was its narrow foundation, its strongly 
coercive nature and therefore its instability. This is a logic which is not acknowledged 
by the Singaporean core executive; control is strength and stability, even if it is 
Alan Chang, Singapore's New Premier Goh Chok Tong, Petaling Jaya, Pendaluk Publications, 1991 
Although the opposition vote in the 1997 general elections was 35 pre cent, the consistently historical figure is 
between 40-45 per cent 
Raj Vasil, Governing Singapore Interviews with the new leaders, Singapore, Times Books International, 1988, p. 
154 
"Whose really in charge of Singapore ? ", Australian Financial Review, 2 March 1999, p. 16 
371 Conclusion 
imposed control. This protection of "the system" means the protection of the PAP and 
its hegemonic program from any threat above a casual level. The extremism by which 
this hold on power is characterised is evidenced by the infrastructure and dynamics 
revealed in this study which facilitate unbridled executive power over the Singaporean 
state. In this respect, Goldring has commented; 
... the most serious violation of human rights through the use of internal security and 
preventative detention legislation is currently taking place in Singapore, where there is no 
apparent threat to a stable social order, where standards of living are second only to Japan in 
Asia, and rapidly overtaking those in Australia and New Zealand, and where there are high 
levels of education. The only plausible reason for the use of these laws in Singapore is the desire 
of the present Prime Minister and the ruling elite to preserve their own power on their own 
terms. ... in this sort of political climate rationality has no place ' 
This lack of political rationality was initially driven by Lee Kuan Yew and his 
associates in the belief that the system they had designed in the 1960s was best for 
Singapore and a determination that it remain without any genuine political challenge 
to its structure and control. 
Since 1992, the current leadership has moved away from the one -man dominant rule of 
Lee Kuan Yew which existed from approximately 1984 - 1991 and under Goh Chock 
Tong's leadership has re- instituted the collective executive rule which prevailed before 
1984.15 This has not changed the power, functions or institutional controls of the 
executive; it has merely re- distributed them among the executive. This has allowed a 
greater contestability of ideas, more obvious divergence in policy approaches (such as 
the marked differences in economic policy between Tony Tan and Lee Hsien Loong in 
198516) and a policy environment more characterised by negotiated outcomes; but with 
negotiations restricted almost wholly to the core executive. No genuinely corporatist 
arrangements exist by which policies are negotiated between the political executive 
and social interests outside the core executive. 
This limited openness has been extended to the parliament which is demonstrably 
more active, which uses its committee system to seek greater legitimacy for 
controversial legislation, but still has only marginal influence on the policy system. 
14 John Goldring, "The legal profession and government in Singapore and Malaysia ", Australian Quarterly, 60, 4, 
1988, pp. 488 -498, pp. 491 -492 
is Tillman also rejects the idea of one man rule by Lee Kuan Yew, although most people interviewed for this study 
from outside the civil service still thought in these terms. See: Robert O. Taman, "The Political Leadership: Lee 
Kuan Yew and the PAP Team ", in Kernial Singh Sandu and Paul Wheatley, eds. Management of Success: The 
Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 53 -69, pp. 59-61 
16 A summary of these differences on appropriate policy responses to the 1985 recession is provided in: T. S. Selvan, 
Singapore: The Ultimate Island, Melbourne, Freeway Books, 1991, pp. 145 -146. Given that Tony Tan provided his 
policy solutions to the annual dinner dance of the Administrative Service's in -house club, the Alpha Society, it can be 
assumed that he had considerable support within the AS for his views. These were ignored by Lee lisien Loong's 
final report to Tan, to whom he then supposedly reported. This is an initial indication of the high degree of autonomy 
Lee exercised, even as a new and inexperienced junior minister reporting to a minister whose economic policy and 
practical business experience was vastly superior to his. 
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Strategies to promote broader community consultation which is almost wholly 
restricted to the middle class have also been implemented, designed as a pressure 
valve for middle class frustrations with the inflexibility of the political system. These 
mechanisms almost wholly exclude the working class except through limited closed - 
door focus group sessions by the Feedback Unit and the union based consultation 
programs operated by the NFUC.17 As one senior administrator involved in this 
strategy commented: 
Of course we're a pressure valve. We have to find more ways of letting them have their say, to 
talk to us and feel they are being heard. Then we have more of a chance to bring them on board, 
to see why we're doing what we're doing ... to show them that we can listen and we'll take 
good suggestions seriously ... but really we don't have any other strategy to deal with this 
discontent ... you're either in the system or you're not and that's too black and white for most 
people ... a lot of them don't accept it - they stay away.18 
New (Coercive) Foundations for Old Structures 
Underlying this 'new' approach, the institutional arrangements which underpinned 
successive Lee Kuan Yew government survive within a more sophisticated and covert 
framework. The implementation of the new technologies of surveillance now provide 
the Singaporean core executive with greater knowledge and potentially greater control 
over its citizens than ever before. Using this technology, the PAP government was able 
to tell the electorate that opposition politician Chee Soon Juan broke a hunger strike, by 
eating in the privacy of his own house 19 
This covert framework extends to the hidden aspects of institutional arrangements and 
the contemporary core executive's management of political opposition. It is precisely 
because parliamentary opposition has been so compromised by the PAP's design of the 
constitution, the legal system, the standing orders of the parliament and the media and 
communications infrastructure that it demands that any opposing views only take 
place within the political arena and not within the broader, less controlled institutions 
of civil society. Its preference is to co -opt informed and intelligent opposition and to 
constrain debate within its own ranks and fora. The PAP is not inured to public 
opinion; Lee Kuan Yew has acknowledged that public opinion is a strong policy 
Several senior bureaucrats and MPs agreed in interview that the need to provide avenues to release middle class 
frustrations with the political system was a major driver of these strategies. The head of the Feedback Unit in 1998, 
Goh Chye Boon, agreed that the unit's feedback sessions, while including some people from working class 
occupations, probably included many more people with higher eduction levels who were felt to be able to contribute 
more to a dialogue session. 
1' Interview, August 1998 
9 Sangwon Suh and Santha Oorjitham, "No Holds Barred ", Asia-week 17 January 1997, p. 13. The PAP distributed a 
open letter to the electorate claiming that Chee Soon Juan had eaten a meal cooked by his wife while he was on a 
hunger strike. Chee took no action against the government 
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determinant.20 However, fighting small political skirmishes with a large number of 
civic groups is a direct danger to any hegemonic order as it displaces consent and 
forces the exercise of coercive powers which, over any lengthy period, turns public 
opinion actively against the hegemonic structure. Hegemony requires a balance of 
consent forces and coercive forces within a relatively stable ideological and political 
framework to be self -sustaining. Thus the PAP has structured the system to ensure that 
most, if not all, political conflicts take place in the highly controlled environment of 
institutionalised politics and that more public political discourse is mediated through 
government controlled media. Opposition in any political environment requires 
people, funding, organisation (preferably national and across ethnic lines where 
ethnicity is an issue), equitable access to media and a political system that promotes 
diversity of opinion. Access to all of these resources by groups opposing the PAP are 
or can easily be, controlled. 
An Unchanging Constitution 
Although this interpretation of institutional arrangements is rejected as "conspiracy 
theory" and "overly simplistic" by Dr. Kevin Tan Yew Lee, one of Singapore's most 
knowledgable constitutional lawyers, he provides no substantive explanation for the 
executive controls built into the constitution and the state's associated institutional 
structure, particularly the elected presidency21 and is presumably ignorant of the new 
strategies of surveillance which have been implemented to underwrite the 
constitutional foundations of hegemony. The problems inherent in the constitutional 
provisions for the elected presidency are more accurately analysed by Thio Li -Ann, 
also of the NUS Law Faculty. Thian notes that under Article 22(L)(3), the provisions for 
removing the president from office are "so broadly defined that one could argue that 
presidential activism could count as violation of the constitution..."" 
I do not argue that Singapore should have retained a "pure" form of Westminster 
constitution; no such thing exists. Constitutions that function well are ethno -centric 
and reflect both the realities and aspirations of the society to which they apply; there is 
20 In an exchange with William Sartre, the New York Times critic who has been a vehement opponent of the PAP 
regime, the following exchange took place: Lee Kuan Yew: `9'm not going to pretend that I don't have influence. In 
the final analysis, if I totally disagree with a policy, and I think it's ruinous, I'll stand up in parliament and attack it, 
and go public, and shake public opinion against policy." Safire: "And so you think public opinion is what drives 
decisions ?" Lee: "Absolutely. Yeah" See: "Whose really in charge of Singapore ? ", Australian Financial Review, 2 
March 1999, p. 16 
'` Tan comments paradoxically that provisions such as the elected presidency exist to ensure that good people occupy 
the office while ignoring the government controlled selection process, rejects the notion that the constitution is 
designed to shore up PAP control, then suggests that society is too tightly controlled and that a review of how the 
government is run is required. See: Ravi Veloo, "Why more power should be given to Singaporeans ", Straits Times 
Overseas Edition, 8 March 1997, p. 15 
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nothing wrong with 'modifications' per se. What is of concern is that these 
modifications and the resulting constitutional framework actually does provide stable 
government as well as allow for social, economic and political development unfettered 
by inflexible limitations of any kind. Societies change, and to be successful the 
constitutional framework which governs them needs to change in response to this and 
for that change to be legitimated by citizens; not at the whim of an executive 
irregardless of the political rationale. 
Change must be balanced by stability; not an imposed stability which is inherently 
unstable in the long term, but a stability which each society establishes for itself 
through negotiated social exchange between the ruled and those who would and do 
rule. As the French discovered from the failure of their Third and Fourth Republic 
constitutions, bad constitutional design can lead to economic and social upheaval and 
possibly even warn This European experience of poor constitutional design has been 
mirrored in both South Korea24 and Taiwan' in recent years. In these latter cases the 
resulting transitions to more democratic regimes was facilitated by the ability of 
oppositions to organise even in the face of authoritarian regimes and the willingness of 
the parties in power to put national interests before party interests. Good constitutional 
design provides political institutions capable of self -reform in alignment with social, 
economic and political forces for change. 
The Singapore constitution provides the nation with only one road to self reform; 
through the PAP. This is an historically dangerous strategy; effective long -term 
national institutional strategies require society stabilising options to be built into the 
system, not monopolies which are inherently unstable in the long term. Such a 
monopolistic approach provides such a high degree of autonomy and lack of 
accountability for the political executive, that it can become so separated from society 
that it begins to operate on the basis of a framework with which the broader society 
cannot identify. 
Chua Lee Hoong, "Containing powers of the EP: Cabinet has `two arrows', Straits Times Overseas Edition, 26 
October 1996, p. 15 
z' For analyses of the shortcomings of the constitution of the Fourth Republic see: Philip E. Converse and Roy Pierce, 
Political Representation in France, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1986; and John Bell, French 
Constitutional Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992. For a specific analysis of the role of cabinet and ministers see: 
Arco Timmermans, "The role of cabinet ministers in the French Fourth Republic ", in, Michael Laver, Cabinet 
Ministers and Parliamentary Government, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 141 -159 
24 For analyses on constitutional and regime transition in the Republic of Korea see: Kal Bong Kurt, "The 
Korean Constitution and Presidential Transition ", Doshiha kogaku, 232, 30 September 1993, pp. 118- 
129; Paik Young Chul, "Political Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea ", Korea and World 
Affairs, 18, 4, 1994, pp. 730 -781; Im Hyug -Baeg, Politics of Democratic transition from Authoritarian 
Rule in South Korea ", Korean Journal of Social Science, 21, 1995, pp. 133 -146 
' For analyses on constitutional and regime transition in Taiwan see: Piero Tozzi, "Constitutional Reform 
on Taiwan: Fulfilling a Chinese Notion of Democratic Sovereignty ? ", Fordham Law Review, 64, 3, 
1995, pp. 1193 -1207; and, Chiu Hung Dah, "Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of 
China on Taiwan", Issues and Studies, 29, 1, 1993, pp. 1 -17 
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Accountability and the Core Executive 
When discussing the accountability of the public sector and the transparency of 
government in Singapore with those close to or in the core executive, it is assumed by 
the majority that the system is transparent and accountable; they see themselves as 
honest people with the best interests of Singapore at heart - and for the most part they 
are. However when one challenges these respondents to draw an accountability chart 
or outline the instruments by which transparency is provided, nothing appears except 
a conversion of these assumptions at a point which comprises elections and the 
political executive. There is almost no concept of accountability or transparency within 
the core executive beyond this; the idea of having the parliament or any genuinely 
independent person or body which can hold the core executive to account for its 
actions is repugnant and dismissed as irrelevant. Moreso, disinformation is provided 
to assure Singaporeans, and to a lesser degree foreigners, that accountability and 
transparency exist. For example, Bilveer Singh notes that in relation to the Internal 
Security Act and other laws that allow unfettered executive discretion in the detention 
of any person: 
What is ... important for the Singapore Government is to make transparent to the international 
community .. that these laws are not abused and that sufficient safeguards are present in the 
system to ensure this. In this connection, the Elected President and the Advisory Council on 
Criminal Law can advise the government on the various cases with reference to the above 
legislation.' 
As has been illustrated in previous chapters, the president has neither the power, 
resources nor institutional independence to counter the executive will and the 
Advisory Council on Criminal Law is a group of civil servants with nominal 
representation from the private legal sector, comprising cadres or proto- cadres and is 
completely under the control of the political executive.27 It can be abolished at the stoke 
of a pen by the Minister of Law. These are not institutional arrangements for providing 
transparency and accountability. 
There is no genuine separation of powers in Singapore; the modern Westminster 
version of liberal democracy does not apply, although Singapore conforms almost 
totally with the unreformed Westminster system minus the constraints of convention 
which the British did not transferred to their colonies. The independence of the 
judiciary and the legislature are so compromised by institutional design and the 
possibility of the executive's exercise of legal and extra -legal powers to enforce political 
conformity, as to be negligible. As a former supreme court judge and Attorney- General 
Bilveer Singh, The Vulnerability of Small States Revisited: A Study of Singapore's Post Cold -War Foreign Policy, 
Jogjakarta, Gadjah Mada University Press, 1999, p. 120 
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has commented, the Singaporean core executive cannot think in terms of a separation 
of powers; 
... the problems inherent in the separation of powers doctrine may however be regarded as the 
inevitable open -endedness of linguistic categories and the imperfectability of our mental 
constructions. The result is that reliance upon general ideas of constitutional arrangement is 
inevitably flawed 28 
The Singaporean core executive answers to no-one but itself; whether aggregated or 
through intra- executive resource exchanges. This lack of accountability has challenged 
the moral integrity of state -society relations and the political system; it is a relationship 
which, to be durable and effective, must be prepositioned on trust but in Singapore 
there are no independent institutional indicators with which to verify that trust, so it is 
generally absent. Therefore, while 88 per cent of the population trust the government 
to rim the country in the broadest of senses, very few trust the government in terms of 
how it runs the country. 
In a recent survey of regular Feedback Unit respondents, 81 per cent of citizens saw 
the media as a tool of the government, 75 per cent thought there is no freedom of 
speech, 66 per cent thought the government is closed and difficult to talk to, 72 per cent 
thought the government incapable of accepting criticisms, 67 per cent wanted the 
government to consult more on policies and, most positively, 48 per cent didn't trust 
their MP to represent their interests.30 
The core executive seems to believe that economic performance is an adequate 
substitute for trust, but this can only carry the relationship for so long. This lack of 
accountability, except for elections within a gerrymandered electoral system, is 
complicated by the high levels of remuneration provided to the core executive and 
those aspects of their public duties, including remuneration, hidden within the GLC 
and statutory board sectors 3t Although it is obvious that remuneration in particular is 
based on performance; good performance in running or assisting with, the effective 
running of the state, eventually the electorate will question why some aspects of core 
executive activity continue to be hidden. It is only human to question why. In this 
respect it has been noted: 
n The Advisory Council on Criminal Law is of such little consequence that it is no longer listed in the Singapore 
Government Directory, in 1998. 
Tan Boon Tiek, "Judicial Review: The Singapore Law Review Lecture 1987 ", Singapore Law Review, 1988, 9, p. 
69 -83, p. 82 
29 The Feedback Unit surveyed its regular respondents and the data presented reflects this. 
Methodologically, one can assume that their may be a positive bias in the results, as these respondents are 
in regular contact with the Feedback Unit and so probably feel that they have access to the government, 
even if indirectly. It is probable that a random survey of citizens would have provided a different result 
See: Chua Mui Hoong, "Are people getting through to the government ? ", Straits Times, 4 July, p. 2 
30 `Govt How public sees it", Straits Times, 20 June 1998, p. 1 
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Intellectuals and professionals sense an atmosphere of corruption - not corruption of money, for there is 
nothing in Singapore corresponding to the activities of families of Presidents of some of the ASEAN 
countries, but corruption in the disbursement of power and influence.'Z 
But Goldring's comment is not new. In 1973 George noted: 
Even Singapore's famous graftlessness has an unseen face. Petty bribery is, of course, unknown 
and no minister or government official grows fat on illegal takings - a unique virtue in 
Southeast Asia. But this does not preclude the existence of a form of political corruption. Falling 
in with the government's line of thinking is recognized as a way of getting official favours such 
as the allotment of choice apartments; a proportion of housing estates' accomodation is set apart 
as a reward for political support. Government pressure through red tape is brought to bear on 
industrialists and traders ... If, however, the businessmen concerned are personally close to the 
top political hierarchy, they are spared the pressures. 
There need be no such sense in Singapore if the core executive is as transparent as it 
claims. Maintaining systems which generate this type of comment can only erode state - 
society relations. This lack of accountability is such an accepted part of the hegemonic 
system that official statements on public morals and values lose any potency in the 
wider society. When Lee Kuan Yew makes statements such as: 
"An Asian society cannot be held together without a sense of what is high and honorable and 
what is low and despicable.' 
few ordinary non -party political Singaporeans take them seriously. The admittedly few 
despicable acts of the state are well known on this small island; they are generally 
accepted, but not necessarily supported, for a variety of reasons, the principal being 
that the hegemonic program has simply squeezed all practical possible alternatives out 
of the national consciousness and that the economic contract that defines state -society 
relations more than the social contract, is still being fulfilled. However, the capacity for 
this contract to continue to underpin state -society relations is limited. Writing in 1989, 
Chan Heng Chee noted that the transition from the Lee to the post -Lee governments 
would probably lead to a resolution of the conflict which emerged from the mid -1980s 
between public aspiration for more political openness and the goals of the political 
elites, a redefining of the contract 
There may be a time lag and compromise between popular demands and their implementation 
but a resolution must be reached; and a compromise in Singapore will ultimately be struck: for 
the leadership, somewhere between economic effectiveness and political stability; for the 
For example, in making the Directory of Government Linked Corporations, a restricted, secret document 
'Z John Goldring, "The legal profession and government in Singapore and Malaysia ", Australian Quarterly, 60, 4, 
1988, pp. 488 -498, p. 494 
" T. J. S. George, Lee Kuan Yew 's Singapore, Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 1984, p. 213 
34 "Singapore minister decries tech ", Reuters, 30 October 1998. Available at: 
http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,28147,00.html 
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citizenry, somewhere between economic well -being and increased political participation a 
Chan's compromise is not being negotiated by the contemporary core executive. 
Instead, the prime minister is asserting that the future, in power arrangement terms, 
will be a reflection of the past: 
But you must believe that the PAP knows best. If you don't believe in that, then we have no 
business m government. Having said that, it doesn't mean we have a monopoly of views. We 
know best, but we listen to views from elsewhere. If the views are sensible, we co-opt them as 
our own - or make them into our policies. So that's also part of knowing best. But in the end, I 
believe that we are the people who can make the best judgement of where Singapore should 
go 
Such views provide no framework in Singapore for evolution towards institutional 
arrangements that are more robust and stable and through which hegemonic 
arrangements begin to be replaced by those which are more socially legitimised. 
This study has demonstrated that the power structures characteristic of contemporary 
governance in Singapore are virtually devoid of this evolutionary potential. They are 
not corporatist, either as state or societal corporatism. As for state corporatism, 
mediating structures are imposed by the state, by they are almost wholly limited to the 
state's relationship with unions which in Singapore are not representative of most 
workers, nor of class interests. Network structures are not highly formalised because 
all policy networks operate at the discretion of the political and civil service executives, 
with other policy actors almost powerless to initiate policy community or network 
activity. Equally, the working class, industry, business and community organisation 
have no power to negotiate with the political executive in resource exchange terms and 
therefore neither societal corporatist structures, nor 'private interest governance' have 
emerged. 
Instead, what one encounters in Singapore are networks, policy and governance 
mechanisms developed, controlled and overseen by the core executive through the 
exercise of its own power, not through negotiations within a balanced state -society 
power framework. Entry into these networks and mechanisms by those outside the 
public sector is through selection by the core executive, not be negotiation or affiliation 
with civil society, union or other types of organisations independent of the party or the 
government. This has been demonstrated through the analysis of the membership of 
statutory boards and GLC boards in Chapter Seven. What this clearly demonstrates is 
that Singapore is governed through hegemonistic structures, strategies and power 
n Chan Heng Chee, "The PAP and the Structuring of the Political System ", in Kemial Singh Sandhu and Paul 
Wheatley, eds., The Management of Success. The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore, 1SEAS, 1989, pp. 70- 
89, p. 87 
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relations. These have some characteristics of state corporatism, but are principally 
oligarchic and elitist and somewhat reflect garrison state arrangements. 
John Hall, noted, I believe correctly, that to fully understand the possibilities of the 
modern state, we must move away from narrow traditional definitions of state power 
defined by the ability to coerce as a sum -zero game with the state always the winner. 
This has obvious limitations, which in due course limit the ability of the state, 
particularly the small vulnerable state, to achieve its full potential. Hall concludes that 
'... societal energy is likely to be enhanced when social institutions are designed so 
that the contributions made by many can be synthesised and utilized.i37 Such a 
synthesis is society- directed, not state- directed so that its inclusiveness harnesses 
societal energy in a way that is self -sustaining. 
The efforts of the contemporary core executive to harness societal energy is partial, 
narrowly targetted and in the longer term prone to failure as it does not attempt to 
genuinely renegotiate state -society relations, but to broaden the hegemonic co -option 
strategy by making it shallower, occassionaI and requiring less commitment by 
involving the middle class, in particular, in consultations. If contemporary institutional 
arrangements continue, its most likely outcome in the next 10 -15 years is even more 
widespread political apathy than is now apparent. The concern expressed by the 
present core executive, that Singaporeans will look upon their country in terms of 
"Hotel Singapore ", could well become true. But whereas, the government is concerned 
that the problem lies with the hotel's customers (citizens), it seems apparent that it is 
with the hotel management (the government) that most problems lie. The 
contemporary Singaporean core executive needs to rework its domestic governance 
scenarios based not on projecting present institutional arrangements based on a 1960s 
conception of Singaporean society into the future, but by testing alternative 
arrangements that can genuinely harness the synergy inherent in a Iegitimated state - 
society relationship. To do this the institutional framework must change, preferably 
through a process which is evolutionary and which will see the gradual development 
of a more contested political system which the PAP can learn to accept. 
CORE EXECUTIVE DYNAMICS 
The major driver in the internal dynamics of the Singaporean core executive from at 
least 1992, and certainly from 1994 when Lee Hsien Loong was diagnosed with cancer, 
to the present time, has been the transfer of power from the Lee family to another 
group within the core executive. This is more a struggle about means, personalities and 
16 "Finally, Being His Own man: Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia - and himself ", Asiaweek 25 November 1999. 
Available at: http: cnn. com /ASIANOW /asiaweek/ interview /goh.chok.tong/index.htm 
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power domains and to a lesser degree about style of governance than about basic 
ideology, democratisation or fundamental changes to state -society relations. Chan, 
almost 25 years ago, assessed Singaporean intra- executive conflict as being driven by 
disputes about means, resource allocation and the autonomy of policy domains and 
my research has shown nothing that would challenge this assessment, except to add 
inter- personal conflict as a factor.` What is not talked about openly is the increasing 
demarcation of core executive actors around the issue of prime ministerial succession, 
the timing of Lee Kuan Yew's retirement from politics and the role of the Lee family 
within the core executive. Goh Chok Tong hinted that Lee Hsien Loong did not have a 
natural or automatic route of accession to the prime ministership when, in 1992 in an 
interview with Asiaweek, he noted that the issue of Lee Hsien Loong being prime 
minister would not arise for 10 -15 years, indicating that he himself had every intention 
of staying in command and seeing Lee Kuan Yew off the political stage.' This was still 
his view in 1999.40 
In developing and consolidating the strategy to move political leadership away from 
the Lee family, Goh has developed three centres of power. The first is the party, the 
second is the development of a power base with MINDEF, and the third is the 
extension of the MINDEF power base, in association with Lim Siong Guan and a 
number of other second generation AOs into the public sector. Since Goh unexpectedly 
increased the PAP vote in the 1997 elections, he has been able to consolidate his power 
and increase his autonomy from Lee Kuan Yew and the cabinet. This has allowed him 
to finally take control of the Defence Council and the Council of Presidential Advisers 
and reduce his need to negotiate on certain issues with the Lees. 
Control, of the party since 1992 has allowed Goh to shape the parliamentary party to 
his liking. He has not done this by sharply differentiating between himself and Lee 
Hsien Loong or other senior ministers, but has balanced his control of the party so that 
no such division is apparent from outside the core executive. Lee remains influential 
within the party, but not in control. Goh's control of the party has also focussed on 
replacing most of the older community based cadres in the branches and GROs that 
were hostile to the current leadership in the 1980s. He has integrated political 
recruitment and training for political office more closely with the party branches, but 
beyond this and an political intelligence function, the party remains isolated from the 
core executive. 
37 John A. Hall, Coercion and Consent: Studies on the Modern State, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994, p. xl 
"Comments on Current and Future Trends ", in Seah Chee Meow, ed., Trends in Singapore.- Proceedings and 
Background Paper, Singapore, Singapore university Press, 1975, p. 141 -142 
w 
"DPM's cancer: `Govt prepared for worst, hoping for best', The Straits Times, 5 December 1992, p. 3 
40 See: "Finally, Being His own man: Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia - and himself', Asiaweek, 25 November 
1999. Available at: http: / /cnn. corn /ASIANOW /asiaweek/ interview /goh.chok.tong/index.html 
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Under the current core executive, the pubic sector executive remains highly 
autonomous from society and, to a degree, its leadership has considerable autonomy 
from the political executive. This autonomy is largely based on the influence of scale in 
Singaporean society. It is a small country demographic and geographically. It is not 
easy in Singapore to replace even small numbers of the public sector elite, of which in 
1998 there were approximately 300, if there was any great schism between the political 
executive and the public sector executive. This provides a public sector management 
environment which is more negotiated than most commentators acknowledge or the 
core executive admits. This is not to say that there are major difference between the 
two executives; there are not. What difference exist are usually over means and 
personalities and are shared across the two executives more than between them. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the relationship between the public service executive 
and the political executive is not symbiotic, as it is often described, but conjugal. 
Although all public bureaucracies have a symbiotic relationship with their controlling 
political institutions if one uses this biological metaphor - each is dependent on the 
other for certain essential functions. A more accurate description in the Singapore case 
uses the mathematical term "conjugal" whether from optics or geometry. If one takes a 
geometrical meaning, two points are conjugal if they are so related as to be 
interchangeable in the enunciation of certain properties. So too, in many ways, is the 
senior civil service in Singapore interchangeable with the political executive in relation 
to certain activities., particularly in the management of policy networks and 
communities. It is only in relation to institutionally specified political or bureaucratic 
roles that the two groups are differentiated. 
THE CONTEMPORARY CORE EXECUTIVE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A 
MATURE DEMOCRACY 
Anyone looking for a transition to liberal democracy in Singapore within the next 15 
years is bound to be disappointed. In the 1998 interviews, all respondents commented 
that they did not expect Singapore to be fully democratised for at least the next 12 -15 
years. The majority of respondents justified this time frame on the basis of the passing 
of the contemporary core executive and the death of Lee Kuan Yew. Most expect Lee to 
live as long as his father - until his mid -90s - and to still have sufficient influence on 
the political system to stop or inhibit any progress toward full democratisation. While I 
agree with the general time frame, I cannot agree with a rationalisation based on Lee 's 
continuing control. This grossly underestimates Goh Chok Tong and the capacity of 
the current core executive to plot its own course for Singapore. It also does Lee himself 
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art injustice; he is far more adaptable than most give him credit for, admittedly 
tempered by an instinct for control and a habit of wielding power.' What was more 
interesting regarding any transition to full democracy was that all respondents also 
agreed that there was no discernible strategy by the PAP to foster this transition; 
instead, its instinct to coopt and control any non -PAP political developments 
continued; some commented, almost unthinkingly. 
Yet, it would appear from the conflicts which have taken place within the core 
executive over the political implications of the transition to a knowledge based 
economy, the increasing impact of globalisation and the changing nature of 
Singaporean society, that it is only too aware that such a transition may be necessary 
to maintain its program. One of the major trends pushing the need for the PAP to 
support this transition is the increasing unwillingness of the broader middle class to be 
recruited into the present political system, which by design largely excludes the 
working class. I believe that what we are now seeing in Singapore is a 'crisis of 
recruitment': a withdrawal of labour from the PAP system by those outside the public 
sector, as the only acceptable response to objecting to its continuance in its present 
form. For example, of the 23 PAP recruits to parliament in 1997, 17 came from the 
PAP's immediate locus of control -13 were current or former public servants (seven of 
whom were either in the Administrative Service or the Singapore Legal Service), 3 
were journalists from SPH and one was from the NTUC. In all, 74 per cent of these new 
recruits could be classed as public sector recruits. As was demonstrated in Chapter 
Five, recruitment to the judiciary is also problematical with substantial passive 
resistance from the legal profession to judicial recruitment. 
This is compounded by the failure of the key public sector feeder to the ministry, the 
Administrative Service, to meet its recruitment targets and thus fall back on a 
dependence on the SAF for new recruits.' This is compounded by the failure to recruit 
high numbers of school leavers through SAF scholarships, the president's scholarships 
and PSC scholarships. These comprise about 145 in total each year, but in 1998 only 
three applicants for the president's scholarships met the criteria, an historically low 
level. The EDB, however, offers over 300 scholarships by itself or jointly with other 
organisations and a work environment that generally insulates its staff from politics 
d1 In 1999, Goh Chok Tong noted that in his relationship with Lee, Lee "gives his views. I don't take offence." 
Obviously Lee's views rarely gel with Goh's. See: "Finally, Being His own man: Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia 
- and himself', Asiaweek 25 November 1999. Available at 
http : / /cnn.com/A S IANO W /asiaweek/ interview /goh. chok tong/index.html 
42 In 1996, Lim Siong Guan, then Permanent Secretary, PMO, told a meeting of Administrative Officers 
that the Administrative Service had failed to meet its recruitment targets for several years and that the 
service would have to rely on other avenues to at least meet its minimum targets. These `other avenues" 
so far seem to be restricted to the SAF and two appointments from the private sector. Data from interview 
with senior Administrative Officer. 
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and easily leads to private sector employment's It is this latter road that is attracting 
school leavers, not a path that leads one into government. If this trend continues, and it 
most probably will, it indicates that society is beginning to isolate the political centre 
by withdrawing its willingness to be co -opted into it. 
Active resistance to PAP hegemony is pointless to most Singaporeans. However, there 
is nothing the PAP can do to force people to participate within that part of the system 
which recruits for the political or public service executives. If these trends are genuine 
and they continue, the core executive will be forced to draw the political executive 
from an increasingly smaller pool, almost wholly from the public sector, until its 
oligarchic nature becomes so apparent that it could cause considerable social discord 
or, more probably, almost complete political apathy. If you exclude everyone from the 
game, it's impossible to then blame them for not wanting to play. The only way to have 
more people play is to change the rules, or increase the size of the team; the latter 
strategy seems increasingly to be not available. 
The current approach to increasing consultation with the middle class is only a 
temporary and partial answer to the long term need to recruit political and public 
sector talent and to maintain support for a stable, highly legitimised government, 
whether PAP or not. To continuing winning in the long term, the PAP will need to 
surrender its tendency for overwhelming control of everything. Given the surveillance 
and covert control structures built into the existing system, even if the PAP begins on a 
path of institutional, not necessarily, liberal democratic, reform, it does so with 
enormous advantages over its political opponents, have little to risk in the next 1045 
years and much to gain from appearing willing to share power and be more 
accountable. 
The basic question to be addressed is whether the structure, dynamics and strategies 
which characterise the contemporary core executive provide the best system to assure 
Singapore of long -term political stability to meet its national development goals? There 
are certainly many within the present core executive who believe so; there are others 
who obviously don't. It is not a question necessarily of the PAP losing power; it is a 
question of whether the PAP can mature as a political party, rather than remain a 
technocratic oligarchy, to engage in authentic political contestation as a necessary 
means of maintaining social and national cohesion? At the moment, the political 
system, including the constitution is designed on a winner- take -all basis with number 
of additional features which allow the loser, presumably the PAP, to spoil the 
governance system if it attains more than one -third of the vote, a reasonable outcome if 
43 Data from EDB, PSC and MINDEF, 1998. 
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it did lose office. The post -Lee core executive has done nothing to change this. In a 
small nation this is a very destructive strategy; one that shows greater concern with the 
PAP holding onto power than it does for the long term national good, if one has 
enough political acumen and emotional maturity to separate the PAP's welfare from 
the nation's. 
If the PAP was to adopt a program for a transition to a more democratic system, what 
would be required? The program below suggests a broad outline that would transform 
the political system, without necessarily displacing the PAP program, whether 
implemented by itself or by another party that shared much of its approach. This is a 
program for a bi -polar hegemonic system, not a transition to liberal democracy; that is 
inconceivable in contemporary Singapore given the way in which the PAP has 
structured political institutions, discourse and dynamics. Such an approach matches 
the type of political representativeness in Singapore, as Rodan notes: 
... a less recognised constraint is the ideological success the PAP has had with opposition parties 
themselves. Their implicit acceptance of elitist PAP assumptions about the purpose and process 
of government also stifles the development of an alternative politics that could find expression 
through the ballot and offer voters a significant choice. At both the structural and ideological 
levels, politics as a process of representation has yet to achieve legitimacy in Singapore:" 
So complete is the PAP's ideological hegemony, that it has co -opted opposition 
political parties into its domain: 
Neither major opposition party, then, directly contests the ruling party's central ideological 
concepts. This does not necessarily indicate a conscious endorsement of PAP ideology, but it 
does at least reflect an inability to formulate alternatives; surely an important measure of the 
PAP's ideological hegemony ' 
It is logical therefore that a transition to a more contested political system must accept 
and come from within this hegemonic framework. This is a safe path for the PAP and 
Singapore to a more representative and legitimate political system. It is safe because it 
builds upon a broad ideological and social consensus developed by the PAP though its 
consent building strategies: a consensus that over the next decade or so, can be 
separated from the PAP as a party and government and be seen as a more socially 
legitimated political framework for the nation as a whole. This would reflect the 
approach taken in the historical development of the Westminster system in Britain; the 
political system can be robust and adversarial, because the political culture and 
44 Garry Rodan, "Elections without representation: The Singapore experience under the PAP ", in R. H. 
Taylor, The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Cambridge, 
1996, pp. 61 -89, p. 63 
as Garay Rodan, "State- society relations and political opposition in Singapore", in, Garay Rodan, ed., 
Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 96 -127, p. 118 
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institutions are based on a broad fundamental consensus on the framework for 
governing the nation. This point is aptly made by Lord Balfour; 
Our whole political machinery pre- supposes a people so fundamentally at one that they can 
safely afford to bicker; and so sure of their own moderation that they are not dangerously 
disturbed by the never ending din of political conflict.' 
In a Singaporean bi -polar hegemonic political arrangement, the state should continue 
to have safeguards against ethnic and religious conflict, but it could safely implement a 
political system in which the 'din of political conflict' was as moderate as that of its 
British ancestor and in which a strong state can act decisively and relatively 
autonomously when this is absolutely necessary for the national good. 
A MODERNISATION PROGRAM FOR SINGAPOREAN DEMOCRACY 
A transition to a bi -polar hegemonic system is a reasonable step in the evolution of the 
governance of Singapore. It assures the continuation of the broad PAP framework 
through the creation of a two party system within which both parties share allegiance 
to certain broad ideological positions and a governance framework derived from the 
current model. However it introduces greater and more authentic competition into the 
political system, should moderate the harsh and socially divisive approach to 
opposition practiced by the current government as the existing political parties become 
more marginalised within a predominantly two party system, and increase the 
legitimacy of government. This approach will also provide a more controlled 
evolutionary path for democratic development in Singapore by defusing much (but 
certainly not all) of the passive resistance to the PAP. 
Such a program requires an institutional reform program to restructure "the system" 
so that it can facilitate bi -polar hegemony. 
The Institutional Reform Program 
The major components of an institutional reform program for Singapore are sketched 
out below. A detailed program is not possible within the context of this study. The 
major components are: constitutional reform, electoral reform, judicial reform, 
parliamentary reform, public sector reform and the development of a proto -PAP 
political party. 
46 Lord Balfour, "Preface ", in, Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1949, xxiv 
386 Ross Worthington 
Constitutional Reform 
The constitution needs to be reformed in several ways, including removal of all those 
articles which would better reside in legislation: most of the public sector management 
provisions and many of the citizenship, financial and special provisions. This would 
then place contestation of these matters within the legislature requiring the 
government to pass legislation on a simple majority vote. This strategy starts to break 
down the brinkmanship and divisions inherent in having such mundane 
administrative matters dealt with as major constitutional matters requiring a two - 
thirds majority in the parliament. The restrictions on fundamental human rights need 
to be changed to conform to the current realities of Singaporean society, associated 
with a jettisoning of the 1960 model of Singapore on which the core executive is now 
operationalised. The powers of the president need to be unequivocally defined, the 
limitations on candidacy for this office need to broadened at least and a constitutional 
role for the Supreme Court should be considered. A guarantee of the equality of votes 
and the establishment of an independent electoral commission appointed by the 
president should also be included to underwrite a revision of the electoral system. 
Compulsory retirement from public office by statutory office holders should also be 
insisted on by the constitution to force generation renewal upon the political executive, 
particularly for judicial offices. 
Electoral Reform 
At the very least, the number of GRC should be halved over the next 15 years and the 
numbers of MPs in each reduced to three. All other constituencies should be single 
member constituencies and the electoral laws should be revised to assure a balance of 
racial and religious representation among the single member constituencies. This 
should be presided over by an independent electoral commission appointed by the 
president on which no serving public servants are represented. This allows the 
possibility of the number of opposition members increasing slowly over a 15 year 
period thus bedding down the other complementary reforms slowly over three 
elections and one generation of voters. 
Judicial Reform 
It is essential that a judiciary genuinely independent of the political executive be 
developed. Given the age profile of the present Supreme Court judiciary, this is a 
matter which could be acted upon in the near future. Lawyers in Singapore are only 
too well aware of the nature of Singaporean society and the ways in which justice 
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should be administered in a multi- ethnic society. Those talented enough to join the 
Supreme Court in particular do not need to act on behalf of the political executive to 
protect society. A genuine commitment to an independent judiciary will find willing 
recruits, although to establish its authenticity, the core executive will have to lose a few 
political court cases gracefully first. This requires a degree of emotional maturity which 
the political executive in particular has failed to demonstrate in the past. The 
subordinate judiciary could remain functionally within the civil service under these 
arrangements and its structure reviewed at a later stage. 
Parliamentary Reform 
Reform of the legislature should include making membership of parliament a full time 
occupation. If need be, salaries should be established at a relatively high level and be 
pegged to the same scale as for civil servants and ministers. MPs should be provided 
with offices in their constituencies, a motor vehicle, support staff and an office adjacent 
to the new parliament house so that they can adequately conduct their duties. 
Ministers could be provided with a small number of independent, non civil service 
staff so as to establish a corps of political trainees for both major parties. The Standing 
Orders of the parliament should be revised to remove the infringements on 
parliamentary privilege, standing committees in certain areas established and a 
practice of genuine budgetary review of estimates be handled by these committees. 
The gradual introduction of these reforms will support the development of 
parliamentary oversight skills and of a culture of public sector accountability within 
the executive, the parliament and the public sector. All public bodies should be 
required to provide annual reports to the parliament which must meet minimum 
uniform guidelines for accountability and transparency. Senior officers in the 
Parliamentary Service should be trained in committee accountability practices and 
parliamentary practices for these committees developed and incorporated in Standing 
Orders. The number of support staff for the parliament should be increased as 
required. 
Public Service Reform 
The initiatives taken under the PS21 program should be extended to develop a culture 
of public sector accountability in the civil service, statutory boards and GLCs. All 
officers of division head level and above whether in the Administrative Service or not, 
should be expected to attend hearings of parliamentary committees, attend budget 
estimate hearings and be trained in parliamentary accountability. The civil service, 
statutory boards and GLCs need to be made genuinely accountable so that citizens 
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clearly understand their status and management. This is an important step in building 
greater trust between the electorate and the political executive. All boards, GLCs and 
ministries should publish annual reports that are tabled in the parliament, with 
possible limitations for genuine national security reasons, such as limiting the annual 
reports of MINDEF and the DSTA to information that has no security sensitivity. 
To assist the Administrative Service in particular, for five to six years small numbers of 
AOs (possibly 5 per year) should be sent on secondment to parliaments in Britain, 
Canada, New Zealand or Australia, to gain a working knowledge of parliamentary 
committees systems suitable for Singapore and their role in public sector 
accountability. Regulations restricting the involvement of Administrative Officers in 
political, parties should be abolished and provision made for these officers to stand for 
parliament and be MPs while retaining their AS positions which can be resumed if the 
lose their seats. This provision should also apply to all civil service officers. 
Development of a Proto -PAP Opposition Party 
A viable opposition party should be nurtured which can progress the nation towards 
the development of a genuine two -party system over the next 20 years. This cannot be 
achieved by splitting the PAP; the PAP needs to adjust its political control strategies to 
allow this party to develop and, almost certainly, to covertly sponsor it. To have any 
genuine success, this new party must be a child of the PAP in its initial stages, 
probably the first 10 years. This party should be a moderate political party with a 
common ideological and policy framework to the PAP, with which the PAP feels it can 
share power without necessarily, in the long -term, sharing a common view on all 
issues. This program for nurturing another hegemonically oriented party must include 
the gradual termination of the program of overt political harassment that makes the 
development of viable opposition parties impossible. The possible core membership of 
such a party already exists and, with certain guarantees, could begin the task of 
developing a second conservative political force in Singapore. 
Strategies for assisting this party to mature and develop should be devised, including 
their members playing a role in the various components of the hegemonic structure, 
especially the GROs, GLCs and statutory boards. This small and growing alternative 
party should develop relationships with the civil service, either directly through civil 
service membership of the party, through the parliamentary system and by other 
mechanisms such as being on ministry resource panels, government committees and 
advisory bodies. The electoral laws may need to be changed to allow public funding of 
elections perhaps based on the Australian model, or a strategy devised whereby the 
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nascent political party receives enough funding to ensure its development. At the same 
time, the PAP needs to refine its funding arrangements so that they are also more 
transparent, particularly its relationship with the NTUC. 
Any program for movement from the current unipolar hegemonic political system has 
to account for resistance to it. In the present core executive such resistance could be led 
by Lee Kuan Yew whose personal commitment to his creation is encapsulated in his 
declaration that: 
I have spent a whole life -time building this and as long as I am in charge nobody is going to 
knock it down.47 
However, Lee, if anything, has also proven to be flexible when required. Any initiative 
such as a move to a bi -polar system need not, and should not, be overly influenced by 
any one person. The current core executive are quite capable of deciding such a 
strategy whatever the opposition from within the core executive, if they feel that it is 
essential to Singapore's continued prosperity and good. 
CONCLUSION: THE CORE EXECUTIVE, THE HEGEMONIC PROGRAM AND 
POLITICAL MATURATION 
This study has attempted to examine how the core executive in Singapore operates 
within an hegemonic political system; a system operationalised by strong, partly 
balanced forces of state coercion and social consent designed and controlled by the 
core executive, its executive agencies, its business enterprises and its extra -institutional 
bodies. 
Our knowledge of how hegemonic power is developed and operates has its 
foundations in the coercive institutional instruments of the state. But within an 
hegemonic system, this coercive power is transformed through a set of tacit 'rules of 
the system' which are acknowledged, acted upon and reproduced by individuals and 
groups, reflected back into the institutional structure and its concomitant social 
structure, to reinforce, soften but not diminish hegemonic coercion and maintain 
consistency with the hegemonic ideology and structure. In particular, we can observe 
these 'rules of hegemonic consent' in within the institutional structure and in the way 
those communities and social networks close to the core executive function; the policy 
communities and policy networks. 
While the rules of hegemonic consent also operate in the broader society, they are not 
as apparent; they are softened, as it is essential if the hegemonic program is to be 
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successful and perpetuated, that both the coercive instruments and the rules of consent 
be tacitly understood, known or suspected but not be overwhelmingly present as this 
promotes social resistance. This partially hidden nature of hegemonic instrumentality 
is best achieved by balancing coercion and consent functions between complementary 
loci of power - institutions and society. Therefore, the rules of consent 'soften' coercive 
power because a constant emphasis on coercion would undermine the perpetuation of 
hegemony as it would facilitate resistance, not consent, and produce a simple 
authoritarian regime, not an hegemonic regime. Likewise, if such a system gives 
greater emphasis to consent and less to coercion, state corporatism rather than 
hegemony is produced and non -state actors have greater autonomy to penetrate the 
core executive and shape the state. 
This is one of the principal reasons political scientists find Singapore so annoying; 
understanding how hegemony functions is complex and on the surface, seemingly 
contradictory. For many analysts, Singapore does not obey the rules of political 
science, as crude as these may be at this stage of the discipline's development. It is the 
only wealthy nation in the world that is not a genuine liberal democracy. It has had 
one party rule and a semi -authoritarian regime for 40 years, but demonstrated long 
term sustained economic growth. This has produced a large middle class that has not 
developed a political opposition to the authoritarian regime nor demanded full 
democracy. The nation has been presided over by one dominant man but there is no 
personalty cult, although there appears to exists a mixture of fear and respect 
regarding Lee Kuan Yew and his family which may, perhaps, be now diminishing. 
The nation is highly militarised, but the military was created by a civilian government 
during peace time and has no connection with the establishment of the state, nor an 
historical existence; the military is a creature of the civilian administration with its 
power structure carefully designed to minimise its political autonomy and optimise its 
defence function. The military is represented in the legislature, the executive and the 
various public bureaucracies, but there is no evidence of military government as it 
would normally be understood. The state is largely autonomous but its rulers could 
not be classed as rent -seekers although they earn the highest public sector salaries in 
the world calculated on a transparent market -linked basis. The bureaucracy has direct 
power over very substantial financial and other resources, but the level of money 
corruption is minuscule. The large Malay ethnic minority, usually hostile to ethnic 
Chinese (as recently evidenced in Indonesia), co- exists peacefully with the Chinese 
majority; there have been no inter- racial clashes since 1969. Is there something very 
right, very strange, or both about this tiny, rather insignificant nation? 
' Lee Kuan Yew, cited in Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 December 1980 
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In attempting to answer this question, commentators generally classify the 
Singaporean state as corporatist, authoritarian or oligarchic. These labels are not 
necessarily misplaced; all have venerable theoretical and empirical roots in political 
science and apply at least partially to Singapore. They do, however, fail to explain the 
full nature of Singaporean state -society relations which I have argued are based on 
hegemony; not a Gramscian hegemony, because under the Singaporean system, it 
could be argued that the working class benefits except in political control terms ' It is 
therefore a neo- Gramscian hegemony. It is in some sense corporatist, authoritarian and 
oligarchic and even elitist with overtones of the garrison state; but it is also more than 
all these separately. 
Most contemporary political thought is uncomfortable with the idea, let alone the 
exercise of, raw unbridled state power, except when it can be classified as belonging to 
states or groups which are at war or somewhat out of the ordinary; nations we can 
accuse of 'state terrorism', institutionalised oppression or label as theocratic, dictatorial 
or somehow peculiar and outside the typology of 'normal' states by which we usually 
mean some variant of the liberal democratic state. Contemporary political thought is 
fascinated by the complexity of advanced industrialised societies and the essentiality of 
consent to the functioning of these societies whether internally or between states; those 
nations below this level are regarded as the domain of development specialist, rather 
in the way that paediatrics is an interesting, even essential medical specialty, but not 
'the main game' in medicine. In relation to Singapore, Tremewan makes a typical 
assessment 
The ordering of society is most effectively achieved by consent. However, when consent is not 
forthcoming or the ordering process requires the rapid breakdown of existing social relations, 
then various degrees of coercion become necessary.49 
It may be unpopular or even distasteful to ponder the necessity of coercion to state 
functioning and governance in modern nations, but intellectual fashion and the 
emotional preferences of analysts have little influence on the hard realities of running a 
country whether democratically or not; the constant and necessary role of coercion in 
all forms of governance cannot be ignored - it is an essential factor in state -society 
relations. 
The key issue is not state coercion itself but the transparency, accountability and 
appropriateness of its use within a particular state and the degree to which it is 
accepted by citizens within a stable framework of state -society relations. This is not to 
a8 Gramsci conceived of hegemonic arrangements as being opposed to the interests of the working class. 
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deny that a concern for political complexity in terms of game playing, resource 
exchange, governance, pluralist competition and civil society dynamics is not 
legitimate or relevant. Rather, these approaches, while pregnant with valid insights, 
each of themselves provide limited assistance in the analysis of a society and political 
system that does not conform to the classificatory criteria of liberal democracy, 
authoritarian (whether fascist, communist or simply militarist), oligarchic, or elitist 
because it depends for its reproduction and continuity on strong, balanced forces of 
both coercion and consent mediated by a quasi -autonomous state. The answer lies in 
understanding the complexity and dynamics of hegemony, as this study has attempted 
to do. It is the structure and particularly the dynamics of hegemony as implemented in 
Singapore through a combination of institutional and extra -institutional mechanisms, 
which provides us, if not with the full answer, at least with a valid description of 
hegemony in action under the direction of a Westminster based core executive. This in 
association with the small size of this nation provide much of the explanation of why 
Singapore is as it is, The scale of society, geography, culture and institutions is such 
that if one remains dedicated to staying in Singapore, one must negotiate and 
compromise to a degree greater than in large more dispersed polities. In Singapore, 
there is no where to hide, so even the PAP must negotiate moreso than it perhaps 
would like us to believe. 
The contemporary Singaporean core executive has been faithful to Lee Kuan Yew's 
regime reproduction aims. Since the transfer of power from Lee, it has done nothing to 
significantly change institutional arrangements, it has retained the PAP's ideological 
and operational framework and a profound belief in its ' manifest destiny' as the 
vehicle for national salvation. It has been, on occasions more consultative, but the 
essential nature of state -society relations have actually deteriorated as evidenced by 
the 'crisis of recruitment' being experienced by the regime. Its most significant changes 
have been marginal in their impact on the hegemonic program: reform of the public 
service through increased efficiency and a service orientation, a more active but 
nonetheless largely powerless legislature, a larger and more dynamic party 
organisation but one still isolated from the centre of power. Other changes have 
significantly strengthened hegemony, particularly the development of advanced 
surveillance and intelligence techniques for monitoring citizens and political 
opposition. These hegemonic enhancement strategies have been more sophisticated 
and covert than those used by the Lee governments, perhaps a hallmark of the current 
core executive. It is probable that the current core executive will have increasing 
difficulty reproducing itself. By comparison, it may eventually seem that Goh Chok 
Tong's succession was relatively easy. 
4' Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore", London, Macmillan, 1994, p. 187 
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The greatest challenge facing the contemporary core executive in Singapore is not 
economic or social; it is the challenge of providing Singapore with a political system 
that is robust and has genuine legitimacy, that is not enforced from above, but 
transparently accepted as legitimate from the grassroots. One possible, although not 
easy route to this, is the preparation of a bi -polar hegemonic system over the next 15 
years and the concurrent preparation of the next generation of PAP leadership to have 
the ability to rotate power between the two parties in peaceful transitions. The current 
core executive has the intellectual and organisational ability to achieve this task. 
However, they have unfortunately demonstrated that they do not seem to have the 
will with which to tackle it. This bodes ill for Singapore in the long -term. I look 
forward to being proven wrong, but expect to be disappointed. 
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4.49 Appendix 1 
APPENDIX 1 
THE PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY'S DEVELOPMENT FROM 1971 
TO 1995 
Compared to the structure of the People's Action party depicted by Pang in 19711, (see 
Diagram 1 below), by 1995 the party had been greatly restructured, although the 
Central Executive Committee has remained the controlling authority, assisted by a 
Party Headquarters Executive Committee (HQ Exco) established in sometime before 
1988,2 probably between 1984 and 1988 after Goh Chok Tong had been designated as 
prime minister designate. In recognition of the central role of branches in the reformed 
party organisation, bimonthly meetings of branch secretaries are also now held in 
order to coordinate branch activities and to ensure uniform dissemination of party and 
government decisions .3 
The party's major policy making forum, the biennial Party Conference' has been 
supplemented by an annual PAP Convention, but both are relatively short and still 
rubberstamp the CEC policy agenda, although debate on policies is now more 
encouraged. In 1995, the HQ Exco was assisted by 13 headquarters committees, but in 
1998, Wong Kan Seng mentioned that only nine headquarters committees existed 5 In 
line with the civil service strategy of devolving authority and responsibility to 
functional units from the central agencies, the party centre was restructured as a 
support and facilitation centre and responsibility for most party activity devolved to 
the branches. 
The party secretariat, which was always small, is possibly smaller than it was, having a 
permanent staff of "fewer than 10".6 Even with the establishment of the PAP 
Community Foundation (PCF), it appears that there was no temptation to develop a 
larger central bureaucracy as the PCF's recruitment, appointment and supervision 
responsibilities were transferred to PCF branches which are under the general 
direction of the PAP branches in each constituency. Advice on PCF teacher 
qualifications, curriculum and facilities standards is provided by the Ministry of 
Pang actually based her structural analysis on the party as of 1968. See: Pang, 1971, op. cit., p. 25 
3 Koh Buck Song, "The PAP cadre system ", Straits Times, 4 April 1998 
3 "Our plans for the year", Petir, January/February 1995, p. 91 
' The Party Conference is a one day event. See: Goh Chok Tong, "Will Singapore be as Prosperous 30 Years 
Hence ? ", Petir, January/February 1995, pp. 7 -14. The PAP Convention is a half -day event. See: "PAP Convention 
1993 ", Petir, January/February 1994, pp.6 -7 
5 Koh, 1998, op. cit. These committees were; Appointments, Constituency Relations, Education, Information, PAP 
Awards, Political Education, Publicity and Publications, Social and Recreational and Malay Affairs. It is assumed 
that the Education Committee was concerned with the National Education program. 
6 Koh, 1998, op. cit. 
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Education, and the PCF training institution, the Institute of Early Childhood 
Education, is headed and staffed mainly by academics from the Institute of Education, 
demonstrating that the PAP's use of government resources to support its party 
activities remains a standard strategy for both decreasing party costs and limiting 
party autonomy by maintaining executive control through the political executive and 
the civil service. 
The CEC elected in 1995 demonstrated the degree of control Goh held over the party. 
Of the 16 members, in addition to Goh himself there were nine members aligned to 
Goh; Tony Tan as chairman and Lim Boon Heng, Abdullah Tarmugi, George Yeo, Lee 
Boon Yang, Lim Hng Kiang, Aline Wong, Teo Chee Hean and Tan Cheng Bock as 
members. While Lee Hsien Loong chaired the Party Headquarters Executive 
Committee and his wife's cousin, Wong Kan Seng was his deputy, the First and Second 
Organising Secretaries and the Organising Secretary (Special Duties) and six of the 
eight ordinary members were aligned to Goh.' Of the other 12 headquarters 
committees, seven were chaired by Goh supporters' and of the eight district advisers, 
five were, although the district advisers, chairman and deputy chairman positions 
were more balanced than the headquarters committees between Lee and Goh 
supporters.' The party journal, Petir was also under the editorship of an MP and Goh 
supporter, Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee. 
' The First Organising Secretary was Lee Boon Yang, the Second Organising Secretary was Matthias Yao and the 
Organising Secretary (Special Duties) was Ow Chin Hock. The ordinary members obviously aligned to Goh include; 
George Yeo, Lim Boon Heng, Lim Hng Kiang, Abdullah Tarmugi, Teo Chee Hean and Aline Wong. 
' These were: Appointments (Teo Chee Hean), Current Affairs (Ho Peng Kee), Education (R. Sinnakaruppan), Malay 
Affair Bureau (Abdullah Tarmugi), Publicity and Publications (Ho Peng Kee), Women's Wing (Aline Wong) and 
Young PAP (George Yeo). 
9 These were: City North (Lee Boon Yang), City South (Lim Hng Kiang), City West (Lim Boon Heng), Suburban 
East (Mah Bow Tan), Suburban West (Yeo Cheow Tong). Lee Hsien Loong was district adviser for Suburban Central 
District. 
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DIAGRAM 1: THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PAP: 196810 
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DIAGRAM 3.2: THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PAP: 1996" 
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" "HQ Committees 95/96 ", Petit; March/April, 1995, pp. 22 -24 
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Development of the PAP Community Foundation 
Reform of the party has been focussed at the branch level and also, since 1992, in 
consolidating the PAP Community Foundation's (PCF) control of the national pre- 
school system12 in association with the government funded People's Association Day 
Care Service13 and the NTUC Child Care Centre network.14 Since 1993 the PCF has also 
worked with the National Library Board (NLB) in establishing and controlling a the 
national Children's Community Library network.15 The PCF branch network in 
integrated with the party branch network to the degree that they are based on 
constituencies and that there is one PCF branch for each PAP branch.1ó The PCF branch 
is headed by salaried staff who oversee PCF facilities in each area but also includes 
volunteer members. The PCF is therefore the only part of the party which has 
developed a large number of salaried staff. However, the PCF education centres 
(kindergartens), childcare centres and student care centres need to respond to 
commercial demand for childcare and kindergarten places and so are established in 
relation to demographic and socio- economic demand.' In 1999 there were 375 PCF 
education centres across the island, 35 children's libraries funded by the NLB but 
operated by the PCF, 14 child care centres's and 14 student care centres19 and the 
Tampines East 3 -in -1 Family Centre which has before school, after school and 
kindergarten facilities.20 It would not be an exaggeration to say that the island is 
saturated with PCF facilities. The PCF is overseen by the PCF Board of Trustees chaired 
by the chairman of the PAP21 and a PCF Management Council comprised mainly of 
PAP MPs and chaired by the Minister of State for Education 22 PAP branches have 
oversight of the PCF branches and facilities and in 1994 some branches organised 
" "PCF Teachers' Seminar 1994 ", Petir, September /October 1994, p. 80 - 87, p. 80. The Ministry of Education 
ceased its Preparatory Year Programme for preschoolers in 1992 and transferred the responsibility for pre -school 
education to the private sector, principally to the PCF, but also to other organisations, such as Mendaki for Malay 
pre -schoolers. However, the ministry provides up to 90 per cent of the capital cost of upgrading PCF facilities to meet 
ministry requirements and sets standards for facilities, equipment and curriculum. 
Speech by Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs and member of parliament for Bishan -Tao Payoh Group 
Representation Constituency at the Joint Graduation Ceremony for the Students of Bishan East PAP Community 
Foundation and PA Bishan Child Care Centre on Friday, 13 November 1998 at 9.30 an at Bishan Community Club. 
Singapore, Media Division, Ministry of Information and the Arts, p. 1. There were 28 PA Child Care Centres in 
1999. 
10 There were 25 NTUC Childcare Cooperative child care centres in 1999, two kindergartens and a parent support 
centre operated under the NTUC Childcare Co-operative. Available at: http:// www. ntuc.childcare.com.sg/cchty.htm 
'S George Yeo, Libraries for a Renaissance City. Speech at the launch of the National Library Board's New Direction 
and Logo, 3 July, 1996. Singapore, Ministry of information and the Arts, 3 July 1996, p. I. Available at: 
htt p:// cyberfair .gsn.org/cgss98 /ver2/nlb.htm 
'6 
"PCF Teachers' Seminar 1994 ", Petir, September /October 1994, pp. 80 -87, p. 81 
" For example, in 1999 there was only one PAP education centre in the wealthy Tanglin area There were 15 in Tao 
Payoh which is largely HDB estates plus four student care centres and a children's library. 
18 Including those in the Yuhua Happy Days Before and After School Care Centre. 
The PCF has only a small responsibility for Student Care Centres as there area total of 119 nationally. 
20 This data on PCF facilities was derived from the Singapore White Pages Telephone Directory. Available at: 
http://www.phonebook.com.sg. 
r' Koh, 1998, op. cit. 
u 
"Teachers training is essential in quality preschool education ", Petir, March/apri11994, pp. 39-41 
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workshops and training for PCF teachers ' The creation of the PCF and its nationwide 
facilities provides an important recruitment facility for the party, provides each party 
branch with additional community responsibilities and further entrenches its presence 
in everyday life. The PCF also provides an avenue for direct political contact between 
the party and the electorate when required. For example, in 1994 after the PAP once 
again losing the Potong Pasir electorate to Chiam See Tong of the SDP, Andy Gan Lai 
Chiang, chairman of the local PAP branch and former PAP candidate, used the PCF 
kindergarten enrolment process to personally interview all parents who were applying 
to place their children in the kindergartens. He later established a Parents- Teachers 
Committee and also used the PCF facilities for community meetings and Meet the 
People sessions.24 The PCF obviously has a political function over and above its 
principal preoccupations with education and political socialisation. 
The Branch Network 
There were 81 PAP branches in 1994, one in each constituency and, in GRCs, one in 
each constituency ward' or division' expanded to 83 branches by 1998, again one in 
each constituency. However in 1995, a search of Petir identified only 71 active PAP 
branches, but 81 active Young PAP branches and a search of the 1999 telephone 
directory identified only 45 branches that were active enough to have a telephone 
number listed; there is therefore obvious differences among the branches in terms of 
membership, community support and mobilisation capacity. 
The island is divided into eight districts each of which has a minister as district 
adviser, an MP as chairman and deputy chairman and district executive committees 
comprising a chairman, deputy chairman and another MP.28 In some constituencies the 
branch structure is augmented by a regular meeting of all GROS and party branches, 
such as the Thompson Executive Committee established by Leong Horn Kee MP, now 
"Suburban West District forms a Branch Secretaries' Committee", Petir, March/April 1994, p. 57 
u 
"Winds of Change", Petir, March/April 1994, pp. 30-33. Despite these initiatives, Gan still lost to Chiam in the 
1997 elections but with a slightly increased vote. 
u The term ward is used colloquially but the term division is the official sub -component of a GRC. 
w 
"What is our course of action? ", Petir, July /August 1994, p. 93 r Petir is the PAP's official journal. 
zs Petir, January/February 1995, p. 85 
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within the Bishan-Tao Payoh CRC.' In each branch there was a Young PAP branch 
and in many, but not all branches, a Women's Wing branch, the Women's Wing having 
9 
"Always on the move ", Petir, March/April 1994, pp. 35 -37, p. 36 
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been established in July 198930 
The Young PAP organisation was a recasting of the PAP Youth Wing, established 
shortly after the party was founded, defunct since the mid -1960s and resistant to 
initiatives under Lee Hsien Loong's leadership to revive it in the mid- 1980s. One MP is 
allocated to chair each branch and is assisted by a deputy chairman, a branch secretary 
and a branch executive committee. Each branch has a minister as an adviser and also a 
second adviser who may be drawn from among the ministers, MPs, the NTUC or from 
the ranks of cadre members. Branch advisers are allocated by the Headquarters 
Executive Committee from the MPs in the same constituency or ward as the branch. This 
pattern is similar for the Young PAP and the Women's Wing branches. In 1995, George 
Yeo was chairman of Young PAP and Aline Wong chairman of the Women's Wing. The 
Young PAP Executive Committee also had Lim Hng Kiang as vice -chairman and three 
MPs as members. The Women's Wing also has a representative on the Young PAP 
Executive Committee. In 1995, Young PAP district chairman were not MPs, although 
one, Yeo Guat Kwang, was elected to parliament in 1997.31 The Women's Wing is 
coordinated at the district level by District Women's Wing Executive Councils. In at least 
one district, Suburban West, coordination is assisted by the establishment of a District 
Branch Secretaries' Committee, chaired by the district chairman 32 
Party membership is controlled by MPs at the branch level who, in association with 
branch secretaries, recruit. Cadre membership is, however still controlled by the CEC 33 
The party does not publish membership figures, but in 1994 it was reported that 40,000 
party activists attended a PAP community day 34 However in 1998, Wong Kan Seng 
stated that there were "more than 10,000 ordinary members" in the party and "more 
than 1000" cadre members 35 Wong also commented that from 1996 -98 more than 1,000 
members were recruited each year, indicating that in 1995 there were only 8,000 
members nationwide, supplemented at election times by approximately 40,000 non- 
member volunteers. Branches were said to have approximately 100 members each, 
which roughly tallies with a national membership of 8,000 -10,000. This does not appear 
3° 
"Three Golden Rules ", Pear, July/August 1994 , pp. 63 -65. Recruitment to the Women's Wing is slower than general 
recruitment See: "Women must be seen and heard ", Petir, July /August 1994, pp. 75 -79, p. 77 
"What is our course of action ? ", Petir, July /August 1994, p. 93 -95, p. 95 
'2 "Suburban West District forms a Branch Secretaries' Committee ", Petir, March/April 1994, p. 57 
" Koh, 1998, op. cit. 
3a 
"PAP Community Day 1994 ", Petir, November/December 1994, p. 48. The figure of 40,000 was supposed to 
exclude family members. 
33 Koh, 1998, op. cit. 
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to include members of the PCF branches which are overseen by the party branches. PCF 
branch members do not have to be party members. 
Party Membership Activities 
In addition to events such as the PAP Community Day for party members, the party has 
introduced a number of national training programs for party members including from 
1994 a biannual two day Political Induction Course limited to 100 selected party 
members, From at least 1993, the Women's Wing's annual Leadership Skills Training 
Workshop comprising a series of half -day modules37 and from 1994 the Political 
Education Committee started holding workshops on how to conduct and manage Meet 
the People sessions (MPS) 38 National awards ceremonies held at the annual PAP 
Convention are supplemented by annual award ceremonies at the district level.' The 
headquarters Current Affairs Committee also organises regular current affairs talks for 
branch secretaries and party activists and all branches and wings of the party are 
expected to follow this pattern at the local leve1.40 
The Women's Wing organises national public fora on political issues, including joint 
meetings with AWARE and SCW0,41 and the NTUC Women's Programme,' an annual 
two day political education residential seminar,' the annual International Women's Day 
Family Outing44 and also local meeting on political and non -political matters.' The 
number of national events is limited however; in 1994 there were only five national 
Women's Wing events. The Young PAP has established a Policy Studies Group chaired 
by a senior backbencher which organises bi- monthly round -table discussion groups and 
other political education events involving MPs, GRO leaders and PAP branch 
36 
"Rites of Initiation: PAP holds its first Political Induction Course ", Petir, January/February 1994, pp. 41-48; 
"Challenges of the future ", Pear, September /October 1994, pp. 23 -27. It is also called the Political Induction 
Programme 
3' "Returning to familiar ground ", Petir, September /October 1994, pp.65 -67; and, "Doing just fine ", Pear, 
January/February 1994, p. 95 
3' 
"Learning from each other", Petir, July August 1994, p. 60 
3' 
"District Award Presentation Ceremony", Petir, January/February 1994, pp. 39. The national awards are usually 
presented in December at the PAP Convention and the district awards in January at district ceremonies. 
'0 "Learn to accept and live with each other", Petir, March/April 1994, p. 7 
" "Break the mould ", Pear, November/December 1994, pp. 73 -77 
42 
`What is Good Government ", Petir, May /June 1995, pp. 37 -41, p. 41 
03 "Coming of Age ", Petir, May /June 1995, pp. 30-35 
" `Family Outing ", Petir, March/April 1995, pp. 63-64 
"3 "More than just politics ", Petir, November/December 1994, pp. 79 -82 
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members ' This are not apparently attended by large numbers of members however; 
only 13 members attended the meeting on 4 August 1994. 47 These alternate with bi- 
monthly lunch meetings to which speakers from parliament, academia, the business 
community and GROs are invited.` District and branch activities are varied and 
integrate with the activities of Community Centres, CCCs and Residents' Committees, 
including sport, cultural and social events' but also include political education 
workshops such as how to run and contribute towards MPS.50 International visits to 
Indonesia," Malaysia sz and China53 had been made in 1994 and 1995 by Young PAP 
delegations under the leadership of ministers. Meetings were also held with the 
Malaysian Minister for Foreign Affairs' and the American ambassador.' With the 
establishment of town councils and CDCs, newsletters and CDC newspapers have also 
been used to publicise activities by party affiliated organisations and GROs thus once 
again transferring party functions into the public sector. 
The Branches and the Leadership 
As with other institutional components, such as GROs and the NTUC, the autonomy of 
the party and its branches is limited by having the legal, financial and major functional 
controls under the supervision or in the hands of members of the political executive. The 
party's main functions, exercised through the branch network are to; 
1. Recruit members, especially members with parliamentary or ministerial potential 
and young members of the post 1965 generations; 
2. Provide the basic political socialisation for these recruits; 
3. Defend and sell the government's policies 'on the ground', particularly among the 
Chinese educated majority; 
4. Provide feedback to the government through MPs, the Feedback Unit, CDCs, Town 
Councils and occasionally the police and LSD on community reactions to policies, 
communal dissent and pro -and anti- government groups; and, 
a6 "Nature or nurture ", Petir, November/December 1994, pp. 83 -85 
°' "Spare the rod ? ", Petir, July /August 1994, pp. 103 -105, p. 103 
"Ride with the tide ", Petir, November/December 1994, pp.87 -89 
69 Ho Peng Kee, "Bridging the affective divide ", Petir, September /October 1994, pp.3 -4 
'° "Young PAP Suburban East District organises a workshop cum sharing session ", Petir, May /June 1995, pp. 59 -61 
5' "Building a new bridge ", Petir, July /August 1994, pp. 99 -101 
52 "Lesson of the day ", Petir, January/February 1994, 89 -91 
sr 
"Red -Letter Mission ", Petir, May /June 1995, pp. 46-49 
u 
"Learning to be good neighbours ", Petir, March/April I994, p. 53 
'5 
"What Makes America Tick ? ", Petir, May /June 1995, pp. 51 -53 
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5. Advance the party's membership drive and policy agenda through the PAP 
Community Foundation, Community Centres in association with the People's 
Association, the CCC and RC network and other GROS. 
The political socialisation of new ministers by MPs and branch secretaries is a 
particularly important task. Speaking in 1994, Loh Meng See, MP for Kampong Glam 
GPC commented that; 
New leaders like BG George Yeo, Lim Hng Kiang and RAdm Teo have been brought into the 
ranks. They need to be filled in on the political background of our constituencies. Only our 
Branches can do that sb 
This is achieved by ministers, acting as adviser to branches or in their capacity as 
chairmen of district executive committees, undertaking bi- monthly 'walkabouts' in 
constituencies, meeting with GROs, Young PAP, Women's Wing and PCF branches, 
taking responsibility as advisers to community centres, CCCs and RCs. This is a 
considerable demand upon ministers and branches; walkabouts, for example, may take 
up to several hours and involve up to six other MPs and meeting with a number of GRO 
leaders and members and participating in community events .57 MPs also have a 
responsibility for resolving conflicts at the branch and GRO level, an apparently and not 
surprisingly common problem. The responsibilities of ministers, MPs and branch 
secretaries at the branch level are detailed in Diagram X below. What this picture of the 
party in 1996 (and partly 1999) demonstrates is that Pang's party of the 1970s no longer 
exists. The party has been revitalised and the branch structure and executives 
incorporated into the outer circle of the political executive. They have been given 
responsibility for a number of specific political intelligence and political socialisation 
tasks; selling government policies at the grassroots, controlling GROs and the PCF 
network, the political socialisation of MPs and ministers, recruitment of members, the 
initial testing of ministerial candidates and political intelligence feedback and feed - 
forward to MPs, ministers and government agencies. However the party remains firmly 
under the control of the political executive, but with increased influence although this is 
influence distributed through the organisational structure, not cumulated within a party 
bureaucracy. 
"Learning from change ", Perir, July /August 1994, pp. 37, p. 37 
n 
"Some things never change ", Perir. May /June 1994, p. 67 
sg 
"Starting over with an edge ", Perir, January/February 1994, pp. 78 -83, p. 83 
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DIAGRAM 4: THE PAP AT THE GRASSROOTS 1995 
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Singapore Parliament - Select Committees: 1950 -1997 
No. DATE COMMITTEE 
1 1997 Singapore. Parliament. Special Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment as 
Nominated Members ofParliament. Report of the Special Select Committee on 
Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament: presented to 
Parliament, 23rd September, 1997. [Singapore : Singapore National Printers], 1997. 
2 1996 Singapore . Parliament . Special Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment 
as Nominated Members of Parliament_ Second report of the Special Select Committee 
on Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament : presented to 
Parliament, 28th August, 1996. [Singapore : Singapore National Printers] , 1996. 
3 1996 Singapore , Parliament . Select Committee on Verification of Health Care Subsidy of 
Government Polyclinics and Public Hospitals. Report of the Select Committee on 
Verification of Health Care Subsidy of Government Polyclinics and Public Hospitals : 
presented to Parliament on 30th September, 1996. Singapore : Printed for the 
Government of Singapore by the Government Printers ,1996. 
4 1996 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Women's Charter (Amendment) 
Bill.Report of the Select Committee on the Women's Charter (Amendment) Bill (Bill 
no. 5/96) : presented to Parliament on 15th August, 1996 / [Tan Soo Khoon, chairman]. 
[Singapore] : Government Printers , 1996. Tan Soo Khoon Chairman 
5 1996 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Advance Medical Directive Bill. 
Report of the Select Committee on the Advance Medical Directive Bill (Bill no. 
40/95). Singapore : Printed for the Govt. of Singapore by the Govt. Printers , 1996. 
6 1995 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Bankruptcy Bill. Report of the 
Select Committee on the Bankruptcy Bill (Bill no- 16/94). Singapore : Printed for the 
Government of Singapore by the Government Printers ,1995 
7 1995 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Maintenance of Parents Bill. Report 
of the Select Committee on the Maintenance of Parents Bill (Bill no. 13/94). 
Singapore : SNP Corporation , 1995. 
8 1994 Singapore . Parliament . Special Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment 
as Nominated Members of Parliament. Report of the Special Select Committee on 
Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament: presented to 
Parliament, 31st August, 1994. [Singapore : Singapore National Printers] , 1994. 
9 1994 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on Patents Bill. Report of the Select 
Committee on the Patents Bill. (Bill no. 4/94/A) Singapore : Printed for Govt. of 
Singapore by Singapore National Printers , 1994. 
10 1993 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on Goods and Services Tax Bill. Report of 
the Select Committee on the Goods and Services Tax Bill (Bill no. 14/93). Singapore : 
Printed for Govt. of Singapore by Singapore National Printers , 1993. 
11 1993 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Land Titles Bill. Report of the 
Select Committee on the Land Titles Bill (Bill no. 36/92). Singapore : Printed for the 
Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printer , 1993. 
12 1993 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill. 
Report of the Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill (Bill no. 33/92). 
Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National 
Printers , 1993. 
13 1992 Singapore . Parliament . Special Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment 
as Nominated Members of Parliament. Report of the Special Select Committee on 
Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament: presented to 
Parliament, 31st August, 1992. [Singapore : Singapore National Printers] , 1992. 
14 1992 Singapore. Parliament . Select Committee on the Drug Trafficking (Confiscation of 
Benefits) Bill (Bill No. 17/92) Report of the Select Committee on the Drug 
Trafficking (Confiscation of Benefits) Bill (Bill No. 17/92). Singapore : Printed for 
the Govt. of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , [1992] 
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15 1991 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Architects Bill (Bill no. 9/91), 
Professional Engineers Bill (Bill no. 10/91), Land Surveyors Bill (Bill no. 11/91) 
Report of the Select Committee on the Architects Bill (Bill no. 9/91) Professional 
Engineers Bill (Bill no. 10/91), Land Surveyors Bill (Bill no. 11/91). Singapore : 
Printed for the Government of Singapore by Singapore National Printers ,1991. 
16 1990 Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment as 
Nominated Members of Parliament. Report of the Special Select Committee on 
Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament: presented to 
Parliament, 19th November, 1990. [Singapore : Singapore National Printers], 1990. 
17 1990 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Constitution of the Republic of 
Singapore (Amendment No. 3) Bill (Bill no. 23/90) Report of the Select Committee on 
the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment no. 3) Bill [Bill no. 23/90]. 
Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National 
Printers , [1990]. 
18 1990 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Maintenance of Religious Harmony 
Bill (Bill no. 14/90) Report of the Select Committee on the Maintenance of Religious 
Harmony Bill (Bill no. 14/90). Singapore : Printed for the Govt. of Singapore by the 
Singapore National Printers , [1990] 
19 1990 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Constitution of the Republic of 
Singapore (Amendment No. 2) Bill (Bill no. 41/89) Report of the Select Committee on 
the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment no. 2) Bill [Bill no. 41/89]. 
Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National 
Printers , 1990. 
20 1990 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on Land Transportation Policy. Report of 
the Select Committee on Land Transportation Policy : presented to Parliament, 2nd 
January, 1990. Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by Singapore 
National Printers , [1990] 
21 1989 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill. 
Report of the Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill (Bill no. 24/89). 
Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National 
Printers , 1989. 
22 1988 Group representation constituencies : a summary of the report of the Select Committee. 
[Singapore] : Information Division, Ministry of Communications and Information , 
[1988 - [Report given by the Select Committee for the Parliamentary Elections 
(Amendment) Bill andthe Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 
2) Bill.] 
23 1988 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Building Control Bill. Report of the 
Select Committee on the Building Control Bill (Bill no. 3/88). Singapore : Printed for 
the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 1988. 
24 1988 Singapore . Parliament 
. Select Committee on the Corruption (Confiscation of 
Benefits) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Corruption (Confiscation of 
Benefits) Bill (Bill no. 7/88] : presented to Parliament on 16th August, 1988. 
Singapore : Printed for the Govt. of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 
[1988] 
25 1988 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Parliamentary Elections 
(Amendment) Bill (Bill no. 23/87) and the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 
(Amendment No. 2) Bill (Bill no. 24/87) Report of the Select Committee on the 
Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Bill (Bill no. 23/87) and the Constitution of 
the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 2) Bill (Bill no. 24/87) Singapore : Printed 
for the Govt. of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 1988. 
26 1987 Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Human Organ Transplant Bill. 
Report of the Select Committee on the Human Organ Transplant Bill [Bill no.26/86 
86] : presented to Parliament on 22nd April, 1987 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman] 
Singapore : Singapore National Printers Ltd , 1987. 
27 1987 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill. 
Report of the Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill [Bill no. 9/86] : 
presented to Parliament on 12th March, 1987 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman] 
[Singapore] : Singapore National Printers , 1987. 
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28 1987 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) 
Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill 
[Bill No.10 /86] : presented to Parliament on 25th June, 1987 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, 
chairman] Singapore : Singapore National Printers (Pte.) Ltd. , 1987. 
29 1986 Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Copyright Bill. Report of the Select 
Committee on the Copyright Bill (Bill no. 8/86). Singapore : Printed for the 
Government of Singapore by Singapore National Printers, 1986. 
30 1986 Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Legal Profession (Amendment) Bill. 
Report of the Select Committee on the Legal Profession (Amendment) Bill [Bill no. 
20/86 86] : presented to Parliament on 16th October, 1986/ [Yeoh Ghim Seng, 
chairman] Singapore : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd , 1986. 
31 1985 Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Requisition of Resources Bill. Report 
of the Select Committee on the Requisition of Resources Bill [Bill no.4/85 85] : 
presented to Parliament on 16th August, 1985 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman] 
[Singapore] : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd , [1985] 
32 1984 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill. 
Report of the Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill (Bill no. 16/83). 
Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National 
Printers , 1984. 
33 1981 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Central Provident Fund 
(Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Central Provident Fund 
(Amendment) Bill (Bill no. 3/81). [Singapore] : Printed for the Government of 
Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , [1981] 
34 1980 Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Private Hospitals and Medical 
Clinic Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Private Hospitals and Medical 
Clinics Bill [Bill no.35/79 791 : presented to Parliament 9th July, 1980 / [Tang See 
Chico, chairman] [Singapore] : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd , [1980] 
35 1980 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Women's Charter (Amendment) 
Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Women's Charter (Amendment) Bill (Bill 
no.23/79) : presented to Parliament on 25th February, 1980 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, 
chairman]. [Singapore] : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd , [1980] 
36 1979 Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation 
Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation Bill 
[Bill no.31/79 79] : presented to Parliament on 28th November, 1979 / [Yeoh Ghim 
Seng, chairman] [Singapore] : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd , [1979] 
37 1979 Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Co-operative Societies Bill. Report 
of the Select Committee on the Co-operative Societies Bill [Bill no.14/79 79] : 
presented to Parliament on 23rd August, 1979 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman] 
[Singapore] : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd , [1979] 
38 1978 Singapore . Select Committee on the Singapore Red Cross Society (Incorporation) 
(Amendment Bill). Report of the Select Committee on the Singapore Red Cross 
Society (Incorporation) (Amendment) Bill. Singapore : Printed for the Government of 
Singapore : by the Singapore National Printers , 1978. 
39 1978 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Central Provident Fund 
(Amendment No.2) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Central Provident 
Fund (Amendment No.2) Bill [Bill no.18 / 78] / presented to Parliament on 25th 
September, 1978 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman] Singapore : Singapore National 
Printers , 1978. 
40 1976 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Criminal Law (Temporary 
Provisions) (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Criminal Law 
(Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill, presented to Parliament on 24th June, 
1976. [Singapore] : The Committee , [1976] 
41 1976 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Criminal Procedure Code 
(Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Criminal Procedure Code 
(Amendment) Bill. Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the 
Singapore National Printers , 1976. 
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42 1976 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) 
Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill. 
Singapore : Printed for the Govt. of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 
1976. 
43 1976 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Evidence (Amendment) Bill. Report 
of the Select Committee on the Evidence (Amendment) Bill. Singapore : Printed for 
the Govt. of Singapore by Singapore National Printers , 1976. 
44 1976 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Residential Property Bill. Report of 
the Select Committee on the Residential Property Bill. Singapore : Printed for the 
Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers ,1976. 
45 1975 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Travel Agents Bill. Report of the 
Select Committee on the Travel Agents Bill : presented to Parliament on 28th October, 
1975. [s.l. : sn. , 1975 or 1976] ([Singapore] : Singapore National Printers, Govt. 
printers) 
46 1975 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Medicines Bill. Report of the Select 
Committee on the Medicines Bill : presented to Parliament on 6th November, 1975. 
[Singapore] : Singapore National Printers (Govt. Printers) , [1975] 
47 1975 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Workmen's Compensation Bill. 
Report of the Select Committee on the Workmen's Compensation Bill : presented to 
Parliament on 15th July, 1975. Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by 
the Singapore National Printers , [1975] 
48 1974 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Roman Catholic Archbishop Bill. 
Report of the Select Committee on the Roman Catholic Archbishop Bill, presented to 
Parliament on 26' November, 1974. [Singapore] : Printed for the Government of 
Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 11975] 
49 1974 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Newspaper and Printing Presses 
Bill. Report. Singapore : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd.] , 1974. Yeoh Ghim 
Seng, chairman. 
50 1973 Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Urban Redevelopment Authority 
Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Urban Redevelopment Authority Bill. 
Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National 
Printers , 1973. 
51 1972 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Employment (Amendment) Bill and 
the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill. Written representations and oral 
evidence submitted to the Select Committee on the Employment (Amendment) Bill 
(bill no. 22/72) and the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill (bill no. 23/72). 
52 1972 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Factories Bill. Report of the Select 
Committee on the Factories Bill, presented to Parliament on 28th December, 1972. 
Singapore : Parliament of Singapore , 1972] 
53 1970 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Professional Engineers Bill. Report 
of the Select Committee on the Professional Engineers Bill. Singapore : Printed by 
Government Printer, Singapore , 1970. 
54 1970 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Land Surveyors Bill. Report of the 
Select Committee on the Land Surveyors Bill. Singapore : Printed by the Government 
Printer, Singapore , 1970. Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman. 
55 1970 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the National Sports Promotion Board 
Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the National Sports Promotion Board Bill. 
Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1970. 
56 1969 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Recovery of Possession of 
ControlledPremises (Special Provisions) Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. 
Print. , 1969. P. Coomaraswamy, chairman. 
57 1969 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Hire- Purchase Bill. Official report. 
Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1969 P. Coomaraswamy, chairman. 
58 1969 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Criminal Procedure Code 
(Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Criminal Procedure Code 
(Amendment) Bill. Singapore : Printed by Government Printer, Singapore , 1969. 
59 1969 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Constitution (Amendment) Bill. 
Report of the Select Committee on the Constitution (Amendment) Bill. Singapore : 
Govt. Print. Off. ,1969. 
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60 1969 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Abortion Bill and the Voluntary 
Sterilization Bill. Report Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1969]. P. Coomaraswamy, 
chairman. 
61 1968 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Hindu Endowments Bill. Official 
report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1968 P. Coomaraswamy, chairman. 
62 1968 Singapore , Parliament . Select Committee on the Singapore Council of Social Service 
Bill. Official report.Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1968. P. Coomaraswamy, chairman. 
63 1968 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Medicines (Advertisement and 
Sale) (Amendment) Bill. Official report.Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1968 P. 
Coomaraswamy, chairman. 
64 1967 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Land Titles (Strata) Bill. 
Official report.Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1967. P. Coomaraswamy, chairman. 
65 1967 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Ngee Ann College Bill. Official 
report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1967. P. Coomaraswamy, chairman. 
66 1967 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Companies Bill.Official report. 
Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1967 P. Coomaraswamy, chairman 
67 1967 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Intestate Succession Bill. 
Report [Singapore : Govt. Print.] ,1967. P. Coomaraswamy, chairman. 
68 1967 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Women's Charter (Amendment) 
Bill. Report Singapore : Govt. Print.] , 1967. P. Coomaraswamy, chairman. 
69 1966 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Inheritance (Family Provision) 
Bill. Official report.Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1966 A. P. Rajah, chairman 
70 1966 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on Land Acquisition Bill.Official 
report.Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1966. P. Coomaraswamy, chairman. 
71 1966 Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Administration of Muslim Law Bill. 
Official report / Parliament of Singapore, Select Committee on Administration of 
Muslim Law Bill. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1966 A. P. Rajah, Chairman 
72 1965 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Housing Developers 
(Control and Licensing) Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1965 
73 1965 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Housing Developers 
(Control and Licensing) Bill. Report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1965 A. P. Rajah, 
chairman 
74 1965 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Land Acquisition 
(Amendment No. 2) Bill. Report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1965 A. P. Rajah, 
chairman. 
MALAYSIA 
75 1963 Singapore . Select Committee on the Local Government Integration Bill Official 
report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1963 
SELF- GOVERNMENT 
76 1962 Singapore , Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Legislative Assembly 
(Privileges. Immunities and Powers) Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 
1962 
77 1962 Singapore . Select Committee on the Singapore National Referendum Bill. 
Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1962 
78 1962 Singapore . Select Committee on the Tariff Advisory Commission and Customs 
(Amendment) Bills. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1962. 
79 1962 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Public Utilities, Local. 
Government Intergration, Planning (Amendment), Pensions (Amendment) and Housing 
andDevelopment (Amendment) Bills Report. 
[Singapore : Printed by Govt. Printer , 1962 Sir George Oehlers, chairman 
80 1962 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Singapore Society of 
Accountants Bills. Report Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1962 
George Oehlers, chairman 
81 1961 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Tan Tock Seng's Hospital 
(Transfer) Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1961 
82 1961 Singapore. Legislative Assembly. Select Committee on the Queen Street and Silat 
Road Sikh Gurdawaras Bill. Official report. Singpaore : Govt. Print. Office, 1961 
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83 1961 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Women's Charter Bill. 
Report of the Select Committee on the Womens Charter Bill. Singapore : Printed by 
Govt. Printer , 1961. George Oehlers Chairman 
84 1961 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Agricultural Leases Bill 
and the Control of Rent (Amendment No. 3) Bill. Report Singapore : Govt. Print. , 
19611. George Oehlers Chairman 
85 1961 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Administration of 
Muslim Law Bill. Report Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1961]. George Oehlers Chairman 
86 1960 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Prevention of Corruption 
Bill.Official report.Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1960 
87 1960 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Lembaga Gerakan 
Pelajaran Dewasa Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1960 
88 1960 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Pawnbrokers 
(Amendment) Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1960. 
89 1960 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Societies (Amendment) 
Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1960] 
90 1960 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Mutual Benefit 
Organizations Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1960 
91 1960 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Criminal Procedure Code 
(Amendment) Bill. Official Report. Singapore , 1960 
92 1960 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Evidence (Amendment) 
Bill. Report Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1960 
93 1960 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Women's Charter Bill. 
Report of the Select Committee on the Womens Charter Bill. Singapore : Printed by 
Govt. Printer , 1960. George Oehlers Chairman 
94 1960 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Muslims (Amendment) 
Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Muslims (Amendment) Bill. Singapore : 
Printed by A.G. Barfield, Government Printer ,1960. 
95 1959 Singapore 
. 
Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Control of Manufacture 
Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1959 
96 1959 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Nanyang University 
Bill. Official report / Singapore Legislative Assembly, Select Committee on 
NanyangUniversity Bill. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1959 
97 1959 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Secretary of the Synod of 
the Diocese of Singapore Bill. Report [Singapore : Govt. Print Off. , 1959 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
98 1958 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Good Shepherd Nuns 
Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1958 
99 1958 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Kwong Wai Shiu 
Hospital (Amendment) Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1958] 
100 1958 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Housing and 
Development Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1958] 
101 1958 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Planning Bill. Official 
report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1958 
102 1958 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Police Force Bill. 
Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 19581 
103 1958 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Public Entertainments 
Bill. Report [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1958 
104 1958 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Factories Bill. 
Report [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1958 G. E. N. Oehlers, chairman 
105 1957 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Singapore Citizenship 
Bill. Official report.[Singapore : Govt. Print. , 19571 
106 1957 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Clerks Employment Bill. 
Official report.[Singapore : Govt. Print. , 19571. 
107 1957 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Education Bill. 
Official report. [Sin a.ore : Govt. Print. , 1957 
108 1957 Singapore . LegisIative Assembly . Select Committee on the Local Government 
Elections Bill. Official re.ort. [Sin a.ore : Govt. Print. , 1957 
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109 1957 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Shop Assistants 
Employment Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1957] 
110 1957 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Little Sisters of the Poor 
Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1957] 
111 1957 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Local Government Bill. 
Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off.] , 1957 
112 1957 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Seamen's Registry Board 
Bill. Official Report. 1957 
113 1957 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Muslims Bill. 
Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1957 
114 1957 Singapore. Legislative Assembly. Select Committee on Languages in Legislative 
AssemblyDebates. Report [microform]. [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off., 1957] Sir George 
Oehlers, chairman 
115 1957 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Luxury Tax Bill. Special 
report Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1957]. 
116 1956 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Land Titles Bill. Official 
report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1956] 
117 1956 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Singapore Youth Sports 
Centre Incorporation Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1956 
118 1956 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Shop and Office 
Employees Bill. Report [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1956 
119 1956 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Languages in Legislative 
Assembly Debates. Reports Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1956]. 
120 1955 Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Labour Bill. Official 
report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1955 
COLONIAL PERIOD 
121 1954 Singapore . Legislative Council . Select Committee Appointed to Examine and Report 
to the Legislative Council on the Bill the Short Title of which is the Criminal 
Procedure Code1954. Report [Singapore : Legislative Council. Select Committee 
Appointed to Examine and Report to the Legislative Council on the Bill the Short 
Title of which is the Criminal Procedure Code , 1954]. 
122 1950 Singapore . Legislative Council . Select Committee to Examine and Report on the 
HolidaysOrdinance (Chapter 174). Report [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1950]. C. H. 
Butterfield, chairman 
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Appendix 3 
Singapore Statutory Boards and Principal Committees 
BOARD /COMMITTEE ABBREVIATION 
Appeals Board (Land Acquisition) ' ABLA 
Asian Civilisations Museum Board ACM 
Board of Architects BOA 
Board of Commissioners of Currency Singapore BCCS 
Central Provident Fund Board 
J 
CPF 
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore Board CAAS 
Commercial and industrial Security Corporation CISCO 
Community Improvements Project Committee CIPC 
Construction Industry Development Board CIDB 
Contact Lense Practitioners Board CLPB 
Council of Presidential Advisers CPA 
Dental Board DB 
Economic Development Board EDB 
Feedback Unit Supervisory Panel FUSP 
Film Appeal Committee FAC 
OST Board of Review GSTBOR 
Hindu Advisory Board HAB 
Hindu Endowments Board HEB 
Hotels Licencing Board HLB 
Housing and Development Board HDB 
Income Tax Board of Review ITBOR 
Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore IRAS 
Institute of Southeast asian Studies ISEAS 
Institute of Technical Education Board of 
Governors 
ITEBOG 
Jurong Town Corporation JTC 
Laboratory Board LB 
Land Surveyors Board LSB 
Land Transport Authority LTA 
Legal Services Commission LSC 
Liquors Licensing Board LLB 
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura MUTS 
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore 
(This is the new name for the Port of Singapore 
Authority - PSA - so include them both as MPA) 
MPA 
Monetary Authority of Singapore MAS 
Nanyang Polytechnic Board of Governors NPBOG 
Nanyang Technological University Council 
(Includes Nanyang Technological Institute 
Council) 
NTU 
National Archives Board NAB 
National Arts Council NAC 
National Computer Board NCB 
National Council of Social Service NCSS 
National Heritage Board NHB 
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National institute of Education Council NIE 
National Library Board NLB 
National Maritime Board NMB 
National Museum of Singapore NMS 
National Parks Board (Don't use for old National 
Productivity Board - put this under SPSB) 
NPB 
National Science and Technology Board NSPB 
National University of Singapore Council NUS 
National Youth Council NYC 
Ngee Ann Polytechnic Council NAPC 
Peoples Association PA 
Pharmacy Board PB 
Post Office savings bank of Singapore Board POSB 
Presidential Council for Minority Rights PCMR 
Presidential Council for Religious Harmony PCRH 
Professional Engineers Board, Singapore PEBS 
Projects Committee PC 
Public Service Commission PSC 
Public Accountants Board PAB 
Public Utilities Board PUB 
Publications Appeal Committee PAC 
Science Centre Board SCB 
Sihk Advisory Board SAB 
Singapore Art Museum SAM 
Singapore Broadcasting Authority (Include under 
this Singapore Broadcasting Commission - SBC - 
which was the previous name) 
SBA 
Singapore Council of Social Service SCSS 
Singapore History Museum Board SHM 
Singapore Labour Foundation SLF 
Singapore Medical Council SMC 
Singapore Nursing Board SNB 
Singapore Polytechnic Board of Governors SPBOG 
Singapore Productivity and Standards Board SPSB 
Singapore Sports Council SSC 
Singapore Totalisator Board STOTB 
Singapore Tourism Board STB 
Strata Titles Board STITB 
Telecommunications Authority of Singapore TAS 
Temasek Polytechnic Board of Governors TPBOG 
Trade Development Board TDB 
Urban Redevelopment Authority URA 
Valuation Review Board VRB 
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Appendix 4 
Members of Statutory Boards in Singapore Holdingl0 or More 
Positions: 1988-1998 
NAME No 
Pos 
ORGANISATION 
1. Tan Chin Nam 44 EDB, GM 
2. Cham Tao Soon, Dr 41 NTI , President 
3. Yu -Foo Yee Shoon 39 MP -NTUC, VP 
4. Cheong Siew Keong, Dr 34 MRTC 
5. Tan Swan Beng, Dr Prof 
(Adj) 
32 MND, PWD, DG 
6. Lim Pin, Prof 31 NUS, VC 
7. Liu Thai Ker 30 FIDE, CEO, DS 
8. Othman bin Haron Eusofe 28 MP -NTUC, ASG 
9. Chen Seow Phun, Dr John 27 MP 
10. Lee Chang Leng, Brian, Prof 26 NTI , Elec. & Electronic Eng 
11. Lee Ek Tieng 26 MOF , PS (Revenue Div) 
12. Chong Yew Fook, Charles 24 MP 
13. Yeo Seng Teck 24 TDB, CEO 
14. Yip Soon Kwong, John 24 MOE, Dir Education 
15. Hu Tsu Tau, Dr Richard 23 Minister for Finance 
16. Tay A K, Keith 23 KPMG Peat Marwick 
17. Chandra Das, S 22 MP 
18. Goh Kim Leong 22 MOE, PS 
19. Lim Swee Say 22 NCB, GM 
20. Lee Hee Seng 21 PSC member & OLB, MD 
21. Pek Hock Thiam 21 STB, ED 
22. Zulláfli bin Mohammed 21 MP- Political Secretary, MCD 
23. Chew Chin Tiong, A/P Ernest 20 NUS , Head, Dept History, Fac Arts Soc 
Sciences 
24. Goh Chee Wee 20 MP 
25. Koh Boon Hwee 20 HP Singapore 
26. Sim Kee Boon, DUBC, PJG 20 KG -EC, Keppel Corp & former PS, Head of 
Civil Service 
27. Su Guaning, Dr 20 MINDEF, DSO, Director 
28. Wong Lee Hoong 20 TH- Singapore Treasury Bldg? 
29. Hong Hin Kay, Albert 19 RSP Arch, Planners, Engrs 
30. Lim Hock San 19 CAAS, DG. 
31. Lim Yong Wah 19 DBS Bank, Exec. VP 
32. Tan Eng Beng 19 MOL , Lab Wel Div, Div. Dir. 
33. Tan Guong Ching 19 MCI, PS 
34. Tan Wee Hin, Leo, Prof 19 NIE , Dir & Dean, Schl Science 
35. Wee Chow Hou, A/P 19 NUS, Dean , Bus Admin Fac 
36. Khattar, Sat Pal 18 Khattar Wong & Part, Solicitors 
37. Law Song Seng, Dr 18 VTIB , Director 
38. Lee Kim Poo, Moses 18 SBA, GM, DS 
39. Othman Dunu bin Wok, Tuan 
Haji 
18 Minister - Former minister & NTUC- Overseas 
Investment 
40. Tan, Bernard A/P BBM, 
PPA(P), PBM 
18 NUS, Dir Office Stud Affairs 
41. Goh Keng Swee, Dr 17 MP- former Deputy PM 
42. Koh Cher Siang 17 MCD, PS 
43. Lua Cheng Eng 17 NOL, CEO 
44. Lee Cbiong Giam 16 PA, Chief ED 
45. Lee Kell Sai 16 K S Lee & Assoc, Prin Consultant. 
46. Sinnakaruppan, Ramasamy 16 MP -NTUC ,Research Unit, Dep Dir 
47. Teo Hwee Choo 16 MOE , Dir, Admin. Div. 
48. Chan Sek Keong 15 Attorney- General 
49. Chen Min Liang, Peter 15 SHELL Eastern Petrol. 
50. Ho Meng Kit, BG (NS) 15 EDB, MD 
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51. Lim Siong Guan 15 MINDEF, PS 
52. Lim, Gloria, Prof. 15 NUS , Dept. Botany 
53. Pek Beng Choon, Col (NS) 15 NUH, CEO 
54. Tan Chee Chuan, Steven 15 SAMAS Mngmt Consult, MD. 
55. Tan Chin Tiong BG (NS) 15 MEA, PS 
56. Tan Kim Siew, Dr Col. (NS) 15 MND , Dir, Housing 
57. Tan Yam Pin 15 Asia Pacific Breweries, Malayan Breweries, 
Dir, Group GM 
58. Tien Sing Cheong 15 INTRACO, COO 
59. Wang Kai Yuen, Dr 15 Xerox Sing. Software Centre & Dir, POSB 
Computer Services 
60. Er Kwong Wah 14 MOE , PS 
61. Fam Yue Onn, Dr Michael 
DUNU (1st Class) 
14 Fraser & Neave (S) 
62. Hiew Siew Nam, Dr 14 MND- Former DG, PWD -Dir (Project 
Completion), SL Marina Centre Devi 
63. Koh Thong Bee, Tommy, Prof 14 IPS, Director 
64. Leong Cham Huen 14 RDC2 Architects, Director 
65. Lew Syn Pau 14 MP- NTUC AD (Industrial Relations) 
66. Ridzwan Tuan Haji bin Haji 
Dzafir 
14 TDB, MD 
67. Yeoh Khwai Hoh, Patrick 14 DBS Bank, Dir, President 
68. Gwee Tack Hai, Eric 13 ESSO Sing, Marine & Supply Dir, 
69. Koh Juan Kiat 13 SPSB 
70. Koo Tsai Kee 13 MP- NTI , Sen. Lecturer 
71. Lee, Pamelia 13 STB, Div. Dir. 
72. Lien Ying Chow 13 OUB, MD 
73. Lim Choo San, Michael 13 Price Waterhouse, Partner 
74. Loh Kwok Hoong, Victor 13 Philips Singapore, Chair & Pres. 
75. Mohamad Maidin BPM 13 Parliamentary Secretary, MITA 
76. Teo Chiang Long 13 See Hoy Chan (S), ED 
77. Wee Cho Yaw 13 OUB, Chair, United OUB 
78. Wong Hung Khim 13 TAS, GM, CEO 
79. Chen Ai Ju, Dr 12 MOH 
80. Chen Chamg Ning, Prof 12 NUS , Dy Pres & Dean, Schl Civil & Struct 
Engng 
81. Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund 12 WING TAI Holdings, Dy MD 
82. Chew Guan Khuan, Dr 
Andrew 
12 CPF Board 
83. Chuang Kwong Yong 12 HDB , CEO 
84. Coomaraswamy, M. 12 Cooma, Lau & Loh 
85. Ho Cheok Sun 12 MND , Director ( Infrastructure) 
86. Hsuan Owwang 12 HDB, Chair 
87. Lee Kuan Yew 12 Prime Minister 
88. Lim Boon Hang 12 MP -NTUC Research Unit 
89. Lim Kim San 12 MP- former minister & AO 
90. Low Sin Leng 12 MOF , Dir., Budget Div. 
91. Low Wong Fook 12 MOL, Dir. Lab Wel Div. 
92. Ngiam Tong Dow 12 MOF, PS, Budget Div. 
93. Tay Jwee Hwa, Thomas 12 NTUC, Sing. Maritime Offs' Union 
94. Yong Pung How, Justice 12 OCBC, MD. 
95. Choe Fook Cheong, Alan 11 RSP Arch, Planners, Engrs 
96. Chua Sian Eng, Dr 11 MND , Parks and Recreation Dept 
97. Chua Teck Chow, Robert 11 ACE Daikin (S), MD 
98. Fang Ai Lian 11 Ernst & Young 
99. Hylkema, Bonno H 11 Philips Sing., Chair, MD 
100. Khoo Cheng Lint, A/P 11 NUS , Dean, Faculty of Architecture & 
Building 
101. Khoo Teng Chye 11 URA , CEO, Chief Planner 
102. Lin Cheng Ton 11 Nanyang Polytechnic, Prin/CEO 
103. Loh Choo Kiat, Robert, Dr 11 Eye Centre and Surgery 
1 Marina Centre Developments is a subsidiary of POSB. 
2 Regional Development Consortium Architects 
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104. Lye Hoeng Fai 11 ST -Sing. Electronic & Engin. GM 
105. Pillai, Philip N, Dr. 11 Shook Lin & Bok, Partner 
106. Seah Lim Huai, Peter 11 OUB, President 
107. Selvaretnam, Daniel 11 EDB , Dir (Plan) 
108. Shelley, R A 11 Metta Energy Resources 
109. Tan Kah Hoe, JP PBM 11 Descon Chartered Achit and Planners 
110. Tan Kin Hian 11 PA , Dir (Corp Services) 
1 l 1. Teh Kong Leong 11 MCI, Dir., Marine Dept 
112. Teo Ming Kian 11 MINDEF, DS (Technology) 
113. Wong, John 11 IBM Singapore Pte Ltd 
114, Yeo Liat Kok, Philip 11 EDB, Chair 
115. Yeo Siew Chye, Stephen 11 MINDEF, Dir, Sys & Comp Org 
116. Ang Kong Hua 10 Natsteel, MD 
117. Ch'ng Jit Koon 10 MP- Minister of State for Com. Dev 
118. Chen Tze Penn 10 MCI 
119. Chng Hee Kok 10 MP, Tampines GRC 
120. Chong Chi Tat, A/P 10 NUS , Vice -Dean, Fac Science 
121. Chu Y. J., Paul 10 
122. Desker, Barry 10 TDB , CEO 
123. Goh Hock Li, Steven 10 Metro 
124. Goh Yong Hong 10 MHA, Commission, SPF 
125. Hang Chang Chieh IO NUS , Fac Engrg 
126. Hochstadt, Herman Ronald 10 TH -Inno Pacific Holding, Chair 
127. Hong Hai, Dr I O MP- Polytek Wearnes Holdings, MD 
128. Khoo Kay Chai 10 Singapore Polytechnic, Principal 
129. Ko Kheng Hwa 10 EDB, Dy MD International 
130. Kog Yue Choong, Dr 10 HDB (former Sr Structural Engr) & Beca 
Carter Hollings & Ferner (SE Asia), Director 
131. Koh Yong Guan 10 IRAS, PS, (Commisioner Inland Revenue) 
132. Lam Pin Foo f 10 SHELL Companies in Sing. 
133. Lee Ching Yen, Stephen 10 Great Malaysia Textile Mfg, MD 
134. Lee Suan Hiang 10 EDB, Dep. MD 
135. Lum Kwan Sung, Raymond 10 TH-Lum Chang Holdings 
136. Nee Yeh Ching, Andrew,Prof 10 NUS, Mech & Produc. Eng Dept. 
137. Sim Cheok Lim 10 TH- director of several GLCs 
138. Tan Ee Ping 10 Tan Ee Ping & Partners, Dir 
139. Tan Keng Joo, Tony 10 HDB, Dep. Chf Architect 
140. Tan Kong Yam, Dr 10 NUS , Sr Lecturer, Dept Business Pol 
141. Tan Lien Seng 10 MND, Dy Dir (Dev. & Building Ctrl) 
142. Thai Chee Ken 10 Price Waterhouse 
143. Tiruchelvarayan, Chelliah 10 
144. Varaprasad, N, Dr. 10 Temasek Poly, Principal/CEO 
145. Yeo Chee Yeow, Alan 10 Yeo Hiap Seng, Chair, MD & KG- Director 
Keppel Bank 1990 -97 & Dir, NOL, 1988 -1992 
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APPENDIX 5 
DEFINITION OF THE CLASSIFICATION LEVELS OF 
GOVERNMENT LINKED COMPANIES IN SINGAPORE 
Six levels are degined for GLCs as detailed below. 
LEVEL 1. These are the major holding companies: Temasek Holdings (Private) Ltd, 
Singapore Technology Holdings, MND Holdings, Health Corporation of Singapore. 
LEVEL 2. These are the major operating companies under the holding companies. For 
example, under Temasek Holdings, second level companies include: Intraco Ltd, 
Keppel Corporation Ltd, Neptune Orient Lines Limited, Sembawang Holdings Private 
Ltd., Singapore Airlines Limited, and Singapore MRT Ltd. 
LEVEL 3. These are the operating companies which comprise the level two companies. 
The level three and level four companies are the operating heart of the GLCs; the profit 
centres. Level five and level six companies are smaller companies which may 
contribute to corporate activity but in a limited way. For example, within Keppel 
Corporation Ltd., level three companies include; Far East Levingston Ship Building 
Ltd. (FELS); Keppel Bank of Singapore Ltd., Keppel Engineering Pte Ltd., Keppel 
Finance Ltd., Steamers Maritime Holdings Ltd., and Straits Steamship Land Ltd. These 
are substantial subsidiaries with large numbers of employees and large businesses. 
This group also includes companies which may be smaller than others in the group, 
but which have a particular strategic or policy importance. For these latter reasons, 
Singapore National Printers and Temasek Management Services are classified as level 
three because they are crucial companies acting as the government's printer and the 
management arm of the Directorship and Consultancy Advisory Council respectively. 
For strategic reasons, Chartered Metal Industries Private limited is classed as level 
three because of its critical role in the manufacture of military ordanance. 
LEVEL 4. These are companies which are similar to those in level three, but are smaller 
in terms of staff, industry share or are less critical in strategic terms. For example, 
within the DBS Group, DBS Securities Holding Pte Ltd, DBS Factors Ltd., DBS Asset 
Management Ltd are all classified at level four, while DBS Land is classified at level 
three. These smaller companies are essential components of the DBS Group, but are 
smaller in scope than DBS Land or The Insurance Corporation of Singapore within the 
Intraco Group. In classifying companies as level four, there was a bias towards 
classifying small finance and realty companies at this level rather than level five as it 
was assumed that the underlying assets were probably more significant than for an 
engineering or service company. 
LEVEL 5. These are companies which are small in terms of employees and scope, 
which may be small joint ventures with foreign investors in niche markets, have a 
monopoly on a particular service or which operate or control one small business entity. 
For example, DBS Securities Nominees Ltd., Gemplus Technologies Asia Pte. Ltd., SAE 
Inspection Services, and Aero Laundry and Linen Services Pte. Ltd. are classified at 
this level. 
LEVEL 6. These are companies which are also small, as with level five companies, but 
which may be only associate companies of a GLC , some with significant foreign 
ownership. Companies for which almost no details are provided, in which no board 
details are provided or which seem to have no business activity have been placed at 
this level, if they were not comletely excluded from the sample. For example, 
Singapore Airport Bus Service, Jurong Country Club Pte. Ltd., Singapore Cable Car Pte 
Ltd., and Singapore Treasury Building Private are classified at this level. 
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Appendix 6 
Directors Of Level 1 Glc Boards 1991: The Major Holding 
Companies 
TEMASEK HOLDINGS (PRIVATE) LIMITED 
BOARD POSITION 
Lee Ek Tieng (Chairman) 
P.Y. Hwang (Deputy Chairman) 
Lum Choong Wah 
Hsu Tse -Kwang 
Yeo Seng Teck 
Herman R. Hochstadt 
Tan Chok Kian 
Chris Liew Peng Fook 
Michael Fam Yue Onn 
Ngiam Tong Dow 
Dr. Andrew Chew Guan Khuan 
Hsuan Owyang 
SUBSTANTIVE AFFILIATION 
MD, Monetary Authority of 
Singapore 
Former chairman, Economic 
Development Board 
MD, Temaek Holdings 
Executive Chairman, Sembawang 
Holdings 
Chief Executive, Trade 
Development Board 
Executive Chairman, Export Crefit 
Isurance Corporation of Singapore 
(ECICS) and former permanent 
secretary 
Singapore trade representative, 
Taiwan and former permanent 
secretary 
Accountant -General, Ministry of 
Finance 
MD, Fraser and Neave and Old 
Guard PAP cadre. 
Chairman and CEO, Development 
Bank of Singapore and Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Finance 
Permanent Secretay, Prime 
Minister's Offie and Head of Civil 
Service 
Chairman, Housing and 
Development Board 
SECTOR 
Board 
Board 
GLC 
GLC 
Board 
GLC 
Civil 
Service 
Civil 
Service 
Private 
Sector 
GLC & 
Civil 
Service 
Civil 
Service 
Board 
477 Appendix 6 
SINGAPORE TECHNOLOGIES HOLDINGS (PRIVATE) LTD. 
BOARD POSITION SUBSTANTIVE AFFILIATION SECTOR 
Ngiam Tong Dow (Chairman) Chairman and CEO, Development GLC 
Bank of Singapore and Permanent Civil 
Secretary, Ministry of Finance Service 
Lim Song Guan (Deputy Permanent Secretary, MINDEF Civil 
Chairman) Service 
Philip Yeo Liat Kok ( Chairman, 
Executive Committee) 
Chairman, economic Development 
Board 
Board 
Lt. Gen. Winston Choo Wee Chief of Defence Force Military 
Leong 
Lam Chuan Leong Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Civil 
Trade and Industry Service 
Koh Yong Guan rd Permanent Secretary, MINDEF Civil 
Service 
Tan Chin Nam Chairman, NCB, MD, EDB, 
member Singapore Polytechnic 
Board 
BOG, EDB, NPC and Science 
Council boards. 
Teo Ming Kian Deputy Secretary (Technology) Civil 
MINDEF Service 
Lim Ming Seong Group President, Singapore GLC 
Technologies Holdings 
MND HOLDINGS (PRIVATE) LIMITED 
BOARD POSITION SUBSTANTIVE AFFILIATION SECTOR 
Civil 
Service 
Dr. Andrew Chew Guan Khuan 
Lee Ek Tieng 
Hsuan Owyang 
Au Eng Kok 
Permanent Secretay, Prime 
Minister's Offie and Head of Civil 
Service 
MD, Monetary Authority of 
Singapore 
Chairman, Housing and 
Development Board 
MD, MND Holdings Private Ltd & 
MD, Pidemco Land Pte Ltd 
HEALTH CORPORATION OF SINGAPORE PTE LTD 
Civil 
Service 
Board 
GLC 
BOARD POSITION 
Dr. Kwa Soon Bee 
Lam Chuan Leong 
Lint Yong Wah 
Ngiam Tong Dow 
Wong Hung Khim 
SUBSTANTIVE AFFILIATION 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade 
and Industry 
Unknown 
Chairman and CEO, Development Bank of 
Singapore and Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry of Finance 
President and CEO TAS, and director, 
Singapore Telecom 
SECTOR 
Civil Service 
Civil Service 
Private Sector 
Civil Service 
Board 
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List of Principal Singapore Government Linked Corporations 
Identified in 1998 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
LEVEL' 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
3 
5 
5 
6 
4 
4 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
4 
5 
COMPANY 
AAPT Ltd. (Australia) 
Abacus Travel Systems Pte. Ltd. 
ACASIA Communications Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia) 
Acoustic Imaging Technologies Corporation (USA) 
Advanced Info Services Co. Ltd. (Thailand) 
Advanced Materials Technologies Pte. Ltd. 
Aero Laundry and Linen Services Pte. Ltd. 
Aerospace Engineering Services Pte. Ltd. (Australia) 
Agilïs Communication Technologies Pte. Ltd. 
Airline Rotables Ltd. (UK) 
Allied Ordanance of Singapore Pte. Ltd. 
Allied Ordinance of Singapore (Taiwan) 
APLS -Bok Seng Logistics Pte. Ltd. 
Aquagen International Pte. Ltd. 
Arab Heavy Industries PJSC (Dubai) 
Arcasia Land Pte. Ltd. 
Asfinco Singapore Ltd. 
Asia Leasing Ltd. 
Asia Pacific Environment Equipment Manufacturing (Vietnam) 
Asia Pacific Investment Company Ltd. 
Asia Pacific Logistic Services Pte. Ltd. 
Asian Aerospace Pte. Ltd. 
Asian Frequent Flyer Pte. Ltd. 
Asia -Pacific Star Pte. Ltd. 
Atlantis Shipyard Pte. Ltd. 
Attwood Agencies PteLtd 
Attwood Holdings PteLtd 
Attwood Impex (Thailand) Co. Pte. Ltd. 
Auspice Pty. Ltd. (Channel Islands) 
Australand Holdings Ltd. 
Automation Leasing and Consultancy Pte. Ltd. 
1 Levels 4 -6 are indicative only and are not based on classifications used in the 
Directoy of Government Linked Corporations. Only levels 1 -3 are definitive. 
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32. 5 Aviation Software Development Consultancy India Ltd. 
33. 6 Avisery Ltd. (UK) 
34. 4 Bangkok Synthetics Co. Ltd. (Thailand) 
35. 5 Bankok Straits Shipping Ltd. Part 
36. 5 Batamindo Industrial Management Pte. Ltd. 
37. 6 Beijing Airport Inflight Kitchen Ltd. 
38. 5 Beijing Asia Pacific First Star Communications Technology Co. Ltd. 
39. 6 Beijing Aviation Ground Services Co. Ltd. 
40. 6 Beijing Uni -Sin Telecommunications Technology Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
41. 2 Belgacom S. A. (Belgium) 
42. 5 Bintan Industrial Estate Management Pte. Ltd. 
43. 4 Bintan Resort Ferries Pte. Ltd. 
44. 4 Bintan Resort Management Pte. Ltd. 
45. 4 BMC Investment Pte. Ltd.- GIC 
46. 5 BST Elomasters Co. Ltd. (Thailand) 
47. 5 Bugis City Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
48. 6 Bukit Sembawang Estates Ltd. 
49. 4 Burwill Holdings Ltd. 
50. 5 California Avi -Tron (1994) Inc. (USA) 
51. 4 Camsin Corporation Pte. Ltd. 
52. 4 Capital Square Pte. Ltd. 
53. 4 Cargo Cmmunity Network Pte. Ltd. 
54. 4 CDC Construction and Development Pte. Ltd. 
55. 4 Cellular Data Inc. (USA) 
56. 5 Centre for International Transactions Ltd. (Vietnam) 
57. 6 Centrepoint Properties Ltd. 
58. 5 Centurion Bank (India) 
59. 5 CF,1 Technologies Pte. Ltd. 
60. 5 Changi International Airport Services Pte. Ltd. 
61. 5 Changi International Logistics Centre 
62. 5 ChangZhou Da Thong Wire Products Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
63. 5 Channel Links Pte. Ltd. 
64. 4 Chartered Ammunition Industries Pte. Ltd. 
65. 4 Chartered Electro -Optics Pte. Ltd. 
66. 2 Chartered Industries of Singapore 
67. 3 Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing Ltd. 
68. 5 Chartered Systems and Networks Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
69. 4 Chatered Systems and Networks Pte. Ltd. 
70. 5 Chengdu Leisure Planet Co Ltd. 
71. 5 Chesterton International Property Consultants Pte. Ltd. 
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72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
93. 
94. 
95. 
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
100. 
101. 
102. 
103. 
104. 
105. 
106. 
107. 
108. 
109. 
110. 
111. 
5 
6 
6 
4 
3 
4 
5 
4 
5 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
4 
3 
3 
5 
China Canton Investments Ltd. 
Chiwan Petroleum Supply Base Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
CHK Chieng Huat Service Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
CIE Manufacturing Pte.Ltd. 
CISCO 
CISCO International Pte. Ltd. 
CISCO Security Storage Pte. Ltd. 
CityCab Pte. Ltd. 
Cleantech Services Pte. Ltd. 
CMA Investment Pte. Ltd.- GIC 
CNC Investment Pte. Ltd.- GIC 
Cognos Far East Pte. Ltd. 
Color Point Security Pty Ltd. 
Combustor Airmotive Services Pte. Ltd. 
Composite Technology International Pte. Ltd. 
Computer Processing Services (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. 
Construction Technology Pte. Ltd. 
COSEM Pte. Ltd. 
C -Pak Pte. Ltd. 
Credinet Singapore Pte. Ltd. 
Credit POSB Pte. Ltd. 
CSA Holdings Ltd. 
CSN Systems Inc. (Philippines) 
CWT Distribution Ltd. 
CyberWay Pte. Ltd. 
D2K Inc. (USA) 
DalFort Aerospace GP Ltd. (USA) 
Dangerous Goods Management (S) Pte. Ltd. 
Data Network Solutions Co. Ltd. (Thailand) 
Datapulse Technology Ltd. 
DB Nominees Pte. Ltd. 
DBS Asset Management Pte. Ltd. 
DBS Bank Philippines Inc. 
DBS Card Centre Pte. Ltd. 
DBS China Square Ltd. 
DBS Computer Services Pte. Ltd. 
DBS Factors Pte. Ltd. 
DBS Finance Ltd. 
DBS Land Ltd. 
DBS Nominees (Private) Ltd. 
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112. 
113. 
114. 
115. 
116. 
117. 
118. 
119. 
120. 
121. 
122. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
126. 
127. 
128. 
129. 
130. 
131. 
132. 
133. 
134. 
135. 
136. 
137. 
138. 
139. 
140. 
141. 
142. 
143. 
144. 
145. 
146. 
147. 
148. 
149. 
150. 
151. 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
5 
4 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
4 
4 
DBS Property Services Pte. Ltd. 
DBS Securities Pte. Ltd. 
Delifrance Asia Pte. Ltd. 
Development Bank of Singapore Ltd. 
DHM Investment Pte. Ltd.- GIC 
DL Properties Ltd. 
Dourer Surgical Products Inc. (USA) 
Dormer Asia Medical Systems Pte. Ltd. 
Dornier India Medical Systems Pte. Ltd. 
Dornier Medical Systems Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
Dornìer Medical Systems do Brazil Ltda. 
Dormer Medical Systems Ltd. 
Dornier MedizinLaser GmbH (Germany) 
Dornier Medizintechnik GmbH (Germany) 
Dornier Medtech Holdigs GmbH (Germany) 
Dormer Surgical Systems GmbH (Germany) 
Dormer Theraphy systems Inc. (USA) 
Double Peak Holdings Ltd. 
d -Post (Thailand) Co. Ltd, 
DSS World Sourcing Ltd. 
Eastech Steel Mill Services Pte. Ltd. 
Eastel Construction Pte. Ltd. 
Eastern Bricks Pte. Ltd. 
Eastern Concrete Pte. Ltd. 
Eastern Industries Pte. Ltd. 
Eastern Maritime Pte. Ltd. 
Eastern Pretech (Malaysia) Pte. Ltd. 
Eastern Pretech Pacific Pte. Ltd. 
Eastern Pretech Pte. Ltd. 
Eastern Steel Services Pte. Ltd. 
Eastern Wire Ltd. 
ECIC Management Pte. Ltd. 
ECICS Credit Insurance Ltd. 
ECICS Holdings Ltd. 
ECICS Management Pte. Ltd. 
ECICS Ventures 2 Pte. Ltd. 
ECICS Ventures Pte. Ltd. 
ECICS -COFACE Guarantee Company (Singapore) Ltd. 
EDB Investments Pte. Lte 
EDB Ventures Pte. Ltd. 
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152. 
153. 
154. 
155. 
156. 
157. 
158. 
159. 
160. 
161. 
162. 
163. 
164. 
165. 
166. 
167. 
168. 
169. 
170. 
171. 
172. 
173. 
174. 
175. 
176. 
177. 
178. 
179. 
180. 
181. 
182. 
183. 
184. 
185. 
186. 
187. 
188. 
189. 
190. 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
5 
6 
5 
5 
5 
1 
4 
5 
4 
5 
5 
6 
5 
5 
Edo Sushi Pte. Ltd. 
El Marine Pte. Ltd. 
El Resources Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia) 
EM Services Pte. Ltd. 
ENV Corporation 
Ethylene Glycos (S) Pte. Ltd. 
Family Leisure Pte. Ltd. 
FHTK Holdings Ltd. 
Fima Corporation Berhad 
First Capital Corporation Ltd. 
First Pacific Land (Vietnam) Ltd. 
Flannigan Investment Pte. Ltd. 
Form Holdings Ltd. 
Forward Media Sdn. Bhd. (Brunei) 
FPSL Watco Ltd. 
Freight Links Express Distripark(Colombo) Ltd. 
Freight Links Express Holdings (Australia) 1997Ltd. 
Freight Links Express Holdings Ltd. 
General Securities Investments Ltd. 
GIC (London Office) Private Ltd. 
GIC (Realty) Private Ltd. 
GIC (Ventures) Pte. Ltd. 
GIC (Thailand) Pte. Ltd. 
GIC Special Investments Pte. Ltd. 
GMCR Inc. (Philippines) 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte. Ltd.(GIC) 
GP Batteries International Ltd. 
Greenfield Development Pte. Ltd. 
Guangdong Guan Sin Auomotive Rebuilding and Repair Co. Ltd. 
(PRC) 
HBM Print Ltd. 
Health Corporation of Singapore Pte. Ltd. 
Health Services Investment of Singapore Pte. Ltd. 
Health Services Management of Singapore Pte. Ltd. 
Ho Bee Holdings (Pte. Ltd.) 
Hofmann DMT GmbH (Germany) 
Hog Auction Market Pte. Ltd. 
Holland Realty Pte. Ltd. 
Huntsmen Offset Printing Pte. Ltd. 
Ideas Investment Pte. Ltd. 
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191. 5 
192. 4 
193. 5 
194. 6 
195. 4 
196. 4 
197. 5 
198. 5 
199. 5 
200. 5 
201. 5 
202. 5 
203. 6 
204. 6 
205. 4 
206. 5 
207. 5 
208. 6 
209. 6 
210. 5 
211. 6 
212. 3 
213. 4 
214. 5 
215. 4 
216. 4 
217. 4 
218. 2 
219. 4 
220. 4 
221. 5 
222. 6 
223. 4 
224. 6 
225. 6 
226. 6 
227. 6 
228. 5 
229. 5 
230. 5 
IMC Part Asia Alliance (Pte.) Ltd. 
[MCB Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
Indeco Consultants Pte. Ltd. 
Inf clink Co. Ltd. (Thailand) 
Information Holdings Asia Pte. Ltd. 
Information Network Services Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia) 
INS (Hong Kong) Ltd. 
Integrated Decision Systems Consultancy Pte. Ltd. 
Integrated Communications Sdn. Bhd. (Brunei) 
Integrated Databases India Ltd. 
Integrated Information (Hong Kong) Ltd, 
Integrated Information (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. 
Integrated Information Pte. Ltd. 
Integrated Media Services (Taiwan) Co. Ltd. 
Integrated Plastics Technology Pte. Ltd. 
Inter Corn Co. Pte. Ltd. 
InterCom (1983) Company Ltd. 
Interlocal Co. Pte. Ltd. 
Interlocal Exím Pte. Ltd. 
International Cuisine Ltd. (UK) 
International Engine Component Overhaul Pte. Ltd. 
International Factors (Singapore) Ltd. 
International Factors (Singapore) Management Services Ltd. 
International Factors Group S.C. (Belgium) 
International Factors Leasing Pte. Ltd. 
International Factors Management Services Pte. Ltd. 
International Technology Park, Bangalore 
lntraco Ltd. 
Intraco Trading Pte. Ltd. 
Intra- Motors (S) Pte. Ltd. 
ITS Technologies Pte. Ltd. 
Joint Shipyard Management Services Pte.Ltd. 
JTC International Pte. Ltd. 
Jurong Bird Park (Pte.) Ltd. 
Jurong Country Club Ltd. 
Jurong Districentre Pte. Ltd. 
Jurong Marine Services Pte. Ltd. 
K Investment Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
KAC Holdings Ltd. 
Kapal Management Pte. Ltd. 
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231. 
232. 
233. 
234. 
235. 
236. 
237. 
238. 
239. 
240. 
241. 
242. 
243. 
244. 
245. 
246. 
247. 
248. 
249. 
250. 
251. 
252. 
253. 
254. 
255. 
256. 
257. 
258. 
259. 
260. 
261. 
262. 
263. 
264. 
265. 
266. 
267. 
Kephinance Investment (Mauritius) Pte. Ltd. 
Kephinance Investment Pte. Ltd. 
Kepital Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Bank of Singapore Ltd. 
Keppel Batangas Dockyard Inc. 
Keppel Bullion and Futures Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Cairncross Shipyard Ltd. 
Keppel Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works Inc. 
Keppel Communications Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Corporation Ltd. 
Keppel Engineering Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Factors Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel FELS 
Keppel Finance Ltd. 
Keppel Finance Nominees Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Harbour Redevelopment Ltd. 
Keppel Hitachi Zosen Ltd. 
Keppel Houston Group Partnership Inc. (USA) 
Keppel Insurance Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Integrated Engineering 
Keppel Investment Management Ltd. 
Keppel WI Investments Inc. 
Keppel Land2 
Keppel Land (Hong Kong) Ltd. 
Keppel Land (Tower D) Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Land Agtex Ltd. 
Keppel Land International Ltd. 
Keppel Land Properties Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Leasing Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Logistics Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Marine Industries Ltd. 
Keppel Monte Bank Inc. 
Keppel Philippines Marine Industries Ltd. 
Keppel Philippines Properties Inc. 
Keppel Phillipines Holdings Inc. 
Keppel Power Systems Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Securities Philippines Inc. 
2 A large number of Keppel Land subsidiaries were identified: 137 subsidiary 
companies, 5 associate companies and 17 inactive companies; a total of 159. Of These, 
only the most significant are included in the table. 
485 Appendix 7 
268. 4 
269. 3 
270. 5 
271. 4 
272. 4 
273. 5 
274. 6 
275. 5 
276. 5 
277. 5 
278. 5 
279. 6 
280. 3 
281. 5 
282. 6 
283. 4 
284. 4 
285. 5 
286. 4 
287. 4 
288. 5 
289. 5 
290. 5 
291. 5 
292. 5 
293. 2 
294. 5 
295. 6 
296. 6 
297. 3 
298. 4 
299. 6 
300. 4 
301. 5 
302. 4 
303. 5 
304. 5 
305. 5 
306. 4 
307. 5 
Keppel Securities Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Shipyard Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Sing Loong Investments Pte. Ltd. 
Keppel Transport &Telecommunications 
KeppelFELS Energy and infrastructure Ltd. 
KI Investments (HK) Ltd. 
Kinetic Ltd. (Australia) 
Kong Siang (Pte.) Ltd. 
Kong Siang Liquor Pte. Ltd. 
KPN -ST Logistics Co. Ltd. (Thailand) 
KSAT Satellite Networks Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
Laguna National Golf and Country Club 
Lanka Communications Services (Private) Ltd. (Sri lanka) 
LimeTreat (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. 
Logistics Training and Consultancy Pte. Ltd. 
Lum Chang Holdings Ltd. 
Lung Kee Metal Holdings Ltd. 
MACS -ECICS Insurance Brokers Pte. Ltd. 
MAP Services Pte. Ltd. 
Marina Centre Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
Marine Brokers Pte. Ltd. 
Martinique Investments Pte. Ltd. 
Meadowsville Investment Pte. Ltd. 
Mechmar Keppel Engineering Sdn Bhd 
Medeclin Tageskliniken fur ESW- Therapie GmbH (Germany) 
Media Corporation of Singapore 
Meditron Pty. Ltd. (Australia) 
MicroAsia Private Ltd. 
Mima International Pte. Ltd. 
MobileOne (Asia) Pte. Ltd. 
Monte De Peidad & Savings Bank 
Multi-Media Communications Sdn. Bhd. 
Multi Tech Products Pte. Ltd. 
Myanmar Investment Fund (Singapore) Ltd. 
Nanyang Press (Holdings) Berhad 
Nanyang Press (Malayasia) Berhad 
National Cement Industry Pte. Ltd. 
National Skin Centre Pte. Ltd. 
National University Hospital (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. 
NatSteel Abrasives Pte. Ltd. 
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308. 
309. 
310. 
311. 
312. 
313. 
314. 
315. 
316. 
317. 
318. 
319. 
320. 
321. 
322. 
323. 
324. 
325. 
326. 
327. 
328. 
329. 
330. 
331. 
332. 
333. 
334. 
335. 
336. 
337. 
338. 
339. 
340. 
341. 
342. 
343. 
344. 
345. 
346. 
3 
5 
4 
3 
6 
2 
4 
4 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
4 
2 
3 
3 
5 
6 
4 
6 
4 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
3 
4 
5 
6 
5 
5 
6 
NatSteel BroadwayLtd 
NatSteel Chemicals (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. 
NatSteel Chemicals Ltd. 
NatSteel Electronics Ltd. 
NatSteel Guinard Oil Services Pte. Ltd. 
NatSteel Ltd. 
NatSteel Resort International Pte. Ltd. 
NatSteel Trade International Pte. Ltd. 
NatSteel Trade International Pte. Ltd. (Singapore & Myanmar) 
NatSteel Vina Co. Ltd. (Vietnam) 
NatSteel -Katayama Chemicals Pte. Ltd. 
NBC Containers Depot Co. Ltd. 
NCS Information technology (Suzhou) Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
NDC Merchant Bank Ltd. 
Neptune Orient Lines Ltd. 
New Changi Hospital Pte. Ltd. 
NSTB Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
Nusantara Technologies Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia) 
Ocean & Capital Properties Pte. Ltd. 
Ocean Properties Pte. Ltd. 
Offshore Joint Services (Bases) Co. of Singapore Pte. Ltd. 
OIL (Asia) Pte. Ltd. 
Omni Industries Ltd. 
Orchid Marine Services Pte. Ltd. 
Ordinance Development Engineering Company of Singapore (1996) 
Pte. Ltd. 
Orix Leasing Singapore Ltd. 
P.T. Ria Bintan 
P.T. Sentral Tanjungan Perkasa 
P.T. Straits CM Village 
Pacific Carriers Ltd. 
Pacific Century Regional Developments Ltd. 
Pacific International Lines (Pte.) Ltd. 
Pacific Internet Pte. Ltd. 
Pacven Investments Ltd. 
Pacven Walden Management Singapore Pte. Ltd. 
Pager Sales Co. Ltd. (Thailand) 
Palau Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
Pan Asian Pacific Aviation Services Ltd. 
Pasir Panjang Realty Pte. Ltd. 
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347. 3 
348. 3 
349. 5 
350. 4 
351. 4 
352. 5 
353. 5 
354. 4 
355. 5 
356. 2 
357. 4 
358. 4 
359. 4 
360. 4 
361. 4 
362. 4 
363. 2 
364, 4 
365. 4 
366. 4 
367. 5 
368. 6 
369. 6 
370. 6 
371, 3 
372. 5 
373. 4 
374. 2 
375. 4 
376. 5 
377, 5 
378. 4 
379. 5 
380. 4 
381. 5 
382, 5 
383. 6 
38.4. 5 
385. 5 
386. 6 
Petrochemical Corporation of Singapore (Pte.) Ltd. 
Pidemco Land Pte. Ltd. 
PIL Travels (Private) Ltd. 
Pittco Investment Pte. Ltd. 
Plastics and Metal Industries (S) Pte. Ltd. 
Polymer Coating Technologies of Singapore Pte. Ltd. 
POSB Computer Services Pte. Ltd. 
POSB Investment Pte. Ltd. 
POSBank Centre Pte. Ltd. 
Post Office Savings Bank Pte. Ltd. 
Power Supply Ltd. 
PowerGas Ltd. 
PowerGrid Ltd. 
PowerSenoko Ltd. 
PowerSeraya Ltd. 
Primary Industries Pte. Ltd. 
PSA Corporation Ltd. 
PSA Marine (Pte.) Ltd. 
PT Bank DBS Buena (Indonesia) 
PT Bukaka SigTel International (Indonesia) 
PT Pantai Indah Tateli (Indonesia) 
PT Pulomas Gemala Misori (Indonesia) 
PT Purimas Straits Resort (Indonesia) 
PT Purosani Sri Persada (Indonesia) 
PT SkyTelindo Services (Indonesia) 
PT SSE -Van Horst Indonesia 
PWD Consultants Pte. Ltd. 
PWD Corporation Pte. Ltd. 
PWD ENV Pte. Ltd. 
Quang Ba Royal Park JV Co. 
R C Hotel Pte. Ltd. 
Radio Corporation of Singapore 
Raffles City Pte. Ltd. 
Raffles Holdings (1995) Pte. Ltd. 
Raffles Hotel (1886) Ltd. 
Raffles Marina Ltd. 
Raffles Nominees (Pte.) Ltd. 
RCC Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
Reliance Contractors Pte. Ltd. 
Renown Property Holdings (M) Sdn Bhd 
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387. 
388. 
389. 
390. 
391. 
392. 
393. 
394. 
395. 
396. 
397. 
398. 
399. 
400. 
401. 
402. 
403. 
404. 
405. 
406. 
407. 
408. 
409. 
410. 
411. 
412. 
413. 
414. 
415. 
416. 
417. 
418. 
419. 
420. 
421. 
477. 
423. 
424. 
425. 
426. 
5 RISIS Pte. Ltd. 
5 Rohr Aero Services Asia Pte. Ltd. 
5 Runhong Engineering Co. Ltd. (Taiwan) 
6 Safe Bintan Resort Ltd. 
4 Safe Enterprises Pte. Ltd. 
5 Safe Margin Investments (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. 
6 Safe Superstore Pte. Ltd. 
5 Safe Technology Pte. Ltd. 
6 SAFE- Mansfield Travel Group Pte. Ltd. 
6 Safra Radio Pte. Ltd. 
6 Safra Resort and Country Club Pte. Ltd. 
5 Saigon Centre Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
5 Saigon Mobile Telephone Centre (Vietnam) 
5 Samaero Company Pte. Ltd. 
5 SATA Catering Pte. Ltd. 
5 SATS Security Services Pte. Ltd. 
6 SCS Australia Pty. Ltd. 
4 SCS Computer Systems (UK) Ltd. 
5 SCS Computer Systems Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia) 
4 SCS Information Technology Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia) 
4 SCS New Zealand Ltd. 
5 Securities 2000 Inc. (Philippines) 
4 Sedona Hotels International Pte. Ltd. 
5 SEET Electronics and Engineering Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia) 
2 Sembawang Corporation Ltd. (SembCorp) 
3 Sembawang Engineering and Construction Pte. Ltd. 
4 Sembawang Gas Pte. Ltd. 
5 Sembawang Leisure Pte. Ltd. 
3 Sembawang Marine & Logistics 
3 Sembawang Maritime Ltd. 
3 Sembawang Properties Pte. Ltd. 
3 Sembawang Resources Ltd. 
3 Sembawang Shipyard Pte. Ltd. 
4 Sembawang Utilities and Termninals Pte. Ltd. 
5 Sembawang Wah Kwong Shipping Pte. Ltd. 
4 SembCorp Energy Pte. Ltd. 
5 SembCorp Parks Management Pte Ltd. 
4 SembCorp Waste Management Pte. Ltd. 
6 Sentosa Cove Pte. Ltd. 
6 Sentosa Golf Club Ltd. 
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Service Quality (SQ) Centre Pte. Ltd. 
SH Tours Ltd. 
Shanghai Elite Electric Vehicles Co. Ltd. 
Shanghai Sunjoy Systems Integration Ltd. 
Shinawatra Paging Co. Ltd. (Thailand) 
SIA Engineering Company Pte. Ltd. 
SIA Mauritius Ltd. 
SIA Properties Pte. Ltd. 
SIAEC Services Pte. Ltd. 
Siam United Hi Tech Co. Ltd. (Thailand) 
SilkAir Pte. Ltd. 
SIM Communications Pte. Ltd. 
Sinawatra Datacom Co. Ltd. (Thailand) 
Singa Infrastructure Management Pte. Ltd. - GIC 
Singamas Container Holdings Ltd. (Hong Kong) 
Singapore Aerospace (UK) Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Aerospace Manufacturing Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Aircrat Leasing Enerprise Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Airlines (Mauritius) Ltd. 
Singapore Airlines Ltd. 
Singapore Airport Bus Services Ltd. 
Singapore Airport Terminal Services Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Airposrt Duty-Free Emporium (Private) Ltd. 
Singapore Arts Centre Ltd. 
Singapore Aviation and General Insurance Company (Pte.) Ltd. 
Singapore British Engineering Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Cable Car (Pte.) Ltd. 
Singapore Cable Vision Ltd. 
Singapore Clearing House Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Computer Systems Ltd. 
Singapore Corporation of Rehabilitative Enterprises (SCORE) 
Singapore Dalian Port Investment Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Dance Theatre Ltd. 
Singapore Discovery Centre Ltd. 
Singapore Dress Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Engineering Software Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Environmental Management and Engineering Services 
Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Flying College Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Food Industries Pte. Ltd. 
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466. 6 
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Singapore Gamma Knife Centre Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore General Aviation Services Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore General Hospital Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre Ltd. 
Singapore International Foundation Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore International Media Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Jamco Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Leisure Industries Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Logistics Consortium Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Manufacturers Service Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Mint Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore MRT Ltd. 
Singapore Offshore Petroleum Services (Private) Ltd. 
Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd. 
Singapore Pools (Private) Ltd. 
Singapore Post Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Power International Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Power Ltd. 
Singapore Precision Industries Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Precision Repair and Overhaul Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Press Holdings Ltd .3 
Singapore Suzhou Industrial Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Suzhou Township Development Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Technologies Marine Ltd. 
Singapore TechnologiesPte Ltd .4 
Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. 
Singapore Television 12 Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Test Services Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Utilities International Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Vietnam Investments Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore Zoological Gardens Pte. Ltd. 
Singaport Cleanseas Pte. Ltd. 
Singatronics Ltd. 
SingCom (Australia) Pty. Ltd. 
3 Government direct and indirect ownership of Singapore Press Holdings is minor. 
However, it is listed here as the government exercises complete control of its 
management, board appointments and monitors and approves its share trading under 
the Newspapers and Printing Presses Act. 
4 A total of 299 subsidiaries of Singapore Technologies Pte. Ltd. were identified. Only 
those considered to be significant in terms of size or strategic value are included in this 
table. 
491 Appendix 7 
500. 
501. 
502. 
503. 
504. 
505. 
506. 
507. 
508. 
509. 
510. 
511. 
512. 
513. 
514, 
515. 
516. 
517. 
518. 
519. 
520. 
521, 
522. 
523. 
524. 
525. 
526. 
527. 
528. 
529. 
530. 
531. 
532. 
533. 
534. 
535. 
536. 
537. 
538. 
539. 
6 
4 
5 
4 
4 
4 
3 
5 
5 
3 
5 
4 
5 
4 
6 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
4 
5 
5 
3 
5 
2 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
3 
5 
4 
3 
4 
3 
Sing -Mas Investment Pte. Ltd. 
SingNet Pte. Ltd. 
Sing -Tech Precision (Suzhou) Co. Ltd. 
Singtel Aeradio 
Singtel Investments Private Ltd. 
SingTel Mobile Pte. Ltd. 
SingTel Ventures 
SingTel Yellow Pages Pte. Ltd. 
SNP Cambec Pte. Ltd. 
SNP Corporation 
SNP Offest (M) Sdn Bhd 
SNP Printing Pte. Ltd. 
SNP Publishing Pte. Ltd. 
SNP Security Printing Pte. Ltd. 
South China Towing Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
Southern Bank Berhard (Malaysia) 
Southern Natsteel (Xiamen) Ltd. (PRC) 
Southern Pipe Industry (Malaysia) Sdn.Bhd. 
Southern Rubber works Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia) 
Southern Steel Berhad (Malaysia) 
Southern Wire Industries (Malaysia) Pte. Ltd. 
SouthQuay Global Markets Ltd. (HK) 
Springwood Technology Pte. Ltd. 
ST Advanced Radio Pte. Ltd, 
ST Aerospace Engineering Pte. Ltd. 
ST Aerospace Engines Pte. Ltd. 
ST Aerospace Ltd. 
ST Aerospace Supplies Pte. Ltd. 
ST Aerospace Systems Pte. Ltd. 
ST Agritech International Pte. Ltd. 
ST Architects and Engineers Pte. Ltd. 
ST Assemby Test Services Ltd. 
ST Automotte Industrial Pte. Ltd. 
ST Aviation Resources Pte. Ltd. 
ST Capital Ltd. 
ST Computer Systems (HK) Ltd. 
ST Computer Systems and Services Pte. Ltd. 
ST Construction Pte. Ltd. 
ST Development Pte. Ltd. 
ST Electronics Pte. Ltd. 
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ST Electronics Systems Assembly Pte. Ltd. 
ST Fund Management Pte. Ltd. 
ST Industrial Corporation (Amalgamated with Sembawang 
Corporation in October 1998) 
ST Infrastructure Technologies (India) Pvt. Ltd. 
ST Logistics Pte. Ltd. 
ST Medical Services Pte. Ltd. 
ST Merchant Capital Pte. Ltd. 
ST Mobile Aerospace Engineering Inc. (USA) 
ST Mobile Data Pte. Ltd. 
ST PAE Holdings Pty. Ltd. (Australia) 
ST Property Investments Pte. Ltd. 
ST Shipbuilding and Engineering Pte. Ltd. 
ST SiChuan XingRong Communication Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
ST Simulation Systems Pte. Ltd. 
ST SunPage Pte. Ltd. 
ST Telecommunications Pte. Ltd. 
ST Telemedia Pte. Ltd. 
St Teleport Pte. Ltd. 
STA Automotive Inspection Pte. Ltd. 
STA Detroit Diesel -Allison (Malaysia) Pte. Ltd. 
STA Detroit Diesel -Allison (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. 
STA Investment Pte. Ltd. 
ST- Airport Services Pte. Ltd. 
Star Kingdom Investment Ltd. 
StarHub (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. 
ST -China Technology Ltd. 
STCS Electronics Investments Pte. Ltd. 
ST -Da Sing Pte. Ltd. 
ST -Da Yang Foods Pte. Ltd. 
Steamers Containership Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
SteelAsia Manufacturing Corporation (Philippines) 
STEL Information Technology (Shangai) Co. Ltd. 
ST -KWE Logistics Pte. Ltd. 
Stockwell (Thailand) Company Ltd. 
Stockwell Investments Pte. Ltd. 
Straits (USA) Inc. 
Straits Properties Ltd. 
Straits Property Investments Pte. Ltd 
Straits Realty (Texas) Inc. 
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Straits Shipping Pte. Ltd. 
STSE Enineering Services Pte. Ltd. 
ST- Straco Pte. Ltd. 
ST- Zerust (SEA) Pte. Ltd. 
Subic Shipyard and Engineering Inc. (Philippines) 
Sun Cruises Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
Superbowl Holdings Ltd. 
Superior Metal Printing Ltd. 
Suzhou Eastern Cement Products Ltd. (PRC) 
Suzhou Zhongxin Telecommunications Engineering Development 
Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
Suzue -PSA Cold Storage Pte. Ltd. (PRC) 
Tampines Mall Pte. Ltd. 
Tan Tock Seng Hospital Pte. Ltd. 
Tao Payoh Community Hospital Pte. Ltd. 
TDB Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
Technology Parks Pte. Ltd. 
Telecom Eqipment Pte. Ltd. 
Teledata Singapore Ltd. 
Telescience (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. 
TeleTech Park Pte. Ltd. 
Television Corporaton of Singapore Pte. Ltd. 
Temasek Holdings (Private) Ltd. 
Temasek Management Services Pte. Ltd. 
Temasek Nominees (Private) Ltd. 
Teodoro N. Romansanta Inc. (Philippines) 
Thai International Ship Breakers Company Ltd. 
The Esplanade Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
The Insurance Corporation of Singapore Ltd. 
The Polyolefin Company (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. 
The Thai Danu Bank Public Company Ltd. (Thailand) 
Three W. Services Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
Through Transport Mutual Services (UK) Ltd. 
Times Publishing Ltd .5 
TICS Enterprises Public Company Ltd. (PRC) 
TLB Land Ltd. 
Tradewinds Tours and Travel Pte. Ltd. 
Trans Maritime Pte. Ltd. 
5 A major subsidiary of Singapore Press Holdings. 
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616. 4 Transit Link Pte. Ltd. 
617. 4 Trans -Link Express Pte. Ltd. 
618. 3 Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd. 
619. 4 Trident DistriCentre Pte. Ltd. 
620. 5 Tridex Pte. Ltd. 
621. 4 Triumph Steel Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
622. 4 TuasPower Pte. Ltd. 
623. 5 Turbine Overhaul Services Pte. Ltd. 
624. 5 Twìnsoft Asia Pte. Ltd. 
625. 5 UNIFI Communications Inc. (USA) 
626. 5 Unload Consolidators Pte. Ltd. 
627. 4 United Engineers Ltd. 
628. 4 United Industrial Corporation Ltd. 
629. 6 VA Dynamics Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia) 
630. 4 Vencap Holdings (1987) Pte. Ltd.- GIC 
631. 4 Vencap Holdings (1992) Pte. Ltd.- GIC 
632. 4 Vencap Investment Pte. Ltd.- GIC 
633. 4 Ventura Development (DST)Pte. Ltd. 
634. 5 Ventura Development (Surabaya) Pte. Ltd. 
635. 4 Ventura Development Pte. Ltd. 
636. 5 Veronique Pte. Ltd. 
637. 5 Vertex Asia Ltd. 
638. 4 Vertex Investment Pte. Ltd. 
639. 4 Vertex Management (II)Pte. Ltd. 
640. 4 Vertex Management (III) Pte. Ltd. 
641. 4 Vertex Management Pte. Ltd. 
642. 3 Vickers Ballas Holdings Ltd. 
643. 4 Vickers Capital Ltd. 
644. 5 Vietnam Investment Fund (Singapore) Ltd. 
645. 5 Vincent Intertrans (Holdings) Ltd., Hong Kong 
646. 5 VisionTech Engineering Pte. Ltd. 
647. 4 Wah Kwong Shipping Holdings Ltd. 
648. 6 Waterfront Properties Pte. Ltd. 
649. 4 WBC Investment Pte. Ltd.- GIC 
650. 4 WBL Corporation Ltd. 
651. 4 WEI Investment Pte. Ltd. - GIC 
652. 4 Wing Lung Bank Ltd. (Hong Kong) 
653. 5 Wuji Jinyang Metal Products Co. Ltd.(PRC) 
654. 5 Wujin Natsteel Co. Ltd. (PRC) 
655. 5 Wuxi International Management Services Pte. Ltd. (PRC) 
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656. 6 
I 
Zip Services Pty. Ltd. (Australia) 
657. 5 Zuellig Insurance Brokers Pte. Ltd. 
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1998 Directorships Of Singapore GLCs Levels 1 -3 
No. Name Position Lv Company Sect 
1. Ang Kong Hua Director 1 GIC G 
2. Ang Kong Hua Chair 2 Intraco G 
3. Ang Kong Hua Chairman 3 NatSteel BroadwayLtd G 
4. Ang Kong Hua Chairman 3 NatSteel Electronics Ltd G 
5. Ang Kong Hua Director, MD President 2 NatSteel Ltd G 
6. Ang Kong Hua Vice Chair 3 Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd. G 
7. Ang Tiek Lim, Eric Director 3 DBS Land G 
8. Boey Tak Hap, BG 
(NS) 
Director 3 PowerGrid Ltd M 
9. Boey Tak Hap, BG 
(NS) 
President, CEO 3 Singapore Power Ltd M 
10. Boey Tak Hap, BG1 
(NS) 
Director 3 Keppel Finance M 
11. Boon Swan Foo Director, Group 
President, CEO 
2 ST Aerospace G 
12. Boon Swan Foo Director 2 ST Industrial Corporation G 
13. Boon Swan Foo Director & President 3 ST Shipbuilding and Engineering G 
14. Ch'ng Jit Koon2 Director 3 Keppel Finance L 
15. Cham Tao Soon Director 2 Keppel Corporation B 
16. Cham Tao Soon Chair 2 NatSteel Ltd B 
17. Cham Tao Soon, Dr. Director 2 Singapore MRT Ltd B 
18. Chamroonratana, 
Niphat 
Alternate Director 3 International Factors (Singapore) 
Ltd 
F 
19. Chan Fook Pong Director 3 SNP Corporation U 
20. Chan Hang Loon, Alan Director 
Member, Audit 
Committee 
2 DBS Bank C 
21. Chart Jer Hing, Peter Director 2 Heath Corporation of Singapore 
Pte Ltd 
C 
22. Chan Meng Wah, 
Alexander 
Director 3 SNP Corporation P 
23. Chan Wing Leong Director 3 Pacific Internet Pte Ltd U 
24. Chang See Hiang Director 3 ST Shipbuilding and Engineering U 
25. Chang Yun Chung Director 3 Keppel FELS U 
26. Chee Jin Kiong Director & MD 3 Kepppel Finance G 
27. Chen Ai Ju, Dr PPA(G), 
PPA(P) 
Director 2 HealtT Corporation of Singapore 
Pte Ltd 
C 
28. Chen Choong Joong Director 3 Singapore Power Ltd P 
29. Chen Choong Joong Director 2 ST Aerospace P 
30. Chen Choong Joong Director 3 TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd P 
31. Chen Tien Lap, 
Bernard 
Director 
Chair, Audit Committee 
2 DBS Bank L 
32. Chen Tien Lap, 
Bernard 
Director, CEO 2 Intraco L 
33. Chen Tien Lap, 
Bernard 
Chair 3 Teledata L 
34. Chen Tien Lap, 
Bernard 
Director 3 The Insurance Corporation of 
Singapore Ltd 
L 
35. Cheng Shao Shiong, 
Bertie 
Director & CEO 2 POSBank G 
36. Cheng Shao Shiong, 
Bertie 
Director 
Chair, Audit Committee 
2 ST Industrial Corporation G 
37. Cheng Wai Wing, Director 2 Neptune Orient Lines Ltd P 
38. Cheng Wai Wing, 
Edmund 
Director 3 Pidemco Land Pte Ltd P 
39. Cheng Wai Wing, 
Edmund 
Director 3 Sembawang Engineering and 
Construction Pte Ltd 
P 
40. m g Wai Wing, Director 2 Singapore Airlines Ltd P 
1 Boey was Chief of Army in 1990. 
2 Ch'ng was an MP from 1968 -1997 and 1992 - 1996, Senior Minister of State, Ministry of 
Community Development before retiring. 
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41. Cheng Wai Wing, 
Edmund 
Director 3 Singapore Power Ltd P 
42. gg Wai Wing, Director 3 SNP Corporation P 
43. 
Edmund h Wai Wing, Director 3 Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd P 
44. 
Dr 
Cheong Choong Kong Chair 3 Singapore International Media Pte G 
45. Cheong Choong Kong 
Dr 
Director 2 Singapore Press Holdings G 
46. Cheong Poh Kin Director 3 ST Capital P 
47. Cheong Quee Wah Deputy Chair 3 Sembawang Marine & Logistics G 
48. Cheong Quee Wah ED 2 SembCorp C 
49. Cheong Yip Seng Director & Editor- 
inChief, English and 
Malay Newspapers 
2 Singapore Press Holdings G 
50. Chew Leng Seng Deputy MD (Technical) 2 i Singapore Airlines Ltd G 
51. Chew LengSeng Director 2 ST Aerospace G 
52. Chia Chay Poh, David Director 3 CISCO P 
53. Cling Hee Kok Director 3 Singapore Power Ltd L 
54. Choe Fook Cheong, 
Alan 
Director 3 Keppel Land P 
55. Chong Kie Cheong Director 3 DBS Finance G 
56. Chong Lit Cheong Director 3 NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd B 
57. Chong Phit Lan Director & Group GM 3 Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd G 
58. 
J 
Choo Boon Tiong Director & MD 3 International Factors (Singapore) 
Ltd 
G 
59. Choo Boon Tiong Director 3 International Factors Leasing Pte 
Ltd 
G 
60. Chao Chiau Beng Director 3 Keppel Bank G 
61. Choo Chiau Beng ED 2 Keppel Corporation G 
62. Choo Chiau Beng Chair 
MD 
3 Keppel FELS G 
63. Choo Chiau Beng Director 3 Keppel Integrated Engineering G 
64. Choo Chiau Beng Alternate Director 3 MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd G 
65. Choo Chin Teck Director 3 Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd U 
66. Choo Wee Leong, 
Winston, Lt. Gen (Ret.) 
Director 3 DBS Land M 
67. Choo Wee Leong, 
Winston, Lt. Gen (Ret.) 
Director 3 Keppel Bank M 
68. Choo Wee Leong, 
Winston, Lt. Gen (Ret.) 
Director 3 Keppel FELS M 
69. Chow Kok Kee Director & Audit 
Committee Member 
3 Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd. U 
70. Chua Boon Lee, 
Thomas 
Director 3 International Factors (Singapore) 
Ltd 
P 
71. Chua Teck Chew, 
Robert 
Director 3 International Factors (Singapore) 
Ltd 
P 
72. Chua Teck Chew, 
Roberta 
Director 3 -ECKS Holdings Ltd P 
73. Chua Yong Hai Director 3 CISCO U 
74. Desker, Barry Director ' 3 TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd B 
75. Dhanabalan, Suppiah Chair 2 DBS Bank L 
76. Dhanabalan, Suppiah Director 1 GIC L 
77. Dhanabalan, Suppiah Chair 2 Singapore Airlines Ltd L 
78. Dhanabalan, Suppiáh Director & Chair 1 Temasek Hdidings (Pte) Ltd. L 
79. Dy, Francisco J. III Director 3 ECICS Holdings Ltd G 
80. Er Kwong Wah Executive Chair 3 Sembawang Marine & Logistics C 
81, Er Kwong Wah Chair 3 Sembawang Maritime Ltd C 
82. Er Kwong Wah Director 3 Sembawang Resources Ltd C 
83. Er Kwong Weh Director 3 Sembawang Shipyard Pte Ltd C 
84. Er Kwong Wah Director & ED 2 -SenbCorp C 
85. Er Kwong Wah Director 3 Singapore Power Ltd C 
86. Er Kwong Wah Chair 3 Temasek Management Services Pte 
Ltd 
C 
87. Faithfull, Timothy 
William 
Director 
Member, Audit 
Committee 
2 -DBS Bank P 
88. Faithfull, Timothy 
William 
Director 2 PSA Corporation Ltd P 
89. Fam Yue Onn, Michael Director 2 Singapore Press Holdings P 
3 Has the malaysian honorific: Datuk, probably from the Sultan of Johore. 
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90. Fam Yue Onn, Michael Director 3 Times Publishing Ltd P 
91. Fang Ai Lian Director 2 POSBank P 
92. Fock Siew Wah Director 1 Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd. U 
93. Foh, Elsie Director 3 CISCO G 
94. Foh, Elsie Director 3 DBS Finance G 
95. Foo Kok Swee Director 3 DBS Land G 
96. Foo Kok Swee Deputy Chair 3 ECICS Holdings Ltd G 
97. Foo Kok Swee Chair 3 International Factors (Singapore) 
Ltd 
G 
98. Foo Kok Swee, Col. Director 3 TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd G 
99. Foo Meng Tong Director 3 EDB Ventures Pte Ltd U 
100. Ganesan, N. Director & MD 3 The Insurance Corporation of 
Singapore 
G 
101. Goh Boon Kiat ED 3 Keppel Marine Industries Ltd G 
102. Goh Eng Chew Director 3 DBS Land P 
103. Goh Eng Chew Director 2 NatSteel Ltd P 
104. Goh Kim Leong Chair 2 Singapore MRT Ltd C 
105. Goh Kim Leong Director 2 -ST Industrial Corporation C 
106. Goh Liang Kwang Director 3 Temasek Management Services Pte 
Ltd 
B 
107. Goh Song How Director & MD 3 ST Construction Pte Ltd G 
108. Goh Yong Hong Director 3 ECICS Holdings Ltd C 
109. Goh Yong Hong Chair 3 Singapore Pools (Pte.) Ltd. C 
110. Goh Yong Siang, MG Director 2 ST Aerospace M 
111. Goon Kok Loon Director 3 Keppel FELS B 
112. Han Cheng Fong Deputy Chair & CEO 3 DES Land G 
113. Han Eng Juan, MG Director 2 POSBank M 
114. Han Eng Juan, MG Director 2 PSA Corporation Ltd M 
115. Hannes, Martin Roy Director 3 Singapore Cable Vision Ltd F 
116. Hawazi bin Daipi Director 2 PSA Corporation Ltd L 
117. HeeThengFong Director 3 Television Corporation of 
Singapore Pte Ltd 
U 
118. Ho Ching Director 3 EDB Investments Pte Lte G 
119. Ho Ching Group Chair 2 ST Aerospace G 
120. Ho Ching Chairman 3 ST Capital G 
121. Ho Ching President, CEO 1 ST Pte Ltd G 
122. Ho Kwon Ping Director 1 GIC G 
123. Ho Kwon Ping Chair 3 Singapore Power Ltd G 
124. Ho Tian Yee Director 2 Singapore MRT Ltd P 
125. Ho, Michael Director & Group GM 3 ST Construction Pte Ltd G 
126. Hochstadt, Herman 
Ronald 
Chair 3 ECICS Holdings Ltd G 
127. Hong Hai, Dr, Director 1 Singapore Telecommunications L 
128. Hong Hai, Dr. Chair 3 Pidemco Land Pte Ltd L 
129. Hong Hai, Dr. Director 2 Singapore Post Ltd L 
130. Hong Hai, Dr. Director 1 Singapore Telecommunications L 
131. Hong Tuck Kim Director 3 DBS Finance G 
132. Hong Tuck Kun Director 2 Intraco G 
133. Howe, Robert 
Montgomery 
Director 2 DBS Bank P 
134. Hsu, Jimmy Director 3 GIC (Ventures) Pte Ltd G 
135. Hsuan Owyang Director 3 DBS Land B 
136. Hsuan Owyang Chair 3 Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd. B 
137. Hu Tsu Tau, Richard, 
Dr. 
Director 1 GIC L 
138. Hutson, Michael 
William 
Alternative 
Director 
3 Singapore Cable Vision Ltd F 
139. Hwang Soo Jin ' Director 3 ECICS Holdings Ltd P 
140. Hwang, Sydney 
Michael 
Director 2 PSA Corporation Ltd P 
141. Khattar, Sat Pal Director 
Member, Executive 
Resource Committee 
2 SembCorp P 
142. Khaw Boon Wan Director 
Member, Exco 
2 DBS Bank C 
143. Khaw Boon Wan Director 1 Health Corporation of Singapore 
Pte Ltd 
C 
144. Khaw Boon Wan Chair 3 Singapore Cable Vision Ltd C 
145. Khaw Boon Wan Chair 3 Singapore General Hospital Pte C 
146. Khaw Boon Wan Director 3 Singapore International Media Pte 
Ltd 
C 
147. Khaw Boon Wan Director 1 Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd. C 
148. Khoo Teng Chye Director 3 Keppefntegrated Ennineering B 
149. Khor Poh Hwa Director 3 Keppel Land G 
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150. Khor Poh Hwa President & CEO 3 PWD Corporation Pte Ltd G 
151. Ko Kheng Hwa Director 3 Pacific Internet Pte Ltd C 
152. Koh Boon Hwee Chair 2 Singapore Post Ltd P 
153. Koh Boon Hwee Chair 1 Singapore Telecommunications P 
154. Koh Boon Hwee Director 1 Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd. P 
155. Koh Cher Siang Director 1 Health Corporation of Singapore 
Pte Ltd 
C 
156. Koh How Eng Director 3 NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd C 
157. Koh Tong -Bee, Prof. 
Tommy 
Director 
Member, Audit 
Committee 
2 DBS Bank C 
158. Koh Yong Guan Director 2 Keppel Corporation B 
159. Kua Hong Pak Director 1 Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd. G 
160. Kua Hong Pak President, CEO 3 Times Publishing Ltd G 
161. Kwa Chong Seng Director 1 Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd. P 
162. Kwa Soon Bee, Dr. Director 3 j Keppel Land C 
163. Kwah Thiam Hock Director & President, 
CEO 
3 ECICS Holdings Ltd G 
164. Kwah Thiam Hock ED 3 International Factors (Singapore) 
Ltd 
G 
165. Kwek Gim Song, 
Benedict 
President, CEO, 
Director 
3 Keppel Bank G 
166. Kwek Gim Song, 
Benedict 
Director 3 ST Construction Pte Ltd G 
167. Kwek Siew Jin, Radm 
(NS) 
Director & MD 2 Singapore MRT Ltd M 
168. Kwok Wai Keong Director 3 GIC (Realty) Pte Ltd G 
169. Lai Ching Chuan ED 3 Keppel Integrated Engineering G 
170. Lai Chun Loong Director & President 2 Chartered Industries of Singapore G 
171. Lai Chun Loong Director 3 Sembawang Marine & Logistics G 
172. Lai Chun Loong Director 3 Sembawang Properties Pte Ltd G 
173. Lai Chun Loong Director 3 Sembawang Resources Ltd G 
174. Lai Chun Loong Director 3 The Insurance Corporation of 
Singapore 
G 
175. Lam Joon Khoi, BG Director 
Member, Audit 
Committee 
2 ST Industrial Corporation M 
176. Lau Chan Sin Director, Deputy 
President and Deputy 
Chief Operating Officer 
2 DBS Bank G 
177. Lau Chan Sin Chair 3 lDBS Land G 
178. Lau Chan Sin Director 3 KK Women's and Children's 
Hospital Board 
G 
179. Lau Chan Sin Chair 3 NDC Merchant Bank Ltd G 
180. Lee Beng Cheng, Billy Director & President 3 - Sembawang Marine & Logistics G 
181. Lee Chee Yeng Director 3 Keppel Marine Industries B 
182. Lee Chee Yang Director 1 3 New Changi Hospital Pte Ltd B 
183. Lee Cheok Yew Director 3 Pacific Internet Pte Ltd G 
184. Lee Cheok Yew Director & CEO 3 Television Corporation of 
Singapore Pte Ltd 
G 
185. Lee Ching Yen, Stephen Director 3 TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd P 
186. Lee Ek Tieng Director & MD 1 GIC C 
187. Lee Ek Tieng Director 3 (London Office) Pte. Ltd. C 
188. Lee Ek Tieng Director -, 
_GIC 
1 MND Holdings (Pte.) Ltd. C 
189. Lee Eng Thong, David Director 3 International Factors (Singapore) 
Ltd 
G 
190. Lee Fook Sun, BG Director 2 Dr Aerospace Engineering Pte Ltd M 
191. Lee Fook Sun, BG Director 2 ST Industrial Corporation M 
192. Lee Hee Seng Director 2 Singapore Press Hordings C 
193. Lee Hee Seng Director 3 Times Publishing Ltd C 
194. Lee Hsien Loong, BG Director 1 GIC L 
195. Lee Hsien Yang, BG President and CEO (Appointed 1 May 
1995) 
2 Singapore Post Ltd M 
196. Lee Hsien Yang, BG Director & 
President/ 
CEO 
1 Singapore Telecommunications M 
197. Lee Hsien Yang, BG Director 2 ST Industrial Corporation M 
198. Lee Kim Poo, Moses4 Director 1 Health Corporation of Singapore 
Pte Ltd 
C 
4 In 1975 Singapore Government Directory, spelt Moses Lee Kim Poh. He was then an 
Administrative Assistant - one of the lower ranks in the Administrative Service. 
500 Ross Worthin ton 
199. Lee Kim poo Moses5 Chair 2 POSBank C 
200. Lee Kuan Yew Chair 1 GIC L 
201. Lee Meng Tuck, 
Nicholas 
Director 3 Pacific Internet Pte Ltd U 
202. Lee Seng Wee Director 1 GIC P 
203. Lee Suan Hiang Director 3 EDB Ventures Pte Ltd B 
204. Lee Suet Fern Director 3 NatSteel Electronics Ltd U 
205. Lee Suet Fern Director (effective 1 
April 1998) 
3 Sembawang Marine Sr Logistics U 
206. Lee Suet Fern Director 3 Vickers Ballas Holdings Ltd U 
207. Lee Theng Kiat Director 3 Singapore Cable Vision Ltd G 
208. Lee Meng Kiat President 3 ST Telemedia /ST 
Telecommunications 
G 
209. Lee Tsao Yuan Director 3 Keppel FELS B 
210. Lee Yong Siang Director 1 Health Corporation of Singapore 
Pte Ltd 
C 
211. Leo Chin Lian, James, 
RAdm 
Director 3 Keppel Integrated Engineering M 
212. Leo Chin Lian, James, 
RAdm 
Director 3 Singapore Cable Vision Ltd M 
213. Leo Chin Lien, James, 
RAdm (ret.) 
Director 1 ST Pte Ltd M 
214. Leo Chin Lian, James, 
RAdm (ret. 
Director 3 ST Shipbuilding and Engineering M 
215. Leong Ka Bong, 
Christopher 
Director 3 - Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd. U 
216. Liew Heng San Director 3 EDB Investments Pte Lte B 
217. Liew Heng San Director 3 EDB Ventures Pte Ltd B 
218. Liew Heng San Director 
(Appointed 1 May 
2 Singapore Post Ltd B 
219. Liew Mun Leong Director 3 EDB Ventures Pte Ltd B 
220. Lim Ah Doo Director 3 EDB Ventures Pte Ltd U 
221. Lim Ang Hock Director/GM 3 KeppeíEngineering Pte Ltd G 
222.1 Lim Ang Hock Director & MD 3 Keppel Integrated Engineering G 
223. Lim Chee Onn Director 3 Keppel Bank L 
224. Lim Chee Onn Director & Senior ED 2 Keppel Corporation L 
225. Lim Chee Onn Director 3 Keppel FELS L 
226. Lim Chee Onn Director 3 Keppel Integrated Engineering L 
227. Um Chee Onn Dep. Chair & MD 3 Keppppel Land L 
228. Lim Chee Onn Director 2 - NatSteel Ltd L 
229. Lim Chee Onn Director 2 Singapore Airlines Ltd L 
230. Lim Chemg Yih, 
Richard, RADM 
Director 3 ST Shipbuilding and Engineering M 
231. Lim Choo San, 
Michael 
Director 1 Health Corporation of Singapore 
Pte Ltd 
P 
232. Lim Chuan Poh Director 2 ST Aerospace C 
233. Lim Chuan Poh BG Director 2 Singapore Post Ltd C 
234. Lim Chuan Poh BG Director 1 Singapore Telecommunications C 
235. Lim Hng Kiang Director 1 GIC L 
236. Lim Ho Kee Director & member 
Group Managing Board 
1 Singapore Telecommunications P 
237. Lim Hock San Director 2 Keppel Corporation G 
238. Lim Hock San Director 3 Keppel Finance G 
239. Lim Hock San President, CEO 3 United Industrial Corporation Ltd. G 
240. Lim Hup Seng Director 3 Singapore Cable Vision Ltd M 
241. Lim ht Poh Director 3 International Factors (Singapore) 
Ltd 
C 
242. Lim Jit Poh Director 3 - Sembawang Resources Ltd C 
243. Lim Kim San Executive Chair 2 Singapore Press Holdings L 
244. Lim Kim San Chair 3 Times Publishing Ltd L 
245. Lim Leong Geok Director 3 Keppel Land G 
246. Lim Leong Geok Deputy Chair 2 Singapore MRT Ltd G 
247. Lim Meng Km, BG 
(NS) 
Director & MD 1 Hearth Corporation of Singapore 
Pte Ltd 
M 
248. Lim Ming Seong Director 2 ST Aerospace G 
249. Lim Ming Seong Director 3 ST Capital G 
250. Lim Ming Seong Group Director 1 ST Pte Ltd G 
5 ln 1975 Singapore Government Directory, spelt Moses Lee Kim Poh. He was then an 
Administrative Assistant - one of the lower ranks in the Administrative Service. 
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251. Lim Neo Chian, MG 
(NS) 
Chair 3 Arcasia Land Pte Ltd M 
252. Lim Say Yan E V P 2 NatSteel Ltd G 
253. Lim Siong Guan Director 1 Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd. C 
254. Lim Tik En, David Director 2 ST Industrial Corporation L 
255. Lim Yong Weh Director 1 Health Corporation of Singapore 
Pte Ltd 
G 
256. Lim Yong Weh Director 2 Intraco G 
257. Lim Yong Wah Director 3 Keppel Bank G 
258. Lin, Chester Director & CEO 3 NatSteel Electronics G 
259. Liow Voon Kheong Director 3 EDB Ventures Pte Ltd C 
260. Lock Sai Hung Director & MD 3 The Insurance Corporation of 
Singapore 
G 
261. Lock Sai Hung Director 3 Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd. G 
262. Loh Meng See Director 3 Keppel Marine Industries L 
263. Loh Wing Siew Director 3 Keppel Bank G 
264. Loh Wing Siew Director & MD 2 Keppel Corporation G 
265. Loh Wing Siew Director 3 Keppel Finance G 
266. Loh Wing Siew Chair 3 Keppel Integrated Engineering G 
267. Loh Wing Siew Director 3 Keppel Lan d G 
268. Loh Wing Siew Chair 3 Keppel Marine Industries G 
269. Loh Wing Siew Director 3 MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd G 
270. Low Huan Ping Director 3 Singapore Cable Vision Ltd G 
271. Low Puk Yeong Director 3 Temasek Management Services Pte 
Ltd 
C 
272. Lua Cheng Eng Deputy Chair 3 International Factors (Singapore) 
Ltd 
G 
273. Lua Cheng Eng ' Director 2 Intraco G 
274. Lua Cheng Eng Deputy Chair, CEO 2 Neptune Orient Lines Ltd G 
275. 
t 
Lua Cheng Eng Chair 3 Sembawang Shipyard Pte Ltd - 
uron Shipyard Ltd 
G 
276. Lua Cheng Eng Director ' 2 orp G 
277. Lum Choong Wah Executive Chair 3 SNP Corporation G 
278. Lun Giap Jin (Alias 
Low Ngiap Jin) 
Director 3 Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd. U 
279. Lye Fai Director 2 Singapore MRT Ltd G 
280. Lye Fei Director 3 Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd G 
281. Meng -En Lim, Judy Director 3 Pacific Internet Pte Ltd U 
282. Montefiore, Neil Director & CEO 3 - MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd G 
283. Nair, Dileep Director 3 ECICS Holdings Ltd C 
284. Nair, Dileep Director 3 Kep l Marine Industries C 
285. Nair, Dileep Director 
CEO 
2 POSEank C 
286. Ng Kee Choe Director 
Member, Exco 
2 DBS Bank G 
287. Ng Kee Choe Chair 3 DBS Finance G 
288. Ng Kee Choe Chair 3 Insurance Corporation of Singapore 
Ltd 
G 
289. Ng Kee Choe Director & Chair, Audit 
Committee 
2 ST Aerospace G 
290. Ng Kim Leong Director & ED 3 DBS Finance G 
291. Ng Kin Sze Director 2 GIC (Ventures) Pte Ltd U 
292. Ng Kok Song Director 3 ECICS Holdings Ltd G 
293. Ng Kok Song Director 3 GIC (London Office) Pte. Ltd. G 
294. Ng Ser Miang Director 3 International Factors (Singapore) 
Ltd 
P 
295. Ng Ser Miang Director 3 Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd. P 
296. Ngiam Tong Dew Chair & 
Chair, Exco 
2 DBS Bank C 
297. Ngiam Tong Dow Director 1 Temasek Holdings (Pte)Ltd. C 
298. Niam Chiang Meng Director 3 Singapore Pools (Pte.) Ltd. C 
299. Niam Chiang Meng Director ' 3 Temasek Management Services Pte 
Ltd 
C 
300. Ong Boon Kwee, Peter Director 3 EDB Investments Pte Ltd C 
301. Ong Boon Kwee, Peter Director 3 Singapore Power Ltd C 
302. Ong Boon Kwee, Peter Director 3 TDB Holdings Pte Ltd C 
303. Ong Sing Pang ED 3 Keppel Finance G 
304. Oo Soon Hee Director 2 Intraco G 
305. Oo Soon Hee Director 2 NatSteel Ltd G 
306. Oo Soon Hee Director & Audit 
Committee Member 
3 Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd. G 
307. Ooi Lay Leng Director 3 GIG (Realty) Pte Ltd G 
308. Ooi Lay Lang Director, Secretary 3 GIC (Ventures) Pte Ltd G 
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309. Oon Kum Loon Director 3 ' DBS Finance G 
310. Oon Kum Loon Director 2 Intraco G 
311. Ow Soon Sian, Alan Director 3 Singapore Pools (Pte.) Ltd. B 
312. Pillay, Naganatha Director, President& 
CEO 
3 ECICS Holdings Ltd G 
313. Quek Chee Hoon Director 2 Singapore MRT Ltd G 
314. Quek Chee Noon Director 3 Singapore Power Ltd G 
315. Quek 1- iong How, 
Raymond 
Alternative Directer 3 Singapore Cable Vision Ltd U 
316. Quek Poh Huat Director 1 MND Holdings (Pte.) Ltd. G 
317. Quek Poh Huat Director & President 1 Singapore Technologies 
Pte Ltd 
G 
318. Quek Poh Huat Director 1 Singapore Telecommunications G 
319. Quek Poh Huat Chair 2 ST Aerospace G 
320. Quek Poh Huat President 1 Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd. G 
321. Ridzwan Tuan Haji 
bin Haji Dzafir 
Director 2 Intraco B 
322. Rinck, JacuFus 
Johannes 
Director & President 3 Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd. G 
323. Scarampi Del Cairo, 
Galeazzo 
Director 3 Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd. U 
324. Seah Lim Huat, Peter Director 3 EDB Investments Pte Lte P 
325. Seah Lim Huat, Peter Director 1 GIC P 
326. Seah Lim Huat, Peter Director 
Chair, Audit Committee 
2 SembCorp P 
327. Seah Lim Huat, Peter Director 3 Singapore Power Ltd P 
328. Seah Lim Huat, Peter Director 1 ST Pte Ltd P 
329. Seah Lim Huat, Peter Director 3 ST Shipbuilding and Engineering P 
330. Seek Ngee Huat Director 3 GIC (Realty) Pte Ltd U 
331. Seel Keong Hoe, 
Arthur 
Altenative Director 3 Singapore Cable Vision Ltd G 
332. Seow, Greg Director 2 POSBank P 
333. Shanmugam, K. Director 
Member, Audit 
Committee 
2 ST Industrial Corporation L 
334. Shiah, Thomas Chair and Acting CEO 3 Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd. G 
335. Sim Cheok Lim Chair 3 CISCO P 
336. Sim Kee Boon Chair 3 Keppel Bank G 
337. Sim Kee Boon Executive Chair 2 Keppel Corporation G 
338. gim Kee Boon Chair 3 MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd G 
339. Sim Kee Boon Director 2 PSA Coporation Ltd G 
340. Sit Peng Sang Director and Financial 
Controller 
3 Keppel FELS G 
341. Soh Chui Geok, Mary Director 3 NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd B 
342. Soh Kim Soon Director 3 Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd. G 
343. Su Guaning, Prof. Director 2 ST Aerospace M 
344. Sum Soon Um6 Deputy Chairman 3 ST Capital P 
345. Tan Boon Huat Director 3 CISCO C 
346. Tan Boon Huat Director 3 Keppel Finance C 
347. Tan Boon Huat Director 3 SNP Corporation C 
348. Tan Boon Teik Director 3 Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd. C 
349. Tan Cheng Yaw, 
Jimmy, Ltc 
Director 3 Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd M 
350. Tan Chin Nam Director 3 EDB Investments Pte Lte B 
351. Tan Chin Nam Director 3 EDB Ventures Pte Ltd B 
352. Tan Chok Kian Director 3 KeppelIntegrated Engineering C 
353. Tan Chok Kian Director 3 ST Capital C 
354. Tan Guong Ching Chair 3 ST Shipbuilding and-Engineering C 
355. Tan I Tong? Director 2 NatSteel Ltd P 
356. Tan Kee Yong Director 3 Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd M 
357. Tan Keng Boon Director & Chair, Audit 
Committee 
3 Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd. U 
358. Tan Keng Boon Director 3 ST Capital P 
359. Tan Keng Yam, Tony Director 1 GIC L 
360. Tan Kim Siew Director 3 Keppel FELS B 
361. Tan Kin Lien Director 3 CISC O NT 
6 Sim is a professional, independent, company director. 
7 Tang I Tong is a professional Independent directo with strong Inks to the Hong Leong 
Group. 
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362. Tan Kin Lian Director 2 POSBank NT 
363. Tan Kok Kheng, 
Oliver 
Director 2 NatSteel Ltd G 
364. Tan Kok Kheng, 
Oliver 
Director 3 ST Capital G 
365. Tan Siew Khoon Director 3 Temasek Management Services Pte 
Ltd 
U 
366. Tan Siew Khoon Director 3 Singapore Pools (Pte.) Ltd. U 
367. Tan Swee Yiow Alternative 
Director 
3 Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd U 
368. Tan Tat Wai, Dr. Director 2 NatSteel Ltd G 
369. Tan Tiong Gie, 
Bernard 
Director 2 Keppel Corporation B 
370. Tan Yong Soon, BG 
(Ns) 
Director 2 Singapore MRT Ltd M 
371. Tang I -Fang Director 2 Singapore Press Holdings P 
372. Tang I -Fang Director 3 Times Publishing Ltd P 
373. Tang, Jackson Director & President 3 ST Capital G 
374. Tay Ah Kee, Keith Director 1 Singapore Telecommunications P 
375. Tay Koon Tek, Denis Director 3 Singapore Cable Vision Ltd G 
376. Tay Koon Tek, Denis Director & MD 2 Singapore Press Holdings G 
377. Tay Siew Choon Director 2 PSA Corporation Ltd G 
378. Tay Siew Choon Director 3 Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd G 
379. Tay Siew Choon Director & President 2 ST Industrial Corporation G 
380. Tay Thiam Peng Director 3 TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd B 
381. Tee Tua Ba Director 3 CISCO C 
382. Teh Kok Peng, Dr. Director 3 GIC (London Office) Pte Ltd C 
383. TengChieh Schen Director 3 CISCO P 
384. Teo Cheng Guan Director 3 Times Publishing Ltd U 
385. Teo Joo Huak Alternate Director 3 International Factors (Singapore) 
Ltd 
P 
386. Teo Ming Kian Director 3 NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd C 
387. Teo Ming Kian Director 2 PSA Corporation Ltd C 
388. Teo Soon Hoe Director 3 Keppel Bank G 
389. Teo Soon Hoe Director, ED and Group 
Finance Director 
2 Keppel Corporation G 
390. Teo Soon Hoe Director 3 Keppel FELS G 
391. Teo Soon Hoe Chair 3 Keppel Finance G 
392. Teo Soon Hoe Director 3 Keppel Integrated Engineering G 
393, Teo Soon Hoe Director 3 Keppel Land G 
394. Teo Soon Hoe Director 3 Keppel Marine Industries G 
395. Teo Soon Hoe Director 3 MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd G 
396. Thai Chee Ken Director 3 Keppel Land P 
397. Thai Chee Ken Director 3 NatSteel BroadwayLtd P 
398. Thai ee Ken Director 3 NatSteel ElectronicsLtd P 
399. Thai Chee Ken Director 2 NatSteel Ltd P 
400. Tham Heng Moo Director 3 Sembawang Marine & Logistics B 
401. Thio Hoe Tong Director 3 SNP Corporation B 
402. Thio Su Mien, Dr. Director 3 ST Capital P 
403. Tie Nyuk Siong, 
Edmund 
Director 
Member, Audit 
Committee 
2 SembCorp P 
404. Tien Sing Cheong Director 2 ST Industrial Corporation G 
405. Tiong Yik Min Director, ED 2 Singapore Press Holdings G 
406. Tong Chong Heong Director, ED 2 Keppel Corporation G 
407. Tong Chong Heon Director 3 Keppel FELS G 
408. Venhuizen, Roelf Executive Chair 3 Petrochemical Corporation of 
Singapore (Pte) Ltd 
P 
409. Wang Kai Yuen, Dr Director 2 POSBank L 
410. Wee Cho Yaw Director 2 Singapore Press Holdings P 
411. Wee Cho Yaw Director 3 Times Publishing Ltd P 
412. Wee Ee Cheong Director 2 PSA Corporation Ltd P 
413. Wee Ee Cheong Director 3 Sembawang Marine & Logistics P 
414. Wee Ee Cheong Director 3 Sembawang Maritime Ltd P 
415. Wee Ee Cheong Director 
Member, Audit 
Committee 
2 ST Industrial Corporation P 
416. Wee Sin Tho Director 3 ST Capital G 
417. White, Emmett F. Director 3 Singapore Cable Vision Ltd F 
418. Wong Boon Kong Director (In report for 3 Keppel Integrated Engineering U 
1997, states since April 
98 ?) 
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419. Wong HungKhim Director 2 DBS Bank G 
420. Wong Hung Khim Deputy Ch 8 1 Singapore Telecommunications G 
421. Wong Kingcheung, 
Kevin 
Director & ED 2 Keppel Corporation G 
422. Wong Kingcheung, 
Kevin 
Director & ED 3 Keppel Land- G 
423. Wong Kingcheung, 
Kevin 
Director 3 Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd G 
424. Wong Kok Siew Deputy Chair, 
Member, Executive 
Resource Committee 
2 SembCorp G 
425. Wong Kok Siew9 Chair 2 ST Industrial Corporation G 
426. Wong Woon Liong Director 2 ST Aerospace B 
427. Wong Yuen Weng, 
Ernest 
Director 3 EDB Investments Pte Lte P 
428. Woon, Walter, Assoc 
Prof. 
Director 2 Intraco B 
429. Woon, Walter, Assoc 
Prof. 
Director 2 NatSteel Ltd B 
430. Yeo Chee Tong Director & Investment 
Commitee Member 
3 SNP Corporation U 
431. Yeo Chee Yeow, Alan Director 3 Keppel Bank P 
432. Yeo Chien Sheng, 
Nelson 
Director 3 Keppel Marine Industries G 
433. Yeo Chien Sheng, 
Nelson 
Director & ED 3 Keppel Shipyard G 
434. Yeo Liat Kok, Philip Director 3 EDB Investments Pte Lte B 
435. Yeo Liat Kok, Philip Chair & 
Chair, Executive 
Resources Committee 
2 SembCorp B 
436. Yeo Ning Hong, Dr Chair 2 PSA Corporation Ltd L 
437. Yeo Ning Hong, Dr 1 ST Pte Ltd L 
438. Yeo Ning Hong, Dr. 
_Chair 
Director 2 DBS Bank L 
439. Yeo Siah Meng Director 3 SNP Corporation P 
440. Yeoh Khwai Hoh, 
Patrick 
Director & President 2 DBS Bank G 
441. YongLumSung Alternative Director & 
Director & President 
3 Singapore Cable Vision Ltd G 
442. Yong Ying -I Director 3 Temasek Management Services Pte 
Ltd 
C 
443. Yu -Foo Yee Shoon Director 
(Appointed) May 1995) 
2 Singapore Post Ltd L 
444. Yu -Foo Yee Shoon Director 1 Singapore Telecommunications L 
8 Wong was formerly President and Ceo of Singapore Telecommunications from at 
least 1992 until 1994 when he became executive Deputy Chairman, 
9 Wong Kok Siew was formerly president of S IC in 1991. 
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Singapore CLC Board Directors in Level 1 -3 GLCs 1998 
No. Name Position & Company Rank Sect 
1. Quek Poh Huat Director & President, Singapore Technologies Pte 
Ltd 
Chair , ST Aerospace Limited 
President , Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited 
Director, Singapore Telecommunications Limited 
Director, MIND Holdings (Private) Limited 
0.28 G 
2. Khaw Boon Wan Director & Member, Exco, DBS Bank 
Chair, Singapore Cable Vision Ltd 
Chair, Singapore General Hospital Pte 
Director, Health Corporation of Singapore 
Director, Singapore International Media Pte Ltd 
Director, PSA Corporation Limited 
Director, TemasekHoldings (Pte) Limited 
0.3 C 
3, Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited 
Director, Neptune Orient Lines Ltd 
Director, Pidemco Land Ltd 
Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd 
Director, Singapore Power 
Director, Singapore Airlines Limited 
Director, Sembawang Engineering and Construction 
Pte Ltd 
Director, SNP Corporation 
0.34 P 
4. Er Kwong Wah Chair, PowerGas Ltd 
Director Sr ED, Sembawang Corporation 
Chair, Sembawang Maritime Ltd (SML) 
Chair , Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd 
Director, Singapore Power 
Executive Chair, Sembawang Marine & Logistics 
Director, Sembawang Resources Ltd 
Director, Sembawang Shipyard Pte Ltd 
0.34 C 
5. Lim Ghee Orci Deputy Chair & MD, Keppel Land 
Director, Keppel Bank 
Director, Keppel FELS 
Director, Keppel Integrated Engineering 
Director, Singapore Airlines 
Director, Keppel Corporation 
Director, NatSteel 
0.37 L 
6. Dhanabalan, Suppiah Chair, Singapore Airlines Ltd 
Director, GIC 
Chair, DBS Bank (+ PosBank) 
Chair, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited 
0.38 L 
7. Seah Lim Huat, Peter Chairman, Sembawang Corporation Ltd 
Director, Singapore Power 
Director, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Director , ST Pte Ltd 
Director, GIC 
0.4 P 
8. Loh Wing Siew Director, Keppel Land 
Chair, Keppel Marine Industries 
Director, Keppel Finance 
Director, Keppel Bank 
Director & MD, Keppel Corporation 
Director, MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd 
Chair, Keppel Integrated Engineering 
0.41 G 
9. Teo Soon Hoe Director, Keppel Bank 
Director, Keppel Marine Industries 
Director, Keppel Land 
Director, Keppel Integrated Engineering 
Director, Keppel FELS 
Chair, KeppelpFinance 
Director, MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd 
0.43 G 
10. Koh Boon Hwee Chair, Singapore Telecom 
Chair, Singapore Post Group 
Director, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited 
0.44 P 
11. Lua Cheng Eng Director, Intraco 
Deputy Chair , International Factors (Singapore) Ltd 
Chair, Jurong Shipyard Ltd /Sembawang Shipyard 
Pte Ltd 
Deputy Chair, CEO, Neptune Orient Lines Ltd 
Director, SembCorp 
0.44 G 
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12. Ang Kong Hua Chair, Intraco 
Chairman, NatSteel Broadway 
0.48 G 
Chairman, NatSteel Electronics 
Vice Chair, Transpac Industrial Holdings 
Director, GIC 
13. Lee Ek Tieng Director, GIC 
Director, MND Holdings (Private) Limited 
0.5 C 
14. Hong Hai, Dr, Director, Singapore Telecommunications Limited 
Chair, Pidemco Land Pte Ltd 
Director, Singapore Post Group 
0.56 L 
15. Lai Chun Loong President, Chartered Industries of Singapore 
Director, Sembawang Properties Pte Ltd 
Director, Sembawang Resources Ltd 
Director, The Insurance Corporation of Singapore 
Director, Sembawang Marine & Logistics 
0.56 G 
16. Lee Hsien Yang, BG President & CEO, Singapore Telecommunications 
Limited 
President and CEO, Singapore Post Group 
Director, ST Industrial Corporation 
0.56 M 
17. Lim Chuan Poh, BG (NS) Director, Singapore Post Ltd 
Director, ST Aerospace 
Director, Singapore Telecommunications Limited 
0.56 C 
18. Wong Hung Khim Deputy Chair, Singapore Telecom 
Director, DBS Bank 
Deputy Chair, Singapore Post Group 
0.56 G 
19. Yeo Ning Hong, Dr Chair, ST Group 
Chair, PSA Corporation Limited 
Director, DBS Group Bank 
0.56 L 
20. Choo Chiau Beng Director, Keppel Land 
Director, Keppel Bank 
Director, Keppel Integrated Engineering 
Chair & MD, Keppel FELS 
Alternate Director, MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd 
0.6 G 
21. Leo Chin Lien, James, RAdm 
(ret.) 
Director, Keppel Integrated Engineering 
Director , Singapore Cable Vision Limited 
Executive Chair, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Director, ST Pte Ltd, 
0.63 M 
22. Ng Kee Choe Director & Chair, Audit Committee, ST Aerospace 
Chair, Insurance Corporation of Singapore Ltd 
Chair, DBS Finance 
Member, Directorships and Consultancy 
Appointments Council 
Director & Member, Exco, DBS Bank 
0.63 G 
23. Wee Ee Cheong Director , Sembawang Maritime Ltd 
Director, Sembawang Marine & Logistics 
Director, Member, Audit Committee, ST Industrial 
Corporation 
Director, PSA Corporation Limited 
0.63 P 
24. Cham Tao Soon Director, Keppel Corporation 
Chair, NatSteel Ltd 
Director, SKIRT Ltd 
0.67 B 
25. Lim Yong Wah Director, Intraco 
Director, Keppel Bank of Singapore Ltd 
Director, Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd 
0.67 G 
26. Thai Chee Ken Director & Chair, Audit Committee, Natsteel 
Director, NatSteel BroadwayLtd 
Director , NatSteel ElectronicsLtd 
Director, Keppel Land 
0.69 P 
27. Foo Kok Swee, BG (NS) Director, MD1 & Deputy Chair, ECICS Holdings Ltd 
Director, DBS Land Ltd 
Chair, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd 
Director, TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd 
0.75 G 
28. Lee Kim Poo, Moses Chair, Board of Directors, POSBank 
Director, Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd 
0.75 C 
29. Ngiam Tong Dow Director, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited 
Chair, Board of Directors Chair, Exco, DBS Bank 
0.75 C 
30. Yu -Foo Yee Shoon Director, Singapore Telecom 
Director, Singapore Post Group 
0.75 L 
31. Fam Yue Onn, Michael Director, Singapore Press Holdings Limited 
Director, Times Publishing Ltd 
Chair, Singa ore Airlines 
0.78 P 
32. Oon Kum Loon Director, DBS Finance 
Executive Vice -President, DBS Bank 
Director, Intraco 
0.78 G 
1 MD from at least 1988 -1991, then President & CEO 1992 -1995. 
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33. ' Sim Kee Boon Executive Chair, Keppel Corporation 
Chair, MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd 
Director, PSA Corporation Limited 
0.78 G 
34. Chen Choong Joong Director, ST Aerospace 
Director, Singapore Power 
Director, TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd 
0.89 P 
35. Chen Tien Lap, Bernard Director, CEO, Intraco Ltd 
Chair, Teledata Singapore Ltd 
Director, The Insurance Corporation of Singapore 
Ltd 
0.89 L 
36. Lau Chan Sin Member, Directorships and Consultancy 
Appointments Council 
Director, KK Women's and Children's Hospital 
Board 
Chair, DBS Land 
Director, Deputy President and Deputy Chief 
Operating Officer, DBS Bank Group 
0.89 G 
37. Nair, Dileep Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd 
Director, Keppel Marine Industries 
Director & CEO, POSBank 
0.89 C 
38. Quek Chee Hoon Director, Singapore International Media Pte Ltd 
Director, Singapore MRT Ltd 
Director, Singapore Power 
0.89 G 
39. Chan Jer Hing, Peter Director, HCS Pte Ltd 1 C 
40. Chen Ai Ju, Dr PPA(G), PPA(P) Director, HCS Pte Ltd 1 C 
41. Cheng Shao Shiong, Bettie Director Chair, Audit Committee, ST Industrial 
Corporation 
Director & CEO, POSBank 
1 G 
42. Choo Wee Leong, Winston, Lt. 
Gen (Ret.) 
Director, Keppef Bank 
Director, DBS Land Limited 
Director , Keppel FELS 
1 M 
43. Faithfull, Timothy William Director & Member, Audit Committee, DBS Bank 
Director, PSA Corporation Limited 
1 P 
44. Fock Siew Wah Director, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited 1 U 
45. Goh Kim Leong Director, ST Industrial Corporation 
Chair, Singapore MRT Ltd 
1 C 
46, Han Eng Juan, MG (NS) D ector, POSBank 
Director, PSA Corporation Limited 
1 M 
47. Ho Kwon Ping Chair, Singapore Power 
Director, GIC 
1 G 
48. Hu Tsu Tau, Richard, Dr. Director, GIC 1 L 
49. Khattar, Sat Pal ice Chairman & Member, Executive Resource 
Committee, SembCorp 
1 P 
50. Koh Cher Siang Director, Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd 1 C 
51. Kua Hong Pak ti' actor, Temasek Holdin (Pte) Limited 
Director Sr President /CEO, Times Publishing Ltd 
1 G 
52. Kwa Chong Seng Director, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited 1 P 
53. Lee Hsien Loong, BG (NS) Director, GIC 1 L 
54. Lee Kuan Yew Chair, GIC 1 L 
55. Lee Suet Fern ' actor, Vickers Ballas Holdings Ltd 
Director , NatSteel Electronics Ltd 
Director, Sembawang Marine & Logistics 
1 P 
56. Lim Choo San, Michael Director, Health Corporation ofSingapore Pte Ltd 1 P 
57. Lim Hng Kiang Director, GIC i L 
58. Lim Ho Kee P' actor, & Member Group Managing Board, 
Singapore Telecommunications Limited 
1 P 
59. Lim Meng Kin, BG (N5)2 Director & MD, Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd 
1 M 
60. Lim Siong Guan Director, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited 1 C 
61. Oo Soon Hee Director, Intraco 
Director, NatSteel 
1 G 
62. Tan Boon Huat Director, Keppel Finance 
Director, CISCO 
Director, SNP Corporation 
1 C 
63. Tan Keng Boon Director & Chair, Audit Committee, Singapore 
Petroleum Company Limited 
Director, ST Capital 
Director Teledata 
1 U 
64. Tan Keng Yam, Tony P' - r, GIC 1 L 
65. Tay Ah Kee, Keith Director, Singapore Telecommunications Limited 1 P 
66. Tay Siew Choon Director, ST Industrial Corporation (Transferred to 
SembCorp) 
Director, PSA Corporation Limited 
_ 
G 
2 Lim Meng Kim was previously, Commander, Singapore Medical Corps, SAF. 
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67, Tie Nyuk Siong, Edmund Director & , Member, Audit Committee, SembCorp 1 P 
68. Woon, Walter, Assoc Prof. Director, Intraco 
Director, NatSteel 
l 13 
69. Yeo Liat Kok, Philip Chair, Board of Directors, Chair, Executive 
Resources Committee, SembCorp 
1 B 
70. Boon Swan Foo Director, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Director, ST Industrial Corporation 
1.25 G 
71. Goh Eng Chew Director, DBS Land 
Director, NatSteel 
1.25 P 
72. Ho Ching Group Chair, ST Aerospace 
Chairman, ST Capital 
Vice Chairman, SembCorp 
1.25 G 
73. Hong Tuck Kun Director, Intraco 
Director, DBS Finance 
1.25 G 
74. Hsuan Owyang Director, DBS Land 
Chair, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited 
1.25 B 
75. Hwang, Sydney Michael Director, Econ International Limited 
Director, PSA Corporation Limited 
1.25 P 
76. Lee Fook Sun, BG Director, ST Industrial Corporation 
Director, ST Aerospace Engineering Pte Ltd 
1.25 M 
77. Lee Hee Seng Director, Singapore Press Holdings Limited 
Director, Times Publishing Ltd 
1.25 C 
78. Lim Hock San Director, Keppel Corporation 
Director, Keppel Finance 
1.25 G 
79. Lim Kim San Executive Chair, Singapore Press Holdings 
Chair, Times Publishing Ltd 
1.25 L 
80. Lim Leong Geok Deputy Chair,Singapore MRT Ltd 
Director, Keppel Land 
1.25 G 
81. Lim Ming Seong Director, ST Aerospace 
Director, ST Ca .ital 
1.25 G 
82. Lin, Chester Director & Chief Executive, NatSteel Electronics, 
Director, NatSteel Ltd 
1.25 G 
83. Tan Kin Lian Director, CISCO 
Director, POSBank 
1.25 NT 
84. Tan Kok Kheng, Oliver Director, NatSteel 
Director, ST Capital 
1.25 G 
85. Tang I -Fang Director, Singapore Press Holdings Limited 
Director, Times Publishing Ltd 
1.25 U 
86. Tay Koon Tek, Denis Director, Singapore Cabre Vision Limited 
Director & MD, Singapore Press Holdings Limited 
1.25 G 
87. Teo Ming Kian Director, NSTB Holdings Re Ltd 
Director, PSA Corporation Limited 
1.25 C 
88. Tong Chong Heong Director, Keppel FELS 
Exec Director, Keppel Corporation 
1.25 G 
89. Wee Cho Yaw Director, Singapore Press Holdings Limited 
Director, Times Publishing Ltd 
1.25 P 
90. Boey Tak Hap, BG (NS) Director, Singapore Power 
Director, Kepp l Finance Ltd 
1.5 M 
91. Cheong Quee Wah Deputy Chair, Sembawang Marine & Logistics 
Executive Chair, Sembawang Resources Ltd 
1.5 G 
92- Chua Teck Chew, Robert3 Director, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd 
Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd 
1.5 P 
93. Foh, Elsie Director, CISCO 
Director, DBS Finance 
1.5 G 
94. Goh Yong Hong Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd 
Chair, Singapore Pools (Private) Limited 
1.5 C 
95. Khor Poh Hwa Director, Keppel Land 
Director, President & CEO, PWD Corporation Pte 
Ltd 
1.5 G 
96. Kwah Thiam Hock Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd 
ED, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd 
1.5 G 
97. Kwek Gim Song, Benedict Director & President /CEO, Keppel Bank 
Director, ST Construction Pte Ltd 
1.5 G 
98. Lee Chee Yeng Director, Keppel Marine Industries 
Director, New Changi Hospital Pte Ltd 
1.5 B 
99. Lee Theng Kiat President, ST Telemedia/T Telecommunications 
Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited 
1.5 G 
100. Lim Ang Hock Director /GM, Keppel Engineering Pte Ltd 
Director & MD, Keppel Integrated Engineering, 
1.5 G 
101. Lim Jit Poh Director, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd 
Director, Sembawang Resources Limited 
1.5 C 
102. Ng Ser Miang Director, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd 
Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited 
1.5 P 
3 Has the Malaysian honorific: Datuk, probably from the Sultan of Johore. 
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103. Niant Chiang Meng Director, Singapore Pools (Private) Limited 
Director, Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd 
1.5 C 
104. Ong Boon Kwee, Peter Director, TDB Holdings Pte Ltd 
Director, Singapore Power 
1.5 C 
105. Sim Cheok Lim Director, Keppel T &T 
Chair, CISCO 
1.5 P 
106. Tan Chok Kian Director, ST Capital Ltd 
Director, Keppel Integrated Engineering 
1.5 C 
107. Tan Siew Khoon Director, Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd 
Director, Singapore Pools (Private) Limited 
1.5 U 
108. Yeo Chien Sheng, Nelson Director, Keppel Marine Industries 
ED, Keppel Shipyard 
1.5 G 
109. Chan Heng Loon, Alan Director, Member, Audit Committee DBS Bank 
Member, Directorships & Consultancy 
Appointments Council 
2 C 
110. Cheong Choong Kong Dr Director, Singapore Press Holdings Limited 2 G 
111. Cheong Yip Seng Director, SPH 2 G 
112. Chew Keng Juea Director, SPH 2 G 
113. Chew Leng Smg Director, ST Aerospace 2 G 
114. Chong Kim Chang Director, SMRT Ltd. 2 B 
115. Fang Ai Lien Director, POSBank 2 P 
116. Goh Yong Siang, MG Director, ST Aerospace 2 M 
117. Ho Tian Yee Director , Singapore MRT Ltd 2 P 
118. Howe, Robert Montgomery Director, DBS Bank 2 P 
119. Koh Tong -Bee, Tommy, Prof. Director & Member, Audit Committee, DBS Bank 2 C 
120. Koh Yon: Guan Director, Ke .. el Co oration 2 B 
121. Kwek Siew Jin, RAdm (NS) Director & MD, Singapore MRT Ltd 2 M 
122. Lam Chuan Leong Director,-SembCorp 2 C 
123. Lam Joon Khoi, BG (NS) Director, Member, Audit Committee, ST Industrial 
Corporation 
2 M 
124. Liew Heng San Director, Singapore Post Group 2 B 
125. Lim Tik En, David Director, ST Industrial Corporation 2 L 
126. Lye Fai Director , Singapore MRT Ltd 2 G 
127. Ridzwan Tuan Haji bin Haji 
Dzafir 
Director, Intraco 2 B 
128. Seow, Greg Director, POSBank 2 P 
129. Shanmugam, K. Director & Member, Audit Committee, ST Industrial 
Corporation ( Transerred to SembCorp on 
amalgamation) 
2 L 
130. Su Guaning, Prof. 
_ 
Director, ST Aerospace 2 M 
131. Tan I Tong Director, NatSteel 2 P 
132. Tan Tat Wai, Dr. Director, NatSteel 2 G 
133. Tan Tion Gie, Bernard Director, Keppel Corporation 2 B 
134. Tan Yong Soon, BG (NS) Director, Singapore MRT Ltd 2 M 
135. Tetsuro Kawakami Director, SembCorp 2 F 
136. Tien Sing Cheong Director, ST Industrial Corporation 2 G 
137. Tjong Yik Min Director, ED, Singapore Press Holdings 2 G 
138. Wang Kai Yuen, Dr Director, POSBank 2 L 
139. Wong Kok Siew Chair, ST Industrial Corporation (Transferred to 
Deputy Chair, Board of Directors, Member, 
Executive Resource Committee, SembCorp) 
2 G 
140. Wong Woon Liong Director, ST Aerospace 2 B 
141. Zainal Abidin Rasheed Director, PSA Corporation Limited 2 L 
142. Ang Tiek Lim, Eric Director, DBS Land 3 G 
143. Ching lit Koon4 Director, Keppel Finance 3 L 
144. Chamroonratana, Niphat Alternate Director, International Factors 
(Singapore) Ltd 
3 F 
145. Chan Fook Pony Director, SNP Corporation 3 U 
146. Chan Meng Wah, Alexander Director, SNP Corporation 3 P 
147. Chan Wing Leong Director, Pacific Internet Pte Ltd 3 U 
148. Chang See Hiang Director, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering 3 U 
149. Chang Yun Chung Director, Keppel FELS 3 U 
150. Chee Jin Keong Director & ED, Keppel Finance 3 G 
151. Cheng Ho Wah Director, Teledata 3 P 
152. Cheong Poh Kin -Director, ST Capital 3 P 
153. Chia Chay Poh, David Director, CISCO 3 P 
154_ Chng Hee Kok Director, Singapore Power 3 L 
155. Choe Fook Cheong, Alan Director, Keppel Land 3 P 
156. Chong Kie Cheong Director, DBS Finance 3 P 
4 Ch'ng was an MP from 1968 -1997 and 1992 - 1996, Senior Minister of State, Ministry of 
Community Development before retiring. 
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157. Chong Lit Cheong Director, NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd 3 B 
158. Chow Kok Kee Director & Audit Committee Member, Singapore 
Petroleum Company Limited 
3 U 
159. Chua Boon Lee, Thomas Director, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd 3 P 
160. Chua Yong Hai Director, CISCO 3 U 
161. Desker, Barry Director, TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd 3 B 
162. Dv, Francisco J. III Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd 3 G 
163. Ganesan, N. Director & MD , The Insurance Corporation of 
Sin spore 
3 G 
164. Goh Boon Kiat ED, keppel Marine Industries Ltd 3 G 
165. Goh Liang Kwang Director, Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd 3 B 
166. Goh Song How Director & MD, ST Construction Pte Ltd 3 G 
167. Goon Kok Loon Director, Keppel FELS 3 B 
168. Han Cheng Fong Director, DB3 Land 3 G 
169. Han Meng Slew Director, Teledata 3 P 
170. Hannes, Martin Roy Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited 3 F 
171. Heng Chiang Meng Director, Econ International Limited 3 L 
172. Ho, Michael Director & Group GM, ST Construction Pte Ltd 3 G 
173. Hochstadt, Herman Ronald Chair, ECICS Holdings Ltd 3 C 
174. Hutson, Michael William Alternative Director, Singapore Cable Vision 
Limited 
3 F 
175. Hwang Soo Jin Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd 3 P 
176. Khoo Teng Chye Director, Keppel Integrated Engineering 3 B 
177. Ko Kheng Hwa Director, Pacific Internet Pte Ltd 3 B 
178. Koh How Eng Director, NSTB Holdin s Pte Ltd 3 C 
179. Kwa Soon Bee, Dr. Director, Keppel Lana 3 C 
180. Lai Ching Chuan ED, Keppel Integrated Engineering 3 G 
181. Lee Beng Cheng, Billy Director & President , Sembawang Marine & 
Logistics 
3 G 
182. Lee Cheok Yew Director, Pacific Internet Pte Ltd 3 G 
183. Lee Ching Yen, Stephen Director, TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd 3 P 
184. Lee Eng Thong, David Director, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd 3 G 
185. Lee Meng Tuck, Nicholas Director, Pacific Internet Pte Ltd 3 U 
186. Lee Seng Wee Director, GIC 3 P 
187. Lee Tsao Yuan Director, Keppel FELS 3 B 
188. Leong Ka Cheong, Christopher Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited 3 U 
189. Lim Chemg Yih, Richard, 
RAdm 
Director, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering 3 M 
190. Um Hup Seng Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited 3 M 
191. Lock Sai Hung Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited 3 G 
192. Loh Meng See Director, Keppel Marine Industries 3 L 
193. Low Huan Ping Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited 3 G 
194. Low Puk Yeong Director, Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd 3 C 
195. Luanne Goh -Wong Pei Leng Director, Teledata 3 P 
196. Lum Choong Wah Executive Chair, SNP Corporation 3 G 
197. Lun Giap Jin (Alias Low 
Ngiap Jin) 
Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited 3 U 
198. Mallek, Anthony Director, Teledata 3 P 
199. Meng -En Lim, Judy Director, Pacific Internet Pte Ltd 3 U 
200. Montefiore, Neil Director & CEO, MobileOne (Asia) Pte. Ltd. 3 G 
201. Ng Kim Leong 1 Director, DBS Finance 3 G 
202. N Kok Song Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd 3 G 
203. Ong Sing Pang Director & ED, Keppel Finance 3 G 
204. Ow Soon Sian, Alan Director, Singapore Pools (Private) Limited 3 B 
205. Quek Hiong How, Raymond Alternative Director, Singapore ble Vision 
Limited 
3 U 
206. Rinck, Jacubus Johannes ' Director & President, Singapore Petroleum Company 
Limited 
3 C 
207. Scarampi Del Cairo, Galeazzo Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited 3 P 
208. Seet Keong Hoe, Arthur Alternative Director, Singapore Cable Vision 
Limited 
3 G 
209. . , ornas S . an. Acting a , ingapore Petro eum 
Company Limited 
3 
210. Sin Kam Choi, Joseph Director, Econ International Limited 3 U 
211. Sit Pen San Director and Financial Controller, Keppel FELS 3 G 
212. Soh Chuff k, Mary Director, NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd 3 B 
213. Soh Kim Soon Director, Singapore Petroleum Company Limited 3 G 
214. Sum Soon Um5 Deputy Chairman, ST Capital 3 P 
215. Tan Boon Teik Director, Singapore Petroleum Company Limited 3 C 
216. Tan Eng Bock Director, Teledata 3 P 
5 Sim is a professional, independent, company director. 
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217, Tan Guong Ching Chair, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering 3 C 
218. Tan Kim Siew Director, Keppel FELS 3 B 
219. Tan Puay Chuan Director, Teledata 3 P 
220. Tang, Jackson Director, ST Capital, President, ST Capital 3 G 
221. Tay Kim Hock Deputy Chair, Teledata 3 P 
222. Tay Thiam Peng Director, TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd 3 B 
223. Tee Tua Ba Director, CISCO 3 C 
224. Ten Chieh Schen Director, CISCO 3 P 
225. Teo Cheng Guan Director, Times Publishing Ltd 3 U 
226. Teo Joo Huak Alternate Director, International Factors 
(Singapore) Ltd 
3 P 
227. Tham Heng Mun Director , Sembawang Marine & Logistics 3 B 
228. Thio Hoe Tong Director, SNP Corporation 3 B 
229. Thio Su Mien, Dr. Director, ST Capital 3 P 
230. Venhuizen, Roelf Executive Chair, Petrochemical Corporation of 
Singapore (Pte) Ltd 
3 P 
231. Wee Sin Tho Director, ST Capital 3 G 
232. White, Emmett F. Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited 3 F 
233. Wong Boon Kong Director , Keppel Integrated Engineering 3 U 
234. Wong Kingcheung, Kevin ED, Keppel Land 3 G 
235. Wong Lin Hong Director, Teledata 3 P 
236. Yeo Chee Tong Director & Investment Commitee Member, SNP 
Corporation 
3 U 
237. Yeo Chee Yeow, Alan Director, Keppel Bank 3 P 
238. Yeo Siah Meng Director, SNP Corporation 3 P 
239. Yeoh Seng Huat, Geoffrey Director, Econ International Limited 3 U 
240. Yong Lum Sung Alternative Director, Singapore Cable Vision Ltd 3 G 
241. Yong Ying -I Director, Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd 3 C 
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Appendix 10 
Directors With A Rank <_ 1 In GLCs In Singapore: 1998 
NO. NAME POSITION & COMPANY NO. RANK SECT 
COMP 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Quek Poh Huat 
Khaw Boon Wan 
Er Kwong Wah 
Cheng Wai Wing, 
Edmund 
Director & President, Singapore Technologies Pte Ltd 
Permanent Secretary, MTI 
Executive Chair, Sembawang Marine & Logistics 
Chair, MD, Wing -Tai Holdings Ltd 
6 
9 
0.28 
0.3 
0.34 
0.34 
G 
C 
C 
P 
Lim Chee Onn Former MP and cabinet minister Deputy Chair & MD, 
Keppel Land 
7 037 L 
6. Dhanabalan, Suppiah Chair, Singapore Airlines Ltd (Until 30/5/98) 4 0.38 L 
Executive Chair, DBS Bank (+ PosBank) (From 30 /5/98) 
Seah Lim Huat, Peter President, CEO, Overseas Union Bank Ltd 5 0.4 P 
8. Loh Wing Siew MD, Keppel Corporation 7 0.41 G 
9. Teo Soon Hoe ED and Group Finance Director, Keppel Corporation 7 0.43 G 
10. Lua Cheng Eng CEO & Deputy Chair, Neptune Orient Lines Ltd 5 0.44 G 
11. Koh Boon Hwee MD, Hewlett - Packard Singapore 3 0.44 P 
12. Ang Kong Hua MD President, NatSteel Ltd. 5 0.48 G 
13. Lee Ek Tieng MD, GIC & Head of Civil Service 2 0.5 C 
14. Lim Chuan Poh, BG Deputy Secretary , Ministry of Communications & former 3 0.56 C 
(NS) Chief of Army , Singapore Armed Forces 
15. Lai Chun Leong President, Chartered Industries of Singapore 5 0.56 G 
16. Wong Hung Khim Chair, CEO, DelGro & former PresidentiCEO Singapore 3 0.56 G 
Telecom 
17. Hong Hai, Dr, Former MP, 1988 -1991. President & CEO Haw Par 
Corporation. 
3 0.56 L 
18. Yeo Ning Hong, Dr Former MP and cabinet minister 3 0.56 L 
19. Lee Hsien Yang, BG President & CEO, Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. 3 0.56 M 
20. Choo Chiau Beng Chair & MD, Keppel FELS 5 0.6 G 
21. Ng Kee Choc President, DBS Bank 4 0.63 G 
22. Leo Chin Lian, lames, 
RAdm (ret.) 
Executive Chair, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering 4 0.63 M 
23. Wee Ee Cheong Deputy President & Director, United Overseas Bank Ltd 4 0.63 P 
24. Cham Tao Soon President, Nayang Technological University 3 0.67 B 
25. Lim Yong Wah Executive Chair, Inter - Roller Engineering Ltd & Old 3 0.67 P 
Guard PAP cadre 
26. Thai Chee Ken Chair, Schroders International Merchant Bankers Ltd 4 0.69 P 
27. Lee Kim Poo, Moses Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Community 2 0.75 C 
Development 
28. Ngiam Tong Dow Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance 2 0.75 C 
29. Foo Kok Swee, BG (NS) Director, MD1 & Deputy Chair, ECICS Holdings Ltd 4 0.75 G 
30. Yu -Foo Yee Shoon MP, Deputy Secretary- General, NTUC 2 0.75 L 
31. Oon Kum Loon Executive Vice -President, DBS Bank 3 0.78 G 
32. Sim Kee Boon Executive Chair, Keppel Corporation 3 0.78 G 
33. Fam Yue Onn, Michael MD, Fraser and Neave & Old Guard PAP cadre 3 0.78 P 
34. Nair, Dileep Director & CEO, POSBank; Deputy Secretary, MOF 3 0.89 C 
35. Lau Chan Sin Director, Deputy President and Deputy COO, DBS Bank 4 0.89 G 
36. Quek Chee Hoon Executive Vice President, Head, Direct Investments 3 0.89 G 
Group of Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd 
37. Chen Tien Lap, Bernard Director, CEO, Intraco Ltd, former MP and Deputy 3 0.89 L 
Secretary 
38. Chen Choong boong Managing Partner, Allen and Gledhill, Solicitors 3 0.89 P 
39. Woon, Walter, Assoc 
Prof. 
Ambassador to Germany, Associate Professor of law, Nus 
and former Nominated Member of Pariiment 
2 1 B 
40. Yeo Liat Kok, Philip Executive Chairman, Economic Development Board B 
41. Chan ter Hing, Peter Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs C 
42. 
43. 
Chen Ai lu, Dr PPA(G), 
PPA(P) 
Goh Kim Leong 
Director of Medical Services (Deputy Secretary), Ministry 
of Health 
Permanent Secretay, Ministry of Law 2 
C 
C 
44. Koh Cher Siang Commissioner of Inland Revenue, IRAS C 
45. Lim Si..: Guan Permanent = .:, , PMO & M' - of Education C 
1 MD from at least 1988 -1991, then President & CEO 1992 -1995. 
46. Tan Boon Huai Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs 3 1 C 
47. Cheng Shao Shiong, 
Bertie 
Director & CEO, POSBank (Retired 1998) 2 1 G 
48. Ho Kwon Ping Executive Chair, Singapore Power & President , Wah G 
Chang International Group (his family company) 
49. Kua Hong Pak Director & President/CEO, Times Publishing Ltd 2 1 G 
50. Oo Soon Hee Deputy President, NatSteel Ltd 2 1 G 
51. Tay Siew Choon President, ST Industrial Corporation then MD, Deputy SO 2 1 G 
SembCorp ater merger with Sembawang Corporation 
52. Hu Tsu Tau, Richard, 
Dr. 
Minister for Finance 2 . L 
53. Lee Hsieh Loong, BG Deputy Prime Minister & Chairman, MAS 1 L 
(NS) 
54. Lee Kuan Yew Senior Minister & former Prime Minister l L 
55. Lim Hng Kiang Minister for National Development 1 I L 
56. Tan Keng Yam, Tony Deputy Prime Minister & Minister for Defence 1 I L 
57. Choo Wee Leong, 
Winston, Lt Gen (Ret) 
Former Head of Defence Force and ambassador 3 i M 
58. Han Eng Juan, MG (NS) Chief Executive, Land Transport Authority & former 2 1 
Chief of Defence Force 
59. Lim Meng Kin, BG MD, Health Corporation of Singapore PH Ltd 1 I M 
(NS)2 
60. Faithfull, Timothy CEO, Shell Group, Singapore 2 1 P 
William 
61. Khattar, Sat Pal Senior Partner, Khattar Wong and Partners, Solicitors 1 1 P 
62. Kwa Chong Seng Chairman' MD, Esso Singapore 1 1 P 
63. Lee Suet Fern Chartered Accountant 3 1 P 
64. Lim Choo San, Michael Managing Partner, Price Waterhouse 1 1 P 
65. Lim Ho Kee Executive Chair, Asia, Union Bank of Switzerland 2 1 P 
66. Tay Ah Kee, Keith Senior Partner, KPMG Peat Marwick 1 1 P 
67. Tie Nyuk Siong, 
Edmund 
Managing Partner, Edmund N. S. Tie Property 
Consultants 
1 1 P 
68. Fock Siew Wah i;nknown C 
69. Tan Ken Boon Unknown U 
2 Lim Meng Kim was previously, Commander, Singapore Medical Corps, SAE 
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Appendix 11 
Representation on 80 Selected Statutory Boards 1988 -1998 
No. Organisation Number 
of 
Positions 
% of 
positions 
Boards' n 
Singaporean companies, 
individuals and government 
agencies with <5 positions (n =159) 
409 7.41 
1. National University of Singapore 357 6.47 NTU, PCMR, NSTB, NHB, PB, 
NLB, NPB, SHM, NIE, NUS, 
URA, NCB, NAC, PUB, 
SPBOG, CPF, FAC, NAB, ACM, 
PB, SAM, SCSS, PSC, EDB, DB, 
GSTBOR, STITB, ITBOR, 
ISEAS, PAC, LTA, SPBS, SCB, 
NAPC, SBA, MUTS, BOA, 
NPBOG, VRB, TAS 
40 
2. Members of Parliament and former 
members 
308 5.58 SPSB, SLF, PSA, HDB, PUB, 
SPBOG, EDB, SSC, HEB, 
STOTB, MAS, PCMR, CPA, 
TAS, URA, NAPC, NAC, 
ISEAS, CIPC, PA, NHB, MRTC, 
ACM, LTA, NCB, NIE, SPSB, 
HDB, JTC, ITEBOG, MPA, 
NHB, SBA, CAAS, NTU, NUS 
36 
Unknown 303 5.5 
3. Ministry of Defence 268 4.9 SCSS, TAS, NTU, NMB, PUB, 
ITEBOG, HDB, SPBOG, 
NPBOG, SAB, PSA, URA, SBA, 
NHB, SSC, CPF, LTA, CAAS, 
TDB, EDB, MPA, NUS, SSC, 
SCB, NAPC, SHM, ACM, JTC, 
NCB, CIDB, NIE, HAB, HEB, 
POSB, ISEAS, BOA, DB, NPB, 
SPSB, LSB, TPBOG, LSB, PA, 
NSTB, STB, MAS, FAC, SCB 
48 
4. Ministers and former ministers 216 3.91 PCMR, VRB, STB, SPSB, PA, 
BCCS, MAS, IRAS, ISEAS, 
ITEBOG, SLF, STOTB, PSA, 
LIUB, PC, CIPC 
16 
5. Ministry of Education 163 2.95 SCB, NIE, NAPC, SHM, 
SPBOG, TPBOG, NLB, NTU, 
SBA, NUS, ISEAS, SAM, PAC, 
SBC, CPF, ITEBOG, NCB, SSC, 
TDB, STOTB, PUB, TAS, 
STOTB 
23 
6. Nanyang Technological 
University' 
152 2.75 NTU, SPBOG, CIDB, NUS, 
NAPC, JTC, TPBOG, PA, 
NSTB, SCB, LSB, PAB, ITBOR, 
SAM, PAC, NCB, SBA, LTA, 
ACM, NAB, NIE, NLB, HDB, 
SPBS, TDB, PUB 
26 
_ 
7. National Trades Union Congress 122 2.21 SPSB, NMB, CPF, PSA, PCMR, 
ABLA, SPBOG, TPBOG, SSC, 
PAC, NPBOG, PB, POSB, 
CISCO, ITBOT, HDB, MPA, 
NUS, NAPC, NLB, ITEBOG, 
SLF 
22 
In the abbreviations used, some older boards have been named as if they were the boards existing m 
1998. The Singapore Tourist promotion Board is included in the Singapore Tourism Board (STB); the 
Singapore Institute of Standards and Research (SISIR) and the former National Productivity Board (NPB) 
are incorporated in the current Singapore Productivity and Standards Board (SPSB). 
2 Representation as Nanyang Technological Instiute included in this category. 
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8. Ministry of National Development 121 2.19 CPF, TAS, CIDB, BOA, SCB, 
NPB, NTU, NAPC, SCSS, 
NMB, NSTB, NLB, URA, 
NPBOG, CAAS, PC, LSB, VRB, 
GSTBOR 
19 
9. EDB 107 1.94 SPSB, ITEBOG, EDB, SPBOG, 
ISEAS, JTC, CIDB, NCB, 
TPBOG, SBA, NAPC, TAS, 
NAC, NS113, MPA, 
15 
10. Ministry of Health 87 1.58 PB, SNB, NPBOG, SMC, DB, 
CLPB, LB, NAC, CPF, LLB, 
STB, IRAS 
12 
11. Temasek Holdings Groupa 85 1.54 SSC, HEB, TDB, NHB, 
GSTBOR, VRB, CISCO, POSB, 
LTA, BOA, NTU, PCMR, CIDB, 
NAPC, EDB, URA, STB, ACM, 
NPB, ITBOR, 
20 
12. Ministry of Finance 79 1.43 ABLA, PCMR, S11113, PC, 
NS113, CIDB, NAB, NCB, PC, 
POSB, TAS, PUB, MRTC, 
BCCS, PAB, NPBOG, URA, 
IRAS, MAS, 
19 
13. HDB 72 1.3 BOA, NUS, HDB, TPBOG, 
CIDB, NAPC, LSB, CPF, URA, 
FAC, TTEBOG, SCB, SCSS, 
TIBOR 
14 
14. Overseas Union Bank Group 62 1.12 SBC, SBA, NUS, BCCS, PSC, 
NPBOG, EDB, CAAS, PAB, 
HDB, TAS, FAC, CIDB 
13 
15. RSP Architects, Planners and 
Engineers 
62 1.12 BOA, SBC, S11113, ABLA, NAC, 
5113, CPF, HDB, NHB, CIDB, 
SIB, SBA 
12 
16, Singapore Technologies Group 60 1.09 NPBOG, TDB, EDB, SPSB, CPF, 
SPBOG, NAPC, ITBOR, NS! B, 
ITEBOG, TPBOG 
11 
17. Trade Development Board. 56 1.01 PSA, JTC, NTU, EDB, NLB, 
ISEAS, TPBOG, CPA, PCMR, 
NHB, 
10 
18. Singapore Tourism Board 53 0.96 SCB, NAC, TPBOG, STB, NLB, 
EDB, NTU, HLB, NHB, URA, 
10 
19. Keppel Groups 51 0.92 NAPC, TDB, SPBOG, JTC, 
TPBOG, CAAS, STOTB, CPA, 
NW 
9 
20. Ministry of Home Affairs 48 0.87 PUB, CISCO, CAAS, SSC, VRB, 
HDB, HLB 
7 
21. Ministry of Information and the 
Arts 
48 0.87 NLB, NAB, PAC, SHIM TAS, 
ITEBOG, NHB, SAM, SBA, 
NAC, STOTB, IRAS, NCB 
13 
22. Ministry of Labour /Manpower 46 0.83 CPF, CIDB, POSE, EDB, MAS, 
SPSB, NUS, NLB, STB 
9 
23. Judiciary 43 0.78 HLB, VRB, PCMR, LSC, ISEAS, 
ABLA, GSTBOR, LLB, TTBOR, 
9 
24. National University Hospital 43 0.78 NIE, NPBOG, SMC, SNB, NUS, 
PSC, CPA, LTA, LSC, DB, 
SHM, SCSS 
12 
25. Neptune Orient Lines Group 42 0.76 TDB, NMB, PSA, MPA, 
SPBOG, NAB, JTC, NHB 
8 
26. DBS Bank 41 0.74 PUB, LLB, LTA, PSA, CISCO, 
TPBORG, BCCS, EDB, SPBOG, 
JTC, NAPC, STB 
12 
s This does not include those companies already given separate entries such as NOL, Sembawang 
Holdings and Singapore Technologies. This group includes such companies as 
4 From 1988 -1994, Yea Seng Teck was chair of both TDB and JTC. 
5 Includes T at Lee Bank appointees from 1992 -1998. Tat Lee Bank was amalgamated with Keppel bank 
in late 1998 to form Keppel -Tat Lee Bank, part of the Keppel Group of GLCs. 
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27. Singapore Press Holdings 41 0.74 STB, NLB, ISEAS, NAC, CAAS, 
TAS, PSA, MUTS, NUS, PAC, 
LTA, SSC, PA, FAC, ACM 
14 
28. National Computer Board 39 0.71 
J5735%16 
SCB, NPBOG, NAPC, NLB, 
TAS, SBA, TPBOG, EDB 
8 
American TNCs with <5 positions 38 0.69 GSTBOR, NLB, EDB, TAS, 
SCSS, SBA, ITEBOG, NPBOG, 
NSTB, NTU 
10 
29. National Institute of Education 35 0.63 NTU, SCB, NIE, NSTB, NPB, 
NAB, PSC 
7 
30. Sembawang Holdings Group - 
GLC 
33 0.6 CAAS, ITBOR, GSTBOR, PAB, 
CIDB, SPSB, MPA, STOTB, 
EDB, NAC, NAPC 
11 
31. Esso Singapore 32 0.58 EDB, PSC, SPBOG, SSC, NUS, 
ITEBOG, LLB, SPSB, ITC, 
CAAS, BOA, NSTB 
12 
32. Urban Redevelopment Authority 31 0.56 HLB, URA, NAC, LTA, STB, 
PSA, CPF, HDB 
8 
33. Prime Minister's Office 29 0.53 STB, CIDB, SPSB, PA, CISCO, 
TDB, TAS, JTC, CPF, 
MAS,PCMR, PSC 
12 
34. Health Corporation of Singapore 
Hospitals 
29 0.53 SMC, SCSS, LB, NHB, SNB, 
PAC, CLPB 
7 
35. Monetary Authority of Singapore 28 0.51 NPBOG, POSB, ISEAS, CPF, 
MAS, PUB, STOTB 
7 
36. Ministry of Community 
Development 
28 0.51 NLB, SSC, STOTB, NMB, ACM, 
SCSS, NPBOG, MRTC, MAS, 
POSB 
10 
37. Philips Singapore 28 0.51 NUS, SPSB, TDB, NSTB, PSA, 
NAPC 
6 
38. Port of Singapore Authority 28 0.51 TDB, ITBOR, PSA, NCB, JTC, 
STITB, PCMR 
7 
39. Royal Dutch Shell Group 
(Singapore) 
27 0.49 PSA, EDB, SCB, NIE, JTC, SCB 6 
40. Singapore Productivity and 
Standards Board 
27 0.49 SPSB, TDB, ITEBOG, NCB 4 
41. Overseas Chinese Banking 
Corporation 
26 0.47 CPA, BCCS, ITBOR, GSTBOR, 
ISEAS, STOTB, TDB, SBC, 
BCCS, SPSB 
10 
42. Singapore International Airlines 
(STA.) 
26 0.47 PUB, SCB, STB, SPSB, SBC, 
SBA 
6 
43. Hewlett Packard Singapore 25 0.45 SSC, EDB, TAS, SCB, PUB, 
NSTB, SPBOG, JTC, 
8 
44. KPMG 25 0.45 ABLA, TAS, PSC, NTU, NHB, 
SPSB, URA, CIDB 
8 
45. Public Utilities Board 25 0.45 VRB, NAPC, PUB, EDB, 
ITBOR, GSTBOR, NPB 
7 
46. Telecommunications Authority of 
Singapore 
25 0.45 CAAS, NCB, NTU, NSTB, 
NTU, TAS, SBA, CPF 
8 
47. Ministry of Communications and 
Information 
24 0.43 NMB, TAS, CAAS, MRTC, PSA 5 
48. The Attorney- General 23 0.42 MAS, PSMR, LSC, PAB, IRAS 5 
49. Ernst & Young 23 0.42 POSB, ITEBOG, NPBOG, TAS, 
SPBOG, NTU 
6 
Japanese TNCs with <5 positions 23 0.42 NS 11f, SPSB, NTU, EDB, BCCS 5 
50. Maritime and Port Authority' 22 0.4 CAAS, MPA, SPBOG 3 
51. Singapore Broadcasting Authority 22 0.4 FAC, S113, SPSB, SBA, TAS, 
NAPC 
6 
52. Wing Tai Holdings Group 22 0.4 TDB, STB, EDB, SPSB, TPBOG, 
CIDB, URA 
7 
53. Fraser & Neave 21 0.38 NTU, ITEBOG, CPA, NUS, PSC 5 
54. Public Service Commission 21 0.38 PSC, PCDSC, ISEAS, LSC, MAS 5 
6 Does not include Singaporean companies, individuals and government agencies with <5 positions, but 
includes all other organisations above. 
'Formed in 1998 by the amalgamation of the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) and the National 
Maritime Board (NMB). Includes, SPECS Consultants, a subsidiary company of the former PSA. 
Incorporates the Singapore Broadcasting Commission's reprentation which the SBA replaced. 
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55. Ministry of Trade and Industry 20 0.36 SPSB, NLB, STB, NLB, CPF, 
NETS, PSA 
7 
56. Peoples Association 20 0.36 PA 1 
57. Price Waterhouse 20 036 POSB, MRTC, FAC, LTA, 
CIDB, NTU, NPB, PAC 
8 
58. Khattar Wong & Partners, 
Solicitors 
19 0.34 PSC, PCMR, SLF, PCDSC, SSC 5 
59. MRT Corporation 19 0.34 PSC, NUS, PUB, MRTC, URA 5 
60. SiemensGroup, Singapore' 19 0.34 SCB, NPBOG, ITEBOG, NAPC, 
CAAS 
5 
61. Yeo Hiap Seng Limited 19 0.34 SCB, TPBOG, SSC, TDB 4 
62. Institute of Policy Studies 18 033 NAC, TDB, ISEAS, FAC, NLS, 5 
63. Institute of Technical Education 18 0.33 NIE, ITEBOG 2 
64. Ministry of Law 18 0.33 URA, 511113, NPB, LSB, 
STOTB, IRAS 
6 
65. Ministry of Communication 18 0.33 CAAS, NMB, LTA, JTC, TAS, 
NSTB, PSA 
7 
66. Nanyang Polytechnic 18 033 SAM, SNB, NPBOG, SPSB, 4 
German TNCs with <5 positions 18 0.33 PSA, NPBOG, EDB, TPBOG 4 
Other TNCs with <5 positions 17 0.31 SPBOG, EDB, HDB, GSTBOR, 
CISCO, CAAS 
6 
67. Asia Life Insurance Society 17 0.3 PSC, PCDSC, IRAS, LSC 4 
68. Export Credit Insurance 
Corporation 
17 02 TDB, PCMR, IRAS 3 
69. Scotts Holdings 16 03 TPBOG, NHB, NAC, STB 4 
70. Singapore Polytechnic 16 03 CLPB, LB, SPBOG, VRB 4 
71. Coopers and Lybrand 16 0.29 SCSS, PDCSC, CISCO, SBA, 
SBC 
5 
72. K S Lee & Associates 16 0.29 SPBOG, ITEBOG, NAPC, 
S111B 
4 
73. PAP cadres without discernable 
affiliations 
16 029 PCMR, PA 2 
British TNCs with <5 positions 16 0.29 BOA, TDB, SPSB, PAB, NCB, 
PB, NUS, CAAS 
8 
74. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 15 0.27 TPBOG, CPF, MPA, NHB, 
ISEAS, NAC, NUS 
7 
75. Xerox Singapore Software Centre 15 027 POSB, NPBOG, NCB 3 
76. Dresdner Bank (South East Asia) 14 0.25 BCCS 1 
77. Natsteel Group 14 0.25 NAPC, JTC, SLF 3 
78. RDC Architects 14 0.25 HDB, STITB, SPBOG 3 
79. Allen & Gledhill Solicitors 13 0.24 POSB, Sill B, ACM, PUB, PSA, 5 
80. See Hoy Chan (Singapore) 13 0.24 NAPC, SPSB 2 
81. JTC 13 0.13 JTC, EDB, NCB, NTU 4 
82. Hong Leong Group 12 
I 
0.22 SPSB, CAAS, SCSS 3 
83. Mt Elizabeth Medical Centre 12 0.22 SCSS, DB, SAM 3 
84. Post Office Savings Bank 12 0.22 POSB, MAS, NAPC 3 
85. Temasek Polytechnic 12 0.22 TPBOG, NHB, 2 
86. Asia Pacific Breweries 12 0.22 PSC, NUS 2 
87. ACE Daikin (S) 11 02 JTC, TDB, ITEBOG 3 
88. CAAS 11 02 CAAS 1 
89. Descon Chartered Achitects and 
Planners 
11 02 PA 1 
90. Ngee Ann Polytechnic 11 02 NAPC 1 
91. Shook. Lin and Bok, Solicitors 11 02 NTU, SBA, SBC 3 
92. Eye Centre and Surgery (Loh Choo 
Kiat) 
11 0.16 SCSS /NCSS 1 
93. Lee & Lee 11 0.16 PUB, ISEAS, SAM 3 
94. Metta Energy Resources 11 0.16 PSC 1 
95. Kuok (Singapore) 10 0.19 TDB, NAC, 2 
96. Intraco 10 0.18 NPBOG, NTU, TDB, SPBOG, 
NAB 
5 
97. Singapore Telecommunications 10 9.18 NCB, CAAS, SCB, LTA 4 
98. Sony Group Singapore 10 0.18 NCB, NTU, NSTB, EDB 4 
99. Tan Ee Ping & Partners 10 0.18 BOA, CIDB, SPSB 3 
'Includes Siemans Advanced engineering, Siemens Coponents, Siemens Nixdorf Information Systems, 
Nixdorf Computers, Siemens Engineering. 
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100. Television Corporation of 
Singapore 
10 0.18 FAC, NAPC, STB, SHM, NCB, 
FAC 
6 
101. Baker Marine Energy 9 0.16 CPF, JTC, 2 
102. Charles N Mendis & Partners, 
Solicitors 
9 0.16 SCB 1 
103. Cooma, Lau & Loh, Solicitors 9 0.16 NMB 1 
104. Far East Organisation 9 0.16 CIDB, NAC, STB, STOTB 4 
105. National Maritime Board 9 0.16 NMB 1 
106. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of 
Singapore 
9 0.16 PCMR 1 
107. SAMAS Management Consultants 9 0.16 ABLA, NAPC 2 
108. Singapore Sports Council 9 0.16 NIE, SSC 2 
109. Thorne Ship Management 9 0.16 NMB 2 
110. Yokogawa Electric Asia 9 0.16 NSTB, ITEBOG, NAPC 3 
111. Attorney- General's Chambers 8 0.14 ISEAS, STITB, MPA, HEB, HAB 5 
112. Compaq /Digital 8 0.14 SCB, LTA 2 
113. DP Architects 8 0.14 BOA, ACM, HDB, NHB 4 
114. Du Pont 8 0.14 TTC, TAS, NUS 3 
115. IPC Corporation 8 0.14 NCB, NSTB, SPBOG, SPBS 4 
116. IRAS 8 0.14 PAB, STOTB, IRAS 3 
117. La Salle -SIA Arts College 8 0.14 NAC, SAM 2 
118. Lee Foundation 8 0.14 ISEAS, SAM 2 
119. Motorola 8 0.14 EDB, NSTB, SPBOG, SPBS 4 
120. National Kap 8 0.14 SCB 1 
121. Singapore Federation of the 
Computer Industry 
8 0.14 NCB 1 
122. Squire Mechanical 8 0.14 SPSB, SPBOG, LLB, BOA 4 
123. Tropical Produce Company 8 0.14 SCB, NPB, NHB 3 
124. Bankers Trust 7 0.13 PSA 1 
125. Charles Toh Clinic 7 0.13 PSC 1 
126. CISCO 7 0.13 CISCO 1 
127. CPF 7 0.13 LSC, ITBOR, GSTBOR, 3 
128. Deloitte & Touche 7 0.13 NAPC 1 
129. George Fong Associates 7 0.13 SPBOG 1 
130. Great Malaysia Textile 
Manufacturing 
7 0.13 TDB 1 
131. National Council of Social Service 7 0.13 NCSS, FAC 2 
132. NEC 7 0.13 , N1E, NUS, 2 
133. Ngee Ann Developments 7 0.13 NAPC 1 
134. RHB Cathay Securities 7 0.13 ABLA, ITBOR, GSTBOR 3 
135. Singapore Indian Chamber of 
Commerce 
7 0.13 ISEAS, NLB 2 
136. Singapore Indian Fine Arts Society 7 0.13 PA 1 
137. Singardo Trading 7 0.13 NAC 1 
138. The Yeoh Clinic /Earl Lu Clinic 7 0.13 SAM, NHB 2 
139. Jardine Matheson Group 7 0.11 ITBOR, CPF, SCSS 3 
140. Land Transport Authority 7 0.11 URA, LTA, 2 
141. Ming -Ho Publications Company 7 0.11 NAC 1 
142. Bank Tokyo-Mitsubishi 6 0.11 BCCS 1 
143. Citibank NA 6 0.11 PUB 1 
144. Dr. James Khoo 6 0.11 ACM, NHB 2 
145. IBM Singapore Pte Ltd 6 0.11 CAAS, NCB, SCB 3 
146. JAMIYAH 6 0.11 PSC 1 
147. Metro Stores 6 0.11 ITEBOG, CPF, 2 
148. National Association of Travel 
Agents 
6 0.11 STB, SCB, NPB 3 
149. Raffles Institution 6 0.11 NIE, SHM, SCB 3 
150. Raffles junior College 6 0.11 NIE, SCB, NUS 3 
151. Singapore Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry 
6 0.11 ISEAS, NHB 2 
152. Steven Tan & Company 6 0.11 TPBOG, NAPC, ABLA, LLB 4 
153. Architects Team 3 5 0.09 BOA, HDB, SCSS, 3 
154. C K Tang 5 0.09 STB 1 
155. Caltex (Asia) 5 0.09 CAAS 1 
156. Connor Pheripherals 5 0.09 EDB, NSTB 2 
157. Eastreco 5 0.09 SPBOG 1 
158. Glaxo Wellcome plc 5 0.09 NSTB 1 
159. Haridass Ho & Partners 5 0.09 NUS 
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160. Harry Tan & Partners 5 0.09 PAB, Sill b, 2 
161. Hotel Properties 5 0.09 NAC 1 
162. Ken Air Leisure 5 0.09 NPBOG, S lb 2 
163. Maersk Singapore 5 0.09 PSA 1 
164. Nanyang Academy of Arts 5 0.09 NAC 1 
165. Singapore Bus Services 5 0.09 CIDB 1 
166. SAA Partnership, Architects 5 0.09 BOA, CIDB 2 
167. Singapore malay Chamber of 
Commerce 
5 0.09 ISEAS 1 
168. SSA Management Consultants 5 0.09 TPBOG 1 
169. Thompson Electronics 5 0.09 NPBOG, EDB, NAPC 3 
170. Watson Hawksley Engineering 
Consultants (Singapore) 
5 0.09 TDB 1 
171. Wearne Brothers Group 5 0.09 ABLA,TPBOG 2 
172. Wuthelam Holdings 5 0.09 NTU 1 
173. National Science and Technology 
Board 
4 0.07 NPBOG, SCB 2 
TOTAL 5520 99.61 
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LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED 
1991 -19991 
No. NAME AFFILIATION 
1. Ang Boon Kheng Assistant Vice President, Direct Investments, 
Temasek Holdings 
2. Baharudin, Zulkifli B. NMP 
3. Boo Kheng Hua Director, Planning and Development, Nanyang 
Polytechnic 
4. Cham Tao Soon President, NTU 
5. Chan Heng Chee, Prof. Director, ISEAS 
6. Chan Hock Cheng, Anna Head, Policy Planning Division, EDB 
7. Chiang, Claire NMP 
8. Chen Shian Jan Deputy Director, Budget Division, MOF 
9. Chiam See Tong MP for opposition Singapore People's Party 
10. Chua Beng Huat, Prof. Department of Sociology, NUS 
11. Gill, Bernadette Manager, Policy and Planning Division, NSTB 
12. Gob Chye Boon Head, Feedback Unit, 1998 and Director, National 
Youth Council 
13. Gomez, James Research and project Director, Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation, Singapore 
14. Jeyaratnam, J. B. NMP for opposition Workers Party 
15. Koh How Eng Director, Planning and Policy Division, NSTB 
16. Lee Lai To Associate Professor, Singapore Institute of 
International Affairs 
17. Lee Tsao Yuan, Dr. Director, Institute of Policy Studies 
18. Lee, Brian, Prof. Dean, School of Electrical and electronic 
Engineering, NTU 
19. Liew Choon Boon Head, Feedback Unit, 1995 
20. Lim Siong Guan Permanent Secretary, PMO 
21. Lim Soo Hoon Deputy Secretary, PMO /PSD 
22. Lim Soon Tze Director, CDIS, MOE 
23. Lim, Eileen S. Y. Senior IT Policy Researcher, NCB 
24. Low Bah Tee Director, Central Singapore Community 
Development Division 
25. Low Thia Khiang MP for opposition Workers Party 
26. Tow Wong Fook Director, Labour Welfare Division, MOL 
27. Mehta, Vijakumar Executive Director, NSTB 
28. Ng Yuk Ping Coordinator, PS21 Office, PMO /PSD 
29. Ng, James Manager, Planning, l l h 
30. Ong Hwee Teng Senior Officer, Research and Information Centre, 
National Productivity Board 
31. Ong Yen Her Director, Labour Relations, MOL 
32. Pious, Joseph, Dr. Director, Fast -Forward, National Productivity 
Board 
33. Saw Ken Wye Deputy Director, Industry and Technology 
Division, NCB 
34. Seah I.ye Kim Senior Industry Officer, NCB 
35. Shanmugaratnam, 
Tharman 
Deputy MD, MAS 
36. Siddique, Sharon, Dr. Deputy Director, ISEAS 
37. Tan Ching Yee Director, Research and Planning Division, MTI 
This list does not include public service officers or others who may have breached any act or regulation 
in Singapore in providing information used in this study. It only includes those who provided on -the- 
record interviews; approximately one -quarter of those interviewed. 
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38. Tan Jek Min 
Tan Seng Hua 39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
Deputy Administrator, Skills Development Fund 
Deputy Director, Corporate services, ilk, 
Tan Wee Khiang Head, Planning, Government Systems Division, 
NCB 
Tan Yap Kwang 
Tan, Judy 
Teo, Nancy 
Tong Yew Heng 
Vasoo, S., Dr. 
Director, Planning Division, MOE 
Senior Planning Officer, EDB 
CEO, Singapore Labour Foundation 
Vice President, Direct Investments, Temasek 
Holdings 
MP and Head, Department of Social Work and 
psychology, NUS. Chairman GPC on Community 
Development 
Senior Vice President, Direct Investments, 
Temasek Holdings 
Wong Heng Tew 
Wong, John, Dr. 
Wu, Lorna 
Yong Cheng Kiat, Dr. 
Zainal Abidin Rasheed 
Director, Institute of East Asian Political Economy 
Director, Expenditure, MOE 
Director, 
Editor, Berita Harlan, SPH 
